Pauga v Chief Executive of Queensland Corrective Services

Link copied
Case Copied 91 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pauga v Chief Executive of Queensland Corrective Services [2023] FCAFC 58 

Appeal from: Pauga v Chief Executive of Queensland Corrective Services (No 6) [2022] FCA 1096
File number: SAD 151 of 2022
Judgment of: WIGNEY, BROMWICH AND ABRAHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 13 April 2023 
Catchwords:

EXTRADITION – unsuccessful application for a writ of habeas corpus – whether the primary judge erred in finding that 'brought as soon as practicable before' under s 15(1) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) requires physical attendance of person arrested – whether the primary judge erred in finding that 'for such period or periods as may be necessary for proceedings … to be conducted' under s 15(2) contemplates a remand from time to time rather than a single remand – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the principles of res judicata, issue estoppel and abuse of process prevented the appellant advancing his argument under s 15(1) – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the proceedings were conducted by a magistrate acting personum designata as required by s 45B(1) – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the s 19(2) hearing did not need to be conducted separately from the s 19(2) hearing – held: appeal dismissed – where the cross-appeal advanced that the primary judge erred in finding procedural unfairness in the conduct of the s 19 hearing in the course of otherwise dismissing an application for a writ of habeas corpus – held: cross-appeal allowed.

BAIL – reasons for dismissing an application for bail made at the conclusion of the appeal hearing – bail provisions under the Extradition Act apply.  

Legislation:

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3(a), 7, 7(1)(c), 12, 15, 15(1), 15A, 15A(4)(a), 16, 17(2A), 18, 18(2)(a)(i), 19, 19(1), 19(1)(a), 19(1)(d), 19(2), 19(2)(d), 19(5), 19(9), 19(9)(a)(i), 21, 21(2)(b), 21(2A)(a), 21(6)(f)(iv), 21(6)(g), 21A, 22, 22(5)(a), 45B(1)

Extradition (Foreign States) Act 1966 (Cth) ss 15(1)(b), 17(1), 17(2)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 196

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 178C

Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (UK) s 5

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27

Bessell v Wilson (1853) 1 El & Bl 489; 118 ER 518

Bethell v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 727

Bethell v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 3) [2021] FCA 811

Cabal v United Mexican States (No 2) [2000] FCA 445; 172 ALR 743

Censori v Adult Parole Board of Victoria [2015] VSCA 254; 254 A Crim R 455

Chan v Commonwealth, High Court of Australia, Stephen J, unreported, 12 December 1980

Chan v Minister for Justice and Customs [2001] FCA 170; 108 FCR 65

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; 187 CLR 384

Coco v The Queen [1994] HCA 15; 179…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Pauga v Chief Executive of Queensland Corrective Services and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 58
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Pauga v Chief Executive of Queensland Corrective Services involved an unsuccessful application for a writ of habeas corpus by the appellant, Pauga, challenging his extradition to Samoa. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the primary judge erred in several key findings concerning the interpretation and application of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). Specifically, the court had to decide whether the phrase 'brought as soon as practicable before' under section 15(1) necessitated the physical attendance of the person arrested, and if 'for such period or periods as may be necessary for proceedings' under section 15(2) implied a single remand or multiple remands. Additionally, the court considered whether the principles of res judicata, issue estoppel, and abuse of process precluded the appellant from arguing his case under section 15(1). The interpretation of the magistrate's role under section 45B(1) and the necessity for a separate hearing under section 19(2) were also scrutinised.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in his interpretations. Regarding the requirement for physical attendance under section 15(1), the court upheld the primary judge's decision that such attendance was not strictly necessary as long as the process was expeditious. For the interpretation of section 15(2), the court agreed with the primary judge that it allowed for multiple remands rather than a single one. The principles of res judicata, issue estoppel, and abuse of process were correctly applied to prevent the appellant from advancing certain arguments. The court also supported the primary judge’s finding that the magistrate acted in a personum designata capacity and that separate hearings under section 19(2) were not mandated. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, but the cross-appeal was allowed on the basis that the primary judge had erred in finding procedural unfairness in the conduct of the section 19 hearing.

In light of these findings, the court issued several orders. The cross-appeal was allowed, and the appeal was dismissed. The warrant of committal issued by Magistrate Previtera was restored, and the appellant was remanded in custody. Additionally, the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first, eighth, and ninth respondents before the Full Court as assessed or agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The cross-appeal is allowed.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The warrant of committal of the appellant dated 9 July 2021, issued by Magistrate Previtera pursuant to s 19(9) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), is restored.

4. The appellant is remanded in custody.

5. The appellant pay the costs of the first, eighth and ninth respondents below and before the Full Court as assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The following are our reasons for refusing bail.Background It is appropriate to recall that there were two separate proceedings before the primary judge, with bail applications being made and refused in both:(a)the s 21 review from the s 19 findings of the primary magistrate, which was dismissed by the same primary judge, with the decision and reasons published the same day as the decision and reasons the subject of this appeal: Pauga v Samoa, see above at [33]; and(b)Mr Pauga’s original habeas corpus proceeding before the primary judge, giving rise to this appeal proceeding. Bail was refused by the primary judge as part of the s 21 review proceeding because Mr Pauga was unable to meet the test of special circumstances for the grant of bail as required by s 21(6)(f)(iv): see Pauga v Samoa at [53]-[60]. There has been no appeal from the primary judge’s orders dismissing the s 21 appeal, nor any application for leave to appeal from his Honour’s decision to dismiss the application for bail made in that proceeding. Although Mr Pauga was partially successful in the habeas corpus proceeding before the primary judge upon a finding of a denial of procedural fairness in the proceedings under s 19, he wholly failed in the substance of his habeas corpus case. His Honour dismissed the bail application despite Mr Pauga’s limited success at that stage, and subsequently gave reasons for that refusal at the end of his reasons: see PJ [426]-[440]. There has been no appeal from the primary judge’s orders refusing bail in this proceeding, nor any application for leave to appeal from his Honour’s decision to refuse bail. The present bail application is therefore a fresh interlocutory application in this appeal proceeding. Strictly speaking, no regard needs to be had to the primary judge’s reasons for refusing bail given that this is a fresh bail application, rather than an appeal or review. However, his Honour’s reasons remain generally relevant and in any event, that reasoning is partially embraced by Mr Pauga and is opposed by the bail respondent. In considering, but refusing, the grant of bail in the habeas corpus proceeding, the primary judge characterised the bail application brought by Mr Pauga as seeking to invoke a common law jurisdiction to grant bail, where the Court’s jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of habeas corpus was invoked: see PJ [427]. His Honour found that there was merit in the argument advanced by Mr Pauga that there is a substantive difference between: a case in which there has been a valid exercise of executive power conferred by the Extradition Act, such that the statutory test for the grant of bail applies; and a case in which that exercise of executive power is invalid, such that a common law supervisory jurisdiction and power to protect the right to liberty from detention without lawful authority applies: see PJ [428]-[430]. That much may be accepted if there has been a finding of invalidity, or indeed if one of the stages of extradition are resolved in favour of the person who is the subject to the proceeding, and that person is still detained despite provisions of the Extradition Act requiring release. In circumstances such as that, a habeas corpus application is a mechanism by which the ordinary operation of the Extradition Act can be enforced. Although that could be achieved just as readily by seeking relief in the nature of mandamus to compel release in accordance with the terms of the Act that apply when a determination has been made that requires or compels release: see, for example, ss 7(1)(c), 17(2A), 19(1)(a), 21(2A)(a) and 22(5)(a).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Aspects of these events are addressed in more detail below.Primary judgment It is sufficient at this stage to set out an overview of the reasons of the primary judge, with further detail included below where relevant to consideration of the grounds of appeal. The case advanced by Mr Pauga before the primary judge raised many separate contentions as to why his detention was unlawful: see PJ [13]. His Honour noted that he had set out the history of the proceedings relating to the circumstances in which appeal grounds were identified in Pauga v Chief Executive of Queensland Corrective Services (No 5) [2022] FCA 684. That judgment provided reasons for his Honour’s order that the summary of grounds filed by Mr Pauga on 6 June 2021 be removed from the Court file including, inter alia, that it was fundamentally defective. A further statement of grounds was filed shortly before the final hearing before the primary judge, which are not recited in the primary judgment: see PJ [13]. In that context, his Honour categorised Mr Pauga’s contentions into 12 propositions: see PJ [14]. On each of those propositions, his Honour concluded as follows:(a)The first proposition was that, contrary to the terms of s 15(1), Mr Pauga was not brought before a magistrate as soon as reasonably practicable after his arrest (with the consequence that he had never been lawfully detained). The primary judge found that proposition to directly contradict the conclusion reached by Crow J in a separate application for a writ of habeas corpus, meaning Mr Pauga was prevented from advancing it: see PJ [243]-[251] and see below at [64]-[65] and [137]. (b)The second proposition was that, in making orders to remand Mr Pauga and directions and orders as to the conduct of the s 19 hearing, magistrates involved in the matter (including the primary magistrate) purported to exercise judicial power and thereby acted without any lawful authority. The primary judge found that this proposition depended on whether any of the magistrates approached the matter on the basis that they were exercising judicial power, in a way that impugned their actions. His Honour found that the primary magistrate had not done so, and any defect in the orders made by the magistrates who dealt with earlier remands would not entitle Mr Pauga to an order releasing him from custody: see PJ [252]-[264]. (c)The third proposition was that certain of the instruments purporting to authorise Mr Pauga’s continuing detention in the period from his arrest to the s 19 hearing were not valid because of their contents, and because they were prepared and issued by persons other than the magistrates involved in the matter. The primary judge rejected that proposition, finding that, inter alia, the contents and nature of the charge sheet and Form 44s did not support it: see PJ [265]-[275].(d)The fourth proposition was that there was no remand ordered by the primary magistrate at the hearing on 30 October 2020, with the consequence that thereafter Mr Pauga had not been lawfully detained. Given the documents before the Court referring to the fact that Mr Pauga was remanded on 30 October 2020, the primary judge found that the alleged factual basis for this proposition was not established: see PJ [276]. (e)The fifth proposition was that there was no jurisdiction to conduct the s 19 hearing unless Mr Pauga had been lawfully remanded. The primary judge explained that, on a proper construction of s 19(1)(a), the jurisdictional fact that must be established is that a decision to remand under s 15 has in fact been made (rather than it being necessary to establish that the remand was valid and lawful). Given that, on the evidence, by the time of the s 19 hearing Mr Pauga had been remanded as a matter of fact, the proposition was not established: see PJ [277]-[279].(f)The sixth proposition was that the primary magistrate did not have jurisdiction to conduct the s 19 hearing because no application had been made for proceedings to be conducted pursuant to the provision in relation to Mr Pauga. The primary judge rejected the proposition, as well as the particulars said to sustain it: see PJ [280]-[286]. (g)The seventh proposition was that the primary magistrate did not have jurisdiction to conduct the s 19 hearing because, before proceeding with it, her Honour did not form the view that Mr Pauga had been allowed reasonable time in which to prepare. The effect of this proposition was that the s 19 hearing should have been conducted in two stages, with the primary magistrate to consider the preconditions set out in s 19(1) in the first stage. The primary judge did not accept the proposition, concluding that the availability of proceeding in the manner suggested by Mr Pauga did not mean it was required in order for there to be a valid decision: see PJ [287]-[294]. (h)In alternative to the seventh proposition, the eighth proposition was that the primary magistrate’s consideration of whether Mr Pauga had been allowed a reasonable time in which to prepare for the s 19 hearing was undertaken without affording him procedural fairness. The primary judge did not accept the proposition, finding that her Honour had expressly considered that Mr Pauga had a reasonable opportunity to prepare, and concluding that s 19(1)(d) was met: see PJ [294]-[360]. (i)In alternative to the seventh and eighth propositions, the ninth proposition was that the primary magistrate’s view that s 19(1)(d) had been met was formed in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious. However, bearing in mind the significance of the provision’s character as a jurisdictional fact, the primary judge found that: the state of mind required to exist by s 19(1)(d) could not be formed arbitrarily or capriciously; and it could not be said that the opinion had not been formed genuinely and in a manner that was reasonably open: see PJ [361]-[368]. (j)The tenth proposition was that the s 19 hearing was conducted without opportunity for Mr Pauga to make submissions or adduce evidence, with the consequence that the primary magistrate did not consider whether there were any extradition objections. The primary judge found that Mr Pauga was refused an opportunity to adduce evidence, without being afforded an opportunity to advance submissions as to why evidence should be received concerning the extradition objections (despite his failure to conform to directions that had been made). Accordingly, his Honour concluded that there had been procedural unfairness in this aspect of the conduct of the s 19 hearing and accepted this proposition: see PJ [369]-[384] and see below at [39].(k)The eleventh proposition was that the Warrant of Committal was invalid by reason of the form in which it was issued. The primary judge did not accept this proposition: see PJ [385]-[393]. (l)The twelfth proposition was that s 15 does not authorise the remand of a person in prison. The primary judge did not accept this proposition: see PJ [394]-[398].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established