Snedden v Republic of Croatia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Snedden v Republic of Croatia [2009] FCA 30

EXTRADITION – extradition proceedings before magistrate – review of magistrate’s decision – extradition objection – substantial grounds for believing that there are extradition objections – Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) s 21

EXTRADITION – extradition proceedings before magistrate – identification of material before the magistrate – Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) s 21

EXTRADITION – abuse of process – whether proceeding should be stayed in the Federal Court of Australia because of delay in the prosecution of extradition offences in extradition country

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – whether applicant entitled to be tried before a jury by reason of his being charged with offences ‘in connection with’ Commonwealth indictable offences – Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth) s 80

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth) s 80

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 5, 7(c), 12(1), 15, 16, 19, 21, 55

Extradition (Croatia) Regulations 2004 (Cth)

Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (Cth) ss 7, 10

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Ahmad et al v The Government of the United States of America [2006] EWHC 2927 (Admin) referred to

Cabal and Another v United Mexican States and Others (2001) 108 FCR 311 followed

Cabal and Another v United Mexican States and Others (No 2) (2000) 172 ALR 743 followed

Damir Travica v The Government of Croatia [2004] EWHC 2747 (Admin) referred to

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Edelsten (unreported, Burchett J, 10 March 1988) referred to

Dutton v O’Shane and Another (2003) 200 ALR 710 followed

Jago v The District Court of New South Wales and Others (1989) 168 CLR 23 referred to

Kingswell v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 264 referred to

Pasini v United Mexican States and Others (2002) 209 CLR 246 referred to

Rahardja v Republic of Indonesia [2000] FCA 1297 followed

Re Colina and Another; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386 referred to

Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251 referred to

Sankey v Whitlam and Others (1978) 142 CLR 1 referred to

Spautz v Williams [1983] 2 NSWLR 506 referred to

Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others (2006) 227 CLR 614 referred to

Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions and Another (1988) 23 FCR 472 referred to

DANIEL SNEDDEN v REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
NSD 705 OF 2007

COWDROY J
3 FEBRUARY 2009
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 705 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

DANIEL SNEDDEN
Applicant

AND:

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

COWDROY J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 FEBRUARY 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 705 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

DANIEL SNEDDEN
Applicant

AND:

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Respondent

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Dragan Vasiljkovic, also known as Captain Dragan, sought a review of the decision by Deputy Chief Magistrate Cloran to surrender him to the Republic of Croatia. This review was conducted under section 21 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and also as an appeal under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Vasiljkovic was accused of committing war crimes against prisoners of war and the civilian population during the conflict between the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia and the armed Serbian paramilitary troops of the Republic of Krajina. He was arrested in Sydney in January 2006 and has remained in custody since then. The central legal issues in this case revolved around the admissibility of evidence during the review process under section 21(6) of the Extradition Act, as well as the applicant’s claims of pre-trial bias and abuse of process.

The court examined the scope of the evidence that could be considered during the review, noting that the review was not a rehearing but confined to the material that was before the magistrate. The court acknowledged that the material before the magistrate included not only what was admitted into evidence but also what was tendered but rejected. Vasiljkovic argued that the court should consider all material provided to the magistrate, including rejected documents. However, the court found that there was no specific evidence of pre-trial bias against the applicant, nor was there a nexus established between the applicant’s apprehension and potential prejudice at his trial. The court also found that the Croatian judiciary was capable of providing a fair trial, and thus Vasiljkovic’s claim under section 7(c) of the Extradition Act was rejected.

In terms of the abuse of process argument, Vasiljkovic claimed that the delay in prosecuting him constituted an abuse of the court’s process. However, the court did not find this argument persuasive, as it noted that there were no signs of unfairness to the applicant and the Croatian justice system had shown progress towards meeting international standards. The court concluded that there were no substantial grounds for believing that Vasiljkovic would be prejudiced at his trial.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application and ordered that Vasiljkovic pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, who is otherwise known as Dragan Vasiljkovic or Captain Dragan, applies under s 21 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (‘the Extradition Act’) for a review of the decision of Deputy Chief Magistrate Cloran (‘the Magistrate’) made on 12 April 2007 which determined that the applicant is eligible for surrender to the Republic of Croatia pursuant to s 19(1) of the Extradition Act. The application is also made by way of an appeal under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).FACTS On 28 November 2005 the Sibenik County Public Prosecutor’s Office in the Republic of Croatia submitted a request to a magistrate of the County Court of Sibenik (‘the Sibenik County Court’) for investigation into criminal offences allegedly committed by the applicant contrary to Articles 120 and 122 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia during the conflict between the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia and the armed Serbian paramilitary troops of the Republic of Krajina. The applicant was said to have been a commander of a special unit of Serbian forces. On 12 December 2005 the Sibenik County Court accepted the prosecutor’s claim that there was a ‘well-founded suspicion’ that the applicant had committed the alleged offences. On 10 January 2006 the Sibenik County Court ordered that a warrant for the applicant’s arrest be issued. On 19 January 2006, in response to a request from the Republic of Croatia, the applicant was arrested in Sydney pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant issued under s 12(1) of the Extradition Act. On 20 January 2006 the applicant was remanded in custody pursuant to s 15 of the Extradition Act. The applicant made three unsuccessful applications for bail on 27 January 2006, 3 March 2006 and 12 December 2007. The applicant remains in detention in a New South Wales correctional centre. On 17 February 2006 Australia received an ‘extradition request’ to extradite the applicant to the Republic of Croatia. An ‘extradition request’ is defined in s 5 of the Extradition Act as ‘a request in writing by an extradition country for the surrender of a person to the country’. The Extradition (Croatia) Regulations 2004 (Cth) (‘the Extradition Regulations’) made pursuant to s 55 of the Extradition Act declares the Republic of Croatia to be an ‘extradition country’. An ‘extradition country’ is defined in s 5 of the Extradition Act to include a country that is declared by the Extradition Regulations to be an extradition country. On 18 March 2006 the extant Minister of Justice and Customs issued a notice of receipt of the extradition request pursuant to s 16 of the Extradition Act. The extradition request was made in respect of two alleged war crimes against prisoners of war, contrary to Article 122 of the Basic Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia, and one alleged war crime against the civilian population, contrary to Article 120 of that same Code (‘the extradition offences’). The request contained particulars of the extradition offences which allegedly took place in Knin in June and July 1991; in the village of Bruska near Benkovac in February 1993; and in Glina in July 1991. The request enclosed a copy of the Sibenik County Court decision and order.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The proponent of the extradition objection bears the onus of establishing the existence of such objection: see Cabal (2001) at [126]. ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE Section 21(6) of the Extradition Act provides that a court conducting a review pursuant to an application under s 21(1) of such Act ‘shall have regard only to the material that was before the magistrate’: see s 21(6)(d) of the Extradition Act. As a threshold question, the Court must determine the evidence which the Court may take into consideration. The Court observes that both the Magistrate and this Court are not entitled to receive evidence which contradicts an allegation that the applicant has engaged in conduct constituting an extradition offence: see s 19(5) of the Extradition Act. The applicant submits that under s 21(6)(d) of the Extradition Act the Court is not limited to consider only the evidence which was accepted as exhibits before the Magistrate. Rather, since the function of the hearing before the Magistrate under s 19(1) of the Extradition Act was administrative, not judicial, this Court is entitled to consider all material provided to the Magistrate. The applicant submits that such material comprises ‘material that was before the magistrate’ regardless of whether or not such material was admitted into evidence. It would follow from the applicant’s submission that any document contained in the Magistrate’s file should be taken into consideration by the Court including material which was rejected by the Magistrate in the course of his inquiry conducted under s 19(1) of the Extradition Act. The applicant also seeks to tender all material which was accepted into evidence by the Magistrate but in respect of which the respondent takes objection in this Court. The extent of the phrase ‘material that was before the magistrate’ was considered by French J in Cabal (2000) at 749 where his Honour said:Upon review by this court under s 21 the material proffered to the magistrate by the parties and received in evidence is plainly material that was before the magistrate for the purposes of s 21(6)(d). So too, in my opinion, is material that was proffered to the magistrate and was rejected by her. At 751 French J said:In summary, I have come to the following conclusions in relation to the materials before the magistrate which may be considered by the court upon review under s 21. It is not suggested that these are exhaustive propositions, but they are reached in the light of the particular debate in this case: (1)The materials before the magistrate comprise the testimony, documents and things which were received by the magistrate in evidence and those which were tendered to the magistrate but not accepted in evidence. (2)The court upon review is not limited to consideration of material received by the magistrate in evidence but may have regard to other material tendered to the magistrate but not received in evidence. On appeal to the Full Court in Cabal (2001) there was no issue between the parties that the material which could be considered by the reviewing court comprised material which had been rejected by the Magistrate. Accordingly, this question was not determined by the Full Court. However, their Honours expressed concern at some of the difficulties that may arise from French J’s interpretation, stating at [73]:Both at first instance and on appeal the parties proceeded on the basis that the review required to be heard by the Court or the Supreme Court of a State or Territory was in the nature of a rehearing, but subject to the provisions of s 21(6)(d) of the Act which confine the Court hearing the review to the material which was before the magistrate. Likewise the parties agreed that when s 21(6)(d) referred to the material “that was before the magistrate” that included not only material which the magistrate had admitted into evidence, but also material tendered by either the extradition country or the person in respect of whom the extradition application was made, which, for whatever reasons, was rejected by the magistrate and accordingly not taken into account by her. At least the latter of these propositions is not self-evident, if only because it would permit the judge conducting the review to consider material not capable of being tested by cross-examination or which might, had it been admitted, have led to the calling of other evidence. Clearly s 21(6)(d) would not permit any cross-examination on that evidence to take place or further evidence to be considered. However, as the parties proceeded on that basis before us we are content to accept for the purposes of the appeal the correctness of this construction of s 21(6)(d).

Decision

Reasons for decision

COWDROY J
In Travica Laws LJ observed at [34] that the conflict between Serbia and the Republic of Croatia and its after-effects have been ‘especially acute In the Krajina region’. However, Laws LJ also observed at [35] that such circumstance did not by itself constitute a claim of prejudice ‘not least when set against the signs of improvement in the conduct of prosecutions which I have surveyed, and which cannot have failed altogether to touch the Krajina region’. At [30] Laws LJ also made comment of the ‘signal progress made in Croatia towards a justice system which meets international standards’. His Lordship’s observations are consistent with the evidence contained in the reports referred to above.Ground 1 - Conclusion The Court has considered the applicant’s evidence and finds that there is no specific evidence of pre-trial bias against the applicant, nor is there a nexus established between the applicant’s apprehension and the question of whether he would be prejudiced at his trial. Further, the evidence before the Court establishes that the Croatian judiciary is capable of providing a fair trial to the applicant. The Court is not satisfied that the evidence establishes that there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant may be prejudiced at his trial or otherwise prejudiced as provided by s 7(c) of the Extradition Act.Ground 2 – Abuse of process The second ground of the applicant’s application alleges that the delay in prosecuting the applicant for the extradition offences constitutes an abuse of this Court’s process. The applicant relies upon the facts that the alleged offences occurred in June and July 1991 and in February 1993 and that they were not made the subject of any investigation request until 28 November 2005. A warrant for his arrest was not issued until 10 January 2006 and the extradition request was not made until 20 January 2006. There was no evidence before the Magistrate that the applicant had been the subject of any investigation until 28 November 2005. The applicant relies upon the judgment of Mason CJ in Jago v The District Court of New South Wales and Others (1989) 168 CLR 23. In those proceedings the question arose whether a permanent stay should be granted in view of a delay in the prosecution of six years after the defendant had been charged with certain offences. The High Court of Australia held that the Court’s power to prevent abuse of process in criminal proceedings extends to a power to prevent unfairness to the accused. At 30-31 Mason CJ stated:The continuation of processes which will culminate in an unfair trial can be seen as a “misuse of the Court process” which will constitute an abuse of process because the public interest in holding a trial does not warrant the holding of an unfair trial. In Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251 McHugh J at 286 observed that abuses of process ‘usually’ fall into three categories, namely where the Court’s procedures are invoked for an illegitimate purpose; where the use of the Court’s procedures is unjustifiably oppressive to one of the parties; and where the use of the Court’s procedures would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: COWDROY J