Abazi v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ABAZI & ORS v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR [2019] FCCA 2646
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – What does and what does not constitute “compelling reasons” for the purposes of the Migration Regulations – couple in relationship of five years – no proper consideration of medical and other evidence – “compelling reasons” established – flaws in the quality of interpretation during the hearing before the AAT – relief granted.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.65

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r.1.20J(2); cl.300.213 & 300.222.

Cases cited:

Babicci v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 141 FCR 285

BZAID v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 242 FCR 310

CYG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 433

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 235
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Paduano v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 204
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173
SZOYU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 936

First Applicant: IRFAN ABAZI
Second Applicant: ENTELA QOSE
Third Applicant: DHIMITRIOS QAZIMLLARI
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: CAG 60 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Neville
Hearing date: 19 March 2019
Date of Last Submission: 19 March 2019
Delivered at: Canberra
Delivered on: 20 September 2019

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicants: Sean Kikkert
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz, Canberra

ORDERS

  1. The decision and recommendation of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 9th July 2018 be set aside, and the matter be remitted for further assessment by a different reviewer.

  2. Absent any Application within 14 days, the First Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs of these proceedings in accordance with Schedule 1 Part 3 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT CANBERRA

CAG 60 of 2018

IRFAN ABAZI

First Applicant

ENTELA QOSE

Second Applicant

DHIMITRIOS QAZIMLLARI

Third Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This matter concerns whether the Applicant has sufficiently established “jurisdictional facts” that constitute “compelling reasons”, which are sufficient “to force or drive the decision-maker” to exercise a discretion, under r.1.20J(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 in the Applicant’s favour.[1]

    [1] Generally, see the comments of Crennan J (as her Honour then was) in Paduano v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 204 at [37], [44] and [53] and the earlier comments of the Full Federal Court in Babicci v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 141 FCR 285 at [23] and [24].

  2. In Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection the High Court said, at [30] - [31] (internal citations omitted):[2]

    [30] The plaintiff's submission misunderstands the operation of cl 202.222(2). Clause 202.222(2) does…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 2646
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that affirmed a delegate's refusal to grant the applicant's partner a Prospective Marriage visa. The visa applicant, a citizen of Albania, had her application refused because the sponsor (the applicant in this matter) had previously sponsored two other individuals for partner visas, and the delegate was not satisfied that there were compelling circumstances to waive this sponsorship limitation under regulation 1.20J of the Migration Regulations 1994. The AAT affirmed this decision, finding that the circumstances presented were not compelling enough to override the sponsorship limitation.

The applicant sought judicial review on several grounds, including that the AAT misconstrued or misapplied the phrase "compelling circumstances," that the quality of interpretation during the hearing was inadequate, that the AAT failed to consider relevant materials, that it made an adverse finding on health issues based on them being raised late, that it failed to give genuine consideration to submissions, and that its decision lacked evident and intelligible justification and was legally unreasonable. The Minister argued that no jurisdictional error had been established and that the application should be dismissed.

The Court considered the meaning of "compelling circumstances" in the context of regulation 1.20J, noting that such circumstances must "force or drive the decision maker irresistibly" to grant special consideration. The AAT had considered various factors presented by the applicant, including the length and nature of his relationship with the visa applicant, his health, and the circumstances of previous relationship breakdowns. However, the AAT found these factors, individually and cumulatively, did not meet the threshold of compelling circumstances. Regarding the interpretation issues, the Court noted the AAT's efforts to rectify problems with remote interpretation by arranging for an in-person interpreter for the visa applicant's evidence, and concluded that the applicant had not been deprived of an adequate opportunity to present his case. The Court also addressed the grounds relating to the consideration of health issues and the alleged misstatement of submissions, finding that the AAT had considered the evidence and that the applicant's claims did not amount to jurisdictional error.

Ultimately, the Court found that the AAT's decision was reasonably open to it on the evidence before it and that the applicant had not established jurisdictional error. The application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The First Respondent’s Submissions, filed 12th March 2019, were as follows (emphasis in original): 1. The Applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal), dated 9 July 2018 (CB 573 to 578), by which it affirmed a decision by a delegate of the First Respondent (Delegate) to refuse to grant the Visa Applicant a Prospective Marriage (Temporary) (Class TO) (Subclass 300) visa (Prospective Marriage visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) (CB 467 to 472).2. These submissions are filed in accordance with the Orders made by this Court on 17 September 2018. The Orders also required that the Applicant file and serve any affidavit containing additional evidence relied upon and any amended application by 12 November 2018. On 28 February 2019, the Applicant filed an amended application (amended application) and sought leave to file the Affidavit of Sean Kikkert filed on 28 February 2019. 3. These submissions respond to the amended application. 4. The Minister submits that the Application does not establish jurisdictional error and for the reasons that follow, the Application ought to be dismissed with costs. Background5. The Visa Applicant, a citizen of Albania, applied for a Prospective Marriage visa on the basis of her relationship with the Applicant, the sponsor. Prior to this application, the Applicant had previously sponsored two other people for Partner visa applications to Australia (CB 469 to 470).6. On 27 May 2016, a delegate of the Minister refused the application on the basis that the Applicant had previously sponsored two other people and the delegate was not satisfied that there were compelling circumstances so as to waive the sponsorship limitation set out in regulation 1.20J of the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). The delegate found that subclause 300.222 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations could not be met as the sponsorship of the visa applicant had not been approved.7. The Applicant applied for review of the decision to the Tribunal and attached a copy of the delegate's decision (CB 473 to 490). The Applicant appointed a migration agent, Marion Le, as his Authorised Representative.8. The Applicant appeared before the Tribunal, assisted by his Authorised Representative on 27 June 2018. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from the Visa Applicant, and the Applicant's family. 9. On 6 July 2018, the Applicant's Authorised Representative provided the Tribunal with a National Police Certificate, medical records and character reference statements in respect of the Applicant (CB 545 to 562).10. On 8 July 2018, the Applicant's Authorised Representative provided the Tribunal with post hearing submissions in relation to the compelling circumstances (CB 563 to 570).11. On 9 July 2018 the Tribunal affirmed the decision on review (CB 573 to 578), on the basis that the Tribunal did not approve the sponsorship under r 1.20J of the Regulations because the Tribunal was not satisfied that there were compelling circumstances affecting the Applicant under r 1.20J for the purpose of clause 300.222 (at [23]).Grounds of review12. The Applicant's grounds of review in the amended application are as follows:1. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by misconstruing or misapplying the phrase "compelling circumstances" in 1.20J of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).2. The Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error in that the standard of translation interpretation was such that the applicant could not adequately put his case before the Tribunal.3. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the reading speeches and explanatory memorandum (EM) relating to 1.20J of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) after the applicant's migration agent requested the Tribunal to have regard to it.4. The Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by making an adverse finding in regards to the applicant's health issues on the basis that it was raised for the first time at the hearing.5. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to give "proper genuine and / or realistic consideration" to matters before it and misstating the applicant's submissions.6. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in that its decision lacked evident and intelligible justification and was legally unreasonable. ConsiderationGround 113. The Applicant asserts that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by misconstruing or misapplying the phrase "compelling circumstances" in 1.20J of the Regulations. 14. Regulation 1.20J(1) places a limitation on the number of spouse, partner, prospective marriage or interdependency visas a person can sponsor. However, sub-regulation 1.20J(2) confers a discretion on the Minister to allow further sponsorship applications if "the Minister is satisfied that there are compelling circumstances affecting the sponsor". 15. The phrase "compelling circumstances" is not defined by the Act or Regulations. In Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50 at [31] (per French, CJ, Bell, Keane ad Gordon JJ), which concerned the phrase "compelling reasons", their Honours observed:. . .the state of mind required of the Minister (or a delegate) must be reached by reference to "reasons" that are "compelling"; that is, those reasons must "force or drive the decision maker"[13 - Babicci v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 141 FCR 285 at 289 [21]], "irresistibly"[14 - Paduano v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 143 FCR 204 at 211 [32], 213 [37]] to be satisfied that "special consideration" should be given to granting the particular application.16. In the present case, the Tribunal was required to determine whether, at the time of its decision, there were "compelling circumstances affecting the sponsor" such that it was persuaded that the limitation in regulation 1.20J should not apply.17. The First Respondent submits that the Tribunal correctly had regard to the following circumstances that the Applicant claimed constituted compelling circumstances and made the following findings in support of its ultimate conclusion that there were not compelling circumstances affecting the sponsor (at [22] to [23]): i.The nature of the Applicant's prior relationships and the circumstances in which they ended but found that there was nothing compelling about the circumstances about the breakdown of those relationships (noting that his record and shortest relationship had broken down as a result of a lack of trust) ([9]-[10]);ii.The nature of the relationship between the Applicant and Visa Applicant (at [11]-[12] and [19]) - the Applicant claimed that they had been in a relationship for 5 years and lived together for 2 years and that they "love each other very much". He claimed that they spoke daily and that he provides financial support. Evidence of communication between the Applicant and Visa Applicant was provided as well as evidence of financial contributions of the Applicant. Both parties gave evidence as to the nature of their relationship. The Applicant stated that he had not visited the Visa Applicant for 2 years and that the uncertainty of the application process was having an effect upon him.iii.The Tribunal noted that despite the longevity of the relationship, the parties had spent little time together. Notwithstanding this observation, the Tribunal was prepared to proceed on the basis that a relationship was in existence and accepted that the parties loved each other, however was not satisfied that the existence of this relationship gave rise to compelling circumstances affecting the Applicant (at [11]-[12]).iv.The Applicant's happiness, the emotional support offered by the Visa Applicant and the Applicant's health (at [12]-[14]). The Applicant's cousin and nephew claimed that the Applicant is happier when he is with the Visa Applicant.v.The Tribunal was not satisfied that these factors constituted compelling circumstances because: 1.the Visa Applicant provided the Applicant with emotional support despite the fact that the Applicant and Visa Applicant resided in different countries and had not seen one another for two years. The Tribunal observed that the parties ability to support one another in the past indicated that this support would continue in the future (at [11]);2.the Applicant's mental health condition was not, in the Tribunal's opinion, of "such nature or severity as to give rise to compelling circumstances" (at [17]). The Tribunal had regard to medical evidence provided after the hearing and accorded it limited probative value as it was not clear that the doctor was familiar with the circumstances of the relationship and it appeared that the Applicant's condition was well-managed and that his condition would not deteriorate if the Visa Applicant could not join him in Australia (at [22]). The First Respondent submits that it was a matter for the Tribunal to assess the Applicant's material and accord the weight it considered appropriate in determining the existence of compelling circumstances. The Tribunal was not bound to accept that the Applicant's health in this case constituted a compelling circumstance.vi.The Tribunal also referred to evidence provided by the human resources manager at the Applicant's employer which stated that his stress and depression would improve if the Visa Applicant relocated to Australia. The Tribunal observed that the HR manager was not appropriately qualified to make this assessment and for this reason, this evidence did not assist the Applicant (at [21]).vii.Further, the Tribunal took into account the Applicant's claim to be happier with the Visa Applicant in Australia and the circumstances of his prior relationship breakdowns (at [22]).viii.The ability of the Applicant to relocate to Albania - the Applicant claimed his community and employment commitments precluded him from moving overseas. ix.The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant may find it difficult to relocate (at [19]) but that his company would be in a position to find a replacement such that he was not obliged to continue working if he wished to move overseas (at [20] and [22]). 18. The First Respondent submits that it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that it was not satisfied that compelling circumstances existed for the reasons it gave based on the evidence before it. The Tribunal clearly had regard all to the Applicant's claims and was not persuaded that those claims were sufficient to rise to compelling circumstances to not apply regulation 1.20J(1). The assessment of the cogency and weight of evidence is a matter for the Tribunal: SBBA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 90 at [15].19. For completeness, the First Respondent notes:a.the Applicant asserts, unsupported by authority, that the Tribunal took a "barring" approach rather than a "facilitating approach". The First Respondent asserts, as outlined above, that the Tribunal performed its statutory task. The weight it afforded to the Applicant's various claims and the approach it took in weighing claims and evidence was a matter for it. There is no authority cited to support the proposition that the Tribunal's approach was unlawful in any way (and it is apparent it considered the Applicant's claims "singularly and cumulatively" (at [22]); b.the Applicant cites Waensila v MIBP [2016] FCAFC 32 (Waensila) in support of this ground. Waensila was concerned with the construction of the phrase "compelling reasons". At paragraph [18] of Waensila, the Full Federal Court found that circumstances arising after the date of the visa application can constitute "compelling reasons" for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria (see also Babicci v MIMIA (2005) 141 FCR 285 at [24]). In light of the above summary of the evidence and claims considered by the Tribunal as evidenced by its decision record, it is apparent that the Tribunal in this matter did not err in the manner identified in Waensila at [18] as the Tribunal did not confine its consideration of relevant circumstances to those that existed at the time of the application. Rather, it had regard to all matters that could be said to comprise such circumstances; andc.the Applicant asserts that the Tribunal should have considered circumstances such as how the Applicant's previous relationships broke down rather than dismissing the claims "outright". However, the First Respondent submits that the Tribunal did acknowledge the circumstances of the previous relationship breakdowns (at [9]) but ultimately found that the totality of the Applicant's circumstances were not compelling in nature (at [22]). That was a conclusion that was open to it on the evidence.20. The First Respondent submits that ground one cannot be made out.Ground 221. In summary, the particulars to ground two state that the standard of interpretation for the hearing on 27 June 2018 was such that the Applicant could not adequately put his case before the Tribunal because:a.the first interpreter was offsite and appeared over the phone, which caused confusion and often the interpreter didn’t know who was speaking;b.the interpreter's services were terminated and the matter had to be adjourned for the onsite interpreter to be retained; c.the confusion caused by the offsite interpreter was a "consequential" error in translation;d.the interpreters were unable to translate the word "compelling" as there is no equivalent Albanian word;e.the Applicant stated that "there's no real word in Albanian for depression" and "as far as I know, compelling, there's no real word in Albanian that means compelling"; andf.the Applicant invited the Tribunal member to "ask the interpreter that, if you like", but the Tribunal did not take up this suggestion.22. Whether an inadequacy in translation has been such as to deprive an applicant of the opportunity to have a hearing in accordance with section 425 (or relevantly section 360) involves a qualitative assessment of the conduct of the hearing before the Tribunal as a whole: SZHEW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 783 at [52] (Jagot J).23. The Applicant has provided an extract of the transcript of the Tribunal hearing. The First Respondent submits that the transcript reveals that the Tribunal recognised that there were difficulties with the interpretation that was being undertaken via the telephone (see extract of transcript p 5 line 37 to line 45) that it then took the following steps to ensure the Visa Applicant had access to adequate interpretation during her evidence:a.asked the first interpreter to stop providing interpretation services (see extract of transcript p 6 line 1 to line 5);b.asked the Applicant whether he would like the Visa Applicant to give evidence relevant to the point of compelling circumstances and when the Applicant responded "yes", the Senior Member said that the Tribunal would get an interpreter to appear in person (see extract of transcript p 6 line 18 to line 41);c.offered to adjourn the hearing to another day if an interpreter could not be arranged to assist the Visa Applicant on the day of the hearing (see extract of transcript p 6 line 33 to line 34);d.adjourned the hearing on that day for half an hour to attempt to locate an interpreter (see extract of transcript p 16 line 16 to p 17 line 10); ande.organised an interpreter to appear at the Tribunal in person to assist the Visa Applicant to give oral evidence (see extract of transcript p 17 line 19 to line 32);24. In particular, the First Respondent submits that during the Visa Applicant's evidence, the Senior Member:a.asked on four occasions whether there were any compelling circumstances, to which the Visa Applicant provided a response (see extract of transcript p 18 line 9 to line 45); andb.asked specifically about the Applicant's health issue (see extract of transcript p 19 line 5 to line 46).25. The First Respondent submits that the transcript reveals that entirely adequate interpretation was provided to facilitate the Visa Applicant's participation in the hearing as the Visa Applicant was given every opportunity to provide relevant evidence on the issue of the existence of "compelling circumstances". 26. The First Respondent submits that notwithstanding initial interpretation issues, when the conduct of the hearing as a whole is considered it is not sustainable to argue that the Tribunal conducted the hearing in a way which could be construed by the Court as depriving the Applicant of an opportunity to be heard. 27. The First Respondent submits that not every departure from the standard of interpretation preferred denies an applicant the opportunity to a hearing so as to give rise to jurisdictional error. The onus is on an applicant to demonstrate that the departure related to a matter of significance to his or her claims and that there was a sufficient connection between the inadequate translation and the Tribunal’s decision: Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 56 ALD 231 (Perera) at [38], [45]; WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 511 (Waco) at [69]; see also SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 179 109 a [72] to [73] (Buchanan J).28. The standard of interpretation is not required to be at the very highest standard of a first-flight interpreter but it must express in one language, as accurately as the language and circumstances permit, the idea or concept as it has been expressed in the other language: Perera at [26] to [29]; WACO at [66].29. In circumstances where the Applicant was;a.represented by a Migration Agent at the hearing (see hearing record and [3] of the Tribunal's reasons);b.where the Migration Agent does not appear to have raised any issue regarding the interpretation at the hearing;c.the Applicant acknowledged the translator did a "good job";d.the Visa Applicant gave evidence on matters that may have gone to the existence of "compelling circumstances";the First Respondent submits that the Tribunal cannot be said to have erred in the way described. Certainly, there is no evidence to suggest that the interpreters did not translate the word 'compelling' as accurately as the language permits. 30. The First Respondent submits that ground two cannot be made out.Ground 331. The First Respondent notes that the Applicant no longer wishes to press ground 3 (see: amended application). Ground 432. By ground 4, the Applicant asserts that the Tribunal erred by making an adverse finding, in relation to the Applicant's health issues, on the basis that this issue was raised for the first time at the hearing. The particulars to ground 4 refer to the Tribunal's reasons at paragraph [14], where the Tribunal stated that 'the claim of depression and poor health was raised for the first time during the hearing, despite multiple written submissions… and despite the review application being represented by a migration agent throughout this review'. The particulars go on to refer to section 55(1) of the Act and state that until the decision the Minister must have regard to any relevant information provided by the Applicant.33. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant's health claims were not made throughout the primary processing of the application and that prior to the hearing no medical evidence had been presented (at [14]). These observations were correct. However, the Tribunal afforded the Applicant an opportunity to submit medical evidence following the conclusion of the hearing in order to ensure that all available evidence was considered (see transcript pp 22- 23). The Authorised Representative then provided two post hearing submissions accompanied by medical evidence relating to the Applicant's health claims (CB 543 to 570).34. The Tribunal went on to consider the medical evidence that was provided by the Applicant's representative. The Tribunal identified concerns about the medical evidence that was provided and found Doctor Thornton's report to be problematic (at [16]). The First Respondent submits that the Tribunal's findings about the Applicant's medical condition were open to it in the circumstances and that the Tribunal was not obliged to give the Applicant a running commentary as to its assessment of his own evidence: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 592 at [48].35. To the extent that the Applicant claims that the Tribunal placed inappropriate weight on the Applicant's evidence when assessing his claims, the assessment of the cogency and weight of evidence is a matter for the Tribunal: SBBA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 90 at [15].36. The First Respondent submits that ground 4 cannot be made out.Ground 537. Ground 5 of the amended application states that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to give proper genuine consideration to the Applicant's submissions, specifically in relation to the Tribunal's findings at [10]. The Applicant claims that the Tribunal misstated the Applicant's representative's submissions and this demonstrates that the Tribunal did not engage with the submission. 38. The First Respondent considers this ground appears to be an assertion that the Tribunal should have accepted the Applicant’s claims about the Applicant's blamelessness in his prior relationship breakdown and, because the Tribunal did not conclude that this circumstance was "compelling", the decision was incorrect or unjust. However, the Court is not concerned with the merits of the decision rather whether it was lawfully made. As Brennan J held in in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at [39]:The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.39. The First Respondent submits that it was for the Applicant to shape the Tribunal's consideration of relevant matters; it was not for the Tribunal to articulate a case on behalf of the applicant that he did not advance: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi (2010) 190 FCR 248 at [83]. 40. Insofar as the Tribunal did misstate the Applicant's assertion about the purpose of regulation 1.20J, we do not consider this would amount to a jurisdictional error in circumstances where the Tribunal identified and applied the correct wording in regulation 1.20J. 41. The Applicant cites Carrascalao v MIBP [2017] FCAFC 107 (Carrascalo) in support of this ground. Carrascalao was concerned with whether the respondent gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case in determining whether or not to cancel a visa under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1954. At paragraph [45] of Carrascalo, the Full Federal Court found that engaging in an active intellectual process directed at each individual claim or criteria does not require the decision maker to refer in the reasons for decision to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant, and it may be that some material provided will not be relevant to the criteria and that the reasons of the decision-maker should not be scrutinised “minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error” (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at [30] per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ, as cited in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi [2010] FCAFC 14, per Stone, Foster and Nicholas JJ at [63] and Telstra Corporation Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2017] FCA 316 per Foster J at [62]). 42. The First Respondent submits that the Tribunal in this case did in fact engage with the Applicant's submissions regarding the purpose of the sponsorship limitations and actively considered the circumstances of the breakdown of the Applicant's previous relationships but ultimately, and in the First Respondent's view, correctly, concluded that the reasons for the relationship breakdowns in this case did not constitute compelling circumstances (at [10] and [22]).43. The First Respondent submits that ground five cannot be made out.Ground 644. Ground 6 to the amended application states that the Tribunal's decision lacked an evident and intelligible justification and was legally unreasonable. 45. In MIBP v Singh (2014) 308 ALR 280 (Singh), the Court acknowledged that any assessment of "reasonableness" would inevitably depend on the facts of the case: Singh at [48]. The Court further noted the approach of French CJ and Gageler J in MIBP v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) when assessing the "reasonableness" of an exercise of discretion. Specifically, the Court held that a Tribunal will exercise a discretionary power unreasonably where it makes a choice "that is arbitrary, capricious or without 'common sense'": Singh at [44]; see also Li at [28] (French CJ), [105] - [113] (Gageler J). 46. The particulars to this ground refer to the Tribunal's treatment of the:a.Langton Medical Centre report, dated 2 July 2018 (considered by the Tribunal at [15] to [17]); b.Statement from the "Managing Director / HR of the review applicant's employer" (considered by the Tribunal at [21]);c.the Visa Applicant's oral evidence regarding the compelling circumstances and the Applicant's health concerns (see extract of transcript at page 18 line 20 to page 20 line 9);d.the Applicant's request to ask the interpreter to explain the word compelling to the Visa Applicant (although the First Respondent submits that the hearing transcript does not indicate that the Visa Applicant had any difficulty understanding what was being interpreted (see e.g. extract of transcript p 18 line 9 to page 20 line 9); ande.Applicants claims of poor mental health (considered by the Tribunal at [14] to [17] and [22]).47. The First Respondent submits that there are two difficulties with this ground. Firstly, legal reasonableness in the sense described Li is concerned with the exercise of discretionary powers, not the making of factual findings. Secondly, in this matter, it was reasonably open, on the evidence available to the Tribunal, in relation to the above claims, to make the impugned findings and to conclude that in the circumstances of this case compelling circumstances did not materialise. In reflecting on that conclusion it should be remembered that the Courts have found that such circumstances would need to force the decision-maker irresistibly to the conclusion that special consideration should apply. The decision-maker was no so satisfied in this case.48. The First Respondent submits that ground 6cannot be made out.Conclusion49. The application does not identify any jurisdictional error, and should therefore be dismissed with an order that the Applicant pay the First Respondent's costs in the amount of $7,467 pursuant to rule 44.15(1) and Item 3 of Schedule 1, Part 3, Division 1 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), or such amount as may be fixed by the Court.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Stretton, Allsop CJ provided a detailed consideration of principle regarding “legal unreasonableness” in the following terms, at [4] – [13] and [21] (emphasis added):[10][10] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1.[4] In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332, the High Court made clear that legal reasonableness or an absence of legal unreasonableness was an essential element in the lawfulness of decision-making; Parliament is taken to intend that statutory power will be exercised reasonably: see Li at [26] and [29] (French CJ), [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) and [88] (Gageler J).[5] These statements of general principle in the three judgments (French CJ, and Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ, and Gageler J) variously drew upon and drew together a number of well-known expressions and bodies of principle including, and without repeating all citations: the Constitutional necessity for legal control of discretion (power): Shrimpton v The Commonwealth [1945] HCA 4; 69 CLR 613 at 629-630; the necessary confinement, explicit or implicit, of any statutory discretion or power by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation: Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning [1947] HCA 21; 74 CLR 492 at 505; the implied legislative intention to condition statutory discretionary power by a requirement that it be exercised reasonably: Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; 190 CLR 1 at 36; Abebe v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510 at 554 [116]; Shrimpton at 620; South Australian Commissioner for Prices and Consumer Affairs v Charles Moore (Aust) Limited [1977] HCA 38; 139 CLR 449 at 466; and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v PekoWallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24 at 41-42; the necessity that a discretion be exercised according to the rules of reason and justice, not private opinion, according to law, and not humour, and within the limits that an honest and competent person would confine herself that is “legal and regular, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful”: Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 173 at 179; Shrimpton at 620; R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd [1965] HCA 27; 113 CLR 177 at 189; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59 at 62 [9]; the illegitimacy of the exercise of a discretion in reaching a conclusion that no reasonable person could ever come to: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229, or where no sensible decision-maker acting with due appreciation of his or her responsibilities would so decide: Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1976] UKHL 6; [1977] AC 1014 at 1064; the requirement that the satisfaction or opinion of a decision-maker about the existence of a matter, in particular a jurisdictional fact, be reasonably formed: Council of the Municipality of Bankstown v Fripp [1919] HCA 41; 26 CLR 385 at 403; R v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd [1944] HCA 42; 69 CLR 407 at 430; Buck v Bavone [1976] HCA 24; 135 CLR 110 at 118119, (though not referred to in Li, Starke J in Boucaut Bay Company Limited (in liq) v The Commonwealth [1927] HCA 59; 40 CLR 98 at 101, approved by Windeyer J in Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Brian Hatch Timber Co (Sales) Pty Ltd [1972] HCA 73; 128 CLR 28 at 57, said that reasonableness here meant not dishonestly, capriciously or arbitrarily and upon a rational ground for the belief); the settled principles of appellate review of judicial discretion in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499, and the guidance found therein in the analogy with judicial review of administrative action: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited 162 CLR at 42; the principle that it is open to infer legal error if the result of the decision appears unreasonable assuming the correct question was addressed and the law was followed in the making of the decision: Avon Downs Proprietary Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26; 78 CLR 353 at 360; the principle concerned with unreasonableness in the exercise of delegated lawmaking power – if such laws were partial and unequal or manifestly unjust, or by operation they involved oppressive or gratuitous interference with rights that could not be reasonably justified: Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 at 99-100; and the fact that the conditioning of a power to be exercised reasonably has an analogy with the conditioning of the power with the obligation to afford procedural fairness: Gageler J in Li at [92].[6] Each of the judgments in Li sought to give explanatory content to the concept of legal unreasonableness. As was discussed in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437, the judgments in Li identified two different contexts in which the concept of legal unreasonableness was employed: a conclusion after the identification of jurisdictional error for a recognised species of error, and an “outcome-focused” conclusion without any specific jurisdictional error being identified: Singh at [44].[7] It is in relation to the second context, the “outcome focused” application of the concept, that precise definition, beyond explanation of the operative notion and of the legal technique by which to make the assessment, becomes productive of complexity and confusion. There is “an area of decisional freedom” of the decision-maker, within which minds might differ. The width and boundaries of that freedom are framed by the nature and character of the decision, the terms of the relevant statute operating in the factual and legal context of the decision, and the attendant principles and values of the common law, in particular, of reasonableness. The boundaries can be expressed by the descriptions and explanatory phrases of the kind set out in [5] above.[8] The content of the concept of legal unreasonableness is derived in significant part from the necessarily limited task of judicial review. The concept does not provide a vehicle for the Court to remake the decision according to its view as to reasonableness (by implication thereby finding a contrary view unreasonable). Parliament has conferred the power on the decision-maker. The Court’s function is a supervisory one as to legality: see Li at [30], [66] and [105].[9] The conclusion that a decision is legally unreasonable by reference to the outcome, whether or not there are reasons therefor, is assisted by reference to expressions taken from cases such as those mentioned in [5] above. Any criticism that these explanations are circular and vague is to be met by attending to the terms, scope and policy of the statute and the values drawn from the statute and the common law that fall to be considered in assessing the decision. The terms, scope and policy of the statute and the fundamental values that attend the proper exercise of power – a rejection of unfairness, of unreasonableness and of arbitrariness; equality; and the humanity and dignity of the individual – will inform the conclusion, necessarily to a degree evaluative, as to whether the decision bespeaks an exercise of power beyond its source.[10] This concept of legal unreasonableness is not amenable to minute and rigidly defined categorisation or a precise textual formulary. For instance, in argument, the submission was put that [76] of Li in the judgment of Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ contained two (different) “tests”: (1) if upon the facts the result is unreasonable or plainly unjust and (2) if the decision lacks an evident and intelligible justification. The submission reflected the dangers of overly emphasising the words of judicial decisions concerning the nature of abuse of power, and of unnecessary and inappropriate categorisation. The plurality’s discussion of unreasonableness at [63][76] in Li should be read as a whole – as a discussion of the sources and lineage of the concept: [64][65], of the limits of the concept of reasonableness given the supervisory role of the courts: [66], of the fundamental necessity to look to the scope and purpose of the statute conferring the power to find its limits: [67], of the various ways the concept has been described: [68][71], of the relationship between unreasonableness derived from specific error and unreasonableness from illogical or irrational reasoning: [72], of the place of proportionality or disproportion in the evaluation: [73]-[74] (as to which see also French CJ at [30] and see also McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34; 325 ALR 15 at [3] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ)), of the guidance capable of being obtained from recognising the close analogy between judicial review of administrative action and appellate review of judicial discretion: [75]-[76].[11] The boundaries of power may be difficult to define. The evaluation of whether a decision was made within those boundaries is conducted by reference to the relevant statute, its terms, scope and purpose, such of the values to which I have referred as are relevant and any other values explicit or implicit in the statute. The weight and relevance of any relevant values will be approached by reference to the statutory source of the power in question. The task is not definitional, but one of characterisation: the decision is to be evaluated, and a conclusion reached as to whether it has the character of being unreasonable, in sufficiently lacking rational foundation, or an evident or intelligible justification, or in being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of the power, such that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes as an exercise of that power. The descriptions of the lack of quality used above are not exhaustive or definitional, they are explanations or explications of legal unreasonableness, of going beyond the source of power.[12] Crucial to remember, however, is that the task for the Court is not to assess what it thinks is reasonable and thereby conclude (as if in an appeal concerning breach of duty of care) that any other view displays error; rather, the task is to evaluate the quality of the decision, by reference to the statutory source of the power and thus, from its scope, purpose and objects to assess whether it is lawful. The undertaking of that task may see the decision characterised as legally unreasonable whether because of specific identifiable jurisdictional error, or the conclusion or outcome reached, or the reasoning process utilised.[13] The relationship between the conclusion or outcome and the reasoning process revealed by reasons to reach it is one that should not be rigidly set. Reasons may fail to disclose an evident and intelligible justification or may not be sufficient to outweigh the inference that the decision is so unjust as to be (in the context of the statutory source of the power) beyond a lawful exercise of the power.…[21] … It is not a correct approach for the Court on judicial review to assess the lawfulness of the decision under s 501 by asking whether the exercise of discretion was necessary for the purpose. That an assessment whether the decision-maker’s conclusion was legally unreasonable may involve some consideration of disproportionality does not authorise the Court to decide for itself what is necessary for the relevant purpose and to declare a decision beyond that assessment as unreasonable. The correct question, or perspective, if one is looking at the outcome in question, is not whether the Court thinks the decision is reasonable, or necessary for the purpose, or not, as the case may be; rather it is whether a decision-maker could reasonably come to the conclusion. Depending upon the nature of the decision, its attendant considerations and the statute in question, the Court may or may not have a degree of familiarity and confidence in assessing how a decision-maker ought to approach the matter. The decision and statutory context in Li was an example of this…

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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