BSX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BSX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 104

Appeal from: BSX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1432
File number: NSD 2220 of 2016
Judges: BARKER, ROBERTSON AND BURLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 11 July 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision to not quash an adverse security assessment issued by Director-General of Security  or restrain Minister from having regard to it in making a decision affecting appellant under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Court has jurisdiction to restrain Minister – whether decision to issue the security assessment was legally unreasonable – whether appellant was denied procedural fairness – whether Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) authorises the issue of a security assessment on a bare conclusion of the Director-General
Legislation:

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 4, 36, 37

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward [1982] HCA 78; (1982) 154 CLR 25

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1074; (1994) 49 FCR 576

Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Incorporated v Commissioner of Police [2008] HCA 4; (2008) 234 CLR 532

El Ossman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection  [2017] FCA 636

Jaffarie v Director-General of Security [2014] FCAFC 102; (2014) 226 FCR 505

Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550

Leghaei v Director-General of Security [2007] FCAFC 37; (2007) 241 ALR 141

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; (2015) 256 CLR 326

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Plaintiff M46 of 2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Ors [2014] FCA 90; 139 ALD 227

Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security [2012] HCA 46; (2012) 251 CLR 1

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 25 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T Brennan with Mr R Scheelings
Solicitor for the Appellant: SBA Lawyers
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Markus of the Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr P Connor QC with Ms A Mitchelmore
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 2220 of 2016
BETWEEN:

BSX15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SECURITY

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

BARKER, ROBERTSON AND BURLEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JULY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Within fourteen (14) days, the appellant is to file and serve a written submission (not exceeding 3 pages in length) addressing the appropriate form of orders to be made, including as to costs.

2.Within…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BSX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against a decision not to quash an adverse security assessment issued by the Director-General of Security under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and to restrain the Minister from having regard to it in making a decision affecting the appellant. The Federal Court was tasked with determining the jurisdiction of the Court to restrain the Minister, the legality of the decision to issue the security assessment, whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness, and whether the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) authorised the issue of a security assessment based on a bare conclusion of the Director-General. The appellant, BSX15, contested the adverse security assessment and argued for its quashing on several grounds, including legal unreasonableness and procedural unfairness.

The court examined whether the decision to issue the security assessment was legally unreasonable, considering the findings about the appellant's faith and the potential obfuscation of connections to Sunni Islamic extremism. The court found that the findings about the appellant's claim to adhere to Shia Muslim were based on material other than the answers given during the security interviews, and that it was open to infer the finding was reached based on information provided at the interviews. Furthermore, the court held that the adverse security assessment was not unreasonable given the appellant's claims and the context in which they were made. Regarding procedural fairness, the court held that the appellant had sufficient opportunity to address the issues raised in the security assessment. Finally, the court concluded that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) authorised the issue of a security assessment based on a bare conclusion of the Director-General, as long as it was supported by relevant information.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to file and serve a written submission within 14 days, addressing the appropriate form of orders to be made, including costs. The respondents were then to file and serve a written submission in response within 21 days. Entry of orders was to be dealt with in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Within fourteen (14) days, the appellant is to file and serve a written submission (not exceeding 3 pages in length) addressing the appropriate form of orders to be made, including as to costs.

2. Within twenty-one (21) days, the respondents are each to file and serve a written submission in response to the submissions filed in accordance with Order 1, (not exceeding 3 pages in length).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Her Honour said at [118]: There was questioning at each of the three security interviews of the applicant about his faith. The applicant’s answers included a claim to be a Shia Muslim; that when he moved to Al Shaab, because his identity card said he was resident of Asamiya, a Sunni area, he encountered difficulties; that he has not visited a Mosque in Australia; and that he does not know how to pray. But the finding about the applicant’s claim to adhere to Shia Muslim follows a redaction at TSOG [37]. It is thus open to infer that the finding was reached based on material other than the answers given during the security interviews and not exclusively or, indeed, at all on the information provided at those interviews. In any event the applicant did claim to be a Shiite Muslim during the interviews while maintaining he did not practice his religion. Thus, as submitted by the Director-General, to the extent the issue was whether the applicant identified as a Shia Muslim in order to obfuscate inquiries into his connections to Sunni Islamic extremism, it cannot be said that this statement or the Adverse Security Assessment was unreasonable.2.3 Consideration of Grounds 2, 3, 4 and 8 These grounds of appeal do not turn on a question of principle, but rather on the factual question of whether or not the primary judge fell into error in reaching the conclusion that it was open to infer that the finding expressed in the Security Assessment at [37], [39] was reached based on material other than the answers given during the security interviews and not exclusively or, on the information provided at those interviews. In this context, there is no doubt that once the public interest in non-disclosure is established, a consequence is that the relevant material cannot be deployed in evidence in curial proceedings. There is also no doubt that a successful claim to public interest immunity may have the consequence that the material excluded would be denied both to the Court and an applicant seeking to subject a decision maker’s reasons to scrutiny; see Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Incorporated v Commissioner of Police [2008] HCA 4; (2008) 234 CLR 532 at [5] (per Gleeson CJ) and [22]-[24] (per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ); Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward [1982] HCA 78; (1982) 154 CLR 25 at 61 (Mason J); Jaffarie v Director-General of Security [2014] FCAFC 102; (2014) 226 FCR 505 (Jaffarie) at [30] (Flick and Perram JJ, White J agreeing). We do not consider that the point of distinction that the appellant seeks to make from the facts in M46 is made out. In the present case, the primary judge did not have before her what appears to have been a material part of the reasoning germane to the conclusions expressed at [37], [39] of the Security Assessment. Examination of the Truncated Statement of Grounds reveals that the redaction at the commencement of [37] removes a potentially significant aspect of the reasoning of ASIO from scrutiny. In our view, it is entirely possible to infer that the basis for the conclusion expressed in the unredacted sentence which appears in [37] arose from materials available to the decision maker, but not present in the materials to which the Court may now have regard. Indeed, the square bracketed redacted portion of [37] of the Truncated Statement of Reasons indicates that there is an undefined amount of classified information, footnoted by reference to further classified information unavailable to scrutiny. In these circumstances, it cannot be inferred that the conclusion expressed in [37] was based only on the information supplied by the appellant during the course of his interviews with ASIO. The same observation is apposite to the conclusion expressed in [39].