Rahardja v Republic of Indonesia

Link copied
Case Copied 83 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rahardja v Republic of Indonesia [2000] FCA 1297

EXTRADITION – Appeal against decision dismissing application for review of magistrate’s determination that appellant is eligible for surrender in respect of two offences – Whether primary judge erred in holding there was no extradition objection – Claim that there are substantial grounds for believing that appellant might be prejudiced at his trial or punished by reason of his race – Whether evidence established that claim – Whether Indonesian supporting documents sufficiently indicated the conduct giving rise to the relevant offences – Admissibility of supporting documents – Whether supporting documents properly authenticated.

Extradition Act 1988, ss7(c), 19, 20, 21 and 22
Prabowo v Republic of Indonesia (1995) 61 FCR 258 discussed and distinguished

HENDRA RAHARDJA v REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
N531 of 2000

WILCOX, SPENDER and DOWSETT JJ
SYDNEY
14 SEPTEMBER 2000


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N531 of 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

HENDRA RAHARDJA
Appellant

AND:

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

WILCOX, SPENDER and DOWSETT JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

14 SEPTEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant, Hendra Rahardja, pay the costs of the respondent, Republic of Indonesia.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N531 of 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

HENDRA RAHARDJA
Appellant

AND:

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

WILCOX, SPENDER and DOWSETT JJ

DATE:

14 SEPTEMBER 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. THE COURT:  This is an appeal against a decision of a Judge of the Court (Tamberlin J) dismissing an application by Hendra Rahardja to review an order of a magistrate, Mr B A Lulham, in respect of an application for his extradition to the Republic of Indonesia. Mr Lulham made a determination, under subs 19(9) of the Extradition Act 1988, that Mr Rahardja was eligible for surrender to the Republic of Indonesia in respect of two offences which he described as follows:

    “(i)Falsifying bank records contrary to Article 49(1)(a) of Indonesian Law No.7 of 1992 on Banks (1 count); and

    (ii)Being a bank officer he intentionally failed to ensure the bank did not breach Indonesian banking law contrary to Article 49(2)(b) of Indonesian Law No.7 of 1992 on Banks (1 count).”

  2. On 24 September 1999 Mr Lulham executed a warrant under subs 19(9) committing Mr Rahardja to prison to await, in relation to those offences, surrender under a surrender warrant or temporary surrender warrant or release pursuant to an order under subs 22(5) of the Extradition Act.

  3. Mr Rahardja made an application in this Court, under subs 21(1) of the Extradition Act, for review of the magistrate’s decision.  His application was heard by Tamberlin J on 28 and 29 March 2000.  On 16 May 2000 his Honour…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Rahardja v Republic of Indonesia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1297
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hendra Rahardja v Republic of Indonesia, the court was tasked with determining whether the appellant, Hendra Rahardja, should be extradited to Indonesia. The central issue in this case was whether the appellant, an ethnic Chinese businessman, would face prejudice or be treated unfairly due to his ethnicity if extradited and tried in Indonesia. The appeal arose from a decision by Tamberlin J, who dismissed the appellant’s application for review, thereby upholding the decision to extradite the appellant.

The court was required to ascertain whether Tamberlin J had correctly applied the legal test for determining an extradition objection based on potential prejudice due to ethnicity. The test involves assessing whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the appellant may suffer prejudice or be treated unfavorably because of his Chinese ethnicity if returned to Indonesia. The court examined the evidence presented, particularly the testimony of Professor Coppel, an expert on Indonesian Studies, who provided insights into the historical and ongoing discrimination against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Despite Professor Coppel’s extensive knowledge and the detailed account of past and present discrimination, the court concluded that the evidence did not establish a substantial or real chance that the appellant would be prejudiced at his trial or in punishment due to his ethnicity.

The court found that Tamberlin J had applied the correct legal test and had appropriately assessed the evidence. The court held that the evidence did not substantiate a belief that the appellant would face prejudice due to his ethnicity if extradited. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the magistrate's decision to extradite the appellant to Indonesia. Additionally, the court ordered that the appellant, Hendra Rahardja, pay the costs of the respondent, the Republic of Indonesia.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant, Hendra Rahardja, pay the costs of the respondent, Republic of Indonesia.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Tamberlin J went on to consider the submissions made on behalf of Mr Rahardja in respect of authentication of the documents and the alleged insufficiency of identification of the offences. His Honour rejected those submissions and dismissed the application for review.Extradition objection evidence(i) Professor Coppel As it was not the subject of criticism before us, it is convenient for us to adopt Tamberlin J’s summary of the evidence of Professor Coppel. His Honour said:“He has worked in the field of Indonesian Studies since 1966, and has continued that study with a particular focus on the Chinese minority. He has a law degree and a PhD and has published widely. He maintains contact with colleagues in Indonesia. He has made several trips to Indonesia and is fluent in the Indonesian language. He has paid special attention to the position of Chinese with respect to the legal system and has authored several publications on that subject. He says that the Chinese minority is seen as being an economically strong but a politically vulnerable group. In his view in order to appreciate the present position of the Chinese in Indonesia it is necessary to understand the long history of institutionalised discrimination against Chinese in Indonesia. He says this dates back to the time of Dutch colonial rule and has continued to the present time. He states that under the 1945 Constitution the Chinese had no automatic right to citizenship and therefore no entitlement to the constitutional guarantee that all citizens would have equal rights. He referred to preferences given to indigenous applicants seeking import licences during the period of the early 1950’s decade. A system then evolved known as the ‘Ali Baba’ system in which the Chinese were required to act in partnership with an indigenous ‘front man’ in order to conduct business. This became institutionalised particularly under President Soeharto.Coppel said that there was continuing discrimination against Chinese until about 1965. During this period a large number of Chinese left Indonesia. Thereafter there were restrictions on Chinese festivals and writing, and Indonesian Chinese were put under pressure to assimilate by changing to an Indonesian name for example. Restrictions were also placed on the number of Chinese permitted to attend universities. Coppel went on to say that in many respects Chinese business thrived, but only with the assistance of influential indigenous partners. He says this gave rise to a false assumption that the wealthy were all Chinese and the poor were all Indonesians.Coppel also refers to what he calls a practice of ‘scape goating’ Chinese businessmen during the Soeharto regime. This expression is used to describe a practice where a government under attack finds a group upon whom the hostility can be deflected. In addition to ‘scape goating’ of Chinese Coppel refers to a tolerance of anti-Chinese discrimination. Coppel noted that this pattern became more acute with the economic crisis experienced by Indonesia in late 1997. He refers in particular to ‘scape goating’ from the Government, the army and related persons and bodies through which prominent Chinese businessmen were accused of being disloyal. Local Chinese businessmen were seen to be responsible for speculation or hoarding, or taking advantage of the economic situation. This lead to massive riots in major urban centres which although not solely anti-Chinese were directed against them. In relation to the Habibie government which came to power in mid-1998 he agrees that tolerance for the overt anti-Chinese activity of the Soeharto years diminished but said that discrimination occurred in practice. He says that sentiment continued against Chinese businessmen, who are referred to in Indonesia as ‘conglomerates’. He says that this increased following the economic crisis of 1997. He says that there is a much stronger feeling of outrage because they are assumed to be guilty of economic crimes. He says that the applicant is a well known Chinese ‘conglomerate’. His conclusion was that it was unlikely that the applicant would receive a fair trial. He refers to a large financial scandal in the Jakarta press concerning Bank Bali which involved allegedly large scale fraud. He concedes that he was ‘not on top of the full detail of all of this’ nor did he have any familiarity of the persons involved. He expressed the view that as a consequence of this if an ethnic Chinses [sic] conglomerate were to be returned to Indonesia it would be seen as an opportunity by the President to show that he is vigorously pursuing matters to deflect attention from the Bank Bali scandals.He agreed under cross-examination that under President Habibie the situation of Chinese in general had improved with steps taken to implement human rights legislation and that there appeared to be a more sympathetic attitude to Chinese business in order to encourage repatriation of Chinese resources. He also agreed that there was an improvement in freedom of the press and a greater inclination to criticise government. He expressed some caution and noted that Indonesia’s statements of intent are not necessarily matched with implementation and practice. He also expressed some doubt over the independence of the Press if they unfairly pursued a Chinese defendant and speculated with sufficient vigour. He considered that there remained a high degree of antagonism against high profile Chinese businessmen such as the applicant. He said that even moderate indigenous Indonesian leaders are very outspoken and critical of the conglomerates.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 22 of the Act confers on the Attorney General a general discretion whether or not to surrender an “eligible person” to the extradition country, but that discretion may be exercised in favour of surrender only if six specified matters apply, including that the Attorney General is satisfied there is no extradition objection in relation to the offence.Extradition objection conclusions We accept the submissions of counsel for the appellant as to the test that must be applied in considering whether there is an extradition objection in this case. As counsel say, the inquiry concerns future and hypothetical events. Necessarily, therefore, the Court is required to engage in a deal of speculation. And it is sufficient if the person raising the objection establishes a substantial or real chance of prejudice; it is not necessary to show a probability of prejudice or any particular degree of risk of prejudice. Although we agree with counsel for the respondent that the non-existence of an extradition objection is a matter about which the Attorney General must be satisfied (under s22) before deciding to surrender the person to the extradition country, that does not relieve the magistrate of the necessity to consider the matter, if it is raised as an issue by the person whose extradition is under consideration. In the present case, the issue was raised and the magistrate considered it. He ruled the existence of an extradition objection was not established. Tamberlin J endorsed that ruling. The question is whether he erred in doing so. Notwithstanding the submission of counsel for Mr Rahardja, we do not think Tamberlin J was under a misapprehension as to the test he was required to apply. In para 40 of his reasons for judgment, quoted at para 25 above, his Honour stated the “specific question for determination”: “are there substantial grounds for believing that the applicant … may be prejudiced or punished or otherwise adversely differentially treated by reason of his Chinese Ethnicity” (our emphasis). In the last sentence of that paragraph he again used the words “may be prejudiced” (our emphasis). The words “would be treated” are used in the context of making the point that there was no evidence of a practice of treating persons of Chinese ethnicity differently, at trial, from other persons. We think his Honour’s comment, in the passage set out in para 30 above, about Professor Lindsey's evidence should be read in the same way; it was a comment about the lack of specificity in that evidence upon the critical question of practices at trial. If Tamberlin J did misunderstand the test, that would not necessarily mean the appeal should be allowed; we would need to consider whether his Honour’s order was erroneous. If, applying the correct test, the appropriate course for Tamberlin J would have been to dismiss the application for review, his Honour’s order should be allowed to stand. Notwithstanding our view that Tamberlin J did not misunderstand the test, but having regard to the importance of the issue to the appellant, we have considered for ourselves whether the evidence placed before the magistrate provides substantial grounds for a belief that, if surrendered to Indonesia, Mr Rahardja might suffer prejudice at his trial or punishment because of his race. We have concluded it does not.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established