Chen v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia - [2021] WASC 152

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   CHEN -v- LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2021] WASC 152
CORAM:   MASTER SANDERSON
HEARD:   18 MARCH 2021
DELIVERED          :   18 MARCH 2021
PUBLISHED           :   13 MAY 2021
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1122 of 2021
BETWEEN:   LILY CHEN
Plaintiff
AND
LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Defendant

Catchwords:

Interlocutory injunction - Application to prevent defendant using information gathered on City of Perth enquiry

Legislation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 (Cth)
Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (WA)
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA)
Local Government Act 1995 (WA)
Royal Commissions Act 1968 (WA)

Result:

Application dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff	:	C P Shanahan SC
Defendant	:	G R Donaldson SC

Solicitors:

Plaintiff	:	HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (Perth)
Defendant	:	Legal Practice Board

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Belan v National Union of Workers - New South Wales Branch [2018] FCAFC 239
Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASC 326
Feldman v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 607
GS v MS [2019] WASC 255
Hartmann v Commissioner of Police (1997) 91 A Crim R 141
Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408
McCarthy v Law Society of New South Wales (1997) 43 NSWLR 42
Sorby v The Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 152 CLR 281

MASTER SANDERSON:

By originating summons filed 25 February 2021 the plaintiff sought the following orders:
1. The Defendant be permanently injuncted from:
(1) making any inquiries into the Plaintiffs conduct, as to whether she be a fit and proper person to hold a legal practising certificate for Western Australia (Certificate) given under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (Act), based on any evidence gathered by the City of Perth Inquiry, being an inquiry constituted pursuant to the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) and invested with the powers of a royal commission (Inquiry), and
(2) relying upon the purported s 56(2) notice given by the Defendant under the Act to the Plaintiff on or about 20 January 2021 or any such notice based on evidence gathered by the Inquiry.
GROUNDS
A. The transmittal of any evidence gathered by the Inquiry to the Defendant for the purpose of initiating disciplinary action against the Plaintiff and its use by the Defendant to inquire into the conduct of the Plaintiff, as to whether she be a fit and proper person to hold a Certificate, is unlawful and any such inquiries ultra vires the Defendants statutory power (derivative or collateral use) in that:
(a) Such transmittal or use is proscribed by the Royal Commissions Act 1968 (WA) (RC Act), and/or
(b) any evidence gathered by the Inquiry using coercive powers conferred on the Inquiry Panel (Commissioner) for the purpose of conducting the Inquiry can only be used for that purpose, precluding such derivative or collateral use.
B. The Plaintiff was not warned at any time before she was compelled to give evidence to the Inquiry that such derivative or collateral use may be made by the Defendant of her evidence to the Inquiry, or of evidence given by others to the Inquiry pertaining to the Plaintiff, precluding such use of that evidence by the Defendant for the purposes of the Act.
C. The Defendant has no statutory power to give the purported s 56(2) notice to the Plaintiff or any such notice based on the derivative or collateral use.
2. The Defendant be permanently injuncted from making any inquiries into alleged criminal conduct by the Plaintiff for the purpose of determining whether the Plaintiff be a fit and proper person to hold a Certificate in circumstances where she has not been charged or convicted of any such alleged crimes, as such inquiries are beyond the powers conferred on the Defendant by the Act.
GROUNDS
The Plaintiff relies upon the provisions of the Act, in particular but not limited to suitability matters, as provided for at s 8, and ss 10, 32, 45, 55, and 56 of the Act.
3. Such other orders as the Court thinks fit.

The application was supported by an affidavit of Christine Alyse Oreo affirmed 25 February 2021. On 16 March 2021, the plaintiff filed a chamber summons seeking interlocutory orders which effectively mirrored the orders sought in the originating summons. There was a need for urgency in dealing with the interlocutory application – the defendant had scheduled a meeting for 1.00 pm on 18 March 2021 and had declined to defer that meeting when asked to do so by the plaintiff's solicitors. Accordingly, the interlocutory application was heard on the morning of 18 March 2021. At the conclusion of the hearing I dismissed the plaintiff's application. I indicated I would publish reasons for my decision. These are those reasons.
For the sake of completeness I should note that two further affidavits were filed by the plaintiff. There was a further affidavit of Ms Oreo affirmed 16 March 2021 and an affidavit of the plaintiff also affirmed 16 March 2021. These three affidavits comprised the evidence in support of the application. The defendant did not file any evidence.
The relevant background facts were not in dispute and can be summarised as follows. The plaintiff is a legal practitioner and the principal of Lily Chen & Associates. She was admitted to practice on 5 March 2002. In addition to operating her legal practice, the plaintiff held elected office as a councillor of the City of Perth between 15 October 2011 and 19 October 2019. The plaintiff maintained, and I accept, that she has been and still is a prominent member of the Chinese community in Perth and holds and has held a number of community leadership positions. The plaintiff's status as a female legal practitioner is highly regarded in the Chinese community.
The defendant is constituted under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) and has statutory authority for the regulation of all legal practitioners in Western Australia.
By written notice dated 24 April 2018, the Honourable David Templeman MLA (Minister for Local Government, Heritage, Culture and the Arts) (Minister) appointed an inquiry panel to inquire into and report on the aspects, operations and affairs of the City of Perth in accordance with written terms of reference. The inquiry was instigated under pt 8 div 2 of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA). Pursuant to s 8.20(a) of the Local Government Act the inquiry panel had powers of a royal commission, the section modifying the Royal Commissions Act 1968 (WA) as required and in terms made applicable to the inquiry.
The inquiry had coercive powers to:
(a)require a person to attend before the inquiry at a time and place specified in a notice given by the inquiry and to produce documents, books, writings or things specified in the notice; and
(b)summons a person to attend before the inquiry at a time and place named in the summons to be examined and to give oral evidence.
The plaintiff was required to produce specified documents, books, writings and certain things to the inquiry and to give oral evidence to the inquiry. Other individuals were subject to the same requirements. The plaintiff makes the point that she was not warned by the inquiry at any time before she gave evidence or during the course of her evidence that the evidence she gave could be used for what she refers to as a 'collateral or derivative use' by a party such as the defendant. I will deal with this issue more fully below. However, it is to be noted that there is nothing in the Local Government Act or the Royal Commissions Act which requires any such warning to be given. So if there is a duty on the inquiry to provide a warning it must arise at common law or in some other statutory enactment.
It was common ground the inquiry may refer any matter to any authority of the State, the Commonwealth, another State or Territory that has power under a law to investigate or take action in relation to a matter of that kind, and may it pass to that authority any 'document' obtained in the course of the inquiry. That power is found in s 8.21 of the Local Government Act. The power enables the inquiry to refer a matter that any investigation is to be conducted by the authority itself on the inquiry's referral. It was the plaintiff's submission that it does not authorise the use of coercively gathered testimony or if it does, any such testimony is inadmissible in a subsequent disciplinary hearing. In written submissions counsel for the plaintiff contrasted s 8.21 of the Local Government Act with s 145(2) of the Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (WA). That section specifically authorises the use of coerce testimony for the purposes of prior inconsistent statements in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
There are limits in the Royal Commissions Act as to what use may be made of evidence referred to such investigative authorities. Neither s 8.20 or s 8.21 of the Local Government Act excludes the operation of s 20 of the Royal Commissions Act. Section 20 of the Royal Commissions Act reads as follows:
20. Statements made by witness not admissible in evidence against him
A statement or disclosure made by a witness in answer to any question put to him by a Commission or any of the Commissioners shall not (except in contempt proceedings or proceedings for an offence against this Act) be admissible in evidence against him in any civil or criminal proceedings in any Court in this State.
The inquiry's report was issued to the Minister on 30 June 2020 and was published on 11 August 2020. The report contained adverse findings made against the plaintiff by the inquiry in her capacity as a councillor of the City of Perth some of which may, if proved, constitute criminal conduct on the part of the plaintiff.
On 24 August 2020, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff advising that the inquiry had referred a number of the inquiry's concerns in relation to the plaintiff's conduct as a councillor to the Legal Practice Complaints Committee (LPCC) which had then passed on those concerns to the defendant. The referral was by way of a letter from the inquiry to the LPCC dated 29 June 2020. A copy of that letter appears as attachment CAO21 to the second affidavit of Ms Oreo.
The plaintiff says, and I accept, the defendant simply reproduced much of the referral in its letter to the plaintiff of 24 August 2020, there being no evidence that either the defendant or the LPCC had undertaken any independent investigations or inquiries into the concerns. The plaintiff submits that even where the inquiry had statutory power to refer material regarding a certified legal practitioner to the LPCC or the defendant, those disciplinary bodies could not take any action absent an independent inquiry to satisfy themselves that the materials provided supported the exercise of their statutory powers. Once again, I will deal with this issue below.
In its 24 August 2020 letter, the defendant invited the plaintiff to provide written submissions in relation to the concerns addressing 'why, in those circumstances, you remain a fit and proper person to hold a local practising certificate'. Following extensive correspondence between the defendant and the plaintiff's solicitors, on 20 January 2021 the defendant purported to issue a notice under s 56(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) advising the defendant it proposed to cancel her local practising certificate under s 56(3)(c)(i) of the Legal Profession Act. The grounds for such cancellation were that she was no longer a fit and proper person to hold a local practising certificate. The plaintiff was invited to make written submissions by 16 February 2021 as to why her local practising certificate should not be cancelled. The notice itself recited twelve sets of alleged facts and circumstances which were said to form the basis of the defendant's belief that the plaintiff was no longer fit to hold a local practising certificate. It is clear the facts and circumstances in the notice closely followed the defendant's earlier articulation of the concerns.
By covering letter enclosing the notice, the defendant advised the plaintiff the matter would be considered further on 11 March 2021. Negotiations took place. The defendant agreed to defer its final decision until a special meeting convened on 18 March 2021.
As noted in written submissions filed on behalf of the plaintiff, the allegations made by the defendant against the plaintiff may constitute criminal conduct on the part of the plaintiff if they are made out. Investigations by the Western Australian Police are ongoing. However, it is important to note the plaintiff has not been charged or convicted of any offence related to matters raised in the inquiry.
There was no dispute between the parties as to the applicable legal principles. It was for the plaintiff to establish there was a serious question to be tried and that the balance of convenience favoured the granting of the injunction. It was the defendant's position the plaintiff had satisfied neither of these requirements. For reasons which follow I was satisfied that was the case.
The defendant's jurisdiction in this matter is grounded in s 55 which is found in pt 5 div 6 of the Legal Profession Act. The section deals with 'Amendment, suspension or cancellation of local practising certificates'. Section 55 is the corollary of s 45(5) in the sense that s 45(5) deals with 'renewing' practising certificates. Section 55 reads as follows:
55. Grounds for amending, suspending or cancelling local practising certificate
Each of the following is a ground for amending, suspending or cancelling a local practising certificate -
(a)the holder is no longer a fit and proper person to hold the certificate;
(b)the holder is not, or is no longer, covered by professional indemnity insurance that complies with requirements imposed under this Act;
(c)if a condition of the certificate is that the holder is limited to legal practice specified in the certificate - the holder is or has been engaging in legal practice that the holder is not entitled to engage in under this Act.
For the purpose of s 55, fitness and propriety to continue to hold a practising certificate is given content by s 38 and incorporates 'suitability matter' as defined in s 8. Really, s 55 empowers the Legal Practice Board (Board) to suspend or cancel a practice certificate if the holder is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a certificate. Section 38(2) empowers the Board in considering whether an applicant for a renewal or the holder of a practice certificate is not a fit and proper person to take into account any suitability matter and any additional matters set out in s 38(2)(a) – (f). Section 75(1) empowers the Board to require cooperation with its inquiries of a person to assist the Board in considering 'whether or not to grant, renew, amend, suspend or cancel a local practising certificate'.
Early in his written submissions, senior counsel for the defendant noted that a decision to amend, suspend or cancel a practising certificate under s 56 of the Legal Profession Act is reviewable by the State Administrative Tribunal. That submission was not disputed by the plaintiff. In fact it was open to the plaintiff to apply to review and/or stay any order made by the defendant. While that option was available to the plaintiff there is no reason in principle why she could not have proceeded by way of this action. There was no suggestion by the defendant that the review available before the State Administrative Tribunal in some way precluded or prevented this action being brought or was suggestive this action was inappropriate. So apart from noting the rights of appeal available before the State Administrative Tribunal and the capacity of the State Administrative Tribunal to stay the decision of the defendant, I need say no more on that issue.
In his written submissions, senior counsel for the defendant analysed the plaintiff's claims under five subheadings. He did so by reference to the terms of the originating process and the written submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff. It is convenient to broadly follow these contentions and deal with the arguments put by both parties. In doing so, I would not wish it to be thought I did not take into account oral submissions made by senior counsel. All the submissions of each of the parties were weighed in the balance in making my decision.
The first contention is framed in pars 37 and 38 of the plaintiff's submissions. These two paragraphs read as follows:
37. While section 20 of the RC Act refers to 'civil or criminal proceedings', disciplinary proceedings of the type the Plaintiff currently faces from the Defendant can be characterised as 'civil proceedings'. In Hartmann v Commissioner for Police, the NSW Court of Appeal found that the equivalent NSW provision, being section 17 of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW), precluded the use of coercively gathered evidence by a royal commission in disciplinary proceedings in the Government and Related Employees Appeal Tribunal.
38. More specifically, the same court in McCarthy v The Law Society of NSW found per coram (at p 59 lines B-C) that [emphases added]:
'Ultimately Hartmann undermines the appellant's argument because it attests to the breadth of the expression "civil proceedings" as one which embraces disciplinary proceedings such as those which the appellant faced'.
Section 14(2) of the Royal Commissions Act requires a person to answer a question if required to do so by the inquirer even if the answer might incriminate. The defendant submitted the word 'incriminate' is not related simply to an offence under the Royal Commissions Act. Section 20 applies to all statements or disclosures made by a witness in answer to any question, not only those that might be incriminating. It was the defendant's submission that as a matter of plain and obvious construction s 20 did not operate to preclude the defendant from having regard to compelled self‑incriminating answers when exercising its powers under s 55 of the Legal Profession Act. This submission was supported on a number of different grounds. First, it was said the Board, when exercising its powers, is not a court. Second, it was said to be a misnomer to construe what the Board does in reading the inquiry transcript to be 'admitting evidence against' a person. The Board is simply having regard to matters that are plainly relevant to the jurisdiction being exercised.
Those submissions should be accepted. The privilege against self‑incrimination is 'not an integral element of the exercise of the judicial power reposed in courts by Ch III of the Constitution'. It is a privilege that has been abrogated by legislation in Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada without anyone suggesting that it involved the elimination of an integral element in the exercise of judicial power in a democratic society: see Sorby v The Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 152 CLR 281, 307. Their Honours did observe (at 308):
The privilege against self-incrimination is deeply ingrained in the common law. The principle is that a statute will not be construed to take away a common law right, including the privilege against self‑incrimination, unless a legislative intent to do so clearly emerges, whether by express words or necessary implication.
It is to be noted that the protection provided by s 20 is expressed to be in relation to 'civil or criminal proceedings in any court in this State'. The question then is what meaning is to be given to 'court' in this context. In its written submissions reference was made to two cases, Belan v National Union of Workers - New South Wales Branch [2018] FCAFC 239 and Hartmann v Commissioner of Police (1997) 91 A Crim R 141. Both of these decisions require some analysis. Dealing first with Belan. The appellant was employed by the respondent union. He was dismissed for serious misconduct. In determining that he had engaged in serious misconduct the union replied upon admissions Mr Belan may in the course of giving evidence before a royal commission. Mr Belan applied to the Fair Work Commission for a remedy for unfair dismissal. The Fair Work Commission dismissed Mr Belan's application having found that he had engaged in serious misconduct. This finding was based on evidence given by Mr Belan at the royal commission. Before the Full Court, Mr Belan contended that the Fair Work Commission was a 'court of the Commonwealth'. That submission was rejected. In line with the reasoning in Belan it seems clear that proceedings before the defendant are not proceedings in a court in Western Australia. That may well be the case in a review before the State Administrative Tribunal. But that is a point which it was unnecessary to decide in the context of this application. Nor is it the case the proceedings before the defendant establish a civil liability. That principle is drawn from a number of cases including Feldman v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 607 and GS v MS [2019] WASC 255.

The plaintiff placed heavy reliance on the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in Hartman. This was understandable. It is difficult to read Hartman as doing anything other than supporting the plaintiff's position. Nonetheless, it seems that to conclude an administrative tribunal falls properly within the definition of the word 'court' on the basis that the legislature could have expressly excluded the administrative tribunal is an odd approach. The fact is a tribunal is not a court. That was a point made by Allanson J in Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASC 326. There his Honour was dealing with the status of the State Administrative Tribunal. He said at [55]:
SAT is not a court but an administrative tribunal, even when constituted by a judicial member.
It must be conceded that there is a difference of judicial opinion on this issue. The decision in McCarthy v Law Society of New South Wales (1997) 43 NSWLR 42 supports the position in Hartman. Belan and Erujin, and to an extent GS v MS, are to the opposite effect. Given the decision of Allanson J in Erujin I think the correct approach in this State is to not hold the defendant to be a court. That being so, there is nothing in the Royal Commissions Act that precludes the Board from considering materials sent to it by the inquiry panel and indeed from the State Administrative Tribunal from reviewing any decision of the Board.
As to the plaintiff's contention, the inquiry was required to issue a warning to the plaintiff before any question was answered by the plaintiff. There is no principle of law to that effect nor is there any statutory enactment to which the plaintiff was able to refer in support of that submission. As noted by the defendant, the plaintiff is a legal practitioner. As such, she should have been aware of the use that might be made of her answers under examination. To the extent that submission suggests that a warning may be necessary depending on the status of a witness it may or may not be correct. But whatever the position at large, in this case, I can see no grounds upon which it can be said a warning should have been issued to the plaintiff and given no warning was issued, no use could be made of the answers she gave to the inquiry.
The second issue is found in par 36(b)(2) of the plaintiff's written submissions. It was said that documents or evidence gathered by the inquiry cannot be used against the plaintiff by the defendant because they were coercively gathered using statutory powers and cannot be used for a purpose other than that for which they were gathered. Reliance was placed upon the High Court decision in Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408. Johns concerned a 'section 19 examination' under the then Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 1989 (Cth) (ASC Act). Section 19 empowered the Australian Securities Commission (ASC) to require certain persons to appear before a specified staff member for examination on oath and to answer questions. Mr Johns was required to attend and required (under s 21) to answer questions. Section 22(1) provided:
The examination shall take place in private and the inspector may give directions about who may be present during it, or during a part of it.
A transcript was taken. Section 127(1) provided:
The Commission shall take all reasonable steps to protect from unauthorised use or disclosure information:
(a)given to it in confidence in or in connection with the performance of its functions or the exercise of its powers …
Section 127(4)(b) provided:
Where the Chairperson is satisfied that particular information:
…
(b)will enable or assist the government, or an agency, of a State or Territory to perform a function or exercise a power;
…
the disclosure of the information to the agency, government, official, body or committee, by a person whom the Chairperson authorises for the purpose is taken to be authorised use and disclosure of the information.
By notice the ASC initially released s 19 examination transcripts to a royal commission. The notice did not authorise the royal commission to publish the transcripts but only to use them internally. Later notices permitted the royal commission to use the transcripts in a public hearing. The royal commission handed copies of the transcripts to media representatives. The High Court held, in broad terms, the ASC had a duty of non‑disclosure in the particular circumstances of that case.
The difficulty with the plaintiff's argument is that Johns concerned the construction of s 127(4)(b) of ASC Act. There is no equivalent to that regime in the Royal Commissions Act. In addition, s 8.21 of the Local Government Act makes it clear that the reference to 'matter' in the section would include a transcript of evidence. The words concerning passing on documents were probably included because parties who are uninvolved in the substance of inquiries that are required to provide documents are on notice their documents may be away from them for some time.
The third issue which relates to the warning I have discussed above. I need say nothing more on this question.
The fourth question is set out in par 20 of the plaintiff's submissions. That paragraph reads as follows:
20.There are limits in the RC Act as to what use may be made of evidence referred to such investigative authorities. Neither section 8.20 or section 8.21 of the LG Act excludes the operation of section 20 of the RC Act. Section 20 of the RC Act states (emphases added):
'A statement or disclosure made by a witness in answer put to him by a Commission or any of the Commissioners shall not (except in contempt proceedings or proceedings for an offence against this Act) be admissible in evidence against him in any civil or criminal proceedings in any Court in this State'.
This provision has to be taken into account in the context of the High Court decisions dealing with collateral and derivative use of coerced testimony and the need for any such use to be expressly authorised by statute, such that any common law rights and immunities (such as informing a witness of the use to which her testimony may be put) are abrogated only by clear words.
The question is do the words of s 20 of the Royal Commissions Act that a statement or disclosure made by a witness in answer to any question put to him shall not be admissible in evidence against him in any civil or criminal proceeding in any court in this State, mean the Board does not have jurisdiction to consider a statement or disclosure made by a witness in answer to a question. For the reasoning set out above, I am not satisfied that is the case. The Board is not a court and the interpretation of the section contended for by the plaintiff cannot be supported.
Finally, it is put the Board has no jurisdiction to consider matters that raise criminal conduct of a practitioner in considering whether a person is fit and proper to continue to hold a practice certificate. It is said there must be a conviction before such matters can be considered. The position is put more comprehensively in par 39 of the plaintiff's submissions. The plaintiff's contention is that because s 8 of the Legal Profession Act (which defines suitability matters) specifically refers to whether the person has been convicted of an offence, 'mere allegations of criminality' cannot be relevant considerations when the Board considers whether or not a person is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate.
In answer to that submission, the defendant says that the mere fact s 8(1)(c) provides that a conviction for an offence is a specific suitability matter does not logically exclude an allegation of committing an offence as being relevant. Furthermore, s 38(2)(f) empowers the Board to consider 'any other matters relating to the person the Board considers are appropriate'. Clearly this provision conveys great discretion and breadth of scope of the relevant matters to which the Board can have regard.
The defendant's submissions on this point should be accepted. Allegations of conduct which may amount to criminal conduct must be relevant to consideration as to whether or not a person is a fit and proper person to hold a practice certificate. Were that not to be the case, the Board could take into account matters which, while serious, did not amount to criminal conduct. On the other hand, serious allegations, although not proven, could not be considered in determining a person's fitness. An interpretation of the Legal Profession Act which embodies that logical inconsistency is to be avoided. There is no substance in the plaintiff's complaint.
For these reasons I was not satisfied the plaintiff had established there was a serious question to be tried. Taken in their totality, the plaintiff's submissions simply did not meet the required threshold. According, that was sufficient to dismiss the plaintiff's application.
For the sake of completeness, I will deal briefly with the question of the balance of convenience. On the part of the plaintiff two points were made. First, the failure to grant the injunction would in all likelihood lead to the plaintiff's loss of the right to practice and consequently her capacity to earn income. It must be acknowledged that is a significant consideration. The second lesser point is that if the plaintiff was suspended from practice her standing in the wider legal community and in the Chinese community in particular, would be compromised. While I accept this is a consideration and reputational damage is a relevant consideration, it is by some distance a lesser complaint than the first.
On the part of the defendant reference was made to the statutory scheme. It was submitted it was of fundamental importance that persons who did not satisfy the requisite character test not be permitted to practice. Further, it was said that if the plaintiff was suspended from practice (and it was not certain that would be the outcome of the Board's meeting) the plaintiff could apply for a stay from the State Administrative Tribunal. Armed with that protection, the balance of convenience favoured allowing the defendant to go ahead with its meeting secure in the knowledge the plaintiff was not without remedy.
Putting these competing interests one against the other clearly shows the balance of convenience favoured not granting the injunction. The clear legislative intent of the Legal Practice Act is the protection of the public. Fundamental to that protection is the quality and character of persons who have practice certificates. If the defendant considered the plaintiff should no longer hold a practice certificate then, in the absence of strong reasons to the contrary, the public interests should prevail and the balance of convenience would favour allowing the defendant to act in accordance with the statute.
It was for these reasons I dismissed the plaintiff's interlocutory application.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
CB
Associate to Master Sanderson
13 MAY 2021