GCQL and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social security second review) - [2025] ARTA 2310

GCQL and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social security second review) [2025] ARTA 2310 (31 October 2025)
Applicant/s:  GCQL
Respondent:  Secretary, Department of Social Services
Tribunal Number:                2025/0248

Tribunal:Senior Member A Suthers (second review)
Place:Perth
Date:31 October 2025

Decision:The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

Statement made on 31 October 2025 at 2:55pm
Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by ss 201(1A)-201(1B) of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth).
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – eligibility for crisis payment – requirement that ‘extreme circumstance’ occur at a time the person was in Australia
LEGISLATION
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)
CASES
Arcibal v Secretary, Department of Family & Community Services [2002] FCA 1313
Dowker v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] FCA 1175
Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] HCA 16
McDonald v Director General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 31 ALR 666
Singh and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2024] AATA 1265
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Australian Government, Guides to Social Policy Law, Social Security Guide
Statement of Reasons
SUMMARY

The Applicant seeks second review of a decision of this Tribunal made on 10 January 2025 (‘first review decision’). The first review decision affirmed a decision made by an Authorised Review Officer (‘ARO’) of Services Australia[1] (‘the Agency’) made on 20 November 2024 to reject the Applicant’s claim for crisis payment lodged on 12 November 2024.
[1] The entity administered by the Respondent.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant is an Australian citizen and the mother of two children.
Along with her now ex-partner, she had previously moved to reside in New Zealand, where her ex-partner and the children still reside.
The Applicant and her ex-partner separated acrimoniously no later than in 2018.
In 2022 a Court in New Zealand made orders placing the children under the guardianship of the Court with the ex-partner appointed as having day-to-day care of the children. The Applicant’s time with her children was thereafter supervised. The Applicant says there were periods where her ability to visit the children was suspended on an ongoing basis.
The Applicant says that she has been active and vocal on public platforms in seeking to redress what she perceives as unfairness in the legal system in that regard. She has sued and sought criminal prosecution of judges in New Zealand for ‘professional negligence,’ ‘embezzlement’ and ‘concealing evidence.’ She says that, as a result, she has been victimised and maliciously prosecuted in New Zealand, and that she has twice been unlawfully arrested by police there. She says that she is listed as a ‘person of interest’ and ‘threat to the judiciary’ in New Zealand. She has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.
Culminating from this, the Applicant sought assistance from the Australian Federal Police (‘AFP’) (seemingly by way of online enquiry) to deal with what she described as the ‘human trafficking’ of her children by the ex-partner. She stated in that report that she was
currently in NZ but will be returning to Perth WA to rebuild my life and get to safety to have the children returned ASAP (I am hoping to return home with them but require australias assistance based on years of evidence of offending burried (sic) by [the children’s contact organiser].
On 24 October 2024 the Applicant received an email from an AFP officer located in Australia, pointing out that she could make a formal complaint, either at a New Zealand police station, or with the local police when she returned to Australia. The Applicant took this as notice that the only way her complaint would be investigated was if she made the complaint to New Zealand police (which she was unprepared to do given the history of her dealings with them) or to return to Australia and make a complaint in person.
On 5 November 2024, after a supervised contact visit, the Applicant was sent an email by the person charged with organising the Applicant’s time with the children (‘contact organiser’). It stated, relevantly:
I have received the recent report from [the person who supervised the last contact visit], which informs that you are moving to Australia and have informed the children of this?
Am I now cancelling the supervised contact?
The Applicant responded that day by email, copying the lawyer who represents the children in her family law proceedings in New Zealand, and stated relevantly:
I have been advised by the Australian federal police to return home to pursue safety measures.
I will be relocating … to be closer to [my son’s] side of the fa[m]ily and to advocate for their freedom where. I will be engaging with child services who mandatorily must protect children from all forms of harm and abuse including neglect.
The contact organiser responded by email that day, stating relevantly:
I will need a response from you in regards to the supervised contact continuing by Friday 8th October 2024 please, if this is no longer required this resource can be reallocated
On 6 November 2024, the Applicant left New Zealand and arrived in Australia.
On 8 November 2024, the Applicant lodged a claim for, and was granted, Jobseeker payment.
On 11 November 2024, the Applicant sent an email to the contact organiser. It was also copied to the children’s lawyer. It stated, relevantly:
As I have re located home for safety reasons and will continue to advocate for my childrens safety in WA, Australia- working with child agencies and police here in accordance with legal avenues which you do not have as no orders in NZ were ever sealed in Australia- despite my efforts- the Australian government can not authorise orders that breach childrens' rights and human rights.
You are legally required to notify the judge of this change to seek directions regarding how contact will be facilitated, considering the s133 report writer confirmed NO SUPERVISION WAS EVER REQUIRED FOR ME- you appear to have made significant profit for OT staff and agencies providing a service not required that has caused significant harm to myself and my children, all the while falsifying reports and concealing [the ex-partner’s] abuse (verified by several supervisors…
The contact organiser responded that day by email. The email stated, relevantly:
Thank you [GCQL] for your email
As you have now relocated to Australia I will cancel the supervised access arrangements for you and the children.
The Applicant promptly replied by email, stating:
I have returned home- where I and the children were born and safe before their abduction by [the ex-partner] on 18/01/2018.
That was their habitual residence before they were abducted and that is why NZ has refused to ever have a hague hearing or allow any appealed decision.
You are required to notify the court urgently, there is no reason why the childrens consistent contact with me can not or should not continue.
It is not for you to decide to cancel contact, rather for you to seek legal advice to notify the court URGENTLY to ensure the childrens attachment needs to me are met.
How will [your organisation] be facilitating contact with the children this weekend and when do you intend to correct the false cyrus reports to the court confirming the childrens disclosures of abuse and medical neglect of the children/ contravention of court orders between yourself and [the ex-partner] for his and your convenience at the cost of the childrens and my safety and rights??
[Addressing the lawyer] have you not notified the court of this? Despite filing some rubbish last week (denying obvious bias regarding the obstruction of affidavits by [the presiding judge].
She then sent an email directly to the children’s lawyer, stating:
… It would have been advantageous not to notify [the ex-partner] who will now likely manipulate the children alleging I have "abandoned them" an ongoing issue of psychological abuse no one has put any safety measures in for.
Be sure to state I have fled due to safety reasons (affidavit of police abuse, conspiring and harassment attached)
It would also be wise to remind [the presiding judge], with a pending recusal hearing and already issuing orders for [the ex-partner] to provide NOE to Australian police, it would be OBVIOUSLY BIAS to obstruct the NZ police … having the NOE for his investigation- in a country that has jurisdiction over offences occurring in NZ)
On 12 November 2024, the Applicant contacted the Fremantle Service Centre of the Agency regarding crisis payment for family and domestic violence (‘FDV’). A file note dated 12 November 2024 records:
… Customer advised having experienced ongoing FDV from ex-partner, particularly in relation to her children. The FDV reportedly occurred in NZ where her children remain and this is an ongoing legal / child protection issue. Customer advised having had to leave NZ and return to Australia approximately 7/11/24 due to FDV and is wanting to pursue a CrP – EXV claim. SWO has advised customer will likely not meet eligibility criteria due to incident occurring outside of Aus however, customer wanting to continue with claim as if it is rejected she wishes to appeal. ACC was attempted however, unable to proceed due to above. SWO has also discussed other support such as EVP through Uniting.
On 12 November 2024, the Applicant contacted the Fremantle Service Centre and lodged a claim for crisis payment for extreme circumstances.
A Social Worker undertook an assessment on 12 November 2024. The resultant Social Work Report dated 15 November 2024 relevantly states:
… [The Applicant] advised she was wanting to claim for a Crisis Payment assessment. [The Applicant] was aware that she likely did not meet basic eligibility criteria and the SW provide further explanation of this as the reported FDV occurred in New Zealand and [the Applicant] was residing in New Zealand when she left the address due to her safety concerns …
[The Applicant] stated she had to leave her home [in] New Zealand on 6/11/24 due to an incident of FDV allegedly perpetrated by her ex partner, … and she decided she was unable to return as of 11/12/2024.
[The Applicant] disclosed a history of FDV, particularly in relation to the disputed care of her children. [The Applicant] explained her ex-partner currently has care of the children and she has been fighting this for many years. [The Applicant] described belief the Police, Child Protection Department and the Justice System as a whole are complicit in [her ex partner’s] alleged perpetration of FDV which she stated has continued to worsen. [The Applicant] advised she was not residing with [him] at this address nor has she for many years however, his reported continued use of the system has left her no longer feeling safe at the previous address. [The Applicant] stated she is planning to stay with a friend [in Australia] and then establish a new home when possible.
… [The Applicant] consented for the SW to contact her friend and house mate, … provided sufficient verification that [the Applicant] had to leave her home in New Zealand due to the presence of FDV which also occurred in New Zealand.
The first review decision recorded that the Applicant’s evidence at the hearing was:
… that she left her former home and arrived in Australia on 6 November 2024. She submitted the extreme circumstance making it unreasonable for her to remain in her home was the ongoing perpetration of family and domestic violence by her ex-partner and the refusal of the justice system in New Zealand to offer her support since her children were abducted in 2018. She feared she would be arrested and harassed by New Zealand Police if she remained in her home. She stated that she has previously suffered false arrest, torture and isolation following an unlawful warrant.
On 12 November 2024, the Applicant contacted the Agency and lodged a claim for crisis payment for extreme circumstances of FDV. In that claim, the Applicant relevantly declared that:
(a)she is currently in Australia;
(b)she was not in Australia when the extreme circumstance occurred;
(c)she left her home address in New Zealand on 6 November 2024;
(d)her new home address is in Australia; and
(e)she decided she could not return to her home in New Zealand on 11 November 2024.
By letter dated 13 November 2024, the Applicant was informed that the Agency had made a decision to reject her claim for crisis payment because she was not in Australia when the extreme circumstance happened.
On 13 November 2024, the Applicant sought internal review of the Agency’s decision. On 20 November 2024, an ARO affirmed the Agency’s decision.
Whilst it can have no bearing on the Applicant’s state of mind as of 11 November 2024, for context I note that the Applicant says that she always intended to return to New Zealand for the children. However, she has not done so. She says that is because, shortly after her arrival in Australia on 16 November 2024, she noticed media reports from New Zealand that indicated new laws had been introduced to Parliament there that would create offences in that country relating to ‘foreign interference undermining core New Zealand interests.’ Because she had been identified as a person of interest and a threat to the judiciary, she believes it was no coincidence that this occurred so soon after she left the country. She believes that, if she were to return to New Zealand, she could lawfully be shot by New Zealand Police because she could expose a trans-Tasman child trafficking syndicate.
On 10 January 2025, the Tribunal on first review affirmed the ARO’s decision, leading to the Applicant’s application for second review.
I conducted a hearing on 2 September 2025. The Applicant gave evidence and represented herself. The Respondent was represented by Ms Economou, a solicitor.
For the reasons that follow, I will affirm the first review decision.
OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK
It is necessary to set out, to an extent, the law and relevant policy to be considered.
The Respondent administers social security, including the crisis payment, under the provisions of, relevantly, the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (‘the Act’); and, and the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) (‘the Administration Act’). It also does so by reference to the Australian Government’s ‘Guides to Social Policy Law, Social Security Guide’ (‘the Guide’), where relevant. The Guide contains governmental guidelines and statements of policy as to how the relevant legislation is to be applied.
The relevant qualification criteria for crisis payment is set out in Part 2.23A of the Act.
The qualification for a crisis payment for extreme circumstances forcing departure from home is set out in s 1061JH of the Act as follows:
1A person is qualified for a crisis payment if, after the commencement of this section:
(a)the person has left, or cannot return to, his or her home because of an extreme circumstance; and
(b)the extreme circumstance makes it unreasonable to expect the person to remain in, or return to, the home; and
(c)the person has established, or intends to establish, a new home; and
(d)at the time the extreme circumstances occurred, the person was in Australia; and
(e)the person makes a claim for crisis payment within 7 days after the extreme circumstance occurred; and
(f)on the day the claim is made:
(i) the person is in severe financial hardship (see section 19D); and
(ii) the person has made a claim (whether on the same day or on an earlier day) for a social security pension or benefit and the person
is qualified for the pension or benefit; and
(g)during the 12 months immediately preceding the day on which the claim is made, no more than 3 crisis payments have been payable to the person based on:
(i) the qualifications set out in this section; or(ii) the qualifications set out in section 1061JHA (remaining in home after removal of family member due to domestic or family violence).
Note: Examples of extreme circumstances that would qualify a person for crisis payment are the person’s house being burnt down, or the person being subjected to domestic or family violence.
2A person is not qualified for a crisis payment in respect of extreme circumstances if the Secretary is satisfied that the extreme circumstance is brought about with a view to obtaining a crisis payment.
The Applicant must satisfy each criterion in s 1061JH(1) to establish eligibility for crisis payment.[2]
[2] Singh and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2024] AATA 1265, [8].
Section 19D of the Act states that a person is in severe financial hardship if their liquid assets are less than the fortnightly amount of social security pension or benefit payment. The Guide at 3.7.4.10 states that the maximum basic rate of the social security payment is taken into account and does not include other supplements.
‘Extreme circumstances’ is not a defined term in the legislation. However, at the end of s 1061JH(1) of the Act the following example is given:
Note: Examples of extreme circumstances that would qualify a person for crisis payment are the person’s house being burnt down, or the person being subjected to domestic or family violence.
The Guide at 3.7.4.50 sets out a table of examples of when a crisis payment is or is not payable in extreme circumstances involving FDV, subject to all other qualifications in s 1061JH of the Act being met.
It also provides at 3.7.4.60:
Explanation: An extreme circumstance can include (but is not limited to) home invasion (1.1.H.72), house fire or flooding. In general, an extreme circumstance is a circumstance that could not be reasonably anticipated and therefore avoided and has not been caused by a deliberate action of the person claiming CrP. However, a determination of whether someone has experienced extreme circumstances must take account of the entire history of events, dealings and relationships that have culminated in the person leaving home and must be made on a case-by-case basis.
In Arcibal v Secretary, Department of Family & Community Services [2002] FCA 1313, Heerey J confirmed that the expression ‘extreme circumstances’ was not a technical term, the examples in the Guide were not exhaustive, and that the Tribunal should look at all the surrounding circumstances as to why the applicant left his or her home. At [8] and [9] Heerey J noted that:
… The [Oxford English Dictionary defines the adjective “extreme” as:
“presenting in the utmost degree some particular characteristic”. The eviction of a tenant who does not pay rent is a normal and inevitable consequence and the Tribunal was entitled to find that it was not, in the relevant sense, an extreme circumstance. Moreover, I think the Tribunal was entitled to look at the whole of the circumstances in which the applicant left his home. These included the provision of alternative accommodation on that night and subsequently. The net result is that the applicant was not rendered homeless and continued to receive his Social Security Benefit.
In Dowker v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] FCA 1175, Charlesworth J dealt further with this issue, stating:
... the expression [‘extreme circumstance’] is clearly intended to describe the reason why a person has left or cannot return to his or her home (s 1061JH(1)(a)) and the reason why it would be unreasonable to expect the person to remain in, or return to, the home (s 1061JHJ(1)(b)). It is not intended to characterise the situation a person may subsequently find himself or herself in, by reason of being unable to remaining in or return to it. That is not to say that the whole of the person’s circumstances may not be considered. However, when considering the whole of the surrounding circumstances, the enquiry is to remain focused on whether the person left or cannot remain or return to the home because of an extreme circumstance. Events occurring after the person has left the home may be taken into account insofar as they legitimately bear upon that enquiry.

The Guide at 3.7.4.20 explains the meaning of a ‘home’ in this context as follows:
Explanation: For the purposes of CrP, ‘home’ is taken to be the person’s house or other shelter that is the fixed residence that the person would have lived in for the foreseeable future. Fixed residence includes a house, apartment, on-site caravan, long-term boarding house or moored boat. A home is not a refuge, overnight hostel, squat or other temporary accommodation. Situations where it would be considered unreasonable to expect the person to remain in, or return to their home, are when the person’s safety or wellbeing is at risk and the person cannot reasonably be expected to face this prospect.
A person whose interests are affected by a first review decision of this nature may seek second review in the Tribunal. The application for second review was filed within the prescribed time and I have jurisdiction and power to conduct this second review due to the combined effect of s 131D(1) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (‘ART Act’), read with ss 12, 105 and 131C(h) of the ART Act.
There is no presumption that the first review decision is correct.[3]
[3] McDonald v Director General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354, 357.
I ‘stand in the shoes’[4] of the original decision maker, in that I am to determine for myself, on the material before me, the decision which can, and which I consider should, be made in the exercise of the power or powers conferred on the original decision-maker for the purpose of making the original decision. The Tribunal is subject to the same constraints as the original decision-maker.[5] However, as s 9 of the ART Act makes clear, the Tribunal makes its decision independently of the parties.
[4] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 31 ALR 666, 671 (Smithers J).
[5] Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] HCA 16, [51] discussing relevantly indistinguishable provisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
THE PARTIES’ RELEVANT CONTENTIONS
It is appropriate to commence by recording the Respondent’s contentions, as the Respondent made several concessions (which are established on the evidence) in favour of the Applicant, and that narrowed the issues considerably. The Respondent concedes that the following criteria for the Applicant to have been eligible for crisis payment are met on the evidence:
(a)the Applicant has left, or cannot return, to her home because of an extreme circumstance of FDV, and it is unreasonable to expect her to return home: s 1061JH(1)(a) and (b) of the Act;
(b)the Applicant has established, or intends to establish, a new home: s 1061JH(1)(c) of the Act;
(c)the Applicant made the claim for crisis payment within seven 7 days after the extreme circumstance occurred: s 1061JH(1)(e) of the Act;
(d)on the day the claim for crisis payment was made, being 12 November 2024:
(i)the Applicant was in severe financial hardship; and
(ii)a social security benefit was payable to the Applicant: s 1061JH(1)(f)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(e)a crisis payment has not been payable to the Applicant during the 12 months immediately preceding the day on which the claim for crisis payment was made: s 1061JH(1)(g) of the Act.
However, the Respondent maintains that:
(a)the Applicant was not in Australia at the time the extreme circumstance occurred as required by s 1061JH(1)(d) of the Act; and
(b)the decision to reject the Applicant’s claim for crisis payment is correct.
The Respondent acknowledged that the legislation does not specify that the home the Applicant fled must be in Australia but submits that if an extreme circumstance resulted in the Applicant leaving her home on 6 November 2024, the circumstance arose while she was in New Zealand. Although the Applicant advised that it was not until 11 November 2024 (while in Australia) that she came to the realisation she could not return home, the Respondent submits this does not displace the requirement that the extreme circumstance must occur in Australia.
Before me, the Applicant’s evidence was that, against the backdrop of being subject to FDV and her negative experiences of the policing and legal system in New Zealand, coupled with her difficult financial position when she arrived in Australia, having her contact with her children being again ‘indefinitely terminated’ on 11 November 2024 was an ‘extreme and unliveable’ circumstance. It is this, she now says, that constitutes the extreme circumstance that enlivened her entitlement to crisis payment. As she was in Australia at the time, the Applicant submits that she meets all the criteria for crisis payment. She describes the outcome that has eventuated and led to the cancellation of her time with the children as ‘predictable and escalating.’ She relies on the oral evidence of a social worker who has assisted her in New Zealand, who described the likely effect of receiving the notification of the cancellation of her contact on 11 November 2024 by email, in the manner it was put, as ‘devastating.’ She says the email was the result of a ‘compounding and cumulative stressful situation.’
The Respondent submits that the email of 11 November 2024, cancelling the Applicant’s supervised contact with her children due to her relocation to Australia, does not constitute an ‘extreme circumstance’ that would make it unreasonable to expect the Applicant to remain in, or return to, her home, within the meaning and purpose of s 1061JH(1) of the Act and the Guide at 3.7.4.60.
CONSIDERATION
I will briefly deal with a contention made by the Applicant that New Zealand forms part of the Commonwealth of Australia because reference to New Zealand is contained cl 6 of Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (‘the Constitution’). The submission proceeds on the basis that the events that occurred in New Zealand can, in effect, be treated as having occurred in Australia for the purposes of s 1061JH(1) of the Act. That submission is misconceived. New Zealand is not part of the Commonwealth of Australia. The Constitution gives New Zealand the option to seek to join the Commonwealth. Section 121 of the Constitution governs the process under which that could occur, but it has not eventuated. Nor does the Applicant’s reliance on trans-Tasman accords between Australia and New Zealand advance her position.
I do, though, accept the Applicant’s submission that I should give no weight to her acknowledgement on the application for crisis payment form that she was not in Australia when the extreme circumstance occurred, given her post-traumatic stress and the difficult circumstances she was living under at the time. What is relevant is what actually occurred.
Whilst I have taken the Applicant’s circumstances into account as a whole, I accept that any relevant events occurring prior to 6 November 2024 occurred in New Zealand. That history can, though, inform what came after.
However, there is no allegation of direct or indirect contact from her ex-partner, or from those the Applicant says are complicit with him contributing to any change in the Applicant’s circumstances between 6 November and 12 November 2024, when she lodged her application, other than the correspondence from the contact organiser on 11 November 2024.
I am not satisfied that that correspondence and the consequent cancellation of the Applicant’s contact with her children, even taking into account the Applicant’s history, can be accurately described as an extreme circumstance. The Applicant was aware it was a likely consequence of her decision to travel to Australia from the contact organiser’s email of 5 November 2024. It was also an inevitable, if poorly communicated, consequence of the Applicant’s decision to move to Australia given the Applicant’s contact was governed by a Court order that provided for ‘supervised face-to-face contact’ and ‘no other direct or indirect contact between [the Applicant] and the children.’
On that basis, I am similarly unsatisfied that the correspondence made any meaningful contribution to the Applicant being unable to return home. Absent the other factors already in existence before the Applicant left New Zealand, it would have been a reason it would be reasonable to expect the Applicant to return home, in order to reestablish her contact arrangements.
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

I certify that the preceding 55 (fifty-five) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member A Suthers

..........[SGD]..............................................................
Associate
Dated: 31 October 2025

Date of hearing: 2 September 2025

Applicant: Self-represented

Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms T Economou, Services Australia

Date of hearing:	2 September 2025
Applicant:	Self-represented
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Ms T Economou, Services Australia