GJDB and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship)
[2023] AATA 3245
•11 October 2023
GJDB and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2023] AATA 3245 (11 October 2023)
Division:General Division
File Number(s):2023/0787
Re:GJDB
APPLICANT
AndMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:The Hon Justice Kyrou, President
Date:11 October 2023
Place:Melbourne
Pursuant to s 43(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the matter to the respondent for reconsideration with a direction that the prohibition in s 24(3) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 does not apply to the applicant.
...........................[SGD]...........................................
Justice Kyrou
Catchwords
CITIZENSHIP – concept of ‘identity’ for purposes of s 24(3) of Australian Citizenship Act 2007 – relevant legal principles – concept bound up with sameness of a human being – individual indicia of identity such as name, appearance and documents must not be conflated with identity itself – BQG21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 865 applied.
CITIZENSHIP – state of being ‘satisfied’ of a person’s identity for purposes of s 24(3) of Australian Citizenship Act 2007 – relevant legal principles.
MINISTERIAL POLICY – citizenship policy instructions promulgated by Minister on assessing identity – whether policy instructions should be applied by Tribunal unless good reasons exist – policy instructions directed at process of reasoning for forming a statutory state of satisfaction – policy instructions not those of the kind referred to in Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 – policy instructions do not bind Tribunal but can be adopted by Tribunal if considered helpful – Green v Daniels (1977) 13 ALR 1 applied.
CITIZENSHIP – citizenship by conferral – delegate not satisfied of applicant’s identity – applicant claimed to be an Afghan national who had fled to Pakistan – applicant held Pakistani identity documents in a different name – Pakistani identity documents found to have been obtained fraudulently – strong evidence of continuum in applicant’s claimed identity – delegate’s decision set aside and matter remitted to respondent for reconsideration with a direction that prohibition in s 24(3) of Australian Citizenship Act 2007 does not apply to applicant.
Legislation
Australian Citizenship Act 2007
Cases
BQG21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 865
BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Green v Daniels (1977) 13 ALR 1
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173
Secondary Materials
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report Pakistan (Report, 20 February 2019)
Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Citizenship Procedural Instruction 16 – Assessing Identity under the Citizenship Act (Policy, 1 January 2022)
Landinfo, Report Afghanistan: Tazkera, passports and other ID documents (Report, 22 May 2019)
Table of Contents
Decision
REASONS FOR DECISION
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELEVANT PRINCIPLES
APPLICANT’S FACTUAL CONTENTIONS
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND CREDIT FINDINGS
AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI IDENTITY DOCUMENTS
Afghan identity documents
Pakistani identity documents
CONTENTIONS (1) TO (10): THE AFGHANISTAN PERIOD
Evidence relating to the Afghanistan period
Parties’ submissions relating to the Afghanistan period
Factual findings regarding the Afghanistan period
CONTENTIONS (11) TO (15): THE PAKISTAN PERIOD
Evidence relating to the Pakistan period
Parties’ submissions relating to the Pakistan period
Factual findings relating to the Pakistan period
CONTENTIONS (16) TO (20): THE AUSTRALIAN PERIOD
PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
OUTCOME OF APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
DECISION
Table of Pseudonyms
Pseudonym
Relationship to the applicant GJDB The applicant MJ The name the applicant claims falsely relates to him on the Pakistani identity documents AA The person the applicant claims is his father MNM The name which the applicant claims falsely refers to AA in an Afghan passport MA The person the applicant claims is his mother MU The person the applicant claims is his uncle (AA’s brother) GA The person the applicant claims is his paternal grandfather (AA and MU’s father) GH The person the applicant claims is his maternal grandfather (MA’s father) KB The person the applicant claims is his great-grandfather (the father of both of the applicant’s grandfathers, GA and GH) NB The person the applicant claims is one of his sisters FA The name the applicant claims falsely refers to NB on the Pakistani identity documents FB The person the applicant claims is one of his sisters AM The name the applicant claims falsely refers to FB on the Pakistani identity documents RB The person the applicant claims is one of his younger brothers ZB The person the applicant claims is one of his younger brothers YU The person the applicant claims is one of his cousins (MU’s son) BU The person the applicant claims is one of his cousins (MU’s son) WB The person the applicant claims is his wife IB The person the applicant claims is his son MI The name of the agent whom the applicant claims sold AA Pakistani identity documents MH The name of the agent’s father as recorded in the Pakistani identity documents NS The person the applicant claims is a friend who was born in the same village as the applicant ES The person the applicant claims is a friend who attended the same Pakistani schools as the applicant PPS The name of the primary school the applicant claims to have attended in Pakistan. PSS The name of the secondary school the applicant claims to have attended in Pakistan. ESS The erroneous name of the secondary school the applicant stated he had attended in Pakistan. REASONS FOR DECISION
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The applicant has sought review of a decision dated 7 February 2023 made by a delegate of the Minister (‘Delegate’) to refuse his application to become an Australian citizen on the basis of the statutory prohibition in s 24(3) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (‘Act’). As appears from [6] below, that section prevents the Minister from approving a person becoming a citizen unless the Minister is satisfied of the person’s identity.
The applicant arrived in Australia by boat in 2010. He claims that he was born in 1987 in Afghanistan to Afghan parents, and that, accordingly, he is an Afghan national. Prior to coming to Australia, he spent some time in Pakistan where, he alleges, his father was able to fraudulently obtain Pakistani identity documents with different names for the applicant and his sisters. The applicant alleges that, notwithstanding those identity documents, he is, and has only been, a legitimate citizen of Afghanistan with the same name as that in his application for Australian citizenship.
The Delegate concluded that the applicant’s identity could not be satisfactorily ascertained and, as such, she was prohibited from approving his application under s 24(3) of the Act.
It should be noted that some very significant evidence that was before the Tribunal in support of the applicant’s identity was not before the Delegate. In the light of the more limited evidentiary basis upon which the Delegate made her decision, it will not be necessary for me to discuss the reasons for her decision.
For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied of the applicant’s identity. Accordingly, the Delegate’s decision will be set aside and the matter will be remitted to the respondent for reconsideration with a direction that the prohibition in s 24(3) of the Act does not apply to the applicant.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELEVANT PRINCIPLES
Section 24 of the Act relevantly provides:
24 Minister’s decision
(1)If a person makes an application under section 21, the Minister must, by writing, approve or refuse to approve the person becoming an Australian citizen.
…
(3)The Minister must not approve the person becoming an Australian citizen unless the Minister is satisfied of the identity of the person.
Section 24 is to be construed according to established principles of statutory construction. The starting point is the text of the statutory provision, considered in the light of its context and purpose. Context includes the legislative context, because the meaning of the provision must be determined by reference to the entire Act.[1]
[1] This paragraph is based upon James v The King [2023] VSCA 34, [28], which cites SAS Trustee Corporation v Miles (2018) 265 CLR 137, 149 [20], 157 [41], 162-3 [64], Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, 46-7 [47] and Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381 [69].
The word ‘identity’ is not defined in the Act and it does not have a single meaning, as its meaning can vary according to the statutory or other context in which it is used. In some contexts, ‘identity’ may have a broad meaning which incorporates a person’s views of themselves and their cultural attributes. In other contexts, ‘identity’ may have a narrower meaning which focuses exclusively upon physical traits – such as those found in DNA or fingerprints – that are unique to each individual.
Dictionary definitions of ‘identity’ tend to incorporate a spectrum of meanings, including those referred to above. For example, one of the definitions of ‘identity’ in the Oxford English Dictionary is: ‘The sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition of being a single individual; the fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else; individuality, personality’. All but the last two words in that definition may be seen to reflect the concept of permanent sameness, whereas the last two words may be seen to reflect a broader concept of outward expression of a person’s character.
In my opinion, s 24(3) of the Act uses the word ‘identity’ in the sense that the person seeking citizenship is the human being that they claim to be. Identity involves a continuum: a person remains the same human being from the moment they are born until the moment they die. In between these times, many attributes associated with them – such as their name, physical appearance (such as their height, weight and the colour of their hair), personality, gender, nationality, languages spoken, manner of speaking and religion – and their life experiences and fortunes may change, but they will remain the same human being.[2] Whilst each of these matters may assist in ascertaining a person’s identity, it is of fundamental importance that, for the purposes of s 24(3), they are not confused with, or treated as equivalent to, a person’s identity.
[2] Some changes may occur naturally whilst others may involve surgical intervention. The reference to ‘nationality’ in this context is to the legal status of being a member of a particular nation and being entitled to the rights and subject to the obligations of that membership. See generally Tji v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 158 ALR 681, 685–6, 689, citing Liechtenstein v Guatemala (1955) ICJR 4.
The above analysis is consistent with the observations of Mortimer CJ in BQG21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.[3] Her Honour stated that the concept of identity for the purposes of s 24(3) of the Act ‘is about an assessment of whether the repository of the power to confer citizenship is satisfied the human being who is the individual applying for citizenship is the person they say they are, with the relevant background to their citizenship application they rely on, and not a different human being with a different background which may affect their citizenship application.’ [4] She added that it is erroneous to conflate a person’s names with the concept of identity.[5]
[3] [2023] FCA 865 (‘BQG21’).
[4] BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [32].
[5] BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [32], [35], [45].
Section 24(3) of the Act does not require the Minister – or the Tribunal in performing its review function – to exercise a discretion. Instead, it requires that the Minister make an evaluative judgment and form an opinion about a person’s identity. If the Minister is satisfied of a person’s identity, the Minister is not required by s 24(3) to refuse to approve them becoming an Australian citizen. That section prompts a binary choice; the Minister is either satisfied of the applicant’s identity or the Minister is not.
The position of the Minister, in evaluating a person’s identity, is similar to that of the Director-General in Green v Daniels.[6] In that case, Stephen J stated that the Director-General was not carrying out any policy and no general discretion was conferred upon him; instead, specific criteria were laid down by the relevant statute and all that was left for him to do was ‘to decide whether or not he attains a state of satisfaction that the circumstances exist to which each of these criteria refer.’[7]
[6] (1977) 13 ALR 1.
[7] Green v Daniels (1977) 13 ALR 1, 9.
Section 24(3) of the Act does not require a person to ‘prove’ their identity, but it does require the Minister – and the Tribunal in performing its review function – to form a state of satisfaction of the person’s identity reasonably and rationally on the material before them. If that material is not sufficient to enable the formation of such a state of satisfaction, the prohibition in s 24(3) is not overcome.[8]
[8] BOY19 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 574, [57] (‘BOY19’); BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [13], [24].
Section 24(3) of the Act does not elaborate on how the Minister is to be satisfied of the identity of a person.[9] However, it is clear that the section does not require that the state of satisfaction be formed in accordance with the principles in Briginshaw v Briginshaw.[10] Expressions such as ‘comfortably satisfied’, ‘more than satisfied’ and ‘well and truly satisfied’ to describe the state of satisfaction required by s 24(3) are inappropriate and should not be used.[11] Further, the balance of probabilities standard of proof that applies in civil proceedings in a court does not apply for the purposes of s 24(3).[12]
[9] BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [10].
[10] (1938) 60 CLR 336. See BOY19 [2019] FCA 574, [57].
[11] In BOY19 [2019] FCA 574, [54], [65]–[66], O’Bryan J stated that use of the phrase ‘comfortably satisfied’ to describe the state of satisfaction set out in s 21(2)(h) of the Act is erroneous because it suggests that the section mandates a higher degree of satisfaction – being well and truly satisfied – than the section requires.
[12] BOY19 [2019] FCA 574, [54], [57].
Whilst the Act does not specifically permit the issuing of ministerial instructions, the Minister has issued Citizenship Procedural Instruction 16 – Assessing Identity under the Citizenship Act (‘CPI 16’). CPI 16 refers to the following three ‘pillars’ as being relevant to the assessment of identity:
(a)biometrics, which include fingerprints and facial images;
(b)documents, being reliable and secure identity documents; and
(c)life story, being an account of the events that happened to a person during their lifetime.
CPI 16 further provides as follows:
(a)officers must seek to establish a person’s identity from birth using an evidence-based approach. It is not sufficient to be satisfied of a person’s identity at one point in time, as a person’s identity is not a point in time concept, and must be verified incrementally throughout a person’s life and considered holistically; and
(b)officers may have regard to relevant country information to assess a person’s life story, particularly where that person is unable to provide identity documents to support their identity.
CPI 16 is an expression of government policy intended to provide guidance to decision-makers in relation to the exercise of the power in s 24(3) to assess a person’s identity for the purposes of the Act.[13]
[13] BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [10]–[11].
There are many types of government policies with potentially different consequences for decision-making by the Tribunal. In the present case, it is only necessary to consider three types of policies.
The first type of policy seeks to provide guidance to public officers about how they should exercise a discretion conferred by a statutory instrument. For example, a statute may confer a discretion on public officers to make grants of up to $50,000 to flood victims without specifying any criteria for determining the amount of the grant in any particular case or class of cases. A government policy may provide that, in determining the amount of a grant in a particular case, an officer must award the full amount if a person becomes homeless for more than nine months as a result of the floods and lesser amounts depending on whether certain criteria are satisfied. If the Tribunal is satisfied that the policy is valid and consistent with the statute, ordinarily the Tribunal would be expected to apply the policy provided that the Tribunal had regard to the particular circumstances of each case and considered whether those circumstances gave rise to cogent reasons for not applying the policy.
This is the type of policy in respect of which Brennan J stated in Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) that ‘there are substantial reasons which favour only cautious and sparing departures’ and that ‘in general, it would be manifestly imprudent for the Tribunal to override a ministerial policy and to adopt a general administrative policy of its own.’[14] Brennan J went on to state that the Tribunal should adopt a practice of applying lawful ministerial policy, unless there were cogent reasons to the contrary.[15] His Honour observed that adoption of guiding policies by the government promoted consistency in decision-making and that, whilst the government is well equipped to formulate broad policies, the Tribunal is not.[16]
[14] (1979) 2 ALD 634, 644 (‘Drake (No 2)’).
[15] Drake (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, 645. See also Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173, 193–6 [52]–[60].
[16] Drake (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, 640, 643, 644.
The second type of policy seeks to provide guidance to public officers by stipulating that a particular interpretation of a statutory provision is the correct interpretation and requiring public officers to adopt that interpretation. Such a policy cannot bind the Tribunal, as a government policy cannot control the meaning of a statute.[17] The Tribunal is obliged to form its own view about the correct interpretation of statutory provisions. The Tribunal may consider any explanation in the policy about why the asserted interpretation is correct and may adopt it if it is persuaded by that explanation and concludes that it is preferable to all alternative interpretations that are argued before it. In such a case, the Tribunal reaches its own view about the correct or preferable interpretation of the provision after taking into account not only the policy but all other submissions and matters before it that are relevant to the interpretation of the provision.
[17] BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [11].
The third type of policy seeks to provide guidance to public officers by setting out a process of reasoning they must follow in deciding whether they are satisfied that a particular statutory requirement is met. Such a policy cannot bind the Tribunal, as the Tribunal is obliged to form its own view about the correct or preferable process of reasoning it should follow. In performing its task, the Tribunal must give an active intellectual consideration of the material before it in a fulsome way, and not only in accordance with a structure imposed on the decision-maker by an executive policy.[18] The Tribunal may consider the logic underpinning the process of reasoning set out in the policy and may adopt it if it is persuaded by it and concludes that it is preferable to all alternative processes of reasoning that are argued before it. In such a case, the Tribunal reaches its own view about the correct or preferable process of reasoning to determine whether it reaches a state of satisfaction after taking into account not only the policy but all other submissions and matters before it that are relevant to whether it should reach the state of satisfaction.
[18] G v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 266 FCR 511, 564 [266]; BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [11]. See also National Disability Insurance Agency v Foster (2023) 295 FCR 521, 536–7 [60]–[67].
In the present case, neither party made submissions which, in broad substantive terms, were inconsistent with the propositions set out at [7] to [23] above.
The applicant made submissions which were consistent with CPI 16 falling into the third type of policy. The respondent submitted that the application of government policy to administrative decision-making in the finding of subjective states of satisfaction promotes consistency in decision-making and, accordingly, it is desirable for the Tribunal to follow CPI 16 so as to ensure consistency in decision-making. The respondent’s submissions were consistent with CPI 16 falling into the first type of policy, such that the Tribunal should apply it unless there are cogent reasons otherwise.
In my opinion, CPI 16 falls into the third, rather than the first, type of policy. For the reasons set out at [12] above, s 24(3) of the Act does not provide for the exercise of a discretion, but sets out a state of satisfaction that a decision-maker either reaches or does not reach. It follows that CPI 16 cannot be characterised as a policy which seeks to provide guidance on the exercise of a statutory discretion. Rather, it is a policy which sets out a process of reasoning to be followed in deciding whether the state of satisfaction to which s 24(3) refers is reached. In the case of a policy such as CPI 16, the desirable consistency in administrative decision-making to which Drake (No 2) referred can be achieved by applying the same legal principles to attain similar outcomes in factually similar cases.
In my opinion, in the case of a statutory provision such as s 24(3) of the Act, to require the Tribunal to follow a process of reasoning that is not set out in the section itself in order to achieve consistency would unduly constrain the Tribunal and potentially compromise its ability to decide the outcome by a different process of reasoning which it considers is more appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case. There is no support for adopting such a formulaic approach to merits review reasoning in Drake (No 2) or any other authority.
The three pillars approach set out in CPI 16 can provide a useful, common sense framework for assessing the facts of a particular case to determine whether one can be satisfied of the identity of an applicant for citizenship. Accordingly, the approach set out in CPI 16 can be adopted by the Tribunal to the extent that the Tribunal considers that the approach may be of assistance in determining whether it is satisfied of the identity of an applicant in a particular case. However, it follows from the above analysis that CPI 16 cannot be regarded as the only useful framework, and therefore the Tribunal is not bound to adopt the three pillars approach to the exclusion of all other factors that may inform the issue of identity in a particular case. In other words, whilst identity, as a concept, may involve examination of the kinds of material CPI 16 describes as ‘pillars’, it is not necessarily limited to these three categories.[19]
[19] BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [31].
Accordingly, in performing the evaluative task required of me by s 24(3) of the Act, I am not bound to follow CPI 16. CPI 16 does not set out the criterion that must be satisfied in order for the Tribunal to be satisfied of the applicant’s identity. That criterion is set out solely in s 24(3) and CPI 16 cannot narrow or define the meaning of ‘identity’ in that section.[20]
[20] BQG21 [2023] FCA 865, [12].
Further, as with all other government policies, CPI 16 must be consistent with the legal principles that govern the interpretation and application of s 24(3) of the Act, including those set out above. To state the obvious, insofar as any policy purports to set out any applicable legal principles, they cannot be followed to the extent that they are inconsistent with the principles determined by the courts.
APPLICANT’S FACTUAL CONTENTIONS
The applicant relies upon the following key factual contentions, which he submits the Tribunal should accept and find that it is satisfied of his identity for the purposes of s 24(3) of the Act.
(1)The applicant’s name is GJDB. His first name can be spelt using one vowel instead of another. His family did not have a surname. He adopted his surname because he liked it. His siblings also adopted the same surname.
The respondent does not accept this contention. However, he accepts that Afghan names can be spelt in different ways in English, including that the first name the applicant uses can be spelt with two different vowels.
(2)The applicant was born in village ‘XX’, district ‘YY’, province ‘ZZ’, in south eastern Afghanistan. The respondent does not accept this contention.
(3)The applicant’s date of birth is not recorded. His mother told him that he was born in 1366 according to the Afghan calendar, which is equivalent to 1987 in the Gregorian calendar. The respondent does not accept this contention.
(4)The applicant’s family tree is as follows:
(a)The applicant’s great-grandfather was KB (deceased).
(b)The applicant’s paternal grandfather was GA (deceased) and his maternal grandfather was GH (deceased). GA and GH were brothers, both being the sons of KB.
(c)The applicant’s father was AA (deceased) and his mother is MA. AA and MA are first cousins. MU is the younger brother of AA, and thus the applicant’s uncle and MA’s first cousin.
(d)The applicant has two sisters, NB and FB, and two brothers, RB and ZB.
(e)The applicant’s uncle, MU, has two sons, YU and BU. They are the applicant’s first cousins.
The respondent accepts that: the applicant’s paternal grandfather was named GA; the applicant’s father was named AA and his mother’s name is MA; MU is the applicant’s paternal uncle; the applicant has two sisters; the applicant has two younger brothers named RB and ZB; and that MU has two sons YU and BU. Otherwise, the respondent does not accept contention (4).
(5)All of the applicant’s family members referred to in (a) to (d) above were born in village ‘XX’, save for RB and ZB, who were born in Quetta, Pakistan, after his family had moved to Pakistan (see below). The respondent accepts that RB and ZB were born in Quetta. Otherwise, the respondent does not accept contention (5).
(6)The applicant studied the Quran at the mosque in village ‘XX’ before he completed two years of schooling at a school in village ‘XX’. The respondent does not accept this contention.
(7)The applicant’s family are Hazaras and belong to the Shia Islam religion. The Hazaras are a minority ethnic group in Afghanistan and the Shias are a minority religion in that country. The majority religion there is Sunni Islam. The respondent accepts that the applicant’s family are Hazaras and belong to the Shia Islam religion.
(8)Before the applicant was born, AA worked in Iran and then Kuwait. Prior to travelling to Kuwait, AA obtained an Afghan passport in a false name in order to make it appear that he was a Sunni Muslim. Later, he worked between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The respondent does not accept this contention.
(9)Following the seizure of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan, the applicant’s family (which then comprised his parents, two sisters and himself) and his uncle MU fled to Quetta in 1996. Quetta is a city in Western Pakistan, in Balochistan Province near the Afghanistan border. The applicant’s brothers, RB and ZB were born in Quetta.
The respondent accepts that RB and ZB were born in Quetta. He does not accept that the applicant’s family and uncle MU fled to Quetta in 1996, but accepts that they all lived in Quetta at some stage.
(10)Many Hazaras who fled Afghanistan settled in refugee enclaves in Quetta. The respondent accepts this contention.
(11)While living in Pakistan, the applicant’s father, AA, fraudulently obtained a genuine Pakistani national identity card (‘NIC’) which had belonged to a deceased Pakistani citizen. He later obtained a B-Form – which is another Pakistani identity document – with three names registered on it, ‘MJ’, ‘FA’ and ‘AM’. AA used the two fraudulent documents to obtain his own NIC and B-Form. In order to maintain consistency with the false identities, the applicant adopted the name MJ and his sisters adopted the names FA and AM. When the applicant’s brothers, RB and ZB, were born, they were added to a B-Form with their correct names and dates of birth.
The respondent does not accept this contention.
(12)AA and MU continued to travel to and work in Kuwait, AA under a false name, while MU worked under his real name. They both travelled to Kuwait using Afghan passports. The respondent does not accept this contention.
(13)The applicant attended school in Pakistan. The respondent accepts this contention.
(14)The applicant returned to Kabul where he briefly worked in a business conducted by his father, after which he returned to Pakistan. The respondent does not dispute this contention.
(15)The applicant married WB in Pakistan, and they have a son named IB. WB and IB remain in Pakistan. The respondent does not dispute this contention.
(16)In 2010, the applicant left Pakistan. He travelled to Malaysia and then Indonesia before arriving in Australia by boat later that year. Upon arrival in Australia, he stated that his name was GJDB, that he was born in 1987 and that he did not know his exact date of birth. He applied for a protection visa and was assigned a date of birth of 31 December 1987 by the authorities. The respondent does not dispute this contention.
(17)The applicant was initially found by a delegate of the Minister to not be owed protection obligations by Australia. Following reconsideration of that decision, in February 2011, another delegate decided to grant the applicant a protection visa. The respondent does not dispute this contention.
(18)On 24 June 2011, Australia issued a Titre de Voyage to the applicant. A Titre de Voyage is a temporary travel document issued to non-citizens who are recognised as refugees. The applicant has used subsequent Titres de Voyage issued by Australia to travel to Pakistan. The respondent does not dispute this contention.
(19)On 19 February 2015, the applicant applied for Australian citizenship by conferral. On 3 May 2017, the applicant was granted a Five-Year Resident Return visa. The respondent does not dispute this contention.
(20)The applicant was issued a Victorian driver’s licence, which expired in 2016, in the name of GJDB. That licence was subsequently renewed. The applicant has been issued a Medicare card in the name of GJDB. The applicant has other documents which were issued to him under that name in Australia, including a private security licence which expired in 2016. The applicant conducts a business in Melbourne through a company. The applicant has produced to the Tribunal tax returns he has lodged with the Australian Taxation Office between June 2012 and June 2020 in the name GJDB.
The respondent does not dispute this contention. He submitted that identification documents which the applicant obtained in Australia do not assist him in satisfying the identity criterion in s 24(3) of the Act.
(21)Identity fraud is prevalent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Country information published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’) and other material published by independent individuals and organisations indicates that, in both countries, non-genuine identity documents and genuine identity documents obtained using false information can be acquired through bribery.
In oral submissions before me, the respondent contended that it is easier to obtain fraudulent identity documents in Afghanistan compared to Pakistan, but agreed that it is possible, through bribes, to obtain fraudulent identity documents in both countries.
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND CREDIT FINDINGS
The applicant relied upon numerous documents, particularly the following:
(a)His Taskera, which he had obtained recently from the Afghan authorities while he was in Australia (‘recent Taskera’). A Taskera is the main Afghan national identity document.[21] The respondent acknowledged that there was ‘no reason within the evidence to doubt the genuineness’ of the applicant’s recent Taskera.
(b)The application he lodged for his recent Taskera.
(c)A Titre de Voyage issued to him by the Australian government and a visitor visa for Pakistan contained in that document.
(d)Taskeras of his father AA, his wife WB, his son IB, his mother MA, his brothers RB and ZB, his sisters NB and FB, and his uncle MU. The respondent did not dispute the genuineness of MU’s Afghan identity documents.
(e)Passports of his uncle MU, his wife WB and his son IB. The respondent did not dispute the genuineness of MU’s and IB’s passports.
(f)An Afghan passport in the name of MNM, which the applicant claimed belonged to his father but was issued in a false name.
(g)A number of photographs.
(h)Letters of support from members of the local Hazara community, including one from the then secretary of a cultural association of people from village ‘XX’. One of the letters states that the author knows that the applicant is from village ‘XX’ and that the author has become good friends with many other men from village ‘XX’ who knew the applicant ‘from his childhood and knew his family for generations’.
[21] Alternative spellings are Tazkira and Tazkera. Further information regarding Taskeras is set out at [48] to [53] below.
The respondent relied upon the following documentary evidence:
(a)Pakistani identification documents relating to the applicant and members of his family.
(b)Various documents the applicant lodged in support of his application for a protection visa and his application for Australian citizenship.
(c)Screenshots of the social media profile of the applicant’s brother, RB, which showed RB competing in various sporting competitions in Pakistan and meeting with a government minister.
The most important documentary evidence, which was the subject of extensive submissions by the parties, was the Afghan identification documents relied upon by the applicant and the Pakistani identification documents relied upon by the respondent. Given the significance of these documents, I will discuss them separately in the next section of these reasons, prior to considering the other evidence.
The applicant relied upon the oral evidence of himself, two of his friends, NS and ES, and MU. The applicant gave evidence mainly in English, with occasional assistance from an interpreter in Hazaragi. MU gave evidence mainly in Hazaragi, with occasional direct observations in English, including a correction to the interpreter’s language on two occasions. The respondent cross-examined each of the four witnesses. The respondent did not call any oral evidence.
The respondent accepted that there were no issues regarding the credibility of NS, ES and MU. However, he stated that there may be issues regarding the reliability of NS’s recollection of events in his childhood in Afghanistan due to his young age at the time,[22] and aspects of MU’s evidence which was of a hearsay nature.
[22] The respondent’s lawyer referred to the age of ES, however I consider that this was a mistaken reference to NS, as NS gave evidence of events in Afghanistan, which would have occurred when he was very young.
The respondent submitted that the Tribunal should have concerns about the applicant’s credibility, particularly in the light of false statements he had deliberately made to the Department of Home Affairs (‘Department’) in support of his application for a protection visa and his application for Australian citizenship. The respondent also relied upon a statement made by the applicant in oral evidence that he had made an error in relation to the name of the school he attended in Pakistan, on the basis that it was implausible that he could have forgotten the name of a school he claimed to have attended for several years. The respondent contended that the Tribunal should be cautious about accepting the applicant’s evidence unless it was corroborated by other evidence.
The false statements of the applicant that the respondent relied upon as a basis for impugning his credibility were as follows:
(a)In a statutory declaration dated 6 June 2010 in support of his application for a protection visa, he claimed that his father had been missing for approximately three years, and that he had been informed that his father had been ‘captured’ by the Taliban, when in fact his father was alive at the time and had not been ‘captured’ by the Taliban.
(b)He had provided to the Department two Taskeras, one dated 2006 (‘2006 Taskera’) and the other dated 2008 (‘2008 Taskera’) in circumstances where he knew, or must have known, that they were false.[23]
(c)In a document dated 27 July 2017 in support of his application for a protection visa, the applicant stated that he had not been known by a different name, when in fact he held Pakistani identity documents which referred to him as MJ.
(d)He did not declare that he held Pakistani identity documents, until notified by the Department on 28 April 2022 that it had confirmed with Pakistani authorities that he was registered as a Pakistani citizen.
(e)In a document dated 27 July 2017 in support of his application for a protection visa, he claimed to have attended ESS High School in Pakistan, a fact he repeated in his application for citizenship.
[23] I have not set out the precise dates of the Taskeras.
In relation to (e) above, in his initial application for a protection visa, the applicant described ESS High School slightly differently. In support of his application for Australian citizenship, in 2017 the applicant stated that he had attended ESS High School in Quetta. The applicant gave evidence that these were errors that he had made, as the name of the schools he attended were PPS and PSS.
In my opinion, the applicant gave oral evidence truthfully and honestly. I have no hesitation in accepting his evidence. He answered questions directly, promptly and candidly, and did not try to prevaricate. His answers during cross-examination were consistent with his answers in examination in chief. He made many admissions against interest, including that he had lied to the Department in documents he had previously submitted. A stark example of an admission against interest was his ‘yes’ response to the question ‘Would it be fair to say, then, you told [a] lie in order to get a better outcome from your migration application?’ On one occasion, the applicant had the opportunity to blame an agent who completed a form on his behalf for an inaccurate statement about his schooling. Instead of doing so, he stated that he had made the error.
It is true that the applicant gave inaccurate and incomplete information to the Department in documents he previously submitted in support of his application for a protection visa and his application for Australian citizenship. Prior to the hearing, on three separate occasions, he admitted having done so, expressed remorse, stated that he took responsibility and apologised for his conduct. The occasions were as follows:
(a)In a statutory declaration dated 23 February 2019, which he signed after he had been informed that the Department had determined that his 2008 Taskera was not genuine, the applicant stated that he had asked a relative to obtain that Taskera in his absence and so he was unaware that it had not been issued by the Afghan government. He apologised for any inconvenience caused and stated that he was remorseful.
(b)On 29 April 2021, the applicant, via a letter from his representatives, admitted that he made incorrect claims that his father had been captured by the Taliban. The letter stated that the claims were made up in a moment of desperation, due to a serious lapse in judgement and in circumstances that, after the applicant arrived on Christmas Island, he was advised by other refugees in immigration detention that his application for a protection visa would be refused if he informed the Department that his father was alive. The letter said that the applicant claimed that his father had disappeared in order to avoid being returned to Afghanistan, and that he did not understand the consequences of providing incorrect information to the Department. In the same letter, the applicant stated that he had been informed by other refugees in immigration detention that he could sponsor his siblings to come to Australia, and that he declared his two cousins (YU and BU) as his siblings in order to be able to sponsor them to come to Australia at a later date.
(c)In a statutory declaration dated 29 August 2022, the applicant stated that he did not mention that he held Pakistani documentation because he did not know how he could possibly explain how he and his family had fraudulent Pakistani documents, and he was told by others on the boat, and in detention, to ‘keep these things quiet’. He also acknowledged that he had provided incorrect information to the Department and had told some ‘half-truths’. He stated that he was sorry for this and took full responsibility for his actions.
In his oral evidence, the applicant accepted that some statements he had previously made were misleading, and apologised. He had arrived on Christmas Island, after spending about 16 days on a boat. When he was in the detention centre, he was advised by other asylum seekers that being a Hazara or Shia would not be enough to be granted a protection visa. Other asylum seekers helped him create the story about his father’s disappearance in order to make his story more personal and achieve a better outcome with the Department. He was scared that, if he told the truth about his father being alive, he would be deported to Afghanistan. He apologised for making up the story about his father’s disappearance.
I have carefully reviewed the inaccurate statements made by the applicant in the documents he previously provided to the Department and the documents in which he accepted responsibility for the inaccuracies and apologised for them. Based on that review, and my observations of the applicant in the witness box – including his sombre and earnest facial expressions and tone when admitting inaccuracies – I am satisfied that he now has insight into the impropriety of his conduct, accepts responsibility for it and is genuinely contrite.
Whilst the applicant’s inaccurate statements to the Department reflect poorly on his attitude to telling the truth at the relevant times and constitute serious lapses on his part, I am satisfied that his explanations for making them are sincere. He lied to the Department because he was desperate to obtain a protection visa and believed, based on what he had been told by others, that making certain statements and withholding certain information was a common practice amongst applicants for a protection visa. Clearly, such behaviour cannot be condoned. However, the applicant’s situation at the time, and the information he was given by others, provide important context for his untruthfulness. His conduct does not necessarily bespeak inherent dishonesty, as even inherently honest people sometimes tell lies in desperate situations. In any event, whatever the applicant’s state of mind at the time of the untruthful statements, I am satisfied that he understood the importance of telling the truth to the Tribunal.
I do not consider that the incorrect statement in the applicant’s applications for a protection visa and for Australian citizenship regarding the name of the school he attended in Pakistan adversely affects his credibility. I accept that, ordinarily, a person will remember the name of the school they attended from around the age of nine. However, an error in naming the school in a document completed by a third party on behalf of a person in a detention centre seeking a protection visa – and repeated by that person in a subsequent document – does not necessarily bespeak of dishonesty or an intention to deceive. There is nothing particularly significant about the name of the school the applicant attended and it has not been suggested that he had anything to gain by misstating its name.
For the above reasons, I do not agree with the respondent’s submission that I should be cautious about accepting the applicant’s evidence unless it was corroborated by other evidence. However, even if I were to adopt this approach, there is ample oral and documentary evidence which strongly corroborates key aspects of the applicant’s evidence. That evidence is discussed later in these reasons.
In summary, the applicant and his three witnesses were honest and truthful. Subject to the qualifications set out below in relation to specific issues, I accept their oral evidence as credible and reliable.
AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI IDENTITY DOCUMENTS
Afghan identity documents
As the main Afghan national identity document, a Taskera serves as a confirmation that a person is an Afghan citizen.[24] A Taskera can be issued in a person’s home district or in Kabul. Some embassies, including the Afghan embassy in Australia, can issue a Taskera in absentia.
[24] Landinfo Report Afghanistan: Tazkera, passports and other ID documents (Report, 22 May 2019) 5. (‘Landinfo report’). The discussion at [48] to [53] is current as at the date of the Landinfo report.
The most common process to obtain a Taskera in absentia is for a person to attend the relevant embassy and bring a copy of a male relative’s Taskera and completed identity verification form. The embassy then verifies the person’s identity before sending the information to the Afghanistan National Statistic and Information Authority for the Taskera to be issued. More recently, prior to the Taliban’s second seizure of power, the Afghanistan government had begun to digitise parts of its documentary system, which meant that a person could obtain a Taskera in absentia without needing to appoint a male relative in Afghanistan to act as agent.
In order to obtain a Taskera in Afghanistan, a person can either present a birth certificate or the Taskera of a male family member on the father’s side, together with two testimonies from a civil servant, local leader or religious dignitaries.[25] In order to obtain a Taskera, a person must be able to identify and verify their place in their family tree.[26] A person is required to attend the issuing office in order to have a Taskera issued, unless they are under the age of seven.[27]
[25] Landinfo report, 7.
[26] Landinfo report, 7.
[27] Landinfo report, 7.
Once issued, a Taskera includes the following information about the holder: name; father’s name; paternal grandfather’s name; place of birth; gender; mother tongue; occupation; physical characteristics; address; place of residence; and an estimate of their age.[28] A Taskera must also contain a registration number, which is a reference number to the registration book where the Taskera is entered.
[28] Landinfo report, 9.
Taskeras are a paper-based system. The Afghan Population Registration Department keeps an archive of all Taskera books in Kabul, however their archive is not complete due to damage resulting from war, fires and other natural causes. In May 2018, the authorities commenced a process of progressively issuing digital Taskeras in the form of a plastic card with an electronic chip.
The information in a person’s Taskera is used as the basis for the issuing of a first passport to that person after that information is verified.[29]
[29] Landinfo report, 14.
In the course of his application for citizenship, the applicant declared that he does not have a birth certificate, as Afghanistan does not usually issue birth certificates for babies born outside a hospital, and he was not born in a hospital. He has provided three Taskeras to the Department, the 2006 Taskera, the 2008 Taskera and the recent Taskera.
The 2006 Taskera contains the following information:
(a)the applicant’s father’s name was AA;
(b)the applicant’s grandfather’s name was GA;
(c)the applicant’s place of residence was village ‘XX’;
(d)the applicant’s first language was Dari;
(e)the applicant’s height was ‘average’, his face colour ‘tan’ and his hair colour black; and
(f)the Taskera’s book number was [redacted].
The 2008 Taskera contains the following relevant information:
(a)the applicant’s father’s name was AA;
(b)the applicant’s grandfather’s name was GA;
(c)the applicant’s place of residence was village ‘XX’;
(d)the applicant’s first language was Dari;
(e)the applicant’s height was ‘median’, his face colour was ‘tanned’ and his hair colour was black; and
(f)the Taskera’s book number was [redacted].[30]
[30] The book number on the 2008 Taskera differed from the book number on the 2006 Taskera.
The recent Taskera contains the following relevant information:
(a)the applicant’s father’s name was AA;
(b)the applicant’s grandfather’s name was GA;
(c)the applicant’s place of birth was district ‘YY’ in province ‘ZZ’;
(d)the applicant’s first language was not recorded;
(e)the applicant’s height was 178 cm, his skin colour was wheat colour and his hair colour was black; and
(f)the Taskera’s book number was [redacted].[31]
[31] The book number on the recent Taskera differed from the book numbers on the 2006 and 2008 Taskeras.
About five years ago, the 2008 Taskera was sent by the Department to the Afghanistan Central Civil Registration Authority (‘ACCRA’) for verification. ACCRA advised that it was not genuine. The applicant stated in a statutory declaration dated 23 February 2019 that he had arranged for the 2008 Taskera to be obtained by a relative because he could not obtain a Taskera in absentia, as he had no close relatives left in Afghanistan whom he could appoint to obtain a Taskera on his behalf.[32] In order to obtain a Taskera in absentia at that time, a person had to attend an embassy of Afghanistan and appoint a male relative, located in Afghanistan, to act as the person’s agent. In response to an invitation by the Department to comment, the applicant stated that he could not verify the process for obtaining the 2006 and 2008 Taskeras, as they were obtained on his behalf while he was in Australia.
[32] In a letter dated 16 February 2022, the applicant’s representatives later clarified that the reference to a ‘relative’ was incorrect and should be read as reference to a ‘friend’.
In oral evidence, the applicant stated that the 2006 Taskera was arranged by his father paying someone in Pakistan and that the 2008 Taskera was obtained by a friend who was living in Kabul at the time. He now accepts that the 2006 and 2008 Taskeras are not genuine.
The applicant obtained the recent Taskera in absentia from the Afghanistan embassy in Canberra using the process described at [49] above. As I have already stated, the respondent acknowledged that there was ‘no reason within the evidence to doubt the genuiness’ of the recent Taskera.
The applicant has produced Afghan identity documents for his father (AA), uncle (MU), first cousins (YU and BU), mother (MA), mother’s father (GH) and siblings (NB, FB, RB and ZB).
Each of the Taskeras provided for the applicant’s siblings and mother refers to the applicant’s father’s, AA’s, Taskera booklet details, being volume 12, page 34, registration number 567.[33] AA’s Taskera booklet states that it was issued in the 1970s, which is prior to the arrival of the applicant’s family in Pakistan.
[33] The numbers are fictitious.
The Taskeras of family members of the applicant referred to other members of his family tree, including his grandfathers and great grandfather. Other documents which referred to the applicant’s father, grandfather or great grandfather were: AA’s application form for new electricity connection; AA’s sale agreements for land; AA’s bank documents; NB’s education documents; AA’s voter registration card; and AA’s Afghan driver’s licence.
Pakistani identity documents
The main Pakistani identity documents are a B-Form and a NIC. A B-Form is a registration document used to register minors. Every Pakistani citizen over the age of 18 is eligible to obtain a NIC.
The applicant has provided the following Pakistani documents, which he alleges were fraudulently obtained:
(a)a B-Form, dated in the late 1980s;
(b)an NIC of AA dated in the early 1990s;
(c)an NIC of GA dated in the early 1970s;
(d)a ‘Local Certificate’ issued to AA, dated in the late 1990s; and
(e)a birth certificate of RB dated in the late 1990s.[34]
[34] I have not set out the precise dates.
The B-Form produced by the applicant is a handwritten document which has two ‘parts’. Part one contains the name and father’s name of the persons above 18 years of age, and part two contains the name, and the father’s name of individuals under the age of 18. Each part has six available spaces in which a person’s name can be entered. Part one of the B-Form lists: MI, son of MH, born in the mid 1950s; AA , son of GA, born between 1958 and 1962; and MA, wife of AA, born in the mid 1960s. [35] AA is expressed to be the nephew of MI. Part two of the B-Form lists: MJ, son of AA, born between 1980 and 1985; FA, daughter of AA, born between 1984 and 1988; and AM, daughter of AA, born between 1985 and 1989.[36]
[35] I have not set out the precise years of birth.
[36] I have not set out the precise years of birth.
For convenience, I will consider the evidence and the parties’ submissions relating to the applicant’s life story under the following headings:
(a)Contentions (1) to (10): The Afghanistan period.
(b)Contentions (11) to (15): The Pakistan period.
(c)Contentions (16) to (20): The Australian period.
It will not be necessary for me to discuss in any detail any contentions which the respondent either accepts or does not dispute.
CONTENTIONS (1) TO (10): THE AFGHANISTAN PERIOD
Evidence relating to the Afghanistan period
The applicant gave evidence that he was born in village ‘XX’ in 1987. He had been told that his year of birth was 1987 because his mother had written the year 1366 in the back of a Quran. In the Afghan calendar, 1366 corresponds with the year 1987 in the Gregorian calendar. He does not know his date of birth, but his mother informed him that the weather was hot when he was born. His recent Taskera refers to him being born in ‘YY’ district, province ‘ZZ’; it does not refer to ‘XX’ village, or any other village.
MU gave evidence that he was born in Kabul and that he is the brother of AA, and thus the applicant’s paternal uncle. AA, the applicant and the applicant’s two sisters were born in village ‘XX’. He was in Kabul at the time of the applicant’s birth and his brother, the applicant’s father, had taken his wife to village ‘XX’ where the applicant was born.
The applicant gave evidence that village ‘XX’ was the second biggest village in district ‘YY’. Village ‘XX’ consisted mainly of people’s houses and had a large bazaar, to which people would travel from the surrounding area to purchase items. The bazaar was like Lygon Street in that it had shops on both sides of the road. MU gave evidence that he had a shop in village ‘XX’ selling ‘almost everything’ such as rice, flour, oil and other groceries.
The applicant gave evidence that he lived in village ‘XX’ with his mother, sisters and uncle’s family. His father worked in Kuwait in a ‘takeaway’ and would come and go from village ‘XX’.
The applicant gave evidence that his grandfather owned land in village ‘XX’ and that they had a house there and land for vegetables and apple trees. MU gave evidence that his family owned land in the hillside in village ‘XX’, as there was no flat land in the village.
The applicant gave evidence that he attended two classes at the village ‘XX’ high school, and before attending school, he studied the Quran at the mosque. MU gave evidence that the applicant studied with a mullah at a mosque and may have attended school in village ‘XX’ for a year, but he could not remember.
The applicant gave evidence that he did not have a birth certificate, but that his Taskera, and the Taskeras of his father and other family members identify him as having come from village ‘XX’. In Australia, he was a member of an association of people who have come from village ‘XX’. The other members of that association either knew him from his time in Quetta or knew his family from village ‘XX’. In his written evidence, NS stated that he was formerly a member of that association with the applicant.
The applicant produced to the Delegate, a letter in support confirming that he was a member of a cultural organisation in Victoria whose membership is made up of people from village ‘XX’.
The applicant gave evidence that he lived in village ‘XX’ until 1996, when his family left Afghanistan for Pakistan. His family travelled to Pakistan from Afghanistan in a large car and his father joined them later in Quetta. MU told him that they left Afghanistan in 1996 because, at that time, the Taliban had captured almost all of Afghanistan and it was not safe in Afghanistan for Hazara people.
MU gave evidence that he had moved from village ‘XX’ to Pakistan in 1996 with his mother, his wife and daughter, the applicant’s mother, the applicant, and the applicant’s sisters. AA was in Kuwait at that time and came to Pakistan in 1997. In 1996, prior to leaving Afghanistan, MU purchased a camera and ‘made a movie’ in village ‘XX’, which included filming the memorial stone of his father’s, the applicant’s grandfather’s, grave and other parts of village ‘XX’. Part of the movie was played to the Tribunal. MU identified the clothing worn by people depicted in the video as characteristic of the type of clothing worn by people in village ‘XX’.
NS gave evidence that he was born in village ‘XX’. He knew the applicant from village ‘XX’, as they had pretty much grown up together in both village ‘XX’ and in Quetta. NS was shown a photograph of adults and children which was date stamped as being taken in 1995. NS identified himself and his mother as being in the photograph, as well as the applicant’s mother and applicant’s aunt, and stated that the photograph was taken in village ‘XX’. NS stated that he was two or three years old when the photograph was taken and so had no memory of it being taken.
In cross-examination, NS stated that he knew the photograph was taken in village ‘XX’ due to the background and attire of the women. He acknowledged that the background was just trees and not very distinct, but stated that village ‘XX’ was very green and that he was 100 per cent sure the photograph was taken in village ‘XX’. He also acknowledged that much of his memory of village ‘XX’ is based upon what he had been told by others.
As mentioned at [51] above, a Taskera contains particulars of the Taskeras of the holder’s father and paternal grandfather. The applicant referred to the Taskeras of his first cousins (YU and BU), mother (MA) and three of his siblings (NB, RB and ZB) which all referred to the same particulars of AA’s Taskera, which was issued in the 1970s.
Parties’ submissions relating to the Afghanistan period
The applicant submitted that the oral and documentary evidence had a number of consistencies, particularly that he, his parents and two sisters were born in village ‘XX’ and that he attended religious instruction at a mosque and some years of schooling in village ‘XX’.
The applicant contended that the Tribunal could be reasonably satisfied of his year of birth. He argued that, although his date of birth was never formally recorded, Afghan nationals often lack an awareness of the exact date of birth, so having a specific date of birth is not common in Afghan culture.
The applicant emphasised that there were a number of genuine Afghan documents which attest to the reliability of his identity. These documents include the Taskeras of his son (IB), father (AA) and uncle (MU) as well as the machine-readable passports of IB and MU. He argued that there should be no presumption that all Afghan documents are fraudulent and that the Taskeras belonging to him, his son, his father, uncle and maternal grandfather (GH) all indicated that he was born in village ‘XX’.
The respondent accepted that the video and photographs showing the applicant with people to whom he said he was related or knew, significantly corroborated his life story. However, due to concerns about the credibility of the applicant,[37] and reliability of NS and MU,[38] the respondent submitted that the Tribunal should not be satisfied that the applicant was born in village ‘XX’ and fled Afghanistan for Quetta in 1996.
[37] See [37] above.
[38] See [36] above.
The respondent accepted that there was no reason to doubt that the applicant’s recent Taskera is genuine, but contended that it does not establish his identity since birth as it was only issued recently. The respondent argued that the Tribunal ought to place no weight on the applicant’s Taskeras in assessing whether it is satisfied as to his identity. The respondent pointed to the fact that each of the Taskeras was recorded to be held in a different book, which, the respondent contended, ought to cause the Tribunal serious concern as to the documents’ veracity.
According to the respondent, the weight attributed to Taskeras belonging to members of the applicant’s family should be diminished to almost naught. The respondent relied upon country information about the widespread forgery of identity documents in Afghanistan, the fact that the Taskera of the applicant’s wife (WB) had been determined to be fraudulent and the fact that the applicant has provided several inconsistent Taskeras relating to him.
Factual findings regarding the Afghanistan period
In my opinion, the oral evidence, coupled with some of the documentary evidence, overwhelmingly establishes contentions (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9) and (10). Contention (8) is not a significant factual matter in the present case, and it is not necessary for me to make a positive finding in relation to it. Had it been necessary for me to do so, I would have found that it was made out on the basis of MU’s evidence.
The most reliable evidence relating to the applicant’s birth and childhood in Afghanistan is that of MU. The respondent accepts that MU is the applicant’s paternal uncle and that MU was a credible witness, subject to an issue about the reliability of such part of his evidence as was of a hearsay nature. However, other than the applicant’s birth, no part of MU’s evidence regarding the applicant’s life in Afghanistan was of a hearsay nature.
MU is about 14 or 15 years older than the applicant and is in a position to remember the applicant’s birth and childhood. MU’s evidence establishes that: the applicant’s name is GJDB; the applicant’s family tree is as stated in contention (4) save that MU did not state that GA and GH were brothers; the applicant and his great grandfather, grandfathers, parents and two sisters were born in village ‘XX’; the applicant received some education in the mosque in village ‘XX’; and the applicant, his mother, two sisters, MU and MU’s family left Afghanistan and settled in Quetta in 1996.
Unlike MU, the applicant is not in a position to remember his birth. However, as the applicant spent the first nine years of his life in village ‘XX’, he is in a position to remember growing up in the village and attending classes there, and to know his family members and friends who lived in the village. Accordingly, I accept the applicant’s evidence about his life, schooling, and relatives and friends in village ‘XX’, and his family’s move to Quetta.
The applicant’s friend, NS, is about six or seven years younger than the applicant. Although NS stated that he has some recollection of village ‘XX’ and the move to Pakistan, he conceded that much of his memory of the village was based on what others had told him. Accordingly, I accept the respondent’s submission that it would not be possible for NS to remember events occurring when he was very young. Whilst NS’s evidence was consistent with that of the applicant and MU, it does not provide strong independent support for the applicant’s evidence about his life in village ‘XX’.
For the above reasons, the applicant’s evidence about his childhood in village ‘XX’ is corroborated by the oral evidence of a credible witness, MU, and is consistent with the evidence of another credible witness, NS. The applicant’s evidence – particularly concerning his family members and their place of birth – is also corroborated by the following documentary evidence:
(a)the applicant’s recent Taskera;
(b)the photograph which was date stamped as being taken in 1995 and which NS identified as depicting the applicant’s mother in the photograph;
(c)the Taskera booklet of MU; and
(d)the video taken by MU.
On the basis of all of the above evidence, I have no hesitation in finding that: the applicant’s name is GJDB; the applicant chose his surname; his siblings adopted the same surname; his family tree is as stated in contention (4); he and his great grandfather, grandfathers, parents and two sisters were born in village ‘XX’ and lived there until 1996; he studied the Quran and attended school in village ‘XX’; and he, his mother, two sisters, MU and MU’s family left Afghanistan and settled in Quetta in 1996, when he was approximately nine years old.
CONTENTIONS (11) TO (15): THE PAKISTAN PERIOD
Evidence relating to the Pakistan period
The applicant gave evidence that, after leaving Afghanistan, he and his family settled in Quetta. There, his two younger brothers, RB and ZB, were born.
The applicant gave evidence that, in Quetta, he attended a school operated by the Iranian Government for Afghan migrants. The school had two campuses, a primary school called PPS and a secondary school called PSS. He attended this school because he wanted to study in the Persian language. He also received tuition in computer classes and English classes at an educational centre. He did not need any documents to enrol in the centre, because they were private courses for which he just needed to pay money.
MU gave evidence that the applicant attended an Iranian school in Pakistan, but that he did not know the school’s name. The applicant’s friend, NS, also gave evidence that the applicant had attended an Iranian/Persian school in Quetta, but that he could not remember the name. NS said that he had attended a different school, which was an Afghan school.
The applicant’s friend, ES, gave evidence that he had known the applicant since the third or fourth grade, as they had attended the same school in Quetta. When they first enrolled in the school, it was called PPS, and that all subjects were taught in Farsi.
ES gave evidence that the PPS school offered education up to fifth grade, after which he and the applicant attended PSS, which was a different school but it was also funded by the Iranian government for migrants and other Farsi speaking people in Quetta. They had to travel 40 minutes by bus to PSS.
In cross-examination, the respondent pressed the applicant on why he had, in his application for a protection visa and a document dated 27 July 2017 in support of his application for Australian citizenship, stated that he had attended a school by the name of ESS in Pakistan.[39] The applicant stated that this was an error. He was asked if the error was that of his agent, who had filled out his application for a protection visa, or if it was his error. The applicant responded that it was either his error or that of the agent, and later stated that he had made the error.
[39] See [38(e)] and [39] above.
NS gave evidence that his family had fled to Afghanistan after the applicant’s family, and that their two families lived within 10 to 15 minutes’ walk of each other in a Hazara town in Quetta. His and the applicant’s families were friends, and they would invite each other to weddings and gatherings. NS was shown a photograph, in which he identified himself, his younger brother and the applicant at a wedding in Quetta. NS stated that he could tell that it was a wedding because he and the applicant were wearing traditional wedding attire called Sherwani, and that he thought the wedding was of a family friend from village ‘XX’, but he was not sure.
NS gave evidence that he knew of: the applicant’s father, AA; the applicant’s sisters, NB and FB, the applicant’s brothers, RB and ZB, the applicant’s mother, MA and the applicant’s uncle, MU. He arrived in Australia in 2010 separately from the applicant and they were reunited in Darwin.
ES gave evidence that he knew and met the applicant’s father, mother and brother RB. He might have met the applicant’s other brother ZB, but ZB was very little at the time. The applicant’s father was called Haji AA because he had travelled to Saudi Arabia to complete the Haj. He did not know the applicant’s mother’s name. It was not common to know a friend’s mother’s name in his culture. He would call the applicant’s mother ‘mother of GJDB’. He knew the names of the applicant’s brothers, RB and ZB, but did not remember the names of the applicant’s sisters.
The applicant gave evidence that he left school after the 8th class. He could not remember what year that was. After completing school, he travelled to Afghanistan to work with his father who had started a business. With regard to that business, the Tribunal was shown the following documents: a business card with a photograph of the applicant; photographs of an office building; and a financial document from 2007/8 which recorded the annual revenue of the business.
The applicant gave evidence that he returned to Pakistan in the late 2000s and married his wife, WB, in Quetta. He did not remember how many people attended his wedding. He did not receive a marriage certificate from the Supreme Court of Afghanistan until nine years later, as they had just received a handwritten certificate written by a religious mullah when they were married. The Afghan marriage certificate was obtained by his wife because an official document was needed in order for her to obtain a visa.
During his evidence, MU was shown a photograph, which he stated depicted the applicant and his wife on their wedding night. MU stated that the wedding took place in a venue in Pakistan.
The applicant gave evidence that, after his marriage, he lived in Quetta and has never returned to Afghanistan. In Pakistan, he worked in a shop selling stationery. In 2010, he left Pakistan for Australia. The situation in Pakistan was very bad for Hazara people and there were targeted killings of Shia Muslims by Sunni Muslims.
MU gave evidence that, after the applicant’s father came to Pakistan in 1997, he bought two Pakistani ID cards, a B-Form and a local certificate through an agent. MU was not involved in obtaining the documents but the applicant’s father had informed him on the telephone, while MU was in Kuwait, that he was going to buy Pakistani documents for his family and would buy documents for MU’s family as well. MU then sent photographs of himself and his family to the applicant’s father. When MU returned from Kuwait, the applicant’s father stated that he had obtained Pakistani identity documents from an agent and showed MU a B-Form, an NIC and a local certificate.
MU gave evidence that he was aware that the applicant’s father had obtained Pakistani identity documents for the applicant and his sisters, and that, according to those Pakistani documents:
(a)the applicant’s name was MJ;
(b)the applicant’s sister NB was known as FA; and
(c)he thought the applicant’s sister FB was known as AM, but he was not sure.
MU’s written evidence stated that AA had purchased a handwritten NIC belonging to a man named ‘GA’, the same name as AA’s father. The NIC had belonged to a deceased Hazara Pakistani citizen, whose family had sold it to an agent instead of registering the death with the authorities. AA then presented the NIC and B-Form to Pakistani authorities to obtain his own NIC and B-Form.
In relation to the Pakistan B-Form referred to at [66] above, the applicant stated in a statutory declaration that he adopted the name MJ and his sisters adopted the names FA and AM. The dates of birth recorded on the B-Form for him and his sisters were incorrect. When RB and ZB were born, they were added to a B-Form with their correct names and dates of birth.
The respondent did not call any evidence, but the T Documents referred to the fact that departmental investigations revealed that the applicant, together with his parents and siblings were all registered with Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) as Pakistani citizens. The investigation further revealed that the applicant’s mother holds a Pakistani Computerised National Identity Card (CNIC) and NADRA had confirmed that she was enrolled as a Pakistani citizen.
The respondent also referred to publicly available social media images which indicated that one of the applicant’s brothers (RB) had participated in sporting competitions in Pakistan. The respondent relied upon advice from the Pakistani government that all participants in such competitions were required to be Pakistani citizens.
Parties’ submissions relating to the Pakistan period
The applicant submitted that there was consistency amongst the oral evidence of all witnesses in relation to the Pakistan period, including that:
(a)the applicant and his family settled in Quetta;
(b)the applicant’s two brothers were born in Quetta; and
(c)the applicant attended a school in Quetta, funded by the Iranian Government, and completed some English and other lessons at an educational centre.
The applicant submitted that whilst some of MU’s evidence was what he had been told by AA, it was consistent with the country information before the Tribunal.
The applicant contended that the Tribunal should accept that the Pakistani identity documents were not genuinely obtained. He referred to DFAT country information on Pakistan which states that fraudulently obtained genuine documents are common in Pakistan, and that NADRA may not always be able to identity fraudulently obtained genuine documents.[40]
[40] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT Country Information Report Pakistan (Report, 20 February 2019) [5.53]–[5.54].
The respondent accepted that there was evidence that both Afghan and Pakistani identity documents could be fraudulently obtained, but argued that the evidence weighed slightly in favour of the Pakistani documents being accepted as genuine, on the basis that they had been verified as genuine by Pakistani authorities. Other than the verification, the respondent acknowledged that there was very little which weighed in favour of accepting the Pakistani identity documents instead of the Afghan ones.
The respondent submitted that the Tribunal was not required to decide between the Afghan and Pakistani identity documents. He contended that the question for the Tribunal was whether it could be positively satisfied of the applicant’s identity, and that the Tribunal’s assessment of the genuineness of the identity documents could inform its assessment of the applicant’s identity.
Whilst the respondent argued that the applicant’s credibility was affected by the error he made about the school he attended in Quetta, he accepted that even if the applicant had attended ESS High School, he nevertheless attended a school in Quetta.
The respondent submitted that the evidence establishing that the applicant returned to Afghanistan to work in his father’s business was ‘not the strongest’. However, the respondent acknowledged that he had nothing to put against that evidence.
The respondent accepted that the applicant married WB, but submitted that, as there were serious questions about the marriage certificate, the details of when the marriage had occurred were not made out. The serious questions were: first, the certificate referred to the applicant’s 2008 Taskera and WB’s Taskera, both of which the respondent states have been found to be not genuine. Secondly, the certificate was issued seven years after the applicant had arrived in Australia and nine years after his marriage took place.
According to the respondent, the fact the applicant’s mother, father and siblings were all registered as Pakistani citizens, and the fact that one of the applicant’s brothers had participated in Pakistani sporting competitions, suggested that the applicant, together with his family, were Pakistani citizens.
Factual findings relating to the Pakistan period
In my opinion, the oral evidence, coupled with some of the documentary evidence, overwhelmingly establishes contentions (11), (13), (14) and (15). Contention (12) is not a significant factual matter in the present case, and it is not necessary for me to make a positive finding in relation to it. Had it been necessary for me to do so, I would have found that it was made out on the basis of MU’s evidence.
As the respondent either accepts or does not dispute contentions (13), (14) and (15), it suffices for me to state that the oral evidence of all four witnesses clearly establishes that: the applicant and his family lived in Pakistan for a considerable period; the applicant attended school in Pakistan; the applicant was married in Pakistan; and the applicant’s son was born in Pakistan.
Contention (11) was strongly disputed by the respondent. Accordingly, I will discuss it in detail.
Although the Pakistani identity documents for the applicant and his immediate family were verified by the Pakistani authorities, it was common ground that genuine Pakistani identity documents can be obtained fraudulently. Accordingly, the applicant’s case would not be undermined if I were to find that his family’s Pakistani identity documents were obtained fraudulently. In order for me to make such a finding, I would have to accept the evidence of MU. I have no hesitation in doing so.
MU was a very impressive witness. He answered each question directly and succinctly. When he was not able to answer a question, he said so rather than speculating. He had opportunities to significantly strengthen the applicant’s case by giving particular favourable evidence, but refrained from doing so. Two examples illustrate this. First, MU could have said, without fear of contradiction, that he was in village ‘XX’ when the applicant was born. Instead of doing so, he said that he was in Kabul at that time. Secondly, MU could have said, again without fear of contradiction, that he was present when the applicant’s father obtained the Pakistani identity documents and observed the payment of a bribe to procure them. Instead of doing so, he stated that he was in Kuwait at that time and that the applicant’s father told him about how he had obtained those documents.
MU gave evidence that the applicant’s father also paid a bribe to obtain Pakistani identity documents for MU and his family. In relation to both the applicant’s family’s identity documents and MU’s family’s identity documents, MU was not present when they were obtained and therefore his evidence about the payment of a bribe is hearsay, based upon what the applicant’s father told him. However, MU gave evidence that he saw both sets of identity documents. Based upon his knowledge of his family tree (which overlaps with the applicant’s family tree), he is in a position to give evidence from his own knowledge that the identity documents relating to the applicant’s family contain false information. Accordingly, notwithstanding that MU’s evidence contains some hearsay, there is a rational basis for me to find – which I do – that it is reliable.
Further, if the Pakistani identity documents that refer to an MJ and his sisters named FA and AM were genuine, they would relate to an entirely different family rather than the applicant’s family. In such a case, there would be no rational explanation for the applicant’s father having such documents in his possession and being able to show them to MU. The fact that the applicant’s father had the documents strongly indicates that he obtained them. As those documents did not accurately set out the applicant’s true family tree, I find that they were obtained fraudulently.
As discussed at [66] above, the Pakistani identity documents contain the same name of the applicant’s father and mother and the applicant’s first name as a surname, but contain a different first name and birth date for the person that the applicant claims to be him (MJ), and different names and birth dates for the individuals that the applicant claims to be his sisters (FA and AM). The fact that some of the details in the Pakistani identity documents match some details of the applicant’s family members but others do not, supports MU’s evidence that the documents are not genuine. That is because, if the Pakistani identity documents were genuine and referred to a family other than that of the applicant, it would be expected that there would be little, if any, overlap between the details of the family described in those documents and the details of the applicant’s family.
I accept that, conversely, it may be said that it is an odd coincidence that there is some overlap between the details which the applicant claims relate to other individuals and the details of his family. However, it would be erroneous to assess the plausibility of the explanation provided by MU for the provenance of the Pakistani identity records by Australian standards of record keeping and naming conventions. I note in this regard that, in his statutory declaration, MU stated that GA is a common name in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, amongst Shias. The respondent did not adduce any evidence to contradict this statement.
It follows that, in my opinion, the applicant is not a genuine Pakistani citizen with the name MJ. The existence of the Pakistani identity documents is not inconsistent with all the other evidence that overwhelmingly indicates that the applicant’s name is GJDB, who was born in village ‘XX’, who travelled to Pakistan when he was around nine years of age and who lived there for some time before coming to Australia. In other words, the Pakistani identity documents do not detract from the continuum of the applicant’s identity as the person who is seeking Australian citizenship, from the date he was born in village ‘XX’ until the hearing of his application for review before the Tribunal.
CONTENTIONS (16) TO (20): THE AUSTRALIAN PERIOD
It is not necessary for me to discuss the period from the time the applicant departed Pakistan in 2010 until the present time. That is because the applicant’s evidence about that period is not challenged by the respondent. Further, I accept the respondent’s submission that, whilst the identity documents obtained by the applicant in Australia – such as his driver’s licence and Medicare card – are consistent with his claimed identity, they have little probative value because they reflect the information provided by the applicant to the organisations issuing those documents.
PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
The applicant submitted that the consistencies in his life story, in both the oral and documentary evidence, establish his identity. He further submitted that he was a witness of truth who made open and frank admissions, and that his evidence was consistent with the evidence of the other three witnesses.
The applicant contended that his recent Taskera is sufficient evidence of his identity, notwithstanding any concerns raised in relation to the 2006 and 2008 Taskeras. He argued that there is nothing to suggest that the recent Taskera was obtained through improper means, as he complied with the absentee process that was in place at that time.
According to the applicant, the references to AA’s Taskera booklet were a consistency across the documents which established a chain of evidence that the applicant and his family are citizens of Afghanistan, and that the applicant has an established lineage in Afghanistan.
The applicant submitted that the Tribunal could reasonably be satisfied that he has used his name throughout his lifetime. He referred to his Afghan documents and letters in support which referred to his name. Whilst he admitted that he has been known by another name, he contended that this name originated from fraudulently obtained genuine Pakistani documents, which were arranged by his father when the applicant was a child.
The respondent submitted that much of his case relied upon the genuineness of the Pakistani identity documents. He accepted that, if the Tribunal was persuaded that those documents were not genuine, his case would be weak.
The respondent acknowledged that the evidence presented by the applicant did establish a continuum of his life story, but argued that the continuum was not a strong one. According to the respondent, the following five points demonstrated that the continuum was not strong:
(a)the applicant’s acknowledged error over which school he attended in Quetta;
(b)inasmuch as parts of the continuum rely upon the applicant’s evidence, those elements are affected by the applicant's past dishonesty in information provided to the Department;
(c)large parts of the applicant's continuum rely upon second-hand evidence;
(d)even the first-hand evidence is attended by great difficulty regarding its reliability due to time elapsed and the age of witnesses when certain events were said to have occurred; and
(e)the continuum is not well supported by the documents throughout.
The respondent contended that, if the Tribunal finds that the continuum of the applicant’s life is weak, then the Tribunal might find it difficult to reject the identity in the Pakistani identity documents. He acknowledged that, if the Tribunal finds that evidence of the continuum of the applicant’s life is strong, then the Tribunal would have a rational basis to reject the genuineness of the Pakistani identity documents.
OUTCOME OF APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
I have already dealt with the substance of the respondent’s submissions in my analysis under the headings ‘Evidence Adduced and Credit Findings’, ‘Factual Findings regarding the Afghanistan period’ and ‘Factual findings regarding the Pakistan period’. I will not repeat that analysis.
Contrary to the respondent’s submissions, the evidence in support of the applicant being GJDB, who was born in village ‘XX’ and who lived there with his family until they moved to Pakistan is overwhelmingly strong. In cross-examination, the respondent did not put to either the applicant, MU or NS that any part of their evidence regarding the applicant’s childhood in Afghanistan was untrue. There was simply no contrary evidence.
My finding at [129] above that the Pakistani identity documents relating to the applicant’s family were obtained fraudulently means that there is no rational basis for me to reject the applicant’s evidence – which was supported by the evidence of the other three witnesses – that he lived predominantly in Pakistan with his family in the period between 1996 and 2010. As for the period after 2010, there was no dispute before me that the applicant embarked upon a journey that resulted in his arrival in Australia by boat in 2010.
Consequently, the applicant has demonstrated to my satisfaction that he is the human being that he claims to be. There is a continuum in the applicant’s life from the time he was born and lived in village ‘XX’, to the time he and his family moved to Quetta and lived there for some years, to the time that he arrived by boat in Australia and finally to the time he appeared and gave evidence before me. Accordingly, I am satisfied of the applicant’s identity for the purposes of s 24(3) of the Act.
I have been able to reach the above conclusion through the above process of reasoning and in reliance upon my factual findings earlier in these reasons, without the need to specifically refer to the three pillars set out in CPI 16. However, my reasoning incorporates much of the substance of CPI 16. This can be demonstrated briefly, as follows.
Based upon the factual findings and the reasoning at [142]–[145] above, the third pillar in CPI 16 – the applicant’s life story – overwhelmingly points to the applicant being the same person – GJDB – from the time he was born until the time of the hearing before the Tribunal.
The second pillar – identity documents – also points to the same conclusion. Those documents include:
(a)Photographs which show the applicant at various stages of his life in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Significantly, MU is present in many of the photographs. NS is in one of the photographs which was said to be taken in Afghanistan, but he was a baby at the time and could not provide direct evidence about the photograph. NS is also in another photograph which he said was taken at a wedding in Quetta. He said that his younger brother and the applicant are in the photograph. ES is in three photographs taken in Pakistan (including a photograph taken at the applicant’s wedding) and was able to identify himself and the applicant in the photographs.
(b)The passports and Taskeras of MU and IB – which the respondent accepts are genuine – contain information about the applicant’s family which is consistent with the applicant being who he claims to be. MU’s two Taskeras refer to GA as his father and KB as his grandfather, consistent with the genealogical information contained in the Taskeras of the applicant and AA.
(c)The applicant’s recent Taskera, which lists his father as AA and his grandfather as GA. This genealogical information is consistent with the information contained in other Taskeras of the applicant’s family, being Taskeras of the applicant’s brothers and sisters, as well as the Taskera of AA.
(d)The Taskeras of the applicant’s two cousins, YU and BU, which refer to GA as their grandfather, consistent with the genealogical information contained in the applicant’s Taskera.
(e)The Taskera of GH, which refers to KB as his father, consistent with the genealogical information in the Taskeras of AA and MU.
The only identity documents which, if genuine, could detract from the applicant being who he claims to be, are the Pakistani identity documents relating to the applicant. However, as I have found that those documents were obtained fraudulently, they do not provide a rational basis for entertaining any doubt about the applicant’s claimed identity.
The first pillar – biometrics – provides some support for the applicant’s claimed identity, in that the applicant’s recent Taskera, which the respondent accepts is genuine, contains descriptions of the applicant which are consistent with his physical appearance in the various photographs as well as his appearance at the hearing before the Tribunal. That Taskera describes the applicant’s skin as ‘wheat colour’ and his hair as ‘black’.
Whilst the support provided by the first pillar is not particularly strong, when it is combined with the second and third pillars, the only reasonable and rational conclusion is that the applicant is the person who he claims to be.
As I am satisfied of the applicant’s identity, the Delegate’s decision will be set aside and the matter will be remitted to the respondent for reconsideration with a direction that the prohibition in s 24(3) of the Act does not apply to the applicant.
DECISION
Pursuant to s 43(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the matter to the respondent for reconsideration with a direction that the prohibition in s 24(3) of the Act does not apply to the applicant.
I certify that the preceding 152 paragraphs are a true copy of the written reasons for the decision of The Hon Justice Kyrou, President
....................[SGD]..............................
Associate
Dated: 11 October 2023
Dates of hearing: 14 and 15 September 2023
Solicitor-Advocates for the Applicant: Ms S Margush and Ms M Rostay
Solicitors for the Applicant: Beena Rezaee Legal
Solicitor-Advocates for the Respondent: Mr O Morris and Ms M Peak
Solicitors for the Respondent: Clayton Utz
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