JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
STREAM: DEVELOPMENT & RESOURCES
ACT: PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2005 (WA)
CITATION: ERUJIN PTY LTD and WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2010] WASAT 29
MEMBER: MR D R PARRY (SENIOR MEMBER)
HEARD: 11 FEBRUARY 2010
DELIVERED : 25 FEBRUARY 2010
FILE NO/S: DR 392 of 2009
DR 438 of 2009
BETWEEN: ERUJIN PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Respondent
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure Abuse of process Relitigation of decided matter Planning application Subdivision Consent orders in previous SAT proceeding modified conditions of subdivision approval for three lot subdivision of rural land Conditions imposed by consent orders required fencing, revegetation and protection of creekline traversing the land and fencing of specified areas of remnant bushland Applicant subsequently lodged two fresh subdivision applications of the land Respondent approved subdivision applications subject to same conditions as were imposed by consent orders in previous proceeding Applicant commenced proceedings for review of conditions Whether proceedings are each an abuse of process Principles in relation to abuse of process by relitigation of decided matter in planning review proceeding Whether a consent order is a decision of the Tribunal Role of the Tribunal in relation to making consent orders Collateral attack on previous decision of the Tribunal
Legislation:
City of Albany Town Planning Scheme No 3
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), s 97
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), s 135, s 145, s151, s 251(1), s 251(2), s 251(3)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 3(1), s 9(b), s 27, s 27(1), s 27(2), s 47, s 47(1), s 47(1)(c), s 47(2), s 56, s 56(1), s 56(2), s 105
Town of Vincent Town Planning Scheme No 1, cl 43(2)
Waterways Conservation Act 1976 (WA)
Result:
Proceedings dismissed as abuse of process
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr PG McGowan
Respondent: Mr DE Leigh
Solicitors:
Applicant: Lewis Blyth & Hooper
Respondent: State Solicitor's Office
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
AON Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256
Dowling v City of Malvern (1983) 1 PABR 86
Duckworth and Western Australian Planning Commission [2005] WASAT 337
Edwards v The Hills Shire Council [2009] NSWLEC 187
Hughan and Town of Vincent [2006] WASAT 48
Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1
Land Enviro Corp Pty Ltd v HTT Huntley Heritage Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 185; (2008) 72 NSWLR 160
Lavenda Pty Ltd and Town of Vincent [2006] WASAT 374; (2006) 48 SR (WA) 149
Muller v Mildura Rural City Council [2010] VCAT 42
Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578
Nikolaidis v Pittwater Council [2009] NSWLEC 227
Re South American and Mexican Company; Ex parte Bank of England [1895] 1 Ch 37
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- Case
- [2010] WASAT 29
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that while the principle of res judicata did not apply in planning review proceedings, and issue estoppel did not readily apply, the principle of abuse of process could be engaged by the relitigation of a matter decided by a consent order. The court reasoned that if a consent order could create an estoppel in a civil proceeding, then, by analogy, it could found an abuse of process in a planning review application. Additionally, the court noted that a consent order is a 'decision' for the purposes of the Act and may be appealed as such. Therefore, a consent order can be a basis for finding that a subsequent proceeding involves an abuse of process by relitigation of a matter decided by the consent order. The court also considered the specific circumstances of the case, including the expiration of certain conditions and the significance of any changes in circumstances between the proceedings.
Consequently, the court concluded that the applicant's proceedings were an abuse of process due to the relitigation of the conditions already decided by the consent order. The court found that the conditions imposed by the consent orders were valid and appropriately imposed, and there was no significant change in circumstances to warrant a different outcome from the previous decision. Therefore, the applicant's challenge to the conditions was dismissed, and the court held that the respondent's approval of the subdivision applications, subject to the same conditions, was valid. The court ordered that the applicant bear the costs of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
See also Isaacs v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd (1958) SR (NSW) 69 at 75; (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 48 at 49 50 per Street CJ and Roper CJ in Eq. While, for reasons discussed by Davies AJA in Russo, the principle of res judicata does not apply and the principle of issue estoppel does not readily apply in the context of planning review proceedings, if a consent order can create an estoppel in a civil proceeding, then, by analogy, a consent order can found an abuse of process in a planning review application. Furthermore, as discussed earlier in these reasons, in deciding to make the consent orders proposed by the parties in the previous proceeding, the Tribunal was required to be satisfied that the conditions could be validly imposed (s 56(2) of the SAT Act) and should appropriately be imposed in the exercise of planning discretion (s 56(1) of the SAT Act). Finally, s 3(1) of the SAT Act states that, in the Act, unless the contrary intention appears 'decision of the Tribunal includes an order, direction, or determination of the Tribunal'. An order made by consent under s 56 of the SAT Act is a 'decision' for the purposes of the Act. Subject to obtaining leave of the appeal court, a party to a proceeding may appeal on a question of law from a consent order under s 105 of the SAT Act. Consequently, a consent order is a decision of the Tribunal and may form the basis for a finding that a subsequent proceeding involves an abuse of process by relitigation of a matter decided by the making of the consent order. Fourthly, Mr McGowan focused on a concession that was properly made by Mr DE Leigh, counsel for the Commission, in response to a question from the Tribunal, that it would not be an abuse of process for Erujin to 'run down the clock' on the subdivision 1 approval and, after it has lapsed on 17 December 2011, to lodge a fresh subdivision application and seek review of the same conditions as it seeks to contest in these proceedings. However, there would be a significant change in circumstances in such a case. While it is correct that the order made on 17 December 2008 will never expire, the modified conditions that it imposed will expire, together with the subdivision 1 approval, unless Erujin submits a diagram or plan of survey of subdivision 1 to the Commission by 17 December 2011. Mr McGowan also relied on the decisions of the Tribunal in Tran and Town of Vincent [2009] WASAT 123 (Tran) and Duckworth and Western Australian Planning Commission [2005] WASAT 337 (Duckworth) and suggested that these cases evidenced an approach by the Tribunal that it can and should hear and determine the current proceedings. However, both of these decisions are distinguishable. Tran involved a review of the Town of Vincent's decision to refuse alterations to an existing dwelling and the construction of an additional two storey dwelling on the rear strata lot in Paddington Street, North Perth. The plans of the proposed development were identical to an application for development on the same property that was conditionally approved by the Tribunal in 2006 (Hughan and Town of Vincent [2006] WASAT 48). As the application was identical to that previously the subject of review, and because there was no significant change of planning context to warrant an alternative outcome from the previous decision, the application for review was upheld and the proposed development was conditionally approved. However, there was a significant change in circumstances between the two proceedings, in that the development approval granted by the Tribunal in 2006 had lapsed: see Tran and Town of Vincent [2009] WASAT 123 (S) at [6] and cl 43(2) of the Town of Vincent Town Planning Scheme No 1. Furthermore, unlike Erujin, the applicant in Tran did not seek a different result to that determined by the Tribunal in the previous proceeding; rather, the applicant put forward precisely the same plans and sought precisely the same result.