Umi v Minister for Home Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 28 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Umi v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 101

Appeal from: Umi v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2148
File number: VID 42 of 2020
Judges: MIDDLETON, WHITE AND BURLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 5 June 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Court of Australia dismissing application for review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal not to revoke cancellation of applicant’s visa – material submitted by partner of applicant outside time period prescribed by s 500(6J) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether decision of Tribunal not to adjourn review hearing denied applicant procedural fairness or was legally unreasonable – whether Tribunal misunderstood its task by failing to correctly construe procedural fairness provisions in Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – consideration of whether alleged errors material to outcome of Tribunal’s review – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499(1), 499(2A), 500(1)(ba), 500(6H), 500(6J), 500(6L), 501(3A), 501(6), 501(7), 501CA(4),
Cases cited:

Director of Public Prosecutions v Jody Lee Downe and Saoloapu Umi [2013] VCC 734

DTN16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1525

Saoloapu Umi v The Queen [2013] VSCA 211

Umi v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2148

Date of hearing: 6 May 2020
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 49
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms G Costello SC with Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr Lawson Bayly
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Symons
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 42 of 2020
BETWEEN:

SAOLOAPU UMI

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MIDDLETON, WHITE AND BURLEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JUNE 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant is a 44 year old national of Samoa who has lived in Australia since 1995. 

  2. On 2 February 2017, a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (the ‘Minister’), acting pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the ‘Act’), cancelled the appellant’s Spouse Visa.  The delegate considered that the appellant did not satisfy the character test set out in sub-ss 501(6) and (7). 

  3. On 10 May 2019, another delegate made a decision, pursuant to sub-s 501CA(4) of the Act, not to revoke the cancellation.

  4. The appellant then applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’) for review.  His application was unsuccessful.  So also was the appellant’s application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision: Umi v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2148.

    Statutory setting

  5. The statutory setting pertinent to the appeal can be summarised briefly.

  6. By sub-s 501(3A) of the Act, the Minister is obliged to cancel a person’s visa if satisfied that…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Umi v Minister for Home Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 101
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, an individual with a criminal history, sought to appeal the Federal Court's dismissal of his application to review a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The Tribunal had declined to revoke the cancellation of the appellant's visa, a decision that was made under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to adjourn the hearing, allowing for compliance with the two-day rule, which required that any evidence to be relied upon by the appellant be submitted to the Minister two business days prior to the hearing. He contended that this failure denied him procedural fairness and that the Tribunal had misunderstood the procedural fairness provisions in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's refusal to adjourn the hearing, and its subsequent failure to consider material submitted by the appellant's partner after the deadline, constituted a denial of procedural fairness or was legally unreasonable. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the Tribunal had misunderstood its task by incorrectly interpreting the procedural fairness provisions in the AAT Act.

The court found that the appellant's argument was not sound as the Tribunal had explicitly stated its reasons for not considering the late-submitted material. The Tribunal's explanations were substantive, intelligible, and reasonable, providing a lawful basis for its decision. The court also concluded that the appellant had a reasonable understanding of the procedural steps and timelines involved in the review process. Furthermore, the Tribunal was entitled to consider the need to complete its review within the 84-day timeframe, and it was appropriate for it to plan to leave enough time to write its decision and deliver it within that period. The court found that there was no denial of procedural fairness as the appellant was, in substance, given a meaningful opportunity to address the relevant matters before the Tribunal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court did not find any merit in the appellant's contention that the Tribunal had misunderstood its task or that the alleged errors were material to the outcome of the Tribunal's review.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Whilst the ambit of the appeal is relatively confined, it will be necessary to rehearse the Tribunal’s reasons and the primary judge’s reasons in a little detail to explain our final conclusion.RELEVANT FACTS Shortly after arriving in Australia, the appellant commenced a relationship with an indigenous woman described in the Tribunal and by the primary judge as “Partner A”. He married her in 2007 and remains married to her. He has had four children with Partner A who, at the time of the Tribunal decision, were aged 9, 11, 19 and 21. In 2000, the appellant commenced a relationship with another woman, referred to in the Tribunal and by the primary Judge as “Partner B”. He fathered a child with Partner B, who was born in 2002. The appellant has a formidable criminal record. Of present relevance, the appellant was sentenced in the County Court in Victoria on 29 May 2013 in respect of a number of offences including armed robbery, making a threat to kill, possessing a firearm while a prohibited person, assault and using a drug of dependence. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a total term of eight years with a non‑parole period of five years: Director of Public Prosecutions v Jody Lee Downe and Saoloapu Umi [2013] VCC 734. On appeal, the total effective sentence was reduced to a head sentence of seven years and six months imprisonment with a non‑parole period of four years and six months: Saoloapu Umi v The Queen [2013] VSCA 211. The appellant was still in prison at the time of the Tribunal hearing in July 2019. As indicated above, the Tribunal’s review was subject to the “84-day rule” under sub-s 500(6L) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which deemed the primary decision (adverse to the appellant) to be affirmed if the Tribunal did not decide the review within 84 days of notification of the primary decision. The review was also subject to the “two-day rule” under sub-ss 500(6H) and 500(6J), which required that any evidence or document to be relied upon by an applicant be set out in writing and given to the Minister with two business days’ notice prior to a hearing. As alluded to already, the final hearing of the matter was listed with two weeks left before the 84th day. On the morning of the hearing, the Tribunal received documents from Partner B (the ‘Partner B Material’) The email which had attached the Partner B Material stated:From: [Partner B]Sent: Monday, 22 July 2019 8:57:07 AMTo:Melbourne.Registry@aat.gov.au <Melbourne.Registry@aat.gov.au>Subject: 2019/2807Dear Andrew Nikolic,Please find attached my support letter and supporting documents for Saoloapu Umi.I only found out yesterday that the hearing is today, as Saoloapu has very limited understanding of the whole legal process.Please, please consider my evidence Kindest regards,[Partner B] The Tribunal refused to consider the Partner B Material and did not look at its content even on a preliminary basis. The email and Partner B Material provided to the Tribunal from Partner B was adduced into evidence by the appellant before the primary judge.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In our view this cannot be denied, looking at the various paragraphs in the reasoning of the Tribunal: at [115], [155]-[156] and the conclusion ([158] to [165]):115.The ex-partners Mr Umi refers to were not called as witnesses during the hearing and could not be cross-examined. No documentary evidence was before the Tribunal from the children or caregivers of the children whose interests Mr Umi invokes. That said, the Tribunal is satisfied, from the attendance of four of Mr Umi’s five biological children at the hearing, that he has a close and continuing relationship with them and that the love they share is genuine. These children may want to have a continuing relationship with Mr Umi in the future, which would be significantly complicated if he were repatriated to Samoa.…155.The Tribunal acknowledges that if returned to Samoa, Mr Umi would lose easy physical access to the family and friends he has in Australia, and to income support and other payments. He would also be subject to the stresses of re-establishing himself in a country he last lived in at the age of 19. That includes trying to re-connect with relatives, securing stable accommodation, and maintaining basic living standards. His aspiration to play a more prominent parental role in the life of his children would also be significantly complicated, potentially causing Mr Umi tangible distress. Under such circumstances, his psychological health may be impacted.156.The Tribunal accepts that there are impediments confronting Mr Umi in re-establishing himself in Samoa and this consideration weighs in favour of revocation.…CONCLUSION158.Mr Umi does not pass the character test and his visa was liable for mandatory cancellation under s 501(3A)(a)(i) of the Act. In determining whether the conditional discretion under s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Act to revoke the mandatory cancellation of his visa should be exercised, the considerations at Part C of the Direction have been applied to the specific circumstances of his case.159.Mr Umi’s criminal offending has caused harm to members of the Australian community. Despite previous lenient treatment by the courts and frequent rehabilitative opportunities, Mr Umi continued to re-offend. He received multiple custodial sentences between 2004 and 2013, and was sentenced as a serious violent offender at his most recent court appearance. Mr Umi’s conduct reflects a disturbing propensity for violence and a lack of respect for Australia’s law enforcement framework.160.If Mr Umi were to repeat his violent offences, the harm that may be inflicted is potentially very serious, encompassing serious injury or death. The Tribunal is unpersuaded by his claims about rehabilitation, noting that despite attendance on a number of courses and programs over the years, he has consistently re-offended. Moreover, the incidents of misconduct recorded against him during his current sentence do not reflect someone with persuasive insight, remorse and an intention to live a law-abiding life. Mr Umi’s risk of reoffending is real and the potential harm caused by his recidivism is so serious that it constitutes an unacceptable risk to the Australian community.161.Mr Umi clearly loves his children and aspires to reconnect more meaningfully with them in the future. Notwithstanding a dearth of evidence from his minor children or their guardians, the Tribunal is satisfied Mr Umi’s children reciprocate his love and want him to remain in Australia. The Tribunal finds this primary consideration weighs in favour of revoking the cancellation of Mr Umi’s visa, but less so given Mr Umi’s role in the lives of his children can be considered sporadic and unreliable at best since his imprisonment in 2012. The interests of the two youngest children Mr Umi has with Partner A are given most weight given the specific circumstances of this case. These children may most benefit from a close and meaningful paternal relationship with Mr Umi.162.Mr Umi’s serious and prolonged criminal conduct is at odds with the reasonable expectations of the Australia community. Informed of the specific circumstances of his case, the broad middle ground of Australian society would expect that Mr Umi should not hold a visa.163.The Tribunal is satisfied that the strongest family and social ties Mr Umi has are in Australia and this consideration weighs in favour of revocation.164.The Tribunal accepts there are impediments confronting Mr Umi in re-establishing himself in a country he left as a 19-year-old. That includes locating stable accommodation, employment and basic living expenses. His unchallenged evidence is that he has no family or friendship networks to draw on in Samoa, because his mother lives in American Samoa. On balance, the Tribunal finds this consideration weighs in favour of revocation.165.Having weighed all of the considerations individually and cumulatively, the weight of evidence supports a finding there is not another reason why the decision to cancel Mr Umi’s visa should be revoked. That is because ‘Protection of the Australian community’ and ‘Expectations of the Australian community’ weigh very strongly against revocation. These considerably outweigh the primary consideration of ‘Best interests of minor children in Australia,’ and the other considerations of ‘Strength, nature and duration of ties’ and ‘Extent of Impediments if removed,’ which favour revocation.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There was no dispute before the primary judge or on the appeal to this Court about the accuracy of the above matters noted by the Tribunal.CONSIDERATION The underlying submission of Counsel for the appellant was that the Tribunal should have adjourned the hearing on 22 July 2019 so as to allow for compliance with the two‑day rule. The premise on which the sole ground of appeal was based was that, although the Tribunal member had said that the five matters listed in [80] set out above were reasons for declining to consider the Partner B Material, they were in truth reasons for the Tribunal member refusing an adjournment so as to allow for compliance with the two‑day rule. Based on that premise, the appellant’s Counsel then submitted that the five matters indicated an incorrect understanding of the law affecting the procedure on the review. However, in our view, the premise for the appellant’s argument is not sound. The matters listed by the Tribunal in [80] were, as the chapeau in the paragraph indicates, the reasons for the Tribunal member declining to consider the Partner B Material. As part of those reasons, the Tribunal member referred to the possibility of adjournment of the hearing and gave two reasons why he considered that was inappropriate in [80(d)]. The primary judge focussed in this context on the adjournment and concluded, when similar arguments as put in this appeal were put to her, as follows:[53]… The real issue, as all counsel accepted in the way they approached the argument, is whether the Tribunal’s own failure to adjourn the hearing occurred because of a misunderstanding of its powers, or constituted a denial of procedural fairness, or was legally unreasonable.[54]It is true that aspects of the Tribunal’s explanation for not adjourning the review can be criticised. It misstated the applicable section of the Migration Act. The applicant’s counsel in this proceeding properly accepted nothing of substance turns on this, especially given the preclusory effect is the same. The Tribunal made something of the procedural unfairness to the Minister if the Tribunal had regard to the late submitted information, when it is apparent that, first, the Minister’s legal representative had in fact seen the material the day before, and second, he told the Tribunal he intended to cross-examine the applicant on matters which were in substance the same as the information contained in what Partner B had said: see the extract at [26(b)] above. Finally, it might be difficult to see how the fact that the applicant was imprisoned (see (e) in the extract at [18] above) counted one way or the other in circumstances where what was at stake before the Tribunal was whether he would be able to remain in Australia when he was released. If these had been the only three justifications for the refusal of an adjournment, then (and without speculating about what the ground might have been) it might have been arguable that the Tribunal’s exercise of power had miscarried in a way which affected its jurisdiction to decide the review.[55]However, two of the explanations given by the Tribunal were substantive, intelligible and reasonable, and are sufficient to provide a lawful foundation for the Tribunal’s refusal to adjourn the review, and to proceed to determine whether the cancellation decision should have been revoked.[56]The first of those was the Tribunal’s reference to the procedural steps which had been undertaken during the review. While I accept that the applicant was at some disadvantage because he had no legal representation, and his English language ability was only moderate, I consider it is apparent from the evidence (for example, the transcript of the review hearing and the applicant’s letters to the Minister and to his family) that he had sufficient comprehension to understand what the Tribunal had told him in both the directions hearing, and in the follow-up emails when he filed nothing ahead of the review hearing. I note the applicant is also familiar, over a long period of time, with court processes. I infer he realises there are timetables, orders made about filing material and the like. I do not accept he is unaware of what is supposed to happen when an entity like the Tribunal makes directions about what he should do to progress his review. Further, he responded within the 28 day time period to the cancellation decision, and he made substantive, handwritten representations on his own behalf, and indeed the handwritten answers he gave to the notification of the original cancellation decision, over a large number of pages and at considerable length, demonstrate a more than adequate capacity to express himself. I find on the evidence the applicant had a reasonable level of understanding about the need to file material and comply with processes, and on that basis there was nothing procedurally unfair about the Tribunal’s expectation that if he had material he wished to put forward, he should have done so in a way which did not engage the preclusory provisions in s 500(6H) or s 500(6J).[57]Second, the Tribunal was entitled to rely upon the need for it to complete its review within the 84 day time period, and a supervising Court should, as Kenny J found in NZA, take the existence of this time period into account in determining what does, and what does not, constitute a reasonable and meaningful opportunity for a person to be heard in the Tribunal’s review, and to put forward material to the Tribunal. Although the unstated premise of the applicant’s submissions was that there would have been no difficulty in the Tribunal adjourning the review for a minimum of two days, and then reconvening, there was no evidence at all to support such a premise. There was a period of approximately two weeks to run before the 84 day time period would expire. The hearing was listed for two days, so that the Tribunal would have needed to find an additional two days within that two week period, as well as leaving itself enough time to write a decision. This would have needed to occur in the midst of what is a pressing and constant workload for the Tribunal. Counsel’s suggestion in oral submissions that the Tribunal could have issued a decision without reasons is contrary to s 43(2) of the AAT Act, which imposes a mandatory obligation on the Tribunal (subject to exceptions which are not presently relevant) to give reasons, either orally or in writing. This review was plainly not appropriate for the giving of oral reasons. Further, to suggest that the Tribunal could act in a procedurally fair way only by deliberately electing not to comply with its obligation to give reasons is not a suggestion which should be accepted. [58]The Tribunal was entitled to, and indeed it was appropriate for it to, plan to leave enough time after the review hearing to write its decision and deliver it within the 84 day time period.…[60]Separately from my findings above, and separately from the reasons given by the Tribunal for failing to adjourn the review, in my opinion there was no denial of procedural fairness to the applicant because he was, in substance, given a meaningful opportunity to address the matters which were in the late submitted material. That is because, in substance (rather than in form), most of those matters were already amply raised before the Tribunal by the material the applicant had already submitted to the Minister, and by what the applicant said at the review hearing. Others were objectively of no or marginal relevance to the outcome of the review.