Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Srouji

Link copied
Case Copied 48 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Plaintiff M46 of 2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 90

Citation: Plaintiff M46 of 2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 90
Parties: PLAINTIFF M46 OF 2013 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICER IN CHARGE, MELBOURNE IMMIGRATION TRANSIT ACCOMMODATION, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
File number: VID 793 of 2013
Judge: TRACEY J
Date of judgment: 21 February 2014
Corrigendum: 24 February 2014
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – refusal of visa on character grounds – visa refused under s 501 of the Migration Act – whether Minister erred by failing to correctly apply the character test – whether Minister misconstrued s 198 of the Migration Act – whether Minister’s decision to refuse applicant a visa was illogical and/or irrational – whether Minister provided adequate reasons for his decision – whether the certificate issued by Minister under s 502 of the Migration Act was valid

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – discovery – public interest immunity – whether public interest immunity claim over assessments should be upheld

Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25D
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ss 4, 17, 35, 36, Part IV
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 22
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 36, 189, 196, 198, 501, 501G, 502, 503A, Part 9
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: AB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 910 – cited
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 – cited
Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604 – cited
Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 – considered
Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532 – cited
Howells v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 580 – cited
Parkin v O’Sullivan (2009) 260 ALR 503 – applied
Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457 – cited
Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security (2012) 292 ALR 243 – considered
Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship (2013) 304 ALR 135 – cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 – considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 – considered
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 – cited
MZYYO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 214 FCR 68 – applied
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212 – cited
Sagar v O’Sullivan (2001) 193 FCR 311 – considered
SBEG v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 291 ALR 281 – considered
State of Victoria v Seal Rocks Victoria (Aust) Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 1 – cited
The Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25 – cited
WAKJv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1336 – cited
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Srouji and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] FCA 90
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Srouji, the applicant, an Egyptian national, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerning his visa application. The case primarily revolved around the legality of the Minister’s decision to refuse the applicant's protection visa application and the subsequent detention. The applicant argued that the Minister’s decision was based on an invalid public interest criterion, misconstrued relevant sections of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), was irrational, and lacked adequate reasons.

The legal issues before the Court included the validity of the public interest criterion used to refuse the visa application, the interpretation and application of specific sections of the Migration Act, the rationality of the Minister’s decision, and the adequacy of the reasons provided. The Court had to balance the public interest immunity claim made by the Commonwealth against the applicant's right to challenge the legality of the Minister’s decisions. The Court had to consider the extent to which it could review decisions based on intelligence and sensitive information while respecting the Commonwealth’s assertion that such information was crucial for national security.

In its reasoning, the Court examined the principles of public interest immunity, noting the importance of national security and the deference owed to the views of security agencies. The Court found that the public interest in maintaining the secrecy of the security assessment outweighed the applicant's interest in accessing the document. The Court held that the Minister's decision to rely on the adverse security assessment was lawful, and the decision was not irrational or otherwise flawed. The Court also concluded that the Minister had provided sufficient reasons for his decision.

The Court dismissed the applicant's claims and upheld the Minister's decisions. The Court found no merit in the applicant’s contentions that the Minister had erred in his application of the public interest criterion, misunderstood the relevant sections of the Migration Act, made an irrational decision, or failed to provide adequate reasons. Consequently, the Court rejected the applicant’s application for judicial review.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In this proceeding the applicant seeks judicial review of the Minister’s decisions on a number of grounds. Each of the alleged errors is said to be exposed by written reasons which the Minister gave for his decision. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND The applicant entered Christmas Island on 29 December 2009. At the time of his entry he held a special purpose visa. That visa expired 50 minutes after he arrived. It has not been renewed. No other visa has since been issued to him under the Act. Upon the expiry of the special purpose visa the applicant was detained under s 189(3) of the Act because he was known or reasonably suspected to be an unlawful non-citizen in an excised offshore place. He was later removed to a detention centre in Melbourne where he has continued to be held pursuant to ss 189(1) and 196(1) of the Act as a person known or reasonably suspected to be an unlawful citizen in the migration zone. In 2009, and again in 2011, the applicant was interviewed by ASIO officers. These interviews led the Director-General of Security to issue adverse security assessments because he considered that the applicant was directly or indirectly a risk to Australia’s security within the meaning of s 4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (“the ASIO Act”). Whilst he was in detention the applicant applied for a protection visa under s 36 of the Act. The application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 18 February 2011. At that time public interest criterion 4002, prescribed in the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) conditioned the granting of a protection visa on there not being an ASIO assessment that the applicant directly or indirectly posed a risk to Australia’s security. The applicant’s failure to satisfy this requirement was the basis for the delegate’s decision. The applicant appealed to the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal was precluded, by s 36(b) of the ASIO Act, from going behind the security assessment. It affirmed the delegate’s decision. The applicant challenged the decision in the High Court. By majority, the Court held that public interest criterion 4002 was invalid: see Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security (2012) 292 ALR 243. Following the High Court’s decision the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration. The Tribunal, in turn, remitted the matter to the Minister. A long delay ensued during which no decision was made. This led the applicant to commence a further proceeding in the High Court in which he applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the Minister to make a decision on his application. On 22 May 2013 the Minister issued a notice of intention to consider refusal of the applicant’s application. Submissions were made on behalf of the applicant and the Minister then made the impugned decisions. At this point the applicant amended his application to seek judicial review of the Minister’s decisions. The High Court remitted the proceeding to this Court for trial of the issues raised by the amended application.THE PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY CLAIM

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant has expressed a deep sense of distress, anguish and hopelessness as a result of the indefinite and prolonged nature of his detention. The applicant has been receiving regular psychological counselling from Grace Lopez who reported symptoms of extreme hopelessness about his future and increased apathy and suicidality. The applicant has attempted to take his own life on one occasion and there is ongoing concern of self-harm or suicide. The Respondent’s Evidence The claim for public interest immunity over the document was supported by two affidavits:a.an open affidavit sworn by Mr David Taylor Irvine, the Director-General of Security on 25 October 2013; andb.a confidential affidavit sworn by Mr Irvine on 25 October 2013. Mr Irvine swore an amended confidential affidavit on 21 November 2013 which made minor amendments to his confidential affidavit of 25 October 2013. Mr Irvine Mr Irvine is the Director-General of Security, holding office under the ASIO Act. In that capacity, he has control of ASIO. The purpose of his open affidavit was to support a claim for public interest immunity over the final assessment dated 9 May 2012 which relates to the applicant. The final assessment was produced by ASIO. The open affidavit established that:·It is one of the functions of ASIO, which is conferred by s 17(1)(c) of the ASIO Act, “to advise Ministers and authorities of the Commonwealth in respect of matters relating to security, in so far as those matters are relevant to their functions and responsibilities.”·Mr Irvine had been provided with a copy of the final assessment and had relied on it in determining to make an adverse security assessment in relation to the applicant.·It is Mr Irvine’s opinion that it is in the public interest that ASIO discharge its core function to protect Australia’s national security and to provide advice to the government in relation to matters relevant to the protection of Australia’s national security. In the absence of ASIO’s advice, the Australian Government’s ability to respond to threats would be severely impaired. He considers that it is fundamental to the effective operation of ASIO that specific details of its area or subjects of interest, its ability to obtain intelligence, its sources, techniques and work methods, its successes and information derived from its successes be kept secret. This goal may require that it neither confirm nor deny activities which may, or may not have occurred. ·Security assessments are a key mechanism employed by ASIO to determine whether a particular individual poses a threat to Australia’s national security. Following a finding of an adverse security assessment a final appreciation document is produced. The Director-General has regard to this document, among others, when determining whether an adverse security assessment should be issued under Part IV of the ASIO Act. Such documents routinely set out or reveal:a.the precise details of ASIO’s assessments;b.the investigative process followed in undertaking the assessment;c.the security issues that have been identified and require resolution;d.the source of information that ASIO relied on in forming the assessment;e.the methods used to gather intelligence or corroborate information; andf.any gaps in ASIO’s intelligence holdings and limits in its capabilities. ·Mr Irvine considers that “[i]t is imperative that a Final Appreciation be as comprehensive as possible.” Transparent reasoning and supporting intelligence information is essential to ensure that a person who becomes subject of an adverse security assessment is not subjected to its consequences unnecessarily. Conversely, it ensures that ASIO does not fail to issue an adverse security assessment when warranted, for the consequences can be equally, if not more, serious. ·It is Mr Irvine’s opinion that:“…it is vital that I be given complete and accurate information upon which to base my decision whether an adverse security assessment should be issued. If any information were to be withheld from the Final Appreciation as a result of a concern that, if such information was included, the information might thereafter be disclosed, that would impair ASIO’s capacity to give accurate advice to government and my capacity to make appropriate decisions in relation to whether adverse security assessments should be issued in any given case.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant’s case also raises issues relating to the provisions of the Act dealing with the detention and removal from Australia of unlawful non-citizens. These provisions are contained in ss 189, 196 and 198 of the Act. Section 189 imposes an obligation on departmental officers who know or reasonably suspect that a person is an unlawful non‑citizen to detain that person. Section 196 stipulates what is then to happen. It provides that:“(1)An unlawful non-citizen detained under section 189 must be kept in immigration detention until:(a)he or she is removed from Australia under section 198 or 199; or(aa)an officer begins to deal with the non-citizen under subsection 198AD(3); or(b)he or she is deported under section 200; or(c)he or she is granted a visa.…(3)To avoid doubt, subsection (1) prevents the release, even by a court, of an unlawful non-citizen from detention (otherwise than as referred to in paragraph (1)(a), (aa) or (b)) unless the non-citizen has been granted a visa.…(6)This section has effect despite any other law.(7)In this section:‘visa decision’ means a decision relating to a visa (including a decision not to grant the visa, to cancel the visa or not to reinstate the visa).” Removal of an unsuccessful visa applicant is dealt with in s 198(6). It provides that:“An officer must remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen if:(a)the non-citizen is a detainee; and(b)the non-citizen made a valid application for a substantive visa that can be granted when the applicant is in the migration zone; and(c)one of the following applies:(i)the grant of the visa has been refused and the application has been finally determined;(iii)the visa cannot be granted; and(d)the non-citizen has not made another valid application for a substantive visa that can be granted when the applicant is in the migration zone.” The High Court has recently confirmed that ss 189, 196 and 198 of the Act fall within the legislative power of the Commonwealth: see Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship (2013) 304 ALR 135.THE REVIEW GROUNDS The applicant challenges the decision, taken by the Minister under s 501 of the Act, on four grounds. They are that:·he erred by basing his decision on the adverse security assessment provided by ASIO;·he misconstrued s 198 of the Act;·the decision was illogical and/or irrational; and·he had provided inadequate reasons for his decision. The applicant further contended that, if one or more of these grounds succeeded, the Minister’s decision under s 502 of the Act must also fall because a statutory pre-condition for the exercise of that power did not exist.RELIANCE ON THE ADVERSE SECURITY ASSESSMENT This ground is founded on the opening words of paragraph 3 of the Minister’s reasons in which he said that his conclusion that the applicant did not pass the character test was “[b]ased on the adverse security assessment provided by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation …”. Attention was also directed to a submission from the Department which was considered by the Minister in which he was advised that “[i]t has been longstanding government policy that non-citizens with an [adverse security assessment] will not be settled in the community and will be removed from Australia where it is consistent with Australia’s international obligations.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Commonwealth countered that the public interest in the applicant gaining access to the document was weak on two grounds. First the document is of little, if any, relevance to the grounds of the applicant’s amended application for an order to show cause dated 23 July 2013, and, secondly, the applicant has already had disclosed to him considerable information regarding the basis of his adverse security assessment, and that information was available to inform the conduct of this case. Consideration The Commonwealth’s public interest immunity claim is founded on common law principles. Those principles require a determination of whether there are competing public interest considerations tending for and against upholding the claim and, if so, the Court must balance those interests: see Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604 at 616-7. In Sagar v O’Sullivan (2011) 193 FCR 311 I examined the authorities which have considered the application of these principles to public interest immunity claims, made in relation to information which impinges on national security. Part of that analysis bears repeating. At 326-7 I said that:“84. Whilst asserting the right of the judicial arm to review decisions made by security agencies, the courts have acknowledged the need for a cautious approach lest their actions might harm national security interests. They have also recognised, without deferring absolutely to any relevant security agency, that such agencies are usually better placed to assess the impact of disclosure of particular material than are the courts.85. In Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 435 Wilson and Dawson JJ said that:The outstanding feature of the claim to immunity is the nature of the public interest which the Minister seeks to protect. Questions of national security naturally raise issues of great importance, issues which will seldom be wholly within the competence of a court to evaluation. It goes without saying in these circumstances that very considerable weight must attach to the view of what national security requires as is expressed by the responsible Minister.In that case (at 455) Brennan J said that a court is “ill equipped itself to evaluate pieces of intelligence obtained by ASIO”.86. In [The Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25] at 74 Brennan J had expanded on this observation. He asked:… how can the gravity of a security risk be evaluated by a court? It may be necessary to evaluate Australia’s relationships with foreign countries, the stability of international affairs, the passion inspired by a particular cause or the likelihood of adherents to the cause taking violent steps in support of it; it may be necessary to evaluate rumour or suspicion as well as proof. It may be reasonable, even necessary, to determine the gravity of a risk by intuition rather than deduction. It may be truly said that the skills and procedures of a court do not fit it to find the point on the scale of gravity of every risk which may be thought to pose a threat to the Commonwealth, the States and Territories and the people thereof, and it may be accepted that a court will not necessarily have or be able to obtain all the evidence needed to allow it to quantify a risk precisely. However, it does not follow that judicial review is excluded.See statements to like effect in the judgment of Hayne J in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at 477.87. In Leghaei, the Full Court quoted with approval the observations of Lord Nicholls in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68 at 128 where his Lordship said that:All courts are very much aware of the heavy burden, resting on the elected government and not the judiciary, to protect the security of this country and all who live here. All Courts are acutely conscious that the government alone is able to evaluate and decide what counter-terrorism steps are needed. … Courts are not equipped to make such decisions, nor are they charged with that responsibility.88. The cautious approach which is reflected in these decisions has a number of implications for the exercise of the power of judicial review of decisions which, it is claimed, have been based on intelligence and other sensitive information.89. The first is that the courts will give ‘very considerable weight’ to the agency’s view of what national security requires in any particular instance: see Alister at 435 (per Wilson and Dawson JJ). This dictum was applied by the Full Court in Leghaei when dealing with an adverse security assessment, made under the ASIO Act: see at 147. That is not to say that the Court must, in all cases, accept the security organisation’s assessment. Such deference is, however, an acknowledgement of the practical difficulty faced by a court in evaluating evidence adduced in support of public interest immunity claims on the grounds of harm to national security.90. Faced with this difficulty Australian courts have stressed that those whose evidence is relied on to make good a claim that disclosure of information would be contrary to the national interest bear a heavy burden and have insisted that decision-makers must give ‘personal genuine consideration’ to the competing interests which are involved when such a claim is made: see Leghaei at 148.91. Courts have always been sensitive to the necessity of avoiding decision-making on the merits when undertaking judicial review: see Peko-Wallsend at 40-41 (per Mason J). This sensitivity has been particularly acute when dealing with challenges to decisions made on security grounds. In Woodward at 54 Gibbs CJ said that ‘the…argument that ASIO may not characterise a person as a security risk unless he is in fact a risk finds no support in the provisions of the Act … and if accepted would, in effect, give a right of appeal from conclusions formed by officers of ASIO.’ Mason J added (at 63) that:And the further allegations … that the appellants are not and have not been at any material time a security risk does not answer the problem. I have already pointed out that, although a person is not in fact a security risk, ASIO may well have reasonable grounds, based on information it receives, for believing or suspecting that he is.”