Hempenstall v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hempenstall v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 216

Appeal from: Hempenstall v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 686
File number(s): VID 395 of 2020
Judgment of: RARES, NICHOLAS AND BURLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 4 December 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether primary judge mischaracterised appellant’s submission about alleged sole significant factor in Minister’s decision to cancel his visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether appellant denied procedural fairness due to Minister’s alleged failure to draw his attention specifically to not obvious and natural conclusion from material in notice of intention to cancel visa – whether material in notice of intention to cancel visa provided appellant with practical, direct and non-misleading advice about matters on which decision likely to turn – held: appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2), 501(6),

Direction 65 – Visa Refusal and Cancellation under s 501 cl 9.1.2

Cases cited:

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576

Degning v Minister of Home Affairs (2019) 270 FCR 451

Minister for Home Affairs v Smith [2019] FCAFC 137

NBNB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 44

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1

Stowers v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 265 FCR 177

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 46
Date of hearing: 24 November 2020
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T. Bagley with Mr B. O’Connor
Solicitor for the Appellant: MyVisa Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A.F. Solomon-Bridge
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

VID 395 of 2020
BETWEEN:

ASHLEY HEMPENSTALL

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES, NICHOLAS AND BURLEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

4 DECEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. Ashley Hempenstall was born in London and arrived in Australia at the age of three in 1971.

  2. On 30 April 2018, the Minister, acting personally, cancelled Mr Hempenstall’s class BF transitional (permanent) visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on the ground that Mr Hempenstall had not satisfied the Minister that he passed the character test in s 501(6).

    Mr Hempenstall’s sentence of imprisonment

  3. The reason that Mr Hempenstall did not pass the character test in s 501(6) was that he had been convicted, on 17 September 2012 in the County Court of Victoria, of three offences relating to child pornography. He received a total effective sentence of 13 months’ imprisonment, to be…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 216
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hempenstall v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, Mr Hempenstall, appealed against the decision of the primary judge to dismiss his challenge to the Minister’s decision to cancel his visa under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Mr Hempenstall argued that the Minister did not afford him procedural fairness because he was not specifically directed to address the potential for future substance abuse as a critical issue in the decision-making process. The central issue before the court was whether the primary judge had correctly assessed whether the Minister had provided Mr Hempenstall with sufficient information to satisfy the principles of procedural fairness in relation to the Minister’s decision to cancel his visa.

The court found that the primary judge had correctly determined that the potential for future substance abuse was not the sole significant factor considered by the Minister in deciding to cancel Mr Hempenstall’s visa. The Minister had also taken into account the seriousness of Mr Hempenstall’s criminal offences under the consideration of “Protecting the Australian Community.” The court held that the primary judge’s findings were supported by the material provided to Mr Hempenstall, including the sentencing remarks and Direction 65, which made it clear that the risk of reoffending, including the potential for substance abuse, was a significant consideration. Therefore, the court found that the primary judge was correct in concluding that Mr Hempenstall was aware that his potential future substance abuse and rehabilitation could be critical issues for the Minister in exercising the discretion to cancel his visa.

Furthermore, the court held that the primary judge did not err in her consideration of whether the Minister had provided Mr Hempenstall with practical, direct, and non-misleading advice about the matters on which the decision was likely to turn. The sentencing remarks and other material provided to Mr Hempenstall contained information that was relevant to the issue of substance abuse and made it clear that this was a critical issue in the decision-making process. The court concluded that the primary judge’s detailed and careful consideration of the material and the applicable authorities demonstrated that she had correctly applied the law.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs. This decision reinforces the principle that procedural fairness requires the decision-maker to provide sufficient information to allow the person affected by the decision to adequately respond to the issues that are likely to be critical in the decision-making process. However, it also underscores that the primary judge must carefully consider whether the material provided was sufficient to alert the person to the critical issues in the decision-making process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister concluded that, substantially because of the lack of evidence before him about Mr Hempenstall’s rehabilitation from substance abuse, he represented an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community and that the protection of the Australian community outweighed any countervailing considerations. For that reason the Minister decided to exercise his discretion to cancel Mr Hempenstall’s visa.The primary judge’s decision Before the primary judge, Mr Hempenstall challenged the Minister’s decision on the ground that he had not been afforded procedural fairness in two respects. Only the second is relevant for the purposes of this appeal. That ground was that the Minister had made a critical finding that Mr Hempenstall could abuse substances in the future and may reoffend, where such a finding was not an obvious and natural conclusion to draw from the material in the notice provided to Mr Hempenstall. Mr Hempenstall contended that the sentencing remarks would have conveyed that he had made significant gains with the psychologist in his treatment for substance abuse, albeit that this treatment was still at its early stages in 2012. He contended that he had put before the Minister evidence of attending a psychologist every fortnight for 10 months after being charged, and only ceasing his treatment once satisfied that he understood the consequences of his actions and behaviours. He contended that the material he had placed before the Minister all suggested that he had substantively rehabilitated and that nothing had occurred following his sentencing that would suggest that he might engage again in substance abuse. Accordingly, Mr Hempenstall argued that procedural fairness required the Minister to have put him on notice that his “potential future substance abuse and rehabilitation was a… or arguably the critical issue” for the Minister in the exercise of his discretion in accordance with the principles in Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576. Her Honour dismissed that ground of review. The primary judge found that Mr Hempenstall would have been aware, on reading Direction 65, including cl 9.1.2, that the decision-maker was likely to consider and assess the risk that he might again commit a child pornography related offence or offences and that, if there were such a risk, the decision-maker would take into account the available information and evidence relevant to that risk. Her Honour also found that on reading Direction 65 carefully, Mr Hempenstall would have appreciated that the decision-maker might find that any risk that he might reoffend was unacceptable. She held that, bearing in mind his conviction for what were undoubtedly serious offences, Mr Hempenstall should have been aware that it was important to place all relevant information and evidence that he could before the decision-maker so as to satisfy him or her that there was no risk that he would reoffend. Given what the sentencing judge said in his remarks, which were part of the material provided to Mr Hempenstall with the notice, her Honour said that he would have been aware that the focus of the decision-maker’s concern regarding the risk of his reoffending was that he might repeat the conduct (including substance abuse) that had resulted in his convictions for child pornography offences. Her Honour found that:As indicated below, the sentencing remarks contained information adverse to the applicant that, on any view, was “credible, relevant and significant” to the issue of substance abuse. The very fact that these remarks were sent to the applicant with the June 2017 Notice should have indicated to the applicant that the remarks, including those with respect to substance abuse, could be used by the decision-maker in making a decision under s 501(2) of the Migration Act. If the applicant had any doubt about this, however, the June 2017 Notice expressly stated that Direction 65, the applicant’s National Police Certificate and the sentencing remarks “consist of information … which the decision-maker may rely on to decide whether you pass the character test; and if not, whether your visa should be cancelled”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In oral submissions Mr Hempenstall’s counsel argued that the reasoning in cases such as Degning 270 FCR at 455 [12]–[13] commanded the conclusion that his attention should have been directed to the critical issues or facts on which the decision was likely to turn, where those issues or facts were not an obvious and natural conclusion to draw. He argued that it was not fair, in all the circumstances, for the Minister to cancel Mr Hempenstall’s visa without having directed him to the critical issue of the potential for him to reoffend if he resorted again to substance abuse. He relied on Stowers 265 FCR at 194–195 [48]–[49] to support the contention that he should have been put on notice of the need to address the issue of substance abuse. He argued that her Honour erred in failing to find that there was “an insufficient level of granularity” in the material enclosed with the notice, and that a reasonable person in his position would not have been alerted to the need to deal with the potential for substance abuse in the future, having regard to the generally positive sentencing remarks.Consideration Neither ground of appeal should succeed. Mr Hempenstall’s arguments largely overlapped.Ground 1 The primary judge was correct, for the reasons she gave, to find that the potential for future substance abuse was not the sole significant factor that weighed against him. That was because the Minister had regard to the seriousness of the nature of Mr Hempenstall’s offending under the separate primary consideration of “Protecting the Australian Community”. As the primary judge explained, the Minister found that his offending was “very serious” and that he had been “sentenced as a serious sexual offender”. In those circumstances, the first ground of appeal, that elevated the issue of future substance abuse to the “sole” or a “critical” issue before the Minister, is untenable. That issue was a significant, but not the only, issue that the material provided to Mr Hempenstall with the notice entitled the Minister to consider in deciding whether to cancel the visa. Her Honour was also correct to dismiss Mr Hempenstall’s argument that the Minister failed to accord him procedural fairness by not specifically drawing attention to his need to deal with the possibility of his future substance abuse. The sentencing remarks had addressed Mr Hempenstall’s long term propensity to engage in substance abuse involving drugs and alcohol when under stress, and the role that his abuse of those substances had played in his offending behaviour. As her Honour found, his own responses to the personal circumstances form referred to the fact that he had “turned to drugs and alcohol to suppress my anxiety and depression which dragged me to a further low point”.Ground 2 Mr Hempenstall’s arguments on ground 2 are also without substance. Her Honour made no error in her careful, detailed consideration of the second ground of review and correctly applied the authorities. Nothing put to us in Mr Hempenstall’s written or oral argument identified any error in the primary judge’s consideration of this matter.