FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 574
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the AAT correctly applied the standard of satisfaction in determining good character and if it was appropriate to consider the applicant's diligence in his dealings with governmental bodies. The court needed to determine whether the AAT's application of a higher standard than required by law constituted an error and whether such an error warranted setting aside the AAT's decision. Furthermore, the court had to decide if the applicant's lack of diligence in providing documents to support his citizenship application was a proper consideration in the assessment of his good character.
The court found that the AAT erred in applying the standard of "comfortable satisfaction" instead of the statutory requirement of being "satisfied" with the applicant's good character. This misapplication of the legal standard led to an incorrect assessment of the applicant's character. Additionally, the court held that the AAT's consideration of the applicant's lack of diligence in dealing with governmental bodies was misplaced because such conduct did not directly relate to the question of good character. Consequently, the court concluded that the AAT's decision should be set aside, and the matter should be remitted to the AAT for reconsideration according to law. The court declined to make a finding of fact regarding the applicant's good character under section 44(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Tribunal’s decision of 22 November 2018 be set aside.
2. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal to be heard and decided again according to law.
3. The first respondent pay the costs of the applicant.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Tribunal err in applying a test of "comfortable satisfaction" in determining whether the applicant was a person of good character under s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)?
2. Did the Tribunal err in taking into account the applicant’s lack of diligence in his dealings with governmental bodies in assessing good character under s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)?
3. Should the Court make a finding of fact as to good character under s 44(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)?
Held
1. The court held that the Tribunal erred in applying a test of "comfortable satisfaction" in determining whether the applicant was a person of good character under s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth). As a result, the Tribunal's decision should be set aside.
2. The court found that the Tribunal erred in taking into account the applicant's lack of diligence in his dealings with governmental bodies when assessing good character under s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth). This consideration was deemed irrelevant to the assessment of good character.
3. The court refused the applicant's request to make a finding of fact as to good character under s 44(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
To be clear, the error in the Tribunal’s decision is not the Tribunal’s assessment of the relative weight to be given to conduct that reflected positively and negatively on the applicant’s character. That is a matter for the Tribunal: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41 per Mason J. The error lies in the choice of the legal standard that the Tribunal applied to its task under s 21(2)(h). The Tribunal’s findings with respect to the conduct that reflected positively and negatively on the applicant’s character inferentially supports the conclusion that the Tribunal adopted an erroneous standard, requiring the Tribunal to be comfortably satisfied (more than satisfied) of the applicant’s good character, rather than being satisfied. Ground 2 – irrelevant consideration By ground 2, the applicant contends that the Tribunal erred in concluding that its finding of fact that the applicant exhibited “a lack of diligence and civic responsibility in his dealings with governmental bodies” was relevant to the question whether the applicant “is of good character”. Two questions arise on this ground: first, whether the Tribunal took into account, when reaching a conclusion as to the applicant’s character under s 21(2)(h), its findings about the applicant’s “lack of diligence and civic responsibility in his dealings with governmental bodies”; second, if and to the extent it did, was it in error to do so. As discussed earlier, one of the categories of conduct considered by the Member in assessing whether the applicant was a person of good character was the applicant’s failure to produce documents promptly in order to establish his identity. The Member recorded the Minister’s reliance upon the following conduct of the applicant (at [65]):(a)the failure to produce any documents to establish identity upon arrival on Christmas Island;(b)the production of educational documents only in response to the first Department request made in September 2016;(c)the production of his parents’ identity cards in May 2017 in response to the second Department request;(d)the production of his identity card and NADRA certificate only after his citizenship application was refused by the delegate;(e)the consistent failure to declare to the Department that he held a Pakistani driver’s licence; and(f)the failure to produce a copy of the record of his birthdate in the family’s Koran. Earlier in his reasons, on the issue of the applicant’s identity, the Member made the following findings with respect to the applicant’s production of documents (at [30] and [31]):The Applicant’s explanation for not producing his Pakistani passport and identity card is that the originals were taken from him by people smugglers before he arrived in Australia. I accept this explanation. The Applicant stated that he did not apply for a replacement passport because he had no need for it as he had an Australian visa and in any event he had no desire to travel outside Australia. He said that he obtained a new identity card when requested by his lawyer for the purpose of his citizenship application. He said he did not produce his Pakistani driver’s licence because it was not treated as an official document in Pakistan as it is in Australia. He stated that all he needed to do to obtain his licence was pay a fee and get two village elders to sign it. He said that he discarded his Pakistani licence once he obtained his Victorian licence. He explained that he did not produce a copy of his family Koran to evidence his date of birth because it was not an official document and no-one had asked him to do so.It is clear that the Applicant has been less than diligent in failing to provide these documents to the Department to support his application. I accept that the Applicant could have produced each of the documents if he had made the effort to do so. However, the explanation he has given in each case is plausible and, given the probative value of the documents he did produce, I am prepared to accept his explanation as cogent and acceptable.