FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Umi v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 101
Appeal from: Umi v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2148 File number: VID 42 of 2020 Judges: MIDDLETON, WHITE AND BURLEY JJ Date of judgment: 5 June 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Court of Australia dismissing application for review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal not to revoke cancellation of applicant’s visa – material submitted by partner of applicant outside time period prescribed by s 500(6J) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether decision of Tribunal not to adjourn review hearing denied applicant procedural fairness or was legally unreasonable – whether Tribunal misunderstood its task by failing to correctly construe procedural fairness provisions in Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – consideration of whether alleged errors material to outcome of Tribunal’s review – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499(1), 499(2A), 500(1)(ba), 500(6H), 500(6J), 500(6L), 501(3A), 501(6), 501(7), 501CA(4), Cases cited: Director of Public Prosecutions v Jody Lee Downe and Saoloapu Umi [2013] VCC 734
Date of hearing: 6 May 2020 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms G Costello SC with Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr Lawson Bayly Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Symons Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 42 of 2020 BETWEEN: SAOLOAPU UMI
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
MIDDLETON, WHITE AND BURLEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JUNE 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
The appellant is a 44 year old national of Samoa who has lived in Australia since 1995.
On 2 February 2017, a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (the ‘Minister’), acting pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the ‘Act’), cancelled the appellant’s Spouse Visa. The delegate considered that the appellant did not satisfy the character test set out in sub-ss 501(6) and (7).
On 10 May 2019, another delegate made a decision, pursuant to sub-s 501CA(4) of the Act, not to revoke the cancellation.
The appellant then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’) for review. His application was unsuccessful. So also was the appellant’s application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision: Umi v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2148.
Statutory setting
The statutory setting pertinent to the appeal can be summarised briefly.
By sub-s 501(3A) of the Act, the Minister is obliged to cancel a person’s visa if satisfied that…
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- Case
- [2020] FCAFC 101
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's refusal to adjourn the hearing, and its subsequent failure to consider material submitted by the appellant's partner after the deadline, constituted a denial of procedural fairness or was legally unreasonable. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the Tribunal had misunderstood its task by incorrectly interpreting the procedural fairness provisions in the AAT Act.
The court found that the appellant's argument was not sound as the Tribunal had explicitly stated its reasons for not considering the late-submitted material. The Tribunal's explanations were substantive, intelligible, and reasonable, providing a lawful basis for its decision. The court also concluded that the appellant had a reasonable understanding of the procedural steps and timelines involved in the review process. Furthermore, the Tribunal was entitled to consider the need to complete its review within the 84-day timeframe, and it was appropriate for it to plan to leave enough time to write its decision and deliver it within that period. The court found that there was no denial of procedural fairness as the appellant was, in substance, given a meaningful opportunity to address the relevant matters before the Tribunal.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court did not find any merit in the appellant's contention that the Tribunal had misunderstood its task or that the alleged errors were material to the outcome of the Tribunal's review.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There was no dispute before the primary judge or on the appeal to this Court about the accuracy of the above matters noted by the Tribunal.CONSIDERATION The underlying submission of Counsel for the appellant was that the Tribunal should have adjourned the hearing on 22 July 2019 so as to allow for compliance with the two‑day rule. The premise on which the sole ground of appeal was based was that, although the Tribunal member had said that the five matters listed in [80] set out above were reasons for declining to consider the Partner B Material, they were in truth reasons for the Tribunal member refusing an adjournment so as to allow for compliance with the two‑day rule. Based on that premise, the appellant’s Counsel then submitted that the five matters indicated an incorrect understanding of the law affecting the procedure on the review. However, in our view, the premise for the appellant’s argument is not sound. The matters listed by the Tribunal in [80] were, as the chapeau in the paragraph indicates, the reasons for the Tribunal member declining to consider the Partner B Material. As part of those reasons, the Tribunal member referred to the possibility of adjournment of the hearing and gave two reasons why he considered that was inappropriate in [80(d)]. The primary judge focussed in this context on the adjournment and concluded, when similar arguments as put in this appeal were put to her, as follows:[53]… The real issue, as all counsel accepted in the way they approached the argument, is whether the Tribunal’s own failure to adjourn the hearing occurred because of a misunderstanding of its powers, or constituted a denial of procedural fairness, or was legally unreasonable.[54]It is true that aspects of the Tribunal’s explanation for not adjourning the review can be criticised. It misstated the applicable section of the Migration Act. The applicant’s counsel in this proceeding properly accepted nothing of substance turns on this, especially given the preclusory effect is the same. The Tribunal made something of the procedural unfairness to the Minister if the Tribunal had regard to the late submitted information, when it is apparent that, first, the Minister’s legal representative had in fact seen the material the day before, and second, he told the Tribunal he intended to cross-examine the applicant on matters which were in substance the same as the information contained in what Partner B had said: see the extract at [26(b)] above. Finally, it might be difficult to see how the fact that the applicant was imprisoned (see (e) in the extract at [18] above) counted one way or the other in circumstances where what was at stake before the Tribunal was whether he would be able to remain in Australia when he was released. If these had been the only three justifications for the refusal of an adjournment, then (and without speculating about what the ground might have been) it might have been arguable that the Tribunal’s exercise of power had miscarried in a way which affected its jurisdiction to decide the review.[55]However, two of the explanations given by the Tribunal were substantive, intelligible and reasonable, and are sufficient to provide a lawful foundation for the Tribunal’s refusal to adjourn the review, and to proceed to determine whether the cancellation decision should have been revoked.[56]The first of those was the Tribunal’s reference to the procedural steps which had been undertaken during the review. While I accept that the applicant was at some disadvantage because he had no legal representation, and his English language ability was only moderate, I consider it is apparent from the evidence (for example, the transcript of the review hearing and the applicant’s letters to the Minister and to his family) that he had sufficient comprehension to understand what the Tribunal had told him in both the directions hearing, and in the follow-up emails when he filed nothing ahead of the review hearing. I note the applicant is also familiar, over a long period of time, with court processes. I infer he realises there are timetables, orders made about filing material and the like. I do not accept he is unaware of what is supposed to happen when an entity like the Tribunal makes directions about what he should do to progress his review. Further, he responded within the 28 day time period to the cancellation decision, and he made substantive, handwritten representations on his own behalf, and indeed the handwritten answers he gave to the notification of the original cancellation decision, over a large number of pages and at considerable length, demonstrate a more than adequate capacity to express himself. I find on the evidence the applicant had a reasonable level of understanding about the need to file material and comply with processes, and on that basis there was nothing procedurally unfair about the Tribunal’s expectation that if he had material he wished to put forward, he should have done so in a way which did not engage the preclusory provisions in s 500(6H) or s 500(6J).[57]Second, the Tribunal was entitled to rely upon the need for it to complete its review within the 84 day time period, and a supervising Court should, as Kenny J found in NZA, take the existence of this time period into account in determining what does, and what does not, constitute a reasonable and meaningful opportunity for a person to be heard in the Tribunal’s review, and to put forward material to the Tribunal. Although the unstated premise of the applicant’s submissions was that there would have been no difficulty in the Tribunal adjourning the review for a minimum of two days, and then reconvening, there was no evidence at all to support such a premise. There was a period of approximately two weeks to run before the 84 day time period would expire. The hearing was listed for two days, so that the Tribunal would have needed to find an additional two days within that two week period, as well as leaving itself enough time to write a decision. This would have needed to occur in the midst of what is a pressing and constant workload for the Tribunal. Counsel’s suggestion in oral submissions that the Tribunal could have issued a decision without reasons is contrary to s 43(2) of the AAT Act, which imposes a mandatory obligation on the Tribunal (subject to exceptions which are not presently relevant) to give reasons, either orally or in writing. This review was plainly not appropriate for the giving of oral reasons. Further, to suggest that the Tribunal could act in a procedurally fair way only by deliberately electing not to comply with its obligation to give reasons is not a suggestion which should be accepted. [58]The Tribunal was entitled to, and indeed it was appropriate for it to, plan to leave enough time after the review hearing to write its decision and deliver it within the 84 day time period.…[60]Separately from my findings above, and separately from the reasons given by the Tribunal for failing to adjourn the review, in my opinion there was no denial of procedural fairness to the applicant because he was, in substance, given a meaningful opportunity to address the matters which were in the late submitted material. That is because, in substance (rather than in form), most of those matters were already amply raised before the Tribunal by the material the applicant had already submitted to the Minister, and by what the applicant said at the review hearing. Others were objectively of no or marginal relevance to the outcome of the review.