Coates-Kelly v New Zealand

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Coates-Kelly v New Zealand [2022] FCAFC 131  

Appeal from: Kelly v New Zealand [2021] FCA 1434
File numbers: VID 722 of 2021
VID 127 of 2022
Judgment of: LOGAN, ABRAHAM AND O'SULLIVAN JJ
Date of judgment: 16 August 2022
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application for leave to withdraw admissions made before the primary judge and magistrate – application made pursuant to rr 26.11 or 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – where appellant contends admissions were not true – where appellant contends circumstances in which admissions were made justify leave being granted – leave refused – application dismissed

EXTRADITION – surrender to New Zealand – where appellant appeals from decision of primary judge confirming an order of a magistrate surrendering the appellant to New Zealand under s 34(1)(c) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) – where appellant convicted in absentia of offences under the Tax Administration Act 1994 (NZ) – where appellant claims error in the primary judge concluding that the warrant is a “New Zealand warrant” within the meaning of s 5 of the Extradition Act – where appellant claims surrender would be unjust or oppressive – appeal dismissed

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for review of a decision of a magistrate to indorse a New Zealand warrant under s 28 of the Extradition Act1988 (Cth) – where applicant seeks declaration that the warrant issued by the Dunedin District Court in New Zealand is not a “New Zealand warrant”, certiorari quashing the Magistrate’s indorsement of the warrant, and a consequential order to effect the release of the applicant from prison – lack of utility to exercise the Court’s discretion – relief inconsistent with the conclusion that the appeal be dismissed – s 39B application dismissed

Legislation:

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3E

Extradition Act1988 (Cth) ss 5, 7, 19, 22, 24, 28, 34, 35, 42

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 174, 175

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 20(1A)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 26.11

Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) ss 62, 62A, 62B

Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 143, 150, 196

Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 25, 80, 183, 190

Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (NZ) ss 121, 125, 127

Tax Administration Act 1994 (NZ) ss 143, 143A, 143B, 148

Cases cited:

Ascic v Comcare [2020] FCAFC 105

Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] AC 1

Bannister v New Zealand (1999) 86 FCR 417

Bennett v United Kingdom (2000) 179 ALR 113

Bertran v Vanstone (2000) 61 ALD 400

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v Aquagenics Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] FCAFC 9; (2018) 352 ALR 131

Chandra v Webber [2010] FCA 705; (2010) 187 FCR 31

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528

Evans v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2009] NZCA 251

Handlen v The Queen

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Details
Case
[2022] FCAFC 131
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ms Coates-Kelly, the appellant, sought leave to withdraw certain admissions made before the primary judge and a magistrate in an extradition matter, which was subsequently appealed. The court had to decide whether to grant leave to withdraw the admissions and if the surrender of the appellant to New Zealand was justified. The appellant argued that the admissions were incorrect and the circumstances justified the withdrawal. The court also had to determine if the warrant was a "New Zealand warrant" and whether the surrender would be unjust or oppressive.

The court rejected the application to withdraw the admissions, finding that it was made after the s 35 review and the filing of the appeal. The legal effect of the indorsed warrant was spent, and there was nothing to quash. Furthermore, any declaration in this proceeding would not affect the parties' rights. The court concluded that the appropriate time to bring such an application was prior to, or in conjunction with, an application for review under s 35 of the Extradition Act. The application in the original jurisdiction was an endeavour to subvert the evidentiary restrictions faced in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the primary judge did not err in finding that the surrender would not be unjust or oppressive. The court also dismissed the s 39B application, finding that there were fundamental difficulties with the application. The court held that the appropriate time to bring such an application was prior to, or in conjunction with, an application for review under s 35 of the Extradition Act.

The court ordered that the s 39B application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The s 39B application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ms Coates-Kelly has not established any error in the primary judge’s conclusion that it would not be unjust or oppressive to surrender her to New Zealand, as contended in Grounds 6-9. Conclusion on appeal Ms Coates-Kelly has not established her appeal, and it must accordingly be dismissed. The primary judge, pursuant to s 35(2)(a) of the Extradition Act, confirmed the order of Magistrate Burke made on 30 August 2021, surrendering Ms Coates-Kelly to New Zealand. That order is confirmed. Section 39B application This application is brought pursuant to s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act, which confers original jurisdiction on the Court “in any matter … arising under any laws made by the Parliament, other than a matter in respect of which a criminal prosecution is instituted or any other criminal matter”. Ms Coates-Kelly seeks a declaration that the warrant issued by the Dunedin District Court in New Zealand is not a “New Zealand warrant” within the meaning of s 5 of the Extradition Act; an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the Magistrate’s indorsement of the warrant under s 28 of the Extradition Act; and a consequential order(s) to effect the release of the applicant from prison. However, there are fundamental difficulties with the application. First, as previously explained, this application was brought after the s 35 review and filing of the appeal therefrom. Since 30 August 2021, Ms Coates-Kelly’s continued detention has been authorised by the committal warrant made under s 34(1)(d) of the Extradition Act. The legal effect of the indorsed warrant is spent. It is not possible to issue certiorari to quash the decision of Magistrate Bazzani, because, as a legal matter, there is nothing to quash. Second, given the conclusion above that the s 34 decision operates on the historical fact of arrest pursuant to an indorsed New Zealand warrant, any declaration in this proceeding would not have any effect on the parties’ rights. Third, Ms Coates-Kelly has not sought directly to impeach or question the validity of either the surrender warrant, the custodial warrant, or the orders of the primary judge on the review confirming each of these warrants. Despite that, one of the consequential orders sought is an order releasing her present detention, which is pursuant to the committal warrant. As Ms Coates-Kelly accepted, the order in respect to that warrant was made by the primary judge exercising original jurisdiction, and this Court, also exercising original jurisdiction, could not set that aside. Fourth, although the applicant appeared to contend that nonetheless, the application should be considered and the declaration sought ought to be made, no proper basis was articulated as to why that should be so. The appropriate time to bring such an application was prior to, or in conjunction with, an application for review under s 35 of the Extradition Act. Again, as explained above, Ms Coates-Kelly, who was represented by counsel and a solicitor, made a forensic choice at the time of the s 35 review not to seek the material on which she now relies. This application in the original jurisdiction is a transparent endeavour to subvert the evidentiary restrictions which she now faces in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction she has invoked by virtue of s 35(6)(e) of the Extradition Act. What is sought is a declaration inconsistent with the conclusion that the appeal be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent contended that Ms Coates-Kelly has not demonstrated sufficient reason for leave to be given to withdraw her admissions. It submitted that the application is made in an appeal and one where further evidence is not permitted: s 35(6)(e)) of the Extradition Act; that it goes to a question of fact, not a question of law; that the correctness of Ms Coates-Kelly’s current position is questionable at best and although it is a question of fact, the better view is that s 148 of the NZ Tax Act does not create a distinct offence; and Ms Coates-Kelly’s position before the primary judge was based on a considered opinion of her then counsel. Although it did not occur to her then counsel that she might have been convicted of offences against s 148 of the NZ Tax Act, it was apparent on the materials provided to her that she had been convicted of aiding and abetting, not as a principal. The respondent accepted that the issue is significant to how Ms Coates-Kelly puts her case now but submitted that even if she were correct about the effect of s 148 of the NZ Act, she would still need to overcome several major hurdles to succeed on the appeal – Australian courts do not rule on the validity of New Zealand warrants (and ss 28 and 34 of the Extradition Act do not require a warrant to specify the relevant offence), and s 34 operates on the historical fact of arrest pursuant to an indorsed New Zealand warrant: primary judgment at [66]-[67]. Further, it should be noted that even under NZ law, a charging document or warrant is not invalid because of a defect or irregularity unless a court is satisfied that there has been a miscarriage of justice. It was submitted that, accordingly, the significance of the admission (however assessed) is comfortably outweighed by the other factors set out above against granting leave.Consideration The respondent’s submission is to be accepted. First, the premise of Ms Coates-Kelly’s application, that the admissions made are incorrect, is based on the content of New Zealand law, which is a matter of fact not law: Mokbel v The Queen [2013] VSCA 118; (2013) 40 VR 625 at [22]; Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] AC 1 at 45; and see, as to proof of such law, ss 174 and 175 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Ms Coates-Kelly contended that she was only convicted of offences under s 148 of the NZ Tax Act, which relates to aiding and abetting a principal offence. It is accepted that the principal offences are under ss 143A and 143B. Ms Coates-Kelly contends that s 148 creates a discrete offence, quite separate from the principal offences, and therefore it is the only offence for which she could be convicted. The respondents take issue with that contention. Whether Ms Coates-Kelly’s submission is correct is, on her case, dependent on the construction of the New Zealand statute. It is noted that in Australian law, a person who aids and abets the commission of an offence is taken to have committed that offence, and that aiding and abetting is not itself a distinct offence: see for example, Handlen v The Queen [2011] HCA 51; (2011) 245 CLR 282 at [6]. As this issue has been raised for the first time at this stage of the proceedings, being after the s 35 review, the respondent has been deprived of the opportunity to present evidence on the content of New Zealand law on this topic before the primary judge. This demonstrates or reflects on the consequence of raising this matter for the first time at this stage of proceedings. Accordingly, Ms Coates-Kelly’s submission that there is no prejudice occasioned to the respondent by the withdrawal of the admission cannot be accepted.