AOZ18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

AOZ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 89  

File number: MLG 321 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE CHAMPION
Date of judgment: 31 January 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection Visa – Where the Authority did not fail to consider a claim as to whether the First Applicant’s husband was suspected of involvement in the LTTE – Where the Authority’s assessment of a letter from the First Applicant’s husband complied with s. 473DD and was not unreasonable in the legal sense – Where the Authority did not misconstrue its statutory task by imposing an onus of proof on the Applicants – Where the Secretary did not comply with a duty under s. 473CB(1)(c) to give relevant information from an invalid visa application to the Authority but the failure was not material to the result – Where the Authority made an assessment of “new information” as to an ICRC Detention Attestation under s. 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act and its conclusion was not unreasonable in the legal sense – Application dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss. 5J, 36, 46A, 47, 473CB, 473DD
Cases cited:

ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection  (2020) 269 CLR 439; [2020] HCA 34

AUF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2019) 274 FCR 82; [2019] FCAFC 222

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494; [2020] HCA 37

BTK19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 658

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 37

CQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 269 FCR 6; [2019] FCAFC 61

CSR16 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 474

DJU20 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2220

DTN16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1525

EMJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1462

Fang Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1044

FGI18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 57

Htun v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 13

Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Affairs [2000] FCA 1788

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12,

McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354

Minister for Immigration And Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; [2016] FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582

SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 562

SZTQP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 232 FCR 452; [2015] FCAFC 12

Wills v Chief Executive Officer of Australian Skills Quality Authority (2022) 289 FCR 175

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 108
Date of last…
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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AOZ18 v Minister for Home Affairs involved the applicants, who were seeking a protection visa, challenging the decisions made by the Department of Home Affairs regarding their visa application. The applicants argued that the authority failed to properly consider certain claims and information, and that the Secretary did not comply with statutory obligations in providing relevant information to the authority. The court was required to determine whether the authority's assessment of the claims and information was legally reasonable, and whether the Secretary's failure to provide certain documents was material to the outcome.

The court found that the authority's assessment of the claims and information was not unreasonable in the legal sense. The court held that the authority was entitled to rely on the information provided to it and did not need to conduct its own investigations. The court also found that the Secretary's failure to provide certain documents to the authority was not material to the outcome of the case. The court held that the applicants had not demonstrated that the Secretary's failure to provide the documents resulted in a legally unreasonable outcome.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the authority's assessment of the claims and information was not unreasonable and that the Secretary's failure to provide certain documents was not material to the outcome. The court held that the applicants had not demonstrated that the authority failed to consider their claims or that the Secretary's failure to provide certain documents resulted in a legally unreasonable outcome. The court dismissed the application and affirmed the decision of the authority.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As in CQR17 (see Jagot J at [33] of CQR17) in this case I have no evidence as to what the Secretary did or did not do in any consideration as to whether the supporting documents to the invalid visa application were relevant and no reasons as to the Secretary’s decision not to give the documents to the Authority. There was no evidence before me of what the Secretary did or did not do to locate material relevant to the review before it gave material to the Authority. There was no evidence of reasonable searches In AUF18 the Court said that s. 473CB(1)(c) contains an implicit duty that the Secretary will take reasonable steps to identify potentially relevant documents (AUF18, [6]; [70]). In AUF18, the court referred to the fact that the Secretary could have performed but did not perform a search of the department’s electronic database. There was no evidence of any reasonable searches the department conducted for the newspaper article. It was within the peculiar power of the Minister to identify what reasonable steps it took to locate relevant documents. It called no evidence. One basis for the Minister’s submission that the obligation of reasonable steps did not extend to searching documents (which comprised the earlier invalid visa application), was that it was open to the Applicants — if they wished to rely upon the newspaper article — to provide it as a supporting document to a later valid visa application. Before me, the Minister submitted that the obligation of reasonable searches did not extend to an assessment of supporting documents which had in any event been returned to the Applicants on 29 May 2015 (T59:L41–42). The Applicants did not apparently include the newspaper article in their later valid protection visa application made on 27 August 2015. Whatever documents the Applicants provided in their valid visa application is not an answer to the independent statutory obligation imposed on the Secretary under s. 473CB(1)(c). The Minister submitted that the proposed relevant searches were outside the scope of what was reasonable because the Applicants’ position required “that the Secretary would be required to sift through the invalid application and conduct a comparative analysis between the earlier, invalid application and the later valid application” (T62:L23–25). I do not accept this submission. In AUF18 the court had some evidence as to what searches might be required. In AUF18, it was not suggested that any search “would have been difficult or particularly time-consuming”. In this case, there was no evidence to support a conclusion that any searches to locate the documents which comprised the invalid visa application would have been unreasonably difficult or time-consuming. The documents were not voluminous. The production of the documents — without objection — in this Court in answer to the Notice to Produce weighs against any conclusion that the proposed searches were outside the ambit of reasonable searches.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I do not accept that Ground 4 fails because the searching out of these documents was outside the scope of reasonable searches.Was it legally unreasonable for the Secretary to make the (assumed) decision that the documents in the invalid visa application were not relevant? In CQR17 Jagot J said at [34] the issue of whether the Secretary considered the documents: tends to collapse into the other question the appellant posed – was it legally unreasonable for the Secretary to have concluded that the documents were not relevant? In CQR17 at [38], Her Honour posed the relevant question as whether there was a “lack of an intelligible justification for the (assumed) decision that the document was not relevant”. As I have noted, the Applicants particularly focused on the relevance of a newspaper article dated 10 May 2009 which corroborated the First Applicant’s claims that her niece was kidnapped and that her brother-in-law had been taken and killed two years earlier. The Minister submitted that the intelligible justification for the Secretary’s assumed decision that the document was not relevant was that the Applicants had not included it in the later valid application. I do not accept that that the Applicants’ non-inclusion of the document in the later valid visa application provides an intelligible foundation for the Secretary’s (assumed) decision that the document was not relevant. Whatever the Applicants did, there had to be an intelligible foundation for the Secretary’s decision not to give the documents to the Authority. Noting as Jagot J did in CQR17 at [39], the test is “not whether I consider the document might have been or was relevant to the review… the test is whether there is an evident and intelligible justification for the conclusion that the document was not relevant to the review”. I cannot propose a “chain of reasoning” (CQR17 at [39]) for an evident and intelligible justification for the (assumed) decision that the document — the newspaper article — was not relevant to the review. The delegate had dealt with this aspect of the First Applicant’s claims as follows:Husband’s family member’s targetedThe applicant claims that in 2007 her husband’s brother was abducted and killed. At the PV interview the applicant said a demand for ransom was made and that she believes he was subsequently killed, although the body was not found.The applicant claims that in 2009 her husband’s niece was killed. At the PV interview she was unable to provide much detail regarding this. It was noted that this occurred several years after her husband’s arrest and in Batticaloa during the conflict. It was noted that this appeared far more likely to be related to the conditions in Batticaloa or her own father’s circumstances. The applicant submitted that there had been a long gap but that anything could happen in Sri Lanka and that the authorities had been after her for a long time.Whilst the applicant has not provided evidence to support this claim, I am prepared to accept that her husband’s brother and niece died between 2007 and 2009. I consider the claim to be plausible as both incidents occurred during the time of the Sri Lankan civil conflict. However there is no evidence to suggest that this was in any way related to her husband’s own circumstances and I am not satisfied that there is any link between these two claims.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 1 has not been made out.GROUND 2: WAS THE AUTHORITY’S ASSESSMENT OF A1’S HUSBAND LETTER IRRATIONAL, ILLOGICAL OR UNREASONABLE? In a Part 7AA review “the primary rule” or “default position” is that the Authority reviews a decision by considering review material provided to it without accepting or requesting “new information” (BTK19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 658, [44]). The Applicants sought that the Authority consider (relevantly) two pieces of “new information” which the Applicants had not provided to the delegate. The Applicants’ provision of new information to the Authority engaged s. 473DD of the Act, the heading of which is “considering new information in exceptional circumstances”. The new information had to be assessed against the criteria in s. 473DD(b) including as to whether it was “credible personal information” before an assessment as to whether the Authority was satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information under s. 473DD(a) as the High Court plurality explained in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494; [2020] HCA 37. The first piece of “new information” relevant to Ground 2 was a letter that the First Applicant’s husband had apparently signed 7 October 2017 which set out that he had had no “contact with his family for the last ten years” and was “residing in France with Refugee Status.” Taken at face value, the First Applicant’s husband’s refugee status in France appeared at least to raise the possibility that in France his narrative about what had happened to him in Sri Lanka was treated as credible. The First Applicant’s Husband wrote in that letter (among other matters):…Due to fear that my life would be endangered, I fled the Country at the beginning of year 2007. Initially I did not communicate with my family due to fear that my family would face problems because of me. Later, after some months, when I tried to communicate with them, I came to know that my family has moved out due to my problem. I did not have any contact with my family for the last ten years. Now, as I come to know that my wife [name omitted], my son [name omitted] and foster child [name omitted] have sought refuge in Australia. I have established contact with them.Currently I am residing in France with Refugee Status. I herewith enclose all relevant documents in support of this.… By Ground 2 the Applicants impugn the Authority’s reasons as to how it dealt with this “new information” on the basis that its conclusions as to this letter were unreasonable in the legal sense. The Applicants contend that the reasoning process was affected by “specific error” in that the Authority made two mutually irreconcilable findings (see, e.g., Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30, [83]). As to the first finding, at [14] the Authority found the letter was credible personal information:Applicant 1 states she has only just come to know about her husband’s residence in France; while his letter is undated, I am willing to accept that the letter from CM and the letter from Applicant 1 could not have been provided to the delegate before the date of the decision. In considering whether the letters are credible personal information, I accept that CM is the author of the letter sent on 9 October 2017. I also accept that the information in his letter is, on its face, information which relates to the applicants personally and is relevant to their claims. Whether or not the contents of his letter do, in fact, support the applicants’ claims is a separate matter which I consider in detail below. For these purposes, I accept that both Applicant 1’s letter and […A1 Husband’s] letter and supporting information (French residence permit and translation and French driver’s licence) are credible personal information and that exceptional circumstances exist which justify my considering the new information.[Emphasis added]