SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 562

Appeal from: SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 2970
File number: NSD 2118 of 2016
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 23 May 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether there was a mistranslation of appellant’s evidence before the Tribunal – whether mistranslation was material to the Tribunal in the context of adverse credit findings and had or could have had significance – whether process to enable evidence to be presented as required by s 425(1) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) satisfied – appeal upheld
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425 and s 477
Cases cited:

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82

Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association v National Retail Association (No 2) (2012) 205 FCR 227

SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 219 FCR 212

SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 465

VAAD vMinister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117

W284 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1788

Date of hearing: 17 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Reynolds
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 2118 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZTFQ

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.Order 3 made on 17 November 2016 by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is set aside and, in lieu thereof, there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent made on 22 April 2014 in case number 1319808.

3.A writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the second respondent, requiring that it hear and determine according to law, the application of the appellant for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent made on 13 March 2013 to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa.

4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, and of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEE J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The issue in this appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court is relatively narrow. 

  2. The appellant alleges the primary judge should have found that…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 562
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the central issue was whether there had been a mistranslation of the appellant's evidence before the Tribunal, and if so, whether this mistranslation was material to the Tribunal's adverse credit findings and had or could have had significance. The case also considered whether the process to enable evidence to be presented as required by s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was satisfied. The Federal Circuit Court had previously dismissed the appeal, but the matter was brought before the court again on further appeal.

The court identified that the key issue was whether the mistranslation of the appellant's evidence regarding the existence of a hospital in Jaghori was material to the Tribunal's adverse credit findings. The appellant argued that the mistranslation led the Tribunal to believe that he had denied the existence of a hospital in Jaghori, when in fact he had only stated that there was no "good" or "proper" hospital in the area. The Minister, on the other hand, contended that there was no material difference between the two versions of the evidence. The court needed to determine whether the mistranslation, if any, was material to the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's credibility.

The court found that there was indeed a material mistranslation that could have made a difference to the overall assessment of the appellant's credibility. The mistranslation led the Tribunal to make an adverse finding about the appellant's credibility based on an incorrect interpretation of his evidence. The court held that the process was not fair and did not meet the requirements of s 425 of the Migration Act, as the mistranslation prevented the appellant from properly presenting his evidence and arguments. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the Tribunal's decision was set aside, and a writ of mandamus was issued, directing the Tribunal to determine the appellant's application for review of the delegate's decision according to law. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. Order 3 made on 17 November 2016 by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is set aside and, in lieu thereof, there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent made on 22 April 2014 in case number 1319808.

3. A writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the second respondent, requiring that it hear and determine according to law, the application of the appellant for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent made on 13 March 2013 to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, and of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

After dealing with matters that again are not presently relevant, there was then the important exchange between the Tribunal member and the appellant, which gives rise to the central issue in this appeal. This exchange was regarding a hospital in Jaghori (Hospital Evidence) and (recording both what was said by the appellant in his native tongue and what was translated) was as follows: MEMBER: Um, the, the information available to me indicates that the Hazara community in Jaghori enjoys better educational and health services than in the neighbouring provinces.INTERPRETER: I don’t know about it.MEMBER: Well you’ve lived there for a long time Mr, um, uh, [the appellant], you have children, you have a family, um, you must know about the education and health services.APPELLANT (IN HAZARAGI):Jaghori, for example, if there is a minor illness, or for example if a women [sic] is pregnant, or for example, if it gets close to the delivery time, or she experiences too much pain, you need to load her into a vehicle and drive her to Ghazni, or drive her to Kabul, if there is a good hospital there [in Jaghori] and for example if there is a proper hospital where an operation can be performed or treatment can be done, then there is no need to take her to Kabul.INTERPRETER (IN ENGLISH):In Jaghori, for some minor disease or sickness, sickness, for example if a lady is pregnant, and near to the delivery time, uh, she must go to Kabul, to Kabul or Ghazni. If there was a hospital in Jaghori, an operation could be carried out in Jaghori, so there’s no need to travel to Kabul for treatment, or for medical attention.MEMBER: [The appellant], you must be aware there’s a very good hospital in Jaghori, in Sangi Masha.INTERPRETER (IN ENGLISH):Actually, yes, there’s a, Shuhada, the hospital called Shuhada hospital, and the, the appearance, it is good, and uh, construction, it is, uh, made from stones. Compared to the surrounding building, it is beautiful, yeah good, but, uh, people take their major, you know, sickness, uh, major... uh sick people to Kabul, to Pakistan, even to India for treatment. It common ground that the difference between what the appellant conveyed in Hazaragi and what was interpreted in English (both highlighted in bold above) is the alleged mistranslation. The “if” underlined in the English version is accepted by both parties as being what was conveyed by the interpreter to the Tribunal member. The appellant contends that when one has regard to what was said in Hazaragi, the appellant in his Hospital Evidence did not tell the Tribunal member there was no hospital in Jaghori; the appellant was conveying that there was no “good” or “proper” hospital, but he did not deny its existence. The position of the Minister was to accept that there was a disparity between what was interpreted at the hearing and what was sought to be conveyed by the appellant but that there was no material difference between the two versions. I will return to these competing characterisations of the Hospital Evidence below, but before doing so I turn to how the relevant evidence was used by the Tribunal member and its connexion to the assessment of the creditworthiness of the appellant. THE TRIBUNAL DECSION AND CRITICAL CREDIT FINDINGS

Decision

Reasons for decision

A fair reading of the reasons of the Tribunal member makes it evident that the member considered the appellant as someone who was willing to fashion his evidence to suit the perceived exigencies of his case for protection. The Tribunal member set out three reasoned instances upon which he formed an adverse view of the appellant’s credibility: being the appellant’s evidence as to first, the Hospital Evidence, secondly, the Beheading Incident and thirdly, the Alcohol Incident. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that despite the order in which the topics were discussed (see [6 – [8] above), the first example to which the Tribunal member referred in expressing adverse views as to credit was the Hospital Evidence and the finding in relation to this matter (that the appellant “deliberately lied”) was expressed in particularly emphatic terms.THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT DECISION The appellant filed an application seeking an extension of time to bring judicial review proceedings against the decision of the Tribunal. The primary judge granted an extension of time pursuant to s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). There were originally five grounds advanced before the primary judge although, at the hearing, the appellant only relied on three grounds. It was Ground 5 (before the Tribunal) which is the focus of the present appeal. Ground 5 was extracted in the judgment below at [32] and was that the “Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error when it found that the [appellant] had deliberately lied about whether there was a hospital in Jaghori”. The primary judge rejected this ground for the reasons set out at [51] – [69]. The first step taken by the primary judge was to direct himself to answering the question as to whether there was, in fact, a mistranslation. His Honour found (and there was no dispute below) that in the relevant exchange there was a difference between the English translation of the words spoken in Hazaragi by the appellant and the English words actually used by the interpreter. The primary judge recognised that emphasis was placed on the non-translation of the words “good” and “proper” and was alive to the submission made by the appellant that the use of those words conveyed the meaning that there was a hospital in Jaghori but the hospital was not a good or proper hospital. The primary judge then turned to the question of whether, by reference to the broader context of the questions asked by the Tribunal, and the answers given by the appellant, the appellant impliedly asserted that there was no hospital in Jaghori. His Honour noted at [67]:In my opinion, on a fair reading of these passages, which includes the [version actually spoken by the appellant], the [appellant] impliedly asserted there was no hospital in Jaghori. It cannot reasonably be read as the [appellant] “criticising the quality of the hospital” at Jaghori. First, in response to the Tribunal’s question that the Hazara community in Jaghori enjoys better educational and health services than in the neighbouring provinces, the [appellant] said he did not know about it. Second, when pressed that he must know something about the educational and health services in Jaghori, the [appellant] said that persons who have minor illnesses, and women who are ready to give birth, have to travel to Ghazni or Kabul. That impliedly coveys a representation to the effect there is no hospital in Jaghori; for why would people with minor illnesses and women who are about to give birth need to travel to Ghazni or Kabul if there was a hospital in Jaghori? Third, in response to the Tribunal’s question that the [appellant] must be aware there was a good hospital in Jaghori, the [appellant] agreed; he did not say the hospital was not good or proper. If, as the [appellant] appears to submit, the true effect of the [appellant’s] evidence was there was a hospital in Jaghori, but not a good or proper hospital, he had the opportunity to say so in response to the Tribunal’s putting to him that he must be aware there was a good hospital. Instead of asserting there was a hospital in Jaghori, but it was not a good or proper hospital, the [appellant] said the hospital was beautiful; and he also said that people with major sicknesses go to Kabul, Pakistan, and even India.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I consider the Minister’s submissions that his Honour was making a finding as to utility are correct. This makes perfect sense when one bears in mind that the primary judge did not consider there had been a mistranslation and hence he was not required to address the separate question as to whether or not the mistranslation had or could have had significance: see SZRMQ at [67]. My view in this regard is fortified by the fact that his Honour had, in this part of his reasons, specifically set out the relevant passages from SZRMQ. Indeed, his Honour also, with respect correctly, directed himself that that the observations in SZRMQ apply equally to hearings conducted under s 425 of the Act by referring to what Griffiths J noted in SZSEI: see [64].CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL It follows that, having differed from the primary judge as to whether there had been a material mistranslation, and having found that the mistranslation could have made a difference to the overall assessment of the appellant’s credibility, I need to consider the grounds of appeal relied upon by the appellant. It was contended below (Ground 5(a)) that the Tribunal's finding that the appellant had attempted to claim that there was no hospital in Jaghori was a finding made in the “absence of evidence”, because the appellant never in fact denied that there was a hospital. I do not think it is correct to suggest that the finding was made in the absence of evidence, because in order to succeed on this ground the appellant would need to establish that there was no evidence at all for such a finding (even if the finding had been reached by illogical reasoning): see Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association v National Retail Association (No 2) (2012) 205 FCR 227 at 235 [31]; Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 356. There plainly was some material, although I consider it to be insufficient, to form the view that the appellant was impliedly making a representation of the type that the primary judge considered he had made. Despite this, the mistranslation provides an answer to what Robertson J observed in SZRMQ at [74] as the “blunter question” of whether the Tribunal, by reason of a mistranslation, gave the appellant an opportunity to appear before it and give evidence and present arguments relating to the relevant issues, as required by s 425 of the Act. This is not a case, like SZRMQ, where the interpretation generally fell well short of the required standard but each case necessarily has to be looked at in the context of its own facts and circumstances, and the mistranslation was critical to a matter specifically relied upon to make an important finding adverse to the credit of the appellant. The mistranslation could have made a difference. As a consequence, the process was not fair and did not meet the requirements of s 425 of the Act. ORDER Accordingly, it follows that the appeal should be allowed, the only relevant order made below should be set aside and the first respondent ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal and in the proceeding below. The Tribunal Decision should be set aside and an order in the nature of mandamus should issue requiring the Tribunal to determine, according to law, the appellant’s application for review of the Delegate’s decision.