JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: SETTLERS HOUSE PTY LTD -v- ROCCA ENTERPRISES PTY LTD [2011] WADC 157
CORAM: EATON DCJ
HEARD: 16 SEPTEMBER 2011
DELIVERED : 29 SEPTEMBER 2011
FILE NO/S: CIV 2534 of 2009
BETWEEN: SETTLERS HOUSE PTY LTD
Plaintiff (Respondent)
AND
ROCCA ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
First Defendant (Appellant)GIOVANNI ROCCA
Second Defendant (Appellant)
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Appeal from a registrar - Effect of a springing order - Security for costs - Delay by the plaintiff - Impact of a legal practitioner's illness
Legislation:
District Court Rules 2005
Result:
Appeal allowed
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff (Respondent) : Mr T R Kean
First Defendant (Appellant) : Mr R Corboy
Second Defendant (Appellant) : Mr R Corboy
Solicitors:
Plaintiff (Respondent) : Corser & Corser
First Defendant (Appellant) : Corboy Legal
Second Defendant (Appellant) : Corboy Legal
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47
FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268
MTQ Holdings Pty Ltd v Lynch [2007] WASC 49
EATON DCJ: On 22 June 2011 Deputy Registrar Hewitt determined two applications before him. The first was that of the plaintiff filed 3 February 2011 seeking, in effect, an extension of the entry for trial date and the second was that of the defendants filed 9 May 2011 seeking dismissal of the plaintiff's application for extension of the entry for trial date, that the plaintiff's statement of claim be struck out and that judgment be entered in favour of the first and second defendants. Having heard the parties the deputy registrar made the following orders:
1.The time for compliance specified in orders 6 and 7 of the orders made on 18 January 2011 be extended to 1 June 2011 and the exhibits to the affidavit of Martin Desmond Mullins filed 2 May 2011 and Travis Rolla Kean filed 27 May 2011 be taken as compliance with those orders.
2.The Plaintiff do pay into Court by way of security for the First and Second Defendants' costs the sum of $50,000.
3.Payment be made within 28 days and until paid the Plaintiff's action be stayed.
4.There be liberty to apply to permit security to be given in some alternative form.
5.The First and Second defendants' application of 9 May 2011 be dismissed.
6.The Plaintiff's pay the defendants' costs of both applications including any costs reserved to be taxed and paid forthwith.
7.Messrs Corser & Corser do show cause why they should not indemnify the Plaintiff from costs ordered to be paid.
8.In the event that security is provided the action be removed from the inactive list and the entry for trial milestone be extended to 31 August 2011.
9.The matter be adjourned to 28 June 2011 for the solicitors for the Plaintiff to show cause why they should not…
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- Case
- [2011] WADC 157
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case were whether an extension of time to comply with the springing order should be granted and whether the plaintiff's conduct and the legal practitioner's illness constituted sufficient grounds for granting such an extension. The defendants argued that the plaintiff's conduct and the legal practitioner's illness warranted an extension of time, citing the case of FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL. The plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted that there was no error in the first instance decision made by Deputy Registrar Hewitt and that the plaintiff's claim had merit.
In deciding the case, the court considered several factors, including the circumstances in which the springing order was made, the reason for non-compliance, and the prejudice to both parties if time were or were not extended. The court found that the plaintiff's conduct and the legal practitioner's illness constituted valid grounds for granting an extension of time. The court also noted that the plaintiff's claim appeared suspect, and that the plaintiff had sold land without regard to the defendants' entitlement, which further supported the granting of an extension of time.
The final orders of the court were to grant the defendants an extension of time to comply with the springing order, and to dismiss the plaintiff's application for an order that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of the application. The court found that the defendants' opposition to the plaintiff's application was well-founded and that granting an extension of time was in the interests of justice.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In their submissions the defendants accept that even though judgment may have been entered upon proof of default following the springing order an extension of time to comply with the order may be granted. They cite FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268. The defendants submit further that, ultimately, the question is: what does justice, in all notions or senses of it that are relevant, require in the circumstances of the case. Reference is made to Osgood v Wham [2007] WASCA 178. The general factors to be taken into account when exercising the discretion to set aside judgment entered as a result of non‑compliance with a springing order are:(a)The circumstances in which the springing order came to be made;(b)The reason for the non‑compliance with the springing order;(c)The prejudice to the defaulting party if time is not extended; and(d)The prejudice to the other party if the time were extended.The defendants cite MTQ Holdings Pty Ltd v Lynch [2007] WASC 49. The plaintiff submits that there was no error at first instance made by Deputy Registrar Hewitt. In exercising appellate power I must, submits the plaintiff, be satisfied that Deputy Registrar Hewitt did make an error. The plaintiff cites Coal andAllied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47 [14] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ) in support of that proposition. In oral submissions Mr Kean, for the plaintiff, submitted that the conduct of the case had been affected by Mr Savas's illness until March 2011, he said:The non‑compliance of this file was not brought to the attention of Mr Bower. Mr Bower trusted, from his affidavits, greatly in Mr Savas. Mr Savas - is one of the - or was one of the senior people in our firm and it was only until the end of March 2011 that Mr Bower discovered the gravity and nature of Mr Savas's illness. As to delays and security for costs generally Mr Kean submitted:We have instructions from our client that he is seeking finance at the moment, he's going through a major restructure and refinance and that that should be resolved shortly. The plaintiff submitted that Deputy Registrar Hewitt was 'quite correct' in his decision because of the problems associated with Mr Savas's illness and its impact on his conduct of the file. He concluded by submitting that there was merit in the plaintiff's claim. Deputy Registrar Hewitt noted that the defendants put in issue the merit of the claim pursued by the plaintiff, he said:I have examined the particulars of damage which have been supplied by the plaintiff under cover of an affidavit and I must say that I consider the sums which are claimed to be suspect. I am also concerned by the fact that a related action in the Supreme Court was settled upon terms which entitled the defendants to a caveat over a nominated piece of land forming part of the development which was being undertaken by the plaintiff and of which the first defendant was the builder. It appears that the plaintiff sold that land without regard to the defendants' entitlement in respect of it and did so, on my reading of the materials, very shortly after or at the same time as the deed of settlement of the earlier action was executed.The date of the deed of settlement is not recorded on its face, but it appears to be in March 2010. The transfer of the relevant land was in April 2010. Allowing some time for the paperwork and transaction to proceed and the settlement to be arranged and take place it seems to me that it is hard to ignore the conclusion that the plaintiff deliberately destroyed the security which it had agreed to grant to the defendant. If I am wrong on that score, it certainly was a case of considerable indifference to the terms of the deed which had been agreed between the parties.