Jeans v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jeans v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2003] FCAFC 309

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Application to withdraw admission contained in pleadings – application made three days after trial commenced – whether Primary Judge erred in principle in refusing application – trial judge considered all relevant circumstances taking into account the question of doing justice as between the parties – discretion held not to miscarry.

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 referred to
Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738 applied
H Clark (Doncaster) Ltd v Wilkinson [1965] Ch 694 not followed
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 referred to
Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146 referred to

JOHN ANTHONY JEANS v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA LTD (ACN 123 123 124)
N681 of 2003

HILL, MADGWICK AND CONTI JJ
19 DECEMBER 2003
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N681 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

JOHN ANTHONY JEANS
APPELLANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA LTD
(ACN 123 123 124)
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HILL, MADGWICK AND CONTI JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

19 DECEMBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeal be dismissed.
  2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N681 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

JOHN ANTHONY JEANS
APPELLANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA LTD
(ACN 123 123 124)
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HILL, MADGWICK AND CONTI JJ

DATE:

19 DECEMBER 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. The appellant, Mr Jeans, appeals from the judgment of a Judge of this Court, Sackville J, dismissing his application against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (‘the Bank’) in which he sought orders setting aside certain securities obtained by the Bank in 1998 and giving judgment in favour of the Bank in its cross claim against him.

  2. The sole ground of appeal is that the learned Primary Judge should have allowed Mr Jeans’ motion brought after the hearing of the proceedings had commenced seeking to amend his pleadings and thereby to withdraw an admission made in the pleadings, namely, that the guarantee upon which the Bank relied in its cross claim had not been executed by him.  Mr Jeans wished to assert, instead, that the signature which purported to be his signature on it had been forged by an officer of the Bank, Mr Cleary.

  3. The proceedings in the Court were the second proceedings brought by Deangrove Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) (‘Deangrove’) and Mr Jeans.  Mr Jeans was the sole shareholder in Deangrove.

  4. The first proceeding had been commenced on 13 March 2000 and sought substantially the same relief as was sought in the second…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 309
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Jeans v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd involved Mr Jeans as the applicant and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd as the respondent. Mr Jeans sought to withdraw an admission he had made in the proceedings, which the bank opposed. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary judge dismissed both the motion to withdraw the admission and the substantive application by Mr Jeans.

The central legal issue before the court was whether Mr Jeans should be permitted to withdraw an admission he had made in the proceedings. The primary judge examined the principles governing the withdrawal of admissions, emphasizing the need to balance the policy of encouraging parties to make admissions without fear of being bound by them against the policy of ensuring a fair trial. The primary judge correctly applied the principles set out in Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd, which outline the circumstances under which an admission may be withdrawn. The judge found that Mr Jeans had not provided sufficient grounds to justify the withdrawal of his admission and that the bank would be prejudiced if the admission were to be withdrawn.

The primary judge's decision was based on the credibility of Mr Jeans and the other witness, Mr Cleary, and the overall fairness of the trial. The judge determined that the admissions made by Mr Jeans were deliberate and well-considered, and that the bank had relied on these admissions in its case. Given the circumstances, the judge found that it was not appropriate to allow the withdrawal of the admission. The appeal against the primary judge’s decision was dismissed, and Mr Jeans was ordered to pay the bank’s costs of the appeal.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant, Mr Jeans, pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. This outcome reinforces the principle that admissions in legal proceedings are significant and should not be lightly withdrawn, particularly when they have been made after careful consideration and have been acted upon by the opposing party.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HILL, MADGWICK AND CONTI JJ
As already noted the learned Primary Judge dismissed the motion and declined to give the leave sought. The hearing then continued for some ten days. At the end of the hearing his Honour dismissed Mr Jeans’ substantive application finding that it had not been established either that the claimed misrepresentations had been made or that Mr Jeans had relied upon them. Despite a suggestion to the contrary by counsel for the Bank it is clear that his Honour’s decision on these ultimate issues was dependent upon findings his Honour made as to the credit of Mr Jeans and of Mr Cleary. It is not necessary to summarise his Honour’s judgment on these matters.The Judgment on the Motion. As his Honour noted, it was common ground that the relevant principles to be applied on the motion for leave were those dealing with an application to withdrawn an admission. His Honour summarised these principles. There was no suggestion on the appeal that his Honour applied the wrong principles or summarised them inaccurately. His Honour correctly rejected the approach taken in England in H Clark (Doncaster) Ltd v Wilkinson [1965] Ch 694 where it was suggested that, except in cases which gave rise to an estoppel, an admission might be withdrawn, at least if the other party was not prejudiced otherwise than in a way that might be cured by a costs order. Rather his Honour accepted the view advanced by Rogers CJ in Coopers Brewery Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 738 that a party should not be permitted easily to withdraw an admission as otherwise the making of an admission might become meaningless. Nevertheless there was a countervailing policy, his Honour accepted, that a party not be discouraged from making admissions out of fear that once given they might not be withdrawn. The true position was, his Honour said, that there was no principle that admissions might or might not be withdrawn. Rather the Court had a broad discretion to weigh up all matters with the overall question being to ensure that there was a fair trial. His Honour accepted the principles stated by Santow J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Drabsch v Switzerland General Insurance Co Ltd (unreported, 16 October, 1996) as follows:‘1.Where a party under no apparent disability makes a clear and distinct admission which is accepted by its opponent and acted upon, for reasons of policy and the due conduct of the business of the court, an application to withdraw the admission, especially at appeal, should not be freely granted….2.The question is one for the reviewing judge to consider in the context of each particular appeal, with the general guidelines being that the person seeking on a review to withdraw a concession made should provide some good reason why the judge should disturb what was previously common ground or conceded… .3.Where a court is satisfied that admissions have been made after consideration and advice such as from the parties’ expert and after full opportunity to consider its case and whether the admission should be made, admissions so made with deliberateness and formality would ordinarily not be permitted to be withdrawn… .4.It will usually be appropriate to grant leave to withdraw an admission where it is shown that the admission is contrary to the actual facts. Leave may also be appropriate where circumstances show that the admission was made inadvertently or without due consideration of material matters. Irrespective of whether the admission has or has not been formally made, leave may be refused if the other party has changed its position in reliance upon the admission… .5.Following Cohen v McWilliam & Anor (1995) 38 NSWLR 476, a court is not obliged to give decisive weight to court efficiency, such that a party who wishes to defend its claim is entitled to a hearing on the merits, with costs orders being available as a means of compensating the other party for any costs thereby unnecessarily incurred or not fairly visited on the other party.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HILL, MADGWICK AND CONTI JJ