Dixon and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2024] ARTA 2
•19 December 2024
Dixon and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2024] ARTA 2 (19 December 2024)
Applicant:Ms Stee Dixon
Respondent: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
Tribunal Number: 2024/1500
Tribunal:General Member A. E. Burke
Place:Melbourne
Date:19 December 2024
Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the delegate dated 14 February 2024, refusing Ms Dixon’s application for Australian citizenship by conferral and remits the matter to the Minister for reconsideration in accordance with a Direction from the Tribunal, pursuant to section 105(c)(ii) of the ART Act, that it is satisfied of Ms Dixon’s identity.
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General Member A. E. Burke
GENERAL DIVISION
Catchwords
CITIZENSHIP – application for citizenship by conferral – eligibility – refusal of citizenship –Australian Citizenship Act 2007 s 24(3) – whether Tribunal satisfied of applicant’s identity – applicant citizen of the United Kingdom – pillars of identity – biometrics – documents – life story – Tribunal satisfied of the Applicant’s identity – reviewable decision set aside
Legislation
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)Australian Citizenship Regulations 2016 (Cth)
Cases
Ater and Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 4677
Beyan and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] AATA 256
BQG21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 865
CDNB and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 757
Dhayakpa and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] AATA 310
Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
GJDB v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] AATA 3245 (GJDB)
Sinnathamby and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 2579Secondary Materials
Department of Home Affairs – Australian Citizenship Procedural Instructions (CPIs) – published 1 January 2019 (as revised)
Statement of Reasons
Ms Stee Dixon (the Applicant) is a 73-year-old citizen of the United Kingdom born in Lanarkshire Scotland, who arrived in Australia on 22 August 1972 under a teacher sponsorship scheme of the Victorian Education Department.
On the 23 November 2023, Ms Dixon was granted a five-year Residence Return (subclass 155) visa. Ms Dixon worked as a teacher at a prestigious Melbourne school for 38 years until her retirement, has 2 adult children who are Australian citizens and is extensively involved in a voluntary capacity in the Arts, most notably as Director of the Savoy Opera Company.
On 7 March 2023, Ms Dixon lodged an application for Australian citizenship by conferral and included numerous documentations including:
a. Pensioner Concession Card
b. Victorian drivers’ licence
c Email from Scotland’s People Service Desk advising there is no record of name change to Stee for applicant
d. Residence Return (Subclass 155) visa grant notice dated 18 January 2018
e. Certified copy of decree nisi of dissolution of marriage between James Hall Ferguson and Stee Ferguson dated 2 August 1976
f. Certified copy of marriage certificate between Stee Ferguson and Peter James Dixon dated 14 August 1976
On 19 May 2023, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) sent Ms Dixon an email requesting additional information to assist with her application; they requested a copy of her birth certificate, change of name documents (including from Leah to Stee and from Wilson to Ferguson), overseas police certificates, and a scan of the biodata page of her passport. Ms Dixon was given 28 days to respond, no response was received by the Department.
On 10 July 2023, the Department sent a further request by email seeking the additional information and provided Ms Dixon 28 days to respond, again, no response was received.
On 31 January, 1 and 8 February 2024, a Departmental officer attempted to contact Ms. Dixon by phone to confirm the outstanding requirements for her citizenship application, no response was received.
On 14 February 2024, a Delegate of the Minister refused Ms Dixon’s application for Australian citizenship under the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (‘the Act’) as the Department was prohibited from approving the application because the Delegate was not satisfied of the identity of Ms Dixon. The Delegate stated in conclusion:
Since the lodgement of your application for Australian Citizenship on 07 March 2023, you have been provided numerous opportunities to update and provide the required documentation relating to your identity to the Department.
To date, you have not provided a scan of your full birth certificate with your date of birth, change of name documents and your travel documents.
Being satisfied of the identity of a citizenship applicant is fundamental when assessing a citizenship application. This is reflected in section 24(4) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 that requires a decision maker to refuse a person citizenship where the Minister or delegate is not satisfied of the person’s identity. It follows that the Australian community would have an expectation that citizenship not be given to persons unless the Department is satisfied of their identity.
With the information above in mind, I am not satisfied of your identity
On 12 March 2024, Ms Dixon lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal stating:
The reason for the refusal appears to be one of my identity. I have supplied all the documentation I had and included a statutory declaration regarding the use of my name as recorded on my birth certificate. Since the refusal was made I have had other advice about how to prove the change of surname and to that end am now waiting for a copy of a marriage certificate from Scotland, which will verify that change. Other relevant reasons for further name changes have been sent in the original application for citizenship.
Regarding the requests for further confirmation details I was absent from Australia from 31ˢᵗ January 2024 until 24ᵗʰ January 2024 and had no access to my phone during that time, apart from local calls only. I have poor reception in Ballarat and did not realize I was being rung by an Agent after my return. As the director of Savoy Opera Company, my focus has been on the next performance of the Company and that has entailed a great deal of time and attention from the time I returned to Australia.
ISSUE FOR THE TRIBUNAL
The issue is whether the Tribunal is satisfied of Ms Dixon’s identity to fulfil the requirements of s 24(3) of the Act.
LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY BACKGROUND
Section 21(2) of the Act sets out the general eligibility criteria for a person to become an Australian citizen:
General eligibility
A person is eligible to become an Australian citizen if the Minister is satisfied that the person:
(a) is aged 18 or over at the time the person made the application; and
(b) is a permanent resident:
(i) at the time the person made the application; and
(ii) at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application; and
(c) satisfies the general residence requirement (see section 22) or the special residence requirement (see section 22A or 22B), or satisfies the defence service requirement (see section 23), at the time the person made the application; and
(d) understands the nature of an application under subsection (1); and
(e) possesses a basic knowledge of the English language; and
(f) has an adequate knowledge of Australia and of the responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship; and
(g) is likely to reside, or to continue to reside, in Australia or to maintain a close and continuing association with Australia if the application were to be approved; and
(h) is of good character at the time of the Minister’s decision on the application.
Section 24 of the Act provides, in part:
Minister's decision
(1)If a person makes an application under section 21, the Minister must, by writing, approve or refuse to approve the person becoming an Australian citizen.
…
(1A)The Minister must not approve the person becoming an Australian citizen unless the person is eligible to become an Australian citizen under subsection 21(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) or (8).
....
(3) The Minister must not approve the person becoming an Australian citizen unless the Minister is satisfied of the identity of the person.
Section 25 of the Act provides, in part:
Minister may cancel approval
(1) The Minister may, by writing, cancel an approval given to a person under section 24 if:
(a) the person has not become an Australian citizen under section 28; and
(b) either of the following 2 situations apply.
Eligibility criteria not met
(2) The first situation applies if:
(a) the person is covered by subsection 21(2), (3) or (4); and
(b) the Minister is satisfied that, at the time the Minister proposes to cancel the approval, the person is:
(i) not a permanent resident; or
(ii) not likely to reside, or to continue to reside, in Australia or to maintain a close and continuing association with Australia; or
(iii) not of good character.
Identity is not defined in the Act; however, it is addressed in the the Australian Citizenship Policy (‘the Policy’) which provides guidance to decision makers on the interpretation and exercise of the powers under the Act. The stated role of the Policy is to support the Act by providing guidance on the interpretation of, and the exercise of powers, under the Act and the Australian Citizenship Regulations 2007 (Cth). The Tribunal, as the decision maker, will generally apply what is contained in the Policy unless there are cogent reasons not to do so (Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 640 per Brennan J).
The Policy at Chapter 13 provides the following:
Overview of the identity provisions
The identity provisions prohibit the approval of a citizenship application in cases where the decision maker (the Minister or their delegate) is not satisfied of the person’s identity. In addition to being a legislative requirement under the Act, the Australian community expects that decision makers will not approve a person for citizenship or give evidence if they are not satisfied of the person’s identity.
The Policy also refers to the concept of identity as described in the Attorney-General’s Department’s National Identity Proofing Guidelines:
2.1.1 A person’s identity is not a fixed concept; it is highly dependent on context. It is some combination of characteristics or attributes that allow a person to be uniquely distinguished from others within a specific context.
2.1.2 A person’s identity in Australia (for the purposes of these Guidelines) is generally considered to be established at birth with the creation of a RBDM birth record that details unique information about an individual-such as name, date and place of birth, For people not born in Australia, their identity in Australia is generally established from personal details recorded on DIBP Australian immigration documents or records.
The Policy at 16 (at [5], [11]) refers to the following three pillars as being relevant to the assessment of identity.
• Biometrics – a measurable characteristic that is unique to a person such as fingerprints or face.
• Documents – reliable and secure identity documents as defined by the Security Standards for Proof-of-Identity Documents. A reliable identity document is issued with robust identity proofing processes along with issuance protocols and security features.
• Life Story – an account of the events that happened to a person during their lifetime.
The Policy at 16 further provides that:
It is not sufficient to be satisfied of a person’s identity at one point in time, as a person’s identity is not a point in time concept; it must be verified incrementally throughout a person’s life and considered historically.
…
the onus is on the applicant to provide information or evidence to support their identity.
EVIDENCE
The evidence before the Tribunal included documents lodged by the Respondent pursuant to s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (‘AAT Act’), referred to as the ‘T-documents and Ms Dixon lodged numerous additional identity documents.
Given the new evidence Ms Dixon had provided at the hearing in respect of her family composition, discovering the identity of her father, and her employment history, the Tribunal issued the following orders:
the Applicant must give to the Tribunal and the Respondent:
a copy of their current passport; and
a record of their employment at Firbank Grammar School.
the Respondent may give to the Tribunal and the Applicant:
any further response to the documents provided by the Applicant.
CONTENTIONS
Ms Dixon
Ms Dixon fundamentally attests that she is who she claims to be, having provided documentation of her identity from before she arrived in Australia, including an extract of her birth certificate and the certificate from her first marriage. As well as extensive documentation of her identity since she has been living in Australia, including her current United Kingdom passport.
Ms Dixon was deeply upset at the rejection of her citizenship application having lived, worked, raised children and contributed to the Australian community for over fifty years. Ms Dixon emphasised she had totally immersed herself into the Australian community, did not belong to Scottish groups or hang out with Scottish people. That she had given back to the Australian community for over 50 years and now felt abandoned by her own Country through this process. Ms Dixon’s evidence was she had worked at the one school for 38 years, volunteered extensively and raised her family as a proud Australians. Ms Dixon advised in the hearing:
MS DIXON: But my health over the past two years has been so bad that I’ve hardly been able to function. And I just wonder, is it worth it when you’re not wanted. You know, that’s the point. And I’m in my seventies now. And I think, well, my blood pressure has been (indistinct) high, all because of this. And I thought, ‘why did I bother? Let’s just leave’. And, of course, all my Australian friends are saying, ‘Well, you’re one of us. You’re definitely one of us’. But it’s not the same.
Mr Dixon advised in the hearing that Ms Dixon had even had her contributions to the community recognised by her being awarded a Senior Citizen of the Year in Ballart, but which she sadly could not accept or receive as she is not an Australian citizen.
MS DIXON: Can I just – what I saw in Edinburgh is the exact copy of what I sent to Peter to send to the tribunal. It was that little half page. There wasn’t any more information on the thing I saw. The thing I saw was just shocked that my name, Leah, was on it. I’d never seen that before.
MR ORCHARD: Right. So, can I understand this then, Ms Dixon, so you learned that your – you’re saying that you learned your real name is Leah when you last reviewed those records. Is that correct?
MS DIXON: I never knew myself as Leah. Nobody called me Leah.
MR ORCHARD: That’s okay. I’m not asking – I’m just asking now, Ms Dixon, I’m just asking about when it is you found out that your legal name isn’t Stee, that it’s Leah. When did you find that out?
MS DIXON: I don’t know. I’m not sure if it came up when I was married because I don’t remember having a copy of a birth certificate or whoever might have passed that on. I didn’t see that birth certificate. It may have come up then. But in the marriage ceremony it was never mentioned. I was never called Leah in that ceremony. I know that. But I’m sure if my mum or grandmother had to provide that, I didn’t see it.
MR ORCHARD: Okay.
MS DIXON: I only saw it – I only first saw it written on a birth certificate myself, with my own eyes, when I was in Edinburgh researching my family. Because my friend had done it for her family and she said, ‘Why don’t you look it up? You to go this place and you pay £15 and there’s someone there who’ll help you, and you can see all your family history’. So I went and did it. And I was on the phone to her in Australia while I was doing it, saying, ‘This is exciting. I’m nearly there. I’ve nearly found it’. And then, of course, I got the shock, what I found.
MR ORCHARD: In your marriage certificate to Mr Ferguson, Ms Dixon, the extract that you’ve provided, it is dated 3 August 1972. It’s written in cursive. And it says for the bride, ‘Wilson, Stee, formerly Leah’, on the formal document.
MS DIXON: That’s what I’m suspecting my mother or my grandmother had submitted that for me. We’re talking about two year 12 students who met and one got a job to go to Edinburgh to go to Australia after her qualifications. And it was a marriage – we thought we had to marry or we don’t see each other ever again when, in fact, it turned out like that. We got married and he took off once he got here and I never saw him again. So I’m wondering if someone else had done the paperwork or submitted details because I did not see a birth certificate then. I know that for a fact I didn’t see one. That’s why - - -
MR ORCHARD: Yes. And I want to just focus, if we can, Ms Dixon, on this marriage certificate, if I may, again. So where it says your name, Stee, and then in brackets formerly Leah, this was your marriage certificate. So is your evidence to the tribunal that someone else filled out this certificate?
MS DIXON: Well, I didn’t fill out the certificate. The vicar or whoever did the marriage filled it out, not me.
MR ORCHARD: All right. And how would the vicar have known that you were formerly called Leah?
MS DIXON: I’m saying that if to be married you have to submit a birth certificate my grandmother or my mother would have done that. I wouldn’t have done it. I didn’t have access to it.
MR ORCHARD: Yes. And just to sort of end that line of questioning, your evidence to the tribunal is that the first time you found out your name was Leah, or you were formally known as Leah was when you viewed your birth certificate or your birth certificate extract in Edinburgh. Is that right?
MS DIXON: That’s as far as I remember. I never used the birth certificate. I was never privy to any of that information. As I said before, as a child I was always told you don’t need to know. And I never questioned it, and I never had any reason to think I was anyone else.
MR ORCHARD: All right. Just one - - -
MS DIXON: And when I did see it on the computer in Edinburgh, I asked the gentleman – I said, ‘What’s this here’. And he said, ‘That’s your name’. I said, ‘No, that’s my mother’s name. There’s a mistake on the birth certificate’. And he said, ‘No, that’s the name they’ve given you’, and I was completely shocked because I had never seen it before.
Ms Dixon submitted the following documentation supported her claim that the Minister could be confident of her identity:
(a)A copy of her birth certificate extract from the Scotland’s People Service Desk (SSD-363374)
Dear Stee,
The record required is detailed below for you:
Surname Forename Mothers Maiden Name Year Registration District Name
WILSON LEAH ROBISON 1951 Dalziel
I am sorry but there is no mention of any name change to Stee recorded on this record.
(b)Copy of her marriage certificate extract from the Registry of Marriages in Scotland (Number: 11579860) which records:
When and where married: on 2 August 1972 at St Mary’s Church Motherwell
Bridegroom: James Hall Ferguson
Bride: Stee (formerly Leah) Wilson
Bride’s Father: None recorded
Bride’s mother: Leah Robison or Wilson
(c)Copy of her Incoming Passenger Card, stamped permitted on 22 August 1972 to enter Australia which records:
Family Name: Mrs S Ferguson
Given names: Stee
Country of birth: Scotland
Date of Birth: 15 August 1951
Usual Occupation: P. E. teacher
Intended address in Australia: c/o Vic Education Department
(d)Statutory declaration from Esther Martha McClure Wilson dated 27 May 2024 which attests:
I have known my Aunt Stee, as Stee, for as long as my living memory and she is referred to and called Stee by all immediate family members.
(e)Statutory declaration from David Thomas Robison Wilson OBE MA BA, dated 19 August 2024 which attests:
Although my younger sister’s birth was registered as Leah Wilson, she has been known, since pre-school days as Stee. (‘Stee’ was in fact one of her early attempts at speech and that was how she was addressed in the family). The expression ‘stuck’, and she opted to use the name rather than ‘given’ name. Through her school years, through her teacher training course at Dunfermline College of Physical Education she was known only as Stee to her family, friends, fellow - students, teachers and tutors. She represented Scotland at volleyball as Stee Wilson. I personally have never referred to her as ‘Leah’; I have always called Stee; I have never heard anyone else among her social and professional friends and colleagues refer to her as anything other than Stee.
I can see unreservedly and without qualification, that my sister, whose birth name was registered by the Scottish authorities as ‘Leah’, has been known as ‘Stee’ for over seventy years.
(f)Statement of service from her former employer, Firbank Grammar and an email outlining her employment at the school:
To whom this may concern,
This is to confirm that Stee Dixon was employed at Firbank Grammar School (Turner House Junior Campus) as a Teacher of Physical Education from February 1st, 1985, up until June 21st, 2013.
Stee was employed on a part-time basis, with an FTE of 0.66. On February 1st, 2013, this load was then increased to full time (1.0 FTE) for the remainder of her employment at Firbank Grammar School.
…
Hi Stee,
Thank you for your call this week.
I have discussed your situation with the Director of People & Culture, and unfortunately, we have not been able to find documentation regarding your employment prior to 1985.
Given more notice, we may have been able to arrange a day to travel to our archive storage and check physical records from prior to 1985, but this was not possible in the period of time given.
Therefore, the Statement of Service that I emailed to you on October 8th is all we can provide you with at this point in time. This letter supports the fact that you were a permanent and valued member of Firbank’s staff for almost 30 years, so I am hoping that this is enough proof for immigration services. If it isn’t, Immigration Services are welcome to reach out to us, and given more notice, we could arrange a date to explore our physical records in archival storage.
(g)A copy of her current United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland passport which records her name as Stee Dixon.
Ms Dixon contended she had supplied a consistent life story regarding family, education and employment aspects, corroborated by all the necessary feeder documentation required for the Department of Immigration to be satisfied of her identity.
Ms Dixon contends she had always been known as Stee, with the only document recording her name as Leah being her birth extract which she was unaware of until she commenced this process to become an Australian citizen. That, as a naive 21-year-old, when she was married and acquired her first passport, her mother and grandparents had taken care of everything. From that time forward, all her identity documentation had been in the name of Stee and she had never been required to formally change her first name.
Ms Dixon contended she had grown up with no father and this had caused great stigma in her life. She lived in the family home with her mother, elder sister, and brother across the road from her grandparents, who were a terrific support to her and her family. She received her education in Scotland gaining her teacher qualifications, was sponsored to Australia by the Victorian Education Department, and her family determined it would be best as a young person that she should marry before she travelled so far from home. She has lived in Australia ever since, divorced her first husband, remarried and had two children from this union, worked for over 30 years at the one school and now volunteers consistently in the Arts.
Ms Dixon contended this was surely enough information on which to accept she was who she claims to be.
Respondent
The Respondent contended that a certificate of Australian citizenship is a legal document of extraordinary significance, the Tribunal should not accept an outcome which could lead to a certificate being issued in circumstances where the identity of the Applicant is far from clear. The Respondent referred the Tribunal to the matter of Beyan and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] AATA 256 at [38] where Senior Member Walsh observed:
Here, the Tribunal is faced with a situation where it cannot be certain of the Applicant’s identity to the standard expected for the conferral of Australian citizenship. As submitted by the Minister, a Certificate of Australian Citizenship is a legal document of considerable significance and the Tribunal should not countenance an outcome which could lead to such a certificate being issued in circumstances where, as is the case here, the identity of the Applicant is far from clear.
The Respondent submitted that whilst identity is not defined in the Act, the concept of identity was addressed in recent case law and the Revised Australian Citizenship Procedural Instructions (CPIs), which provide guidance to decision makers (or the Tribunal on review) on the interpretation and exercise of the powers under the Act. The Tribunal, as the decision maker, will generally apply policy such as the CPIs unless there are cogent reasons not to do so.
The Respondent submitted the Tribunal should be guided by the recent determination in GJDB v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] AATA 3245 (GJDB), where Justice Kyrou stated at [10]:
…s 24(3) of the Act uses the word “identity” in the sense that the person seeking citizenship is the human being that they claim to be. Identity involves a continuum: a person remains the same human being from the moment they are born until the moment they die. In between these times, many attributes associated with them – such as their name, physical appearance…personality, gender, nationality… - and their life experiences…may change, but they will remain the same human being. Whilst each of these matters may assist in ascertaining a person’s identity, it is of fundamental importance that, for the purposes of s 24(3), they are not confused with, or treated as equivalent to, a person’s identity.
The Respondent submitted the level of satisfaction required for a decision maker to be satisfied of an applicant’s identity has been considered by the Tribunal in a number of cases. And these cases provide useful guidance, again drawing the Tribunal’s attention to Justice Kyrou found (at [14]-[15]) that s 24(3) of the Act:
…does not require a person to “prove” their identity, but it does require the Minister – and the Tribunal in performing its review function – to form a state of satisfaction of the person’s identity reasonably and rationally on the material before them. If that material is not sufficient to enable the formation of such a state of satisfaction, the prohibition in s 24(3) is not overcome.
The Respondent contended Ms Dixon’s Australian identity documents should be given minimal weight as her Australian identification documents are not, of themselves, “feeder documents” as they do not provide an unbroken chain linking them to a primary official identity document. The CPIs state “the crucial element of a document, whether genuine or not, is the story the document tells”. The Respondent contended Ms Dixon’s Australian identity documentation provides no refence to historically contextualise her claims of her identity particularly as she had provided no “feeder” document in her application for Australian citizenship by conferral.
The Respondent contended there was a significant lack of clear or convincing documentary evidence to clarify who Ms Dixon is. The Respondent submitted in addition to the sparsity of documentation, detail was lacking regarding Ms Dixon’s life story including her family composition, education, employment, countries of residence, countries visited, social footprint, and online presence.
The Respondent contended in total, Ms Dixon claims to have had the following names throughout her life:
a. Leah Wilson (name born with).
b. Stee Wilson (name always know by).
c. Stee Ferguson (name she took after her first marriage to James Ferguson in Scotland on 2 August 1972 (divorce on 30 June 1976)).
d. Stee Dixon (name she took after her second marriage to Peter Dixon in Australia on 14 August 1976).
The Respondent submitted Ms Dixon had claimed that her legal name at birth (Leah Wilson) is the same as her mother’s name and that her mother changed her name “Leah Robison” after marriage. The Respondent submitted Ms Dixon had also claimed she does not know her father’s name.
The Respondent contended Ms Dixon’s documents were deficient, her life story incomplete and therefor her application for citizenship cannot satisfy the Tribunal of her identity. The Respondent contended in those circumstances, the decision under review should be affirmed.
The Respondent provided closing written submissions following Ms Dixon’s viva voce evidence and additional documentation she had provided.
The Respondent in their written submission addressed Ms Dixon’s new evidence from the hearing:
a. Mrs Dixon she had the following relatives in Scotland.
i. Older brother
ii. Older sister
iii. Sister-in-law
iv. Niece
v. Nephew
vi. Elderly aunt
vii. Elderly uncle
None of these people were included in the applicant’s citizenship application, despite such connections being requested. This is demonstrative of the failings of the application for citizenship overall.
b. Her father’s name was “definitely” Peter Cameron (from Aberdeen), a Scottish cycling champion. Ms Dixson learned about this seven years ago. Despite this, Ms Dixon did not disclose her father’s name, or that she knew who he was, in her application for citizenship made in 2023, despite being expressly asked. She was not able to explain why when asked about this in evidence. Her evidence changed from being confused about dates, to then saying she said “unknown” because she “never met” her father. With respect, it is not clear why Ms Dixon simply did not just disclose her father’s name and expand about her knowledge of him in the form (as she did at question three of the form for her own name.
c. Mrs Dixon could not recall how she obtained her marriage certificate, however her husband claimed a friend of Mrs Dixon’s did so.
d. She claimed she had gone to Scotland in about 2017 and had accessed the archives and had looked at her birth certificate, she said this was the first time she had seen it and the first time she learned her given name was “Leah”. She later claimed that she hadn’t actually seen it, only an extract of it.
e. She gave evidence that there was an “addendum” or a “little white square” to her birth certificate that she had seen, but was only able to provide an extract because there “was a dispute” about her birth. No evidence of this appears in the documentary evidence produced to the Tribunal. To the extent the applicant’s own evidence is that the Scottish authorities are not sure of the applicant’s identity, this weighs against the applicant relying on the extract of her birth certificate.
f. The applicant later said that what she saw on the screen was “the exact copy of what I sent to Peter and the Tribunal”, however it is difficult to accept this in circumstances where Mrs Dixon had earlier described seeing an “addendum” and the explanations about a dispute about her parentage, neither of which appear in the material before the Tribunal.
g. When asked why she hadn’t disclosed any of the above earlier, she gave evidence at various points that she hadn’t been asked.
h. To the extent Mr Dixon complained in evidence that “this is all there is” by way of documents, plainly that is not the case as there are other documents, including a birth certificate, on file in Scotland which contains at least one addendum. It also appears the Scottish authorities have records relating to court cases about the applicant’s identity and those records have been accessed by someone who informed Mrs Dixon of this.
i. She claimed that someone else had possession of her birth certificate when her marriage certificate of 3 August 1972 was filled out, however was unsure as to who and did not explain whether she had sought to find out who.
j. Evidence was provided that Mrs Dixon has a current UK passport. A passport biodata page was subsequently produced showing Mrs Dixon’s name as “Stee Dixon”, the passport was issued on 15 August 2016. It is unexplained how Mrs Dixon was able to have a UK passport issued in 2016 under a first name she does not legally hold, and a last name acquired in Australia. For example, was Mrs Dixon required to provide any evidence about her past identity in order to obtain this document (or its progenitor), or was the information on it entirely self-reported?
The Respondent contented that:
The Minister’s submission is that Mrs Dixon is obviously a hard working person who has led a fulsome life. The issue in this matter is not whether the Australian community do not “want” her to be a citizen due to her character, for example. The issue for the Tribunal to decide is whether it can be satisfied of her identity. At present, Mrs Dixson’s identity prior to 1976 remains blurry and while she has sought out some documents, her evidence to the Tribunal at the hearing raised more questions than it answered, for the reasons set out above.
CONSIDERATION
The Tribunal notes that the Policy indicates that the assessment of a person's identity must be conducted through an evidenced-based approach, which seeks to establish a person's identity from birth. Also, the Tribunal cannot be satisfied of a person's identity at one point in time, as a person's identity is not a point in time concept but must be verified incrementally through a person's life and considered historically. When assessing a person's identity, the objective is to determine whether inconsistencies are identified with any aspect of a person's life story, biometric data and documentary information (i.e. an identity card).
Further, the Policy clearly identifies that individuals seeking citizenship may be undocumented arrivals who are stateless and are unable to provide any evidence of their identity prior to arriving in Australia. In this situation, the Policy articulates that an informed assessment is necessary, based on research of applicable country information and weighed against the evidence provided by an Applicant.
The Tribunal found Ms Dixon to be a credible witness who has not only provided a consistent life story since she arrived legally in Australia on 22 August 1972 on a valid British passport but has also supplied significant feeder documentation that demonstrates her identity since birth.
The Tribunal certainly appreciate the exacerbation expressed by the Respondent during the hearing and in its written closing submission. Whilst the Tribunal found Ms Dixon credible, they did not consider her a reliable historian, the Tribunal makes no suggestion that Ms Dixon was not telling the truth about discovering her birth name or her father, but her recall of events and facts was haphazard. The Tribunal did not consider Ms Dixon had deliberately set out to mislead the Department in her citizenship application by not including her extended family nor that she had hidden her actual identity by not providing her father’s details or the origins of her first name.
The Tribunal considered that Ms Dixon who is not an undocumented stateless person, but a documented citizen of Great Britian, believed that her documentation would speak for itself and accepted she did not appreciate she had to provide a life story to substantiate her identity.
The fact there is no registered change of Ms Dixon’s first name from Leah to Stee or that she could not explain how she obtained a passport in the name of Stee did not seem to the Tribunal to be a fatal flaw in being satisfied of her identity. The Tribunal considered it was more a reality of the systems in place when Ms Dixon first obtained a passport to travel to Australia.
The Tribunal did not find Ms Dixon’s testimony at the hearing clouded its ability to be satisfied of her identity, Ms Dixon’s testimony seemed entirely plausible and supported by her documentary evidence. Ms Dixon’s evidence that she had grown up without a father was corroborated by her birth extract and marriage certificate which both recorded no father. Her subsequent discovery of a father was overwhelming and her evidence at the hearing demonstrated the confusion and distress this had caused as she was not able to clearly say how or when she had discovered this fact – just that she had. The Tribunal in being satisfied of Ms Dixon’s identity did not require more evidence of Ms Dixon’s claims to the information she had discovered.
The Tribunal accepted Ms Dixon’s evidence that as a young person travelling to Australia, she had relied on her mother and grandmother to arrange all the documentation to acquire a passport, visa and marriage certificate. The Tribunal accepts that since that time, Ms Dixon’s passports have been renewed on the information in her original passport. The Tribunal accepted Ms Dixon and Mr Dixon’s evidence that they could not explain why Great Britain had given her a passport in the name Stee or Australia a visa in the name Stee, but they had. The Tribunal finds this to be plausible explanation.
The Tribunal was satisfied on the evidence provided that it was certain of Ms Dixon’s identity to the standard expected for the conferral of Australian citizenship. In arriving at this finding, the Tribunal placed substantial weight on Ms Dixon’s feeder documentation and her life story. The Tribunal considered its determination was in accordance not only with the guidance provided in CPI 16 but was also supported by the principle set out in BQG21 and GJBD.
The Tribunal concurred with the Chief Justice’s finding in BQG21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, where she stated:
The point I am seeking to make is that in circumstances such as those before the Tribunal, it is critical not to confuse or conflate different names with different identities. Identity is a concept entirely bound up with a human being. A person has an identity. At least in the context of the Citizenship Act, a person may have, or have been ascribed (correctly or incorrectly) different names, but will only have one identity. CPI 16 recognises this, correctly so. The Tribunal’s decision, and the Minister’s submissions to the Tribunal and to this Court, do not always appreciate that distinction.
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Ultimately, the concept of “identity” is about an assessment of whether the repository of the power to confer citizenship is satisfied the human being who is the individual applying for citizenship is the person they say they are, with the relevant background to their citizenship application they rely on, and not a different human being with a different background which may affect their citizenship application. The historic use in documents of different names that appear to all be attributed to an applicant may clearly be relevant to this assessment. But use (or ascription, even without knowledge, to a person) of a different name may in a given factual circumstance say nothing about identity. Take for example the common situation of a person changing their name when they marry. There may not be documentary proof of this name change, for a variety of reasons, in any given circumstances. But the name change may not affect the proposition that the person has a single identity, rather than being two different human beings, or a human being with an entirely different background to the one they rely upon in their citizenship application. The Minister’s submissions acknowledged this to some extent.
The Tribunal had no hesitation in finding Ms Stee Dixon is who she claims to be. As Chief Justice in BQG21 eloquently articulates a person can have numerous names but only one identity. The Tribunal was satisfied to the level required that Ms Dixon has demonstrated she is the one and same person she claims to be.
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the delegate dated 3 September 2020, refusing the Applicant’s application for Australian citizenship by conferral and remits the matter to the Minister for reconsideration in accordance with a Direction from the Tribunal, pursuant to
section 105(c)(ii) of the ART Act, that it is satisfied of the Applicant’s identity.
I certify that the preceding 51 (fifty-one) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member A. E. Burke
............................[sgd]............................................
Associate
Dated: 19 December 2024
Date of hearing: 23 September 2024 Date of final submissions: 21 November 2024 Applicant: Self-Represented (with assistance from Mr Dixon)
Advocate for the Respondent: Mr Chris Orchard Solicitors for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
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