McDonald v Director-General of Social Security

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Re: CARMEL ELIZABETH McDONALD
And: DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY
No. VG 196 of 1982
(1984) ADMN para 96-005 / (1984) ASSC para 92-000 / 1 FCR 354
Social Security - Crown

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA


VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Woodward(1), Northrop(2) and Woodward(3) JJ.
CATCHWORDS

Social Security - invalid pension - meaning of "permanently incapacitated for work" - likelihood of persistence in the foreseeable future - whether any onus of proof.

Administrative Law - whether principles concerning onus of proof apply to hearings by administrative tribunals - importance of relevant legislation.

Social Security Act 1947 ss.14, 23, 24, 46(1) and 108.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act ss.33(1)(c), 43 and 44.

Social Security - Invalid pension - Permanent incapacity for work - Meaning of "permanent" - Likelihood of persisting in the foreseeable future - Whether any onus of proof - Social Security Act 1947 (Cth), s. 24.

Social Security - Invalid pension - Onus of proof - Whether principles concerning onus of proof apply to grant, cancellation or refusal of pension - Appeal from decision confirming cancellation - Whether either party bears onus of proof - Social Security Act 1947 (Cth), ss 24, 14, 46(1) - Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 33(1)(c), 43, 44.

Crown - Administrative Appeals Legislation (Cth) - Review of decision affirming cancellation of invalid pension - Whether principles concerning onus of proof apply - Social Security Act 1947 (Cth), ss 14, 46(1) - Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 33(1)(c), 43, 44.

Words and phrases - "permanent incapacity" - Social Security Act 1947 (Cth), s. 23.

HEADNOTE

The Social Security Act 1947 (Cth), s. 24 provides:

"a person above the age of sixteen years who . . . is permanently incapacitated for work . . . shall be qualified to receive an invalid pension."

Held (per totam curiam), that for the purposes of the Social Security Act 1947 (Cth), s. 24, the true test of a permanent, as distinct from temporary, incapacity is whether in the light of the available evidence, it is more likely than not that the incapacity will persist in the foreseeable future.

Wicks v. Union Steamship Company of New Zealand Ltd (1933) 50 C.L.R. 328; Calico Printers' Association, Ltd v. Higham (1912) 1 K.B. 93, distinguished.

Per Jenkinson J. The Tribunal considered that the applicant's pension should be cancelled unless she were found to be permanently incapacitated for work, whereas the requirement of the Act was that the pension should be cancelled if she were found not to be permanently incapacitated for work.

Observations concerning the inapplicability of adversary proceeding concepts such as the onus of proof in administrative proceedings.

Dickinson v. Minister of Pensions (1953) 1 Q.B. 228 at 232, distinguished.

HEARING

Melbourne, 1983, December 12; 1984, March 27. #DATE 27:3:1984

APPEAL

Appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal which affirmed a decision to cancel an invalid pension granted under the Social Secutiry Act 1947 (Cth), s. 24.

P. N. Rose, for the applicant.

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Details
Case
[1984] FCA 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of McDonald v Director-General of Social Security involved the applicant seeking to determine her eligibility for an invalid pension under the Social Security Act. McDonald, who had been awarded a disability support pension, contended that she should qualify for an invalid pension due to her permanent incapacity for work. The Director-General of Social Security opposed the claim, arguing that McDonald did not meet the criteria for an invalid pension, particularly in relation to the likelihood of her incapacity persisting into the foreseeable future. The dispute was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issues before the court were the interpretation of the phrase "permanently incapacitated for work" and the associated onus of proof required for McDonald to establish her eligibility for an invalid pension. The court needed to determine whether the onus of proof lay with McDonald to demonstrate the permanence and future persistence of her incapacity, or whether the Director-General bore this burden. Additionally, the court had to interpret the phrase "permanently incapacitated for work" and assess the evidence provided by McDonald concerning her health and capacity to work.

The court found that the onus of proof regarding the permanence and future persistence of incapacity for work did not solely rest on McDonald but was shared between both parties. The phrase "permanently incapacitated for work" was interpreted to mean that the incapacity must be both permanent and likely to continue into the foreseeable future. Given the evidence presented, the court concluded that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had not adequately considered the requirements of the Act, particularly in relation to the shared onus of proof and the interpretation of "permanently incapacitated for work". Consequently, the court set aside the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and remitted the matter back for reconsideration, directing that the matter be reheard with or without further evidence, in light of the court's findings. The appeal was allowed, and the Director-General was ordered to pay McDonald's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

(a) the appeal be allowed;

(b) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside;

(c) the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be reheard, with or without further evidence, and decided in the light of this Court's reasons for judgment, and

(d) the Respondent pay the Applicant's costs. Appeal allowed with respondent to pay costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established