FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hempenstall v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 216
Appeal from: Hempenstall v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 686 File number(s): VID 395 of 2020 Judgment of: RARES, NICHOLAS AND BURLEY JJ Date of judgment: 4 December 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether primary judge mischaracterised appellant’s submission about alleged sole significant factor in Minister’s decision to cancel his visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether appellant denied procedural fairness due to Minister’s alleged failure to draw his attention specifically to not obvious and natural conclusion from material in notice of intention to cancel visa – whether material in notice of intention to cancel visa provided appellant with practical, direct and non-misleading advice about matters on which decision likely to turn – held: appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2), 501(6),
Direction 65 – Visa Refusal and Cancellation under s 501 cl 9.1.2
Cases cited: Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Degning v Minister of Home Affairs (2019) 270 FCR 451
Minister for Home Affairs v Smith [2019] FCAFC 137
NBNB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 44
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1
Stowers v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 265 FCR 177
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 46 Date of hearing: 24 November 2020 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T. Bagley with Mr B. O’Connor Solicitor for the Appellant: MyVisa Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A.F. Solomon-Bridge Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore ORDERS
VID 395 of 2020 BETWEEN: ASHLEY HEMPENSTALL
Appellant
AND: MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RARES, NICHOLAS AND BURLEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
4 DECEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Ashley Hempenstall was born in London and arrived in Australia at the age of three in 1971.
On 30 April 2018, the Minister, acting personally, cancelled Mr Hempenstall’s class BF transitional (permanent) visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on the ground that Mr Hempenstall had not satisfied the Minister that he passed the character test in s 501(6).
Mr Hempenstall’s sentence of imprisonment
The reason that Mr Hempenstall did not pass the character test in s 501(6) was that he had been convicted, on 17 September 2012 in the County Court of Victoria, of three offences relating to child pornography. He received a total effective sentence of 13 months’ imprisonment, to be…
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- Case
- [2020] FCAFC 216
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge had correctly determined that the potential for future substance abuse was not the sole significant factor considered by the Minister in deciding to cancel Mr Hempenstall’s visa. The Minister had also taken into account the seriousness of Mr Hempenstall’s criminal offences under the consideration of “Protecting the Australian Community.” The court held that the primary judge’s findings were supported by the material provided to Mr Hempenstall, including the sentencing remarks and Direction 65, which made it clear that the risk of reoffending, including the potential for substance abuse, was a significant consideration. Therefore, the court found that the primary judge was correct in concluding that Mr Hempenstall was aware that his potential future substance abuse and rehabilitation could be critical issues for the Minister in exercising the discretion to cancel his visa.
Furthermore, the court held that the primary judge did not err in her consideration of whether the Minister had provided Mr Hempenstall with practical, direct, and non-misleading advice about the matters on which the decision was likely to turn. The sentencing remarks and other material provided to Mr Hempenstall contained information that was relevant to the issue of substance abuse and made it clear that this was a critical issue in the decision-making process. The court concluded that the primary judge’s detailed and careful consideration of the material and the applicable authorities demonstrated that she had correctly applied the law.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs. This decision reinforces the principle that procedural fairness requires the decision-maker to provide sufficient information to allow the person affected by the decision to adequately respond to the issues that are likely to be critical in the decision-making process. However, it also underscores that the primary judge must carefully consider whether the material provided was sufficient to alert the person to the critical issues in the decision-making process.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In oral submissions Mr Hempenstall’s counsel argued that the reasoning in cases such as Degning 270 FCR at 455 [12]–[13] commanded the conclusion that his attention should have been directed to the critical issues or facts on which the decision was likely to turn, where those issues or facts were not an obvious and natural conclusion to draw. He argued that it was not fair, in all the circumstances, for the Minister to cancel Mr Hempenstall’s visa without having directed him to the critical issue of the potential for him to reoffend if he resorted again to substance abuse. He relied on Stowers 265 FCR at 194–195 [48]–[49] to support the contention that he should have been put on notice of the need to address the issue of substance abuse. He argued that her Honour erred in failing to find that there was “an insufficient level of granularity” in the material enclosed with the notice, and that a reasonable person in his position would not have been alerted to the need to deal with the potential for substance abuse in the future, having regard to the generally positive sentencing remarks.Consideration Neither ground of appeal should succeed. Mr Hempenstall’s arguments largely overlapped.Ground 1 The primary judge was correct, for the reasons she gave, to find that the potential for future substance abuse was not the sole significant factor that weighed against him. That was because the Minister had regard to the seriousness of the nature of Mr Hempenstall’s offending under the separate primary consideration of “Protecting the Australian Community”. As the primary judge explained, the Minister found that his offending was “very serious” and that he had been “sentenced as a serious sexual offender”. In those circumstances, the first ground of appeal, that elevated the issue of future substance abuse to the “sole” or a “critical” issue before the Minister, is untenable. That issue was a significant, but not the only, issue that the material provided to Mr Hempenstall with the notice entitled the Minister to consider in deciding whether to cancel the visa. Her Honour was also correct to dismiss Mr Hempenstall’s argument that the Minister failed to accord him procedural fairness by not specifically drawing attention to his need to deal with the possibility of his future substance abuse. The sentencing remarks had addressed Mr Hempenstall’s long term propensity to engage in substance abuse involving drugs and alcohol when under stress, and the role that his abuse of those substances had played in his offending behaviour. As her Honour found, his own responses to the personal circumstances form referred to the fact that he had “turned to drugs and alcohol to suppress my anxiety and depression which dragged me to a further low point”.Ground 2 Mr Hempenstall’s arguments on ground 2 are also without substance. Her Honour made no error in her careful, detailed consideration of the second ground of review and correctly applied the authorities. Nothing put to us in Mr Hempenstall’s written or oral argument identified any error in the primary judge’s consideration of this matter.