Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions

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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
) No. G 1148 of 1988
1
GENERAL DIVISION 1
BETWEEN:  EUGEN ALEXANDER WIEST

Appellant

AND :  DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS and ANOR.

Respondents

CORAM: MORLING, BURCHETT AND GUMMOW JJ.

DATE: 16 AUGUST 1988

ORAL REASONS FOR DECISION

THE COURT : As framed, this is a notice of motion that the applicant be granted bail pending the hearing of his appeal against the decision of Pincus J given on 28 July 1988. On

that date the learned judge refused to make an order that the
appellant be granted bail pending the determination of his

appeal against the learned judge's decision.

interlocutory nature. Accordingly leave to appeal is required.

It was conceded by senior counsel for the appellant
that his client needed the leave of this Court to appeal

against Pincus J ' s decision. In my view that concession was

well founded. It is plain that the decision was of an

In the substantive application which came before

Pincus J the appellant sought an order of review in respect of a decision of a magistrate under the Extradition (Foreign

States) Act 1966. The learned magistrate had made an order
that a warrant should issue committing the appellant to prison
to await the warrant of the Attorney-General for the
appellant's surrender to the Republic of Germany. On 28 July
Pincus J ordered that the decision of the magistrate be

confirmed and that the application made to him under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act be dismissed.

An appeal against the learned judge's decision has

been lodged and we understand it will be heard in about one

month's time.

In written submissions on behalf of the respondent, it is contended that this Court has no power

to admit the

appellant to bail pending the hearing of his appeal. We do

c.

not find it necessary to rule upon the submission. The submission raises a point of substance and importance, but since we are of the opinion that we can dispose of the

application without determining the point, we do not propose to
do so. If we were to decide the point we would necessarily
have to reserve our decision. In the circumstances of the
present case, that would be unsatisfactory.

There was evidence'before Pincus J that, if admitted to bail, the appellant would probably answer to it

when called

upon. On the other hand there were a number of circumstances
which had to be taken into account in determining the

application. Those circumstances led to the result that, in his Honour's words, "The matter was finely balanced" before him.

Pincus J was of the view that he should follow a
dictum of French J in Hempel v Moore (1986) 70 A.L.R. 714 at
p.722 to the effect that it is the policy of the Act that
M exceptional circumstances need to be shown before bail is
granted in a case such as the present.
We think…
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Details
Case
[1988] FCA 872
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia, comprising Morling, Burchett, and Gummow JJ, presided over the case of Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions. The appellant, Eugen Alexander Wiest, sought bail pending the hearing of his appeal against the decision of Pincus J, who had previously refused to grant bail. The respondents were the Director of Public Prosecutions and another party. The court needed to determine if the appellant should be granted leave to appeal and, if so, whether bail should be granted pending the appeal hearing.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether it had the authority to grant the appellant bail pending the appeal hearing. Additionally, the court needed to consider if the appellant's appeal had a reasonable prospect of success. The respondents argued that the court lacked the power to admit the appellant to bail. The court acknowledged the significance of this argument but determined that it did not need to rule on it since the application could be resolved without addressing the point.

The court considered several factors in its decision. Firstly, the appellant had been convicted in West Germany for the offence related to the extradition proceedings. While his considerable wealth could potentially ensure compliance with bail conditions, it could also motivate him to seek asylum elsewhere. Secondly, the final order by Pincus J was made nearly three weeks prior, and the appeal was scheduled in about a month. Lastly, the appellant's departure from Germany during his trial added to the complexity of the case. Given these factors, the court concluded that granting leave to appeal would likely be futile as the appeal would not succeed.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and determined that the appeal would not succeed. The costs of the application were reserved to be addressed by the court that would hear the appeal.

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