FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WACO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 171
MIGRATION – appeal – a denial of natural justice occurred where the Refugee Review Tribunal found that documents that were potentially corroborative of a critical aspect of the appellant’s claims were not genuine but failed to give the appellant an opportunity to be heard on this issue.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424A, 425, 425(1)(a), 474Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 162 ALR 1 – referred to
Allied PastoralHoldings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1983) 44 ALR 607 – approved
Cong Tam Dang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 61 ALD 29 ‑ distinguished
FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342 – approved
Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd (1988) 93 FLR 414 – approved
Hussein v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 57 ALD 297 – approved
In re HK (An Infant) [1967] 2 QB 617 – cited
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 – referred to
Koulaxazov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 75
Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 144 cited
Meadows v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 370 ‑ approved
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Djalal (1998) 51 ALD 567 – referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 – followed
NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 193 ALR 449 – not followed
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 – applied
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 195 ALR 24 – followed
R vHickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 – cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 – referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 77 ALJR 699 ‑ referred to
SBBG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 199 ALR 281‑ approvedSDAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SBBK (2003) 199 ALR 43 ‑ approved
Soltanyzand v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 917 – citedWACO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
W261 OF 2002LEE, HILL & CARR JJ
15 AUGUST 2003
PERTH
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W261 OF 2002
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
WACO
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
LEE, HILL AND CARR JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
15 AUGUST 2003
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
- The appeal be allowed.
- The orders made by this Court on 21 August 2002 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:
“1)
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- Case
- [2003] FCAFC 171
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal had not denied the appellant an opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal had raised the inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence regarding the time and nature of the house arrest of Ayatollah Shirazi and allowed the appellant to provide further documents potentially evidencing his relationship with the Ayatollah. The court held that it was not authorised to engage in merits review of the weight the Tribunal placed on the appellant's evidence. The court also found that the Tribunal had not failed to take into account relevant considerations. The court held that a Tribunal may make a jurisdictional error if it takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take into account relevant considerations. However, the court held that it was sufficient in such a case that the party has not been afforded an opportunity to put his or her case and that only where the case is one where it can be shown that the appellant could not, even if given the opportunity to do so, affect the outcome would it be held that there was no denial of procedural fairness.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Court on 21 August 2002 and remitted the applicant's application for a visa to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law. The court also ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by this Court on 21 August 2002 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered:
“1) A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made 9 November 2001.
2) The applicant’s application for a visa be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.
3) The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.”
3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The comments of Gleeson CJ at [36] – [38] and particularly his Honour’s reference to ‘practical injustice’ must be read in the light of the facts of the case. Particularly we do not understand his Honour to be saying that it is necessary in each case where denial of natural justice is alleged that the person claiming not to have been given an opportunity to put his or her case lead evidence to show that had the opportunity been given it would make a difference to the outcome. There can be a denial of natural justice where a decision maker makes a finding on an important issue in a case without notice that the issue is the subject of any dispute and where the party affected adversely by that finding is not given an opportunity to be heard. That is because so to do will itself be unfair. It will not be necessary for the party alleging unfairness to put before the court the evidence which he would have presented had there not been a miscarriage of justice. It is sufficient in such a case that the party has not been afforded an opportunity to put his or her case. Only where the case is one where it can be shown that the appellant could not, even if given the opportunity to do so, affect the outcome would it be held that there was no denial of procedural fairness. If the possibility exists that the appellant, if given the opportunity might be able to make submissions or call evidence which could affect the outcome the appellant will not fail merely because the appellant has not proved that the submissions or evidence would affect the outcome. Did the Tribunal fail to take into account relevant considerations or take irrelevant considerations into account It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by taking into account irrelevant considerations, those being the inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence regarding house arrest. Alternatively, it was submitted that in failing to take into account the appellant’s version of house arrest, and consequently his consistent evidence regarding it, the Tribunal failed to take a relevant consideration into account. It may, for present purposes, be accepted that a Tribunal may make a jurisdictional error if it takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take into account relevant considerations, although there have been some suggestions that this is not so: Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 144 at [13], Koulaxazov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 75 per Conti J with whom Gyles J agreed, but see, to the contrary the judgment in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, where McHugh, Gummow JJ and Hayne JJ at 351 noted: ‘ “Jurisdictional error” can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have the authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law.’