JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: ERUJIN PTY LTD -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2010] WASC 326
CORAM: ALLANSON J
HEARD: 13 SEPTEMBER 2010
DELIVERED : 12 NOVEMBER 2010
FILE NO/S: GDA 9 of 2010
BETWEEN: ERUJIN PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MR D R PARRY (SENIOR MEMBER)
Citation :ERUJIN PTY LTD and WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION [2010] WASAT 29
File No :DR 392 of 2009, DR 438 of 2009
Catchwords:
Administrative law - Appeal from State Administrative Tribunal - Consent orders - Abuse of process by relitigating
Legislation:
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), s 135, s 138, s 143, s 151, s 153, s 241, s 251
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 13, s 26, s 27, s 29, s 47, s 56
Result:
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed on ground 2
Matter sent back to tribunal for reconsideration
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr P G McGowan
Respondent: Mr C S Bydder
Solicitors:
Applicant: Lewis Blyth & Hooper
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guba [1973] HCA 59; (1973) 130 CLR 353
Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of NSW [1908] HCA 94; (1908) 6 CLR 469
Barker v The Queen [1983] HCA 18; (1983) 153 CLR 338
Blair v Curran [1939] HCA 23; (1939) 62 CLR 464
Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1988] HCA 21; (1988) 164 CLR 502
Chin v Legal Practice Board Western Australia [2009] WASCA 117
Coffey v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1999] FCA 375; (1999) 86 FCR 434
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409
Erujin Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASAT 29
Hartwig v Builders' Registration Board of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 138
In re South American and Mexican Company; Ex parte Bank of England [1895] 1 Ch 37
Isaacs v The Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd & Winslett [1958] SR (NSW) 69
Mustac v Medical Board of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 128
Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578
Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [16] - [18]; Secretary to the Department of Premier and Cabinet v Hulls [1999] 3 VR 331
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton [1945] HCA 53; (1945) 70 CLR 598
Samad v District Court of New South Wales [2002] HCA 24; (2002) 209 CLR 140
Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 6) [2004] FCA 1699
Walton v Gardiner [1992] HCA 77; (1993) 177 CLR 378
Western Australian Planning Commission v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 63; (2004) 221 CLR 30
ALLANSON J: Erujin Pty Ltd (Erujin) was the applicant in proceedings in the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT). It applied to…
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- Case
- [2010] WASC 326
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the scope of the SAT's power to dismiss proceedings as an abuse of process, under section 47 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act. It noted that the verbal formula 'correct and preferable' recognises that in some cases more than one decision may correctly be made, and the role of the tribunal in such a case is to make the decision that is preferable. The court held that the SAT had correctly interpreted section 47 to permit the dismissal of proceedings that were an abuse of process. The court also considered the effect of section 56 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act, which allows the SAT to make orders to give effect to a settlement. The court found that the SAT had correctly exercised its discretion under section 56 to make orders to give effect to the settlement between the parties.
The court upheld the SAT's decision to dismiss Erujin's appeal and to make orders to give effect to the settlement. The court found that Erujin had abused the process of the tribunal by re-litigating issues that had already been resolved by consent orders. The court held that the SAT had correctly exercised its discretion under section 47 to dismiss the proceedings as an abuse of process. The court also held that the SAT had correctly exercised its discretion under section 56 to make orders to give effect to the settlement between the parties. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
The court made no orders as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 27(2) reflects the language used by Bowen CJ and Deane J in Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409, 419, describing the nature of the review jurisdiction exercised by the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The verbal formula 'correct and preferable' recognises that in some cases more than one decision may correctly be made, and the role of the tribunal in such a case is to make the decision that is preferable. When dealing with a matter in the exercise of its review jurisdiction, SAT has functions and discretions corresponding to those exercisable by the decision‑maker in making the reviewable decision: State Administrative Tribunal Act, s 29(1). It may affirm the decision, vary it, or set it aside and substitute its own decision or send it back to the decision‑maker with any directions or recommendations as the tribunal considers appropriate: s 29(3). Part 4 div 2 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act contains two provisions that are central to this appeal: s 47 and s 56. Under s 47:(1)This section applies if the Tribunal believes that a proceeding -(a)is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance;(b)is being used for an improper purpose; or(c)is otherwise an abuse of process.(2)If this section applies, the Tribunal may order that the proceeding be dismissed or struck out and make any appropriate orders. The tribunal's power to strike out proceedings as an abuse of process may only be exercised by a legally qualified member. While the condition for the operation of s 47 is that the tribunal 'believes' that a proceeding is an abuse of process, a decision under s 47 can be challenged where the relevant belief is the result of a mistake of law. The expression 'abuse of process' has an acquired legal meaning. Unless a contrary indication appears from the context, it is presumed that it is used in s 47 in that sense: see Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of NSW [1908] HCA 94; (1908) 6 CLR 469, 531; Barker v The Queen [1983] HCA 18; (1983) 153 CLR 338 at 341, 356. The three grounds in s 47(1)(a) ‑ (c) show an intention to use the expression in its acquired meaning. The tribunal applied s 47 in that way. Section 26 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act provides that, subject to specific exceptions, after the commencement of proceedings for review, the original decision‑maker cannot vary the decision, or set it aside and substitute a new decision. Accordingly, where a settlement requires orders to be made which will have a legal effect, such as orders imposing conditions on the grant of an approval, orders will be necessary to give effect to the settlement. Section 56(1) provides that SAT may make those orders. By s 56:(1)If the parties agree in writing to settle a proceeding that is before the Tribunal, the Tribunal may make any orders necessary to give effect to the settlement.(2)The Tribunal cannot make an order under subsection (1) unless it is satisfied that it would have the power to make a decision in the terms of the agreed settlement or in terms that are consistent with the terms of the agreed settlement.