FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BFA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2102
ORDERS
NSD 870 of 2019 BETWEEN: BFA17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 DECEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs”.
2.Leave to rely on a new ground of appeal is refused.
3.The appeal is dismissed.
4.The appellant to pay the first…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 2102
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the Immigration Assessment Authority misconstrued the appellant’s claims, whether the alleged errors were material, and whether any factual errors infected the decision with jurisdictional error. Additionally, the court had to decide whether the appellant should be granted leave to rely on a new ground of review that was not raised in the Court below. The appellant argued that the Authority incorrectly interpreted his reasons for going to Dubai and that this error was both legally unreasonable and materially affected the decision.
The court found that the appellant's claims were inconsistent, particularly regarding the reasons for his departure to Dubai. The Authority's findings were based on the appellant's own statements and the country information available, which indicated that the Karuna group did not exist at the time the appellant went to Dubai. The court held that the appellant's inconsistent evidence undermined the credibility of his claims and that the Authority's decision was not legally unreasonable. Consequently, the court refused the appellant leave to rely on the new ground of appeal and dismissed the appeal.
The court's final orders were to change the name of the respondent to "Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs," to refuse the appellant leave to rely on a new ground of appeal, to dismiss the appeal, and to order the appellant to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the first respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs”.
2. Leave to rely on a new ground of appeal is refused.
3. The appeal is dismissed.
4. The appellant to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant relied on two grounds of appeal in the Court below, only the second of which (ground 4 in the Federal Circuit Court) is repeated in this Court. It is therefore unnecessary to recite the reasoning in respect to the first of those grounds. The Court’s reasoning in relation to ground 4 is discussed in detail below in considering ground 1 of this appeal. Suffice to say at this stage, the Court below found that the grounds were not established and dismissed the appeal.Consideration As noted above, the appellant relies on four grounds of appeal, the first three relate to the same issue, and the fourth of which he needs leave to rely on as it was not raised in the Court below.Ground 1 and 2: there is no basis for the Authority’s finding as to why the appellant went to Dubai, the Authority misconstrued the claims These appeal grounds centred on a particular claim which the appellant submitted was clear from the statement he provided in support of his SHEV application: that he had been selected as the family member who was to join the LTTE. At that time the LTTE and the Karuna group were the same body, but it was the idea of the Karuna group that a family member from every family be conscripted. The appellant travelled to Dubai to avoid conscription by the LTTE. By the time he returned to Sri Lanka the Karuna group had split from the LTTE. He feared the Karuna group as he had avoided subscription at the time they had been enforcing that within the LTTE. The appellant submitted that the material before the Authority established that the Karuna group had been part of the LTTE until 2004 and therefore did not have an independent existence until 2004. The appellant departed for Dubai in 2003. The particular finding by the Authority which was challenged in the Court below was at paragraph [14]: In his SHEV statement, he claimed to fear harm from the Karuna group, because he went to Dubai to avoid serving the Karuna group. When the delegate questioned the applicant regarding this part of his claims, he stated because Karuna worked with the army, that was why the army sometimes questioned him. I consider that explanation does not clarify why the Karuna group would target the applicant for harm because he went to Dubai. As discussed above, his evidence elsewhere is he went to Dubai due to a subjective fear of forced recruitment by the LTTE, not to avoid the Karuna group. The country information I referred to above indicates too that the Karuna group did not exist at the time the applicant went to Dubai. I consider the applicant has provided materially inconsistent evidence as to his fearing the Karuna group on return to Sri Lanka from Dubai and I consider that inconsistent evidence undermines the credibility of his claims. The appellant submitted that the first sentence of paragraph [14] was incorrect, because the appellant’s claim was that he went to Dubai to avoid being threatened by the LTTE and the SLA. In that respect the appellant relied on paragraph [12] of his statement, recited above at [5]. The appellant submitted that this error infected the reasoning in this paragraph. It was submitted that the Authority used an inconsistency between a claim the appellant did make - going to Dubai to avoid subscription by the LTTE - and a claim he did not make - going to Dubai to avoid serving with the Karuna group - as a basis for an adverse credibility finding. It was submitted that this finding was legally unreasonable and materially affected the decision.