WACO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WACO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 171

MIGRATION – appeal – a denial of natural justice occurred where the Refugee Review Tribunal found that documents that were potentially corroborative of a critical aspect of the appellant’s claims were not genuine but failed to give the appellant an opportunity to be heard on this issue.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424A, 425, 425(1)(a), 474

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 162 ALR 1 – referred to
Allied PastoralHoldings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1983) 44 ALR 607 – approved
Cong Tam Dang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 61 ALD 29 ‑ distinguished
FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342 – approved
Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414 – approved
Hussein v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 57 ALD 297 – approved
In re HK (An Infant) [1967] 2 QB 617 – cited
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 – referred to
Koulaxazov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 75
Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 144 cited
Meadows v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 370 ‑ approved
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Djalal (1998) 51 ALD 567 – referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 – followed
NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 193 ALR 449 – not followed
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 – applied
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 195 ALR 24 – followed
R vHickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 – cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 – referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 77 ALJR 699 ‑ referred to
SBBG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 199 ALR 281‑ approved

SDAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SBBK (2003) 199 ALR 43 ‑ approved
Soltanyzand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 917 – cited

WACO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
W261 OF 2002

LEE, HILL & CARR JJ
15 AUGUST 2003
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W261 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

WACO
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

LEE, HILL AND CARR JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

15 AUGUST 2003

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeal be allowed.
  1. The orders made by this Court on 21 August 2002 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:

“1)

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 171
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In WACO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the appellant, an Iranian national, sought review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal which had dismissed his application for a visa on the grounds that he did not have a genuine fear of persecution and that there was not a real chance that he would face persecution upon his return to Iran. The appellant had alleged that he had a close relationship with Ayatollah Shirazi, a prominent Iranian cleric, and that he had been involved in anti-regime activities. The Tribunal had rejected his claims and found him not to be a credible witness. The central issues in the appeal were whether the Tribunal had denied the appellant an opportunity to be heard and whether it had failed to take into account relevant considerations.

The court found that the Tribunal had not denied the appellant an opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal had raised the inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence regarding the time and nature of the house arrest of Ayatollah Shirazi and allowed the appellant to provide further documents potentially evidencing his relationship with the Ayatollah. The court held that it was not authorised to engage in merits review of the weight the Tribunal placed on the appellant's evidence. The court also found that the Tribunal had not failed to take into account relevant considerations. The court held that a Tribunal may make a jurisdictional error if it takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take into account relevant considerations. However, the court held that it was sufficient in such a case that the party has not been afforded an opportunity to put his or her case and that only where the case is one where it can be shown that the appellant could not, even if given the opportunity to do so, affect the outcome would it be held that there was no denial of procedural fairness.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Court on 21 August 2002 and remitted the applicant's application for a visa to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law. The court also ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by this Court on 21 August 2002 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:

“1) A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made 9 November 2001.

2) The applicant’s application for a visa be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.

3) The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.”

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Given that the Tribunal’s notion of house arrest was not so dissimilar to that of the appellant as to require an opportunity to be afforded to the appellant to explain what he understood house arrest to be it is difficult to see that the Tribunal was under a duty to raise the inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence regarding the time and the nature of the house arrest of the Ayatollah Shirazi. The transcript shows that the Tribunal member in fact plainly and unambiguously raised inter alia the question when the Ayatollah Shirazi had been placed under house arrest after the appellant had stipulated a date inconsistent with the country information. The Tribunal also raised with the appellant the question whether the Ayatollah was allowed to teach and receive students during his period of house arrest. The Tribunal also indicated, directly after house arrest had been discussed, that on the basis of the evidence provided by the appellant he was not satisfied that the appellant had the claimed relationship with the Ayatollah Shirazi. The appellant consequently offered, and was allowed to provide further documents potentially evidencing this relationship. Accordingly the submission that the appellant was not given an opportunity to be heard in relation to inconsistencies between his evidence on the one hand and the fact of Ayatollah Shirazi’s house arrest must fail.C. Did the Tribunal fail to allow the appellant an opportunity to be heard by ignoring the consistent evidence he gave on the Ayatollah Shirazi’s house arrest? The appellant submits that he was denied an opportunity to be heard because the Tribunal characterised the evidence he gave on the Ayatollah Shirazi’s house arrest as inconsistent, where as it was submitted the evidence of the appellant was consistent. With respect to the appellant’s submission, the transcript and the reasons of the Tribunal do not show that the Tribunal failed to listen to the appellant’s evidence, but merely show that it drew unfavorable conclusions regarding it. The appellant’s submission in this respect is therefore merely an invitation for the Court to engage in merits review of the weight the Tribunal placed on the appellant’s evidence concerning this aspect of his application. The Court is not authorised to do so.D. Did the Tribunal deny the appellant an opportunity to be heard on the genuineness of the letters? At the hearing the Tribunal member indicated that he would be unlikely to accept the claimed close relationship with Ayatolla Shirazi on the evidence which was then before the Tribunal. The appellant then indicated that he could provide documentary material supporting his claims. There was subsequently provided additional information including the translation of a personal letter purporting to be from Ayatollah Shirazi and of a letter from Mr Azizollah Vahdati, the Head of the Notary of Public Office in Tehran. These letters were central to the appellant’s claim in so far as they were tendered as evidence of his relationship with the Ayatollah Shirazi. However, in its reasons the Tribunal stated: ‘[in] view of the Tribunal’s firm findings against the Applicant in respect his religious association with Ayatollah Shirazi, the Tribunal is not prepared to accept either of these documents as genuine…the Tribunal is not satisfied that the contents of the letters…regarding [the Applicant’s] claimed status as a follower and a close associate of Ayatollah Shirazi are genuine and finds that they have been prepared to seek to bolster his claims’.

Decision

Reasons for decision

After a letter from the Tribunal inquiring whether the appellant would be providing any further information, the appellant’s advisors on 7 November 2001 provided translated copies of the two letters and a copy of the birth certificate of the cousin on whose passport he allegedly left the country. The first letter purported to be from the Ayatollah Shirazi to the appellant’s father. It thanked him for raising a son who had sacrificed himself to preserve the true meaning of the Koran. The second letter from Mr Azizollah Vahdati, the Head of the Notary of Public Office in Tehran, testified to the appellant’s relationship with the Ayatollah Shirazi. Both letters if accepted as genuine corroborated a critical element of the appellant’s claim. The advisors also indicated that the appellant was unable to furnish any further proof of his relationship with Ayatollah Shirazi. The Tribunal’s Decision The Tribunal’s decision was handed down on 9 November 2001. It found that the appellant did not have a genuine fear of persecution and that there was not a real chance that the appellant would face persecution upon his return to Iran. In particular, the Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s account of the nature and extent of the appellant’s relationship with Ayatollah Shirazi. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant was a follower of Ayatollah Shirazi, or had a close relationship with the Ayatollah Shirazi or Dr Jafarri or even that he had attended the Ayatollah Shirazi’s religious school at Qom. The Tribunal concluded that several aspects of the appellant’s claims were implausible and that he was not a credible witness ‘in respect of key aspects of his claims for protection.’ The Tribunal said: ‘He was not an impressive witness in giving consistent and cohesive testimony about matters which he professed to have some close familiarity. He conveniently varied his evidence, including very subtly on occasions, to answer the Tribunal’s concerns with certain key aspects of his claims. He clearly had difficulty providing convincing explanations on issues on which the Tribunal expected straightforward, informed responses. He was also generally unsatisfactory in testifying about the circumstances that he claims led to him departing Iran as a fugitive and in respect of how he managed his exit from Iran. He was also hesitant, unconvincing and shifted ground too readily in answering concerns about his actions and objectives in seeking to attack the clerical leadership.’ This finding on the appellant’s credit was based on his inability to satisfy the Tribunal of the course of events which precipitated the anti-regime leaflet dropping episode, and the episode itself. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s account of this incident to be ‘highly implausible and [had] no hesitation in rejecting it’ on the basis of the appellant’s lack of ability to satisfy the Tribunal in relation to inconsistencies between the appellant’s account at the hearing and in his application, and why such a means of distributing the leaflets was chosen at all.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The comments of Gleeson CJ at [36] – [38] and particularly his Honour’s reference to ‘practical injustice’ must be read in the light of the facts of the case. Particularly we do not understand his Honour to be saying that it is necessary in each case where denial of natural justice is alleged that the person claiming not to have been given an opportunity to put his or her case lead evidence to show that had the opportunity been given it would make a difference to the outcome. There can be a denial of natural justice where a decision maker makes a finding on an important issue in a case without notice that the issue is the subject of any dispute and where the party affected adversely by that finding is not given an opportunity to be heard. That is because so to do will itself be unfair. It will not be necessary for the party alleging unfairness to put before the court the evidence which he would have presented had there not been a miscarriage of justice. It is sufficient in such a case that the party has not been afforded an opportunity to put his or her case. Only where the case is one where it can be shown that the appellant could not, even if given the opportunity to do so, affect the outcome would it be held that there was no denial of procedural fairness. If the possibility exists that the appellant, if given the opportunity might be able to make submissions or call evidence which could affect the outcome the appellant will not fail merely because the appellant has not proved that the submissions or evidence would affect the outcome. Did the Tribunal fail to take into account relevant considerations or take irrelevant considerations into account It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by taking into account irrelevant considerations, those being the inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence regarding house arrest. Alternatively, it was submitted that in failing to take into account the appellant’s version of house arrest, and consequently his consistent evidence regarding it, the Tribunal failed to take a relevant consideration into account. It may, for present purposes, be accepted that a Tribunal may make a jurisdictional error if it takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take into account relevant considerations, although there have been some suggestions that this is not so: Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 144 at [13], Koulaxazov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 75 per Conti J with whom Gyles J agreed, but see, to the contrary the judgment in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, where McHugh, Gummow JJ and Hayne JJ at 351 noted: ‘ “Jurisdictional error” can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have the authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law.’