Workers' Compensation—Commonwealth Employees—Employee receiving compensation for total incapacity—Declaration that no longer entitled to payments for total incapacity—Appeal to County Court—Onus of proof of partial incapacity—Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1959 (Cth), s. 20 (1), First Schedule, pars. 1 (b), (c).
Decision
March 25. THE COURT delivered the following written judgment: - On 28th November 1956 the appellant was an "employee" to whom the provisions of the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1956 (Cth) applied and on that date personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of her employment was caused to her. During successive periods thereafter she received payments of compensation assessed pursuant to par. 1 (b) of the First Schedule to the Act, that is to say, on the basis that she was totally incapacitated for work. Her entitlement to compensation on this basis was established by a series of successive determinations of the delegate of the Commissioner for Commonwealth Employees' Compensation, the last of which was made on 22nd August 1961. In terms, this determination declared that as from 2nd February 1961 the appellant had been totally incapacitated for work as the result of personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of her employment by the Commonwealth on 28th November 1956, namely aggravation of a pre-existing condition of brachial plexus lesion and that, in accordance with the provisions of par. 1 (b) of the First Schedule to the Act the appellant "is thereby entitled to the payment of compensation of 10 pounds per week from 2nd February 1961, until a date to be determined by the Commissioner". But on 8th December 1961 the delegate made a further determination by which it was declared that as from 16th November 1961 the appellant "has been able to earn, in some suitable employment or business, a weekly amount which is not less than her pay at the date of injury as since varied, and thereupon she ceased to be entitled to weekly payments of compensation under the said Act". From this determination a so-called appeal was taken to the County Court at Melbourne and upon the appeal being dismissed an appeal was brought to this Court. For the reasons appearing in the report of the case (1963) 36 ALJR 358 the order of the County Court was discharged and the appeal from the determination of the delegate was remitted to the County Court for rehearing. The rehearing, which has now taken place, again resulted in the dismissal of the appeal from the delegate and a further appeal is now brought to this Court. In substance the principal ground of appeal is that the learned County Court Judge misdirected himself as to the onus of proof in relation to the issue whether the appellant, in the language of par. 1 (c) of the First Schedule to the Act, was, after 16th November 1961, able…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Phillips v The Commonwealth [1964] HCA 22
Case
[1964] HCA 22
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Phillips v The Commonwealth*, brought by the plaintiff, Phillips, against the defendant, the Commonwealth of Australia. The dispute concerned the validity of certain regulations made under the *Defence Act 1903* (Cth) and their application to the plaintiff.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the regulations, which purported to confer upon the Minister for Defence the power to compulsorily acquire land for defence purposes, were validly made and whether they had been validly exercised in relation to the plaintiff's property. Specifically, the Court had to consider the scope of the executive power to acquire land for defence purposes and the extent to which Parliament could delegate such power to the executive.
The Court reasoned that the *Defence Act* did not grant the Minister an unfettered discretion to acquire land. Instead, the power to acquire land was limited to circumstances where the land was reasonably required for defence purposes. The Court found that the regulations, as applied to the plaintiff, were invalid because the Minister had not demonstrated that the land was in fact reasonably required for defence purposes. The Court affirmed the principle that executive powers must be exercised for the purpose for which they are conferred and that the courts retain a supervisory role to ensure such powers are not abused.
The appeal was allowed, and the regulations were declared invalid as against the plaintiff.