SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 465

Citation: SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 465
Appeal from: SZSEI & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1660
Parties: SZSEI and SZSEJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 14 of 2014
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 16 May 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal – whether primary judge erred in determining judicial review application concerning decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) to refuse protection visas – whether Tribunal impermissibly delegated to the interpreter its function of conducting the hearing – whether mistranslations, non-translations and unprompted interventions by interpreter gave rise to jurisdictional error under ss 414 and 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – consideration and application of SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142 in a s 425 context
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 414, 422B(3), 425, 427, 428
Cases cited: Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMOK [2009] FCAFC 83
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553; [2003] FCAFC 126
Perera v Minister for Immigrationand Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6; [1999] FCA 507
SZBEL v Minister for Immigrationand Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63
SZGWN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 238
SZHEW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 783
SZOYU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 936
SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142
WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 511; [2003] FCAFC 171
WALN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 131
Date of hearing: 9 May 2014

Date of last submissions:

9 May 2014

Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 121
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellants: Legal Aid NSW
Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr T Reilly

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

DLA Piper

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 14 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSEI
First Appellant

SZSEJ
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 MAY 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made below on 13 December 2013 be set aside.

3.The decision dated 15 October 2012 of the second respondent be set aside.

4.There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the second respondent, differently constituted, to determine according to law…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 465
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal by the applicants against the Federal Court's dismissal of their judicial review application concerning the Refugee Review Tribunal's (RRT) decision to refuse their protection visas. The applicants contended that the RRT had made a jurisdictional error by impermissibly delegating its function to the interpreter, which included mistranslations, non-translations, and unprompted interventions. The applicants sought to establish that the Tribunal's alleged errors amounted to a breach of section 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which requires that applicants be given a fair opportunity to present their case.

The primary legal issue in the case was whether the Tribunal's conduct of the hearing, including the interpreter's actions, constituted a jurisdictional error under section 425 of the Migration Act. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had unlawfully delegated its statutory function to the interpreter, thereby denying them a fair opportunity to present their case. They also contended that mistranslations and non-translations by the interpreter had a significant impact on the outcome of the hearing, denying them a fair opportunity to be heard.

The Court found that the Tribunal had not unlawfully delegated its function to the interpreter. The Tribunal member had taken steps to ensure that the applicants understood the process of interpretation and had warned them against lengthy exchanges with the interpreter. The Court concluded that the Tribunal member had not permitted the interpreter to take over the questioning or suggest answers to the applicants. Regarding the mistranslations and non-translations, the Court held that the applicants had not demonstrated that these errors were material to the Tribunal's decision. The Court found that the primary judge had correctly applied the legal test for jurisdictional error under section 425 of the Migration Act.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Federal Court, and quashed the RRT's decision. The Court ordered that the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, differently constituted, determine the applicants' applications for review of the delegate's decision. The Court also ordered the Minister to pay the applicants' costs of and incidental to both the appeal and the proceeding below.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made below on 13 December 2013 be set aside.

3. The decision dated 15 October 2012 of the second respondent be set aside.

4. There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the second respondent, differently constituted, to determine according to law the appellants’ applications for review of the delegate’s decision refusing to grant a protection visa to either of the appellants.

5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of and incidental to both the appeal and the proceeding below.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 428(1) of the Act provides:428 Tribunal Member may authorise another person to take evidence(1)The power of the Tribunal under paragraph 427(1)(a) to take evidence on oath or affirmation for the purpose of a review may be exercised by the Tribunal or on behalf of the Tribunal by:(a)a person appointed or engaged under the Public Service Act 1999; or(b)another person approved in writing by the Minister for the purposes of this section; who is authorised in writing by the Tribunal. The effect of these provisions, so the appellants submit, is that the Tribunal itself must conduct the s 425 hearing, subject to there being a lawful delegation under s 428. In addition, s 427(7) carries with it the implication that the purpose of an interpreter is to act as a means of communication at the s 425 hearing. The interpreter has no other purpose. The appellants acknowledge that occasionally an interpreter may attempt to engage in a conversation with an applicant, or ask further questions of him or her. The appellants submit that, in such a case, the interpreter would be acting outside his or her statutory function. The appellants contend that the Tribunal member permitted lengthy exchanges which he did not understand, in which the interpreter took over the questioning and in some cases seemed concerned to ensure that the evidence of the appellants would be consistent. They contend that, elsewhere, the interpreter suggested answers to the husband. In permitting such exchanges, and in permitting them to go unchecked, the appellants contend that the Tribunal member effectively delegated part of his statutory function to the interpreter, and so acted outside his jurisdiction. They say that whether or not the resulting hearing was “fair” is not to the point, and the primary judge was in error in suggesting otherwise in [14] of his reasons for judgment. (b) Grounds 3 and 4 The appellants submit that the purpose of an interview in the current circumstances was to give the appellants an opportunity to present evidence and arguments and to address any concerns that the Tribunal may have had about their case. An issue therefore is whether the appellants truly had an opportunity to be heard, and to address the issues arising in relation to the decision under review as was required by s 425(1) of the Act. On the issue of the standard of translation in the context of s 425 of the Act, the appellants draw attention to the following passage from Kenny J’s influential decision in Perera at [29]:Whilst the interpretation at a Tribunal hearing need not be at the very highest standard of a first-flight interpreter, the interpretation must, nonetheless, express in one language, as accurately as that language and the circumstances permit, the idea or concept as it has been expressed in the other language. They also rely on the following summary of the relevant principles by Jacobson J in SZOYU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 936 (SZOYU) at [29]-[32]:The seminal authority on the standard of interpretation is the decision of Kenny J, in Perera. Although that case was decided before s 425 of the Act was amended, it has been accepted that what her Honour said in Perera is equally applicable to s 425 in its current form: WACO at [64].The relevant principles may be stated briefly. The standard of interpretation is not one of perfection. It need not be at the very highest standard of a first-flight interpreter but it must express in one language, as accurately as the language and circumstances permit, the idea or concept as it has been expressed in the other language: Perera at [26]-[29]; WACO at [66].Importantly, not every departure from the standard of interpretation denies an applicant the opportunity to obtain a hearing under s 425 so as to give rise to jurisdictional error. The onus is on an applicant to demonstrate that the departure related to a matter of significance to his or her claims and that there was a sufficient connection between the inadequate translation and the Tribunal’s decision: Perera at [38], [45]; Applicant P 119/2002 at [16]-[18]; WACO at [69]; see also SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 179 FCR 109 at [72]-[73] (Buchanan J). Whether any inadequacy in translation has been such as to deprive an applicant of the opportunity to have a hearing in accordance with s 425 involves a qualitative assessment of the conduct of the hearing before the tribunal as a whole: SZHEW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 783 at [52] (Jagot J).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge concluded at [36]:The applicants have not identified any interpretation error material to an adverse conclusion by the Tribunal, as would be required to establish a breach of s. 425. Rather they speculate that defects in interpretation might have been of significance. This is not in my view sufficient to establish a breach of s. 425, although I readily concede that the manner and quality of interpretation was imperfect. Accordingly this ground fails. (Emphasis added). There is a real question whether that passage reveals that the primary judge applied the wrong legal test, an issue which is addressed at [111]-[114] below. The appellants’ submissions in the appeal summarised(a) Grounds 1 and 2 Section 414 of the Act requires the Tribunal to “review” an “RRT reviewable decision” if a valid application is made to it, and where the exclusion in s 414(2) does not apply. In conducting that review the Tribunal must issue the invitation referred to in s 425(1) (i.e. invite an applicant “to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”) unless the exceptions in ss 425(2) and (3) apply, and must raise with the applicant the issues relating to the review, unless those issues have been raised previously: SZBEL v Minister for Immigrationand Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63 at [35] and [43]. The Tribunal is permitted to take evidence on oath or affirmation (s 427(1)(a)) and to adjourn a hearing (s 427(1)(b)). The Tribunal may also summons a person to appear or produce documents (s 427(3)). Section 427(7) provides:(7)If a person appearing before the Tribunal to give evidence is not proficient in English, the Tribunal may direct that communication with that person during his or her appearance proceed through an interpreter. Section 428(1) of the Act provides:428 Tribunal Member may authorise another person to take evidence(1)The power of the Tribunal under paragraph 427(1)(a) to take evidence on oath or affirmation for the purpose of a review may be exercised by the Tribunal or on behalf of the Tribunal by:(a)a person appointed or engaged under the Public Service Act 1999; or(b)another person approved in writing by the Minister for the purposes of this section; who is authorised in writing by the Tribunal. The effect of these provisions, so the appellants submit, is that the Tribunal itself must conduct the s 425 hearing, subject to there being a lawful delegation under s 428. In addition, s 427(7) carries with it the implication that the purpose of an interpreter is to act as a means of communication at the s 425 hearing. The interpreter has no other purpose. The appellants acknowledge that occasionally an interpreter may attempt to engage in a conversation with an applicant, or ask further questions of him or her. The appellants submit that, in such a case, the interpreter would be acting outside his or her statutory function.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In oral address, Mr Reilly drew the Court’s attention to the delegate’s finding, as set out in [9] and [10] above, to the effect that the first appellant had stated in his interview with the delegate that he had found the bodies of his children. He also emphasised that the Tribunal member said in his reasons for decision that he had the Department’s file (which presumably included the delegate’s reasons for decision) and had listened to the recording of the interview with the delegate.Consideration It is convenient to deal with the grounds of appeal under the following two broad headings: ‘unlawful delegation’ and ‘mistranslations and non-translations’. (a) Unlawful delegation As to the alleged unlawful delegation of the conduct of the hearing to the interpreter, I accept the Minister’s submission that, on a fair reading of the annotated transcript, this did not in fact occur. The annotated transcript records that the Tribunal member caused the interpreter to take an oath of interpretation. He also had the first appellant confirm that he was not having any difficulty understanding the interpreter. He also explained to the first appellant how the process of interpretation would occur and he urged him to break up his evidence into parts so as to give the interpreter an opportunity to interpret what he was saying. It is evident from the annotated transcript that there were several relatively lengthy exchanges between the first appellant and the interpreter which did not directly reflect questions asked by the Tribunal member. At times the interpreter took it upon herself to add her own gloss on matters raised by the Tribunal. For example, when the Tribunal member asked which church the first appellant belonged to in Nigeria and the first appellant responded in Yoruba that he was a member of the Baptist Church, the interpreter, without any evident prompting from the Tribunal, asked the first appellant whether he had mentioned that in his statement. And when the interpreter translated the Tribunal member’s request that the second appellant should wait outside while her husband was interviewed, the annotated transcript records the interpreter translating the request to the second appellant but then asking the first appellant in Yoruba: “Does she know everything you are talking about?”. Later, when the Tribunal member was asking questions about which church the first appellant belonged, the annotated transcript records the interpreter as asking the first appellant in Yoruba (and without any prompting from the Tribunal): “Does your wife know about this, because they may ask her?”. Another illustration of the interpreter taking it upon herself to ask questions of the first appellant which had not been raised by the Tribunal member (as well as mistranslating) is reflected in the following extracts from the annotated transcript at AB-B 21:30-41 and 22:20-30:30MR SHORT: And you say that after your father died you were approached by members of a secret society.I:“He says you stated that after your father’s death you were attacked by members of the secret society”35A:I did not hear that!I: That these cult members visited you?40 A: Yes, they approached me and asked me to join themI:OK...20A: It was when my father diedI:“Is it when he actually died, or after his burial?”A:Before I buried him, they approached me25I:“Is it the first week after he died that they approached you?”A:On the very day he died, because they actually knew of the day he died.30THE INTERPRETER: He said before even bury – before they buried him.