FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Stowers v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 174
Appeal from: Stowers v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 485 File number: NSD 714 of 2018 Judges: FLICK, GRIFFITHS AND DERRINGTON JJ Date of judgment: 12 October 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of a single Justice of the Federal Court of Australia – where the Assistant Minister determined under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act (Cth) (the Act) not to revoke a mandatory decision to cancel the appellant’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Act – where the appellant was provided with material which he was told might be taken into account in making the decision whether to revoke the visa cancellation decision – whether the primary judge erred in finding that there was no procedural unfairness – whether the appellant was given practical, direct and non-misleading advice as to how material disclosed to him might be used by the Assistant Minister – Held: appeal allowed, with costs Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 499, 501(3A), 501(6)(a), 501(7)(c), 501CA, 501G
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure Act) 1999 (NSW), s 10A
Cases cited: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Commissioner of ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; 256 CLR 326
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH [2012] FCAFC 45; 200 FCR 223
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475
NBNB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 39; 220 FCR 44
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1
Splendido v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2018] FCA 1158
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152
SZQNO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 326
Date of hearing: 10 August 2018 Date of last submissions: 17 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 61 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Johnson Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Francois Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 714 of 2018 BETWEEN: JUNIOR STOWERS
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
FLICK, GRIFFITHS AND DERRINGTON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
12 OCTOBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The Court’s orders dated 11 April 2017 be set aside.
3.The appellant’s request for revocation of the decision dated 23 December 2016 be remitted to the respondent for reconsideration according to law.
4.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceeding below, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 174
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles of procedural fairness, noting that while Mr Stowers was entitled to be made aware of the critical issues and any adverse information relevant to the decision, the decision-maker was not necessarily required to disclose every piece of information they had or might consider. The court examined the Assistant Minister's statement of reasons, particularly the paragraphs that referenced Mr Stowers' convictions for breaches of judicial orders and noncustodial dispositions, which were central to Mr Stowers' complaint of procedural unfairness.
The court concluded that the primary judge had erred in finding that there was no procedural unfairness. The Assistant Minister had failed to provide Mr Stowers with direct and non-misleading advice on how the material disclosed to him could be used in making the decision. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Assistant Minister was remitted for reconsideration according to law. The court also ordered that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceeding below, as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The Court’s orders dated 11 April 2017 be set aside.
3. The appellant’s request for revocation of the decision dated 23 December 2016 be remitted to the respondent for reconsideration according to law.
4. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceeding below, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Assistant Minister defended the primary judge’s decision. He placed particular emphasis on the significance of Direction 65 which, he submitted, made plain that the appellant’s criminal record and his risk of reoffending were critical issues for decision (referring to cll 13(2)(a), 13.1, 13.1.1 and 13.1.2 of the Direction). The Assistant Minister submitted that the appellant had been alerted to the adverse nature of the National Police Certificate by Direction 65, the sentencing remarks in the Local Court and the District Court on appeal, as well as “the apparent nature of the power and common sense”. Consideration and determination It was common ground that procedural fairness requirements applied to a decision made under s 501CA(4). It was also common ground that the statutory requirement under s 501CA(3)(a)(ii) to provide “particulars of relevant information” only applied to information which the Minister considered was information which would be the reason or part of the reason for making the original decision to refuse to grant or to cancel a visa. It was not disputed that this statutory provision is inapplicable to the separate and subsequent decision under s 501CA(4) whether or not to revoke the original decision. It is appropriate, therefore, to focus on the requirements of procedural fairness in the particular circumstances of this case. There is the following helpful statement of relevant general principles concerning procedural fairness in Snedden v Minister for Justice for the Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCAFC 156; 230 FCR 82 at [175]-[178] per Middleton and Wigney JJ:175.There is no dispute that Mr Snedden was entitled to procedural fairness at the s 22 stage of the extradition process: Santhirarajah at [324]. In general terms that means the Minister was relevantly obliged to inform Mr Snedden of the case against him and provide him with a reasonable opportunity to answer it: Minister for Immigration v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 at [40]. Mr Snedden was entitled to be made aware of, and have the opportunity to address, the critical issues or factors on which the decision was likely to turn, as well as any adverse information that was credible, relevant and significant to the decision to be made: Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 (Kioa) at 587 (Mason J) and 629 (Brennan J); Applicant VEAL/2002 v Minister for Immigration (2005) 225 CLR 88 (VEAL) at [15]. 176.That is not to say that a decision-maker is necessarily required to disclose to a person affected by the decision every piece of information that the decision-maker has or might consider: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223 (SZQHH) at [30]. Nor is a decision-maker necessarily required to disclose issues in respect of which the person is already on notice or information the substance of which is already known to the person: SZQHH at [30]; Brock at [22]. Whilst a decision-maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material, there is no obligation for the decision-maker to expose mental processes or provisional views: Commissioner of ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 (Alphaone) at 592. 177.The rules of procedural fairness do not have an immutably fixed content: Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 638 at [156]. There are no concrete rules as to what procedures a decision-maker must employ to provide procedural fairness in any particular case. What will be both sufficient and necessary to ensure a fair hearing in any given case will depend on, and vary with, the context in which a decision-maker acts, including any statutory or regulatory requirements or considerations: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 (SZBEL) at [26], [29]; Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252 (Saeed) at [19]-[20]; SZQHH at [26]; see too Re Minster for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 at [30]-[32]. The content of procedural fairness is flexible and adaptable to the circumstances of the particular case (Saeed at [18]) and must be approached on the basis of what is reasonable (Kioa at 627) and necessary to avoid “practical injustice”: Lam at [37]-[38]. 178.As the Full Court (Allsop CJ, Middleton and Foster JJ) in TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 83 reminded us at [86]:86.The required content of fairness in any particular case will depend on context: constitutional, statutory and human, on all the circumstances of the case: Salemi v MacKellar (No 2) [1977] HCA 26; 137 CLR 396 at 419. The fairness required relates principally to the procedure employed in dealing with the party in question. That may involve the exercise of state or governmental power over the individual, who may be vulnerable and powerless, or a great corporation. The terms of any statute will be critical. The common element is that, generally speaking, the exercise of power should be fair. That exercise will always have a human context. That is why, as Gleeson CJ said in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1 at 14, fairness is not an abstract concept, but essentially practical. The concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice. Fairness is normative, evaluative, context-specific and relative.