Cong Tam Dang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cong Tam Dang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 73

MIGRATION – Deportation of non-citizens who have committed serious crimes – the requirements of the Ministerial Policy – the need to balance all relevant considerations – a two-stage process not required – whether the Tribunal substituted its own opinion for those of experts – whether the Tribunal breached “natural justice” by not alerting the applicant’s representatives to the adverse view it had taken of certain evidence in the applicant’s case – whether language used by the Tribunal created an apprehension of bias

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 200 and 201
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 33

Gascor v Ellicott [1997] 1 VR 332 applied
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Gray (1994) 50 FCR 189 considered
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 followed
ReGogebakan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 6 AAR 544 referred to
Gumus v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 30 FCR 145 referred to
Percerep v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 483 referred to
Marelic v Comcare (1993) 121 ALR 114 distinguished
Meadows v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 54 ALD 654 distinguished

CONG TAM DANG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 157 OF 1999

DRUMMOND, MATHEWS AND MANSFIELD JJ
15 FEBRUARY 2000
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 157 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CONG TAM DANG

APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

DRUMMOND, MATHEWS AND MANSFIELD JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

15 FEBRUARY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 157 OF 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CONG TAM DANG
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

DRUMMOND, MATHEWS AND MANSFIELD JJ

DATE:

15 FEBRUARY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DRUMMOND J:

  1. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed, generally for the reasons given by Mathews J.

  2. However, I wish to explain why I would reject as unfounded the ground of appeal suggesting bias on the part of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal member.  This ground was raised for the first time, by leave, at the hearing of the appeal.

  3. This attack on the Tribunal’s decision was based on the learned primary judge’s comments set out in Mathews J’s reasons.  The appellant here submitted:

    “… that the language used by the AAT as summarised by the trial judge, for the reasons given by his Honour, creates the apprehension of bias and would do so in the fair-minded…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 73
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Cong Tam Dang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant, a Vietnamese-born refugee, appealed against a deportation order made by the respondent under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant's criminal history included multiple assaults and involvement in a serious home invasion robbery in 1988, which was the basis for the deportation order. Following an unsuccessful review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound, particularly whether it properly balanced the factors for and against deportation, and whether it considered relevant matters such as the appellant's potential contribution to the Australian community.

The court examined whether the Tribunal engaged in a process of independent merits review as required by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). It found that the Tribunal had indeed undertaken a de novo review, considering new evidence and making its decision based on the merits of the case. The court also assessed whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations, such as the appellant's employment and potential positive contributions to the community. Despite the appellant's argument that the Tribunal only made a "passing reference" to his employment, the court found that this matter was sufficiently considered in the context of the overall merits review.

In conclusion, the court determined that the Tribunal's decision was legally correct and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant had committed previous offences, as I shall detail later, but the offence of December 1988 was the first (and only) offence which attracted the deportation provisions of the Act. On 9 June 1997 a delegate of the respondent ordered that the appellant be deported from Australia. The appellant sought AAT review of that decision but on 12 June 1998 Dr Gerber, a Deputy President of the Tribunal, affirmed the delegate’s decision. The appellant appealed to a single judge of this court who dismissed the appeal. The appellant then appealed to this court relying upon most of the grounds of appeal that were before the primary judge. He also sought leave to rely upon certain additional grounds, as I shall detail later. Leave was granted to rely on all but one of these additional grounds.The Appellant’s Background The appellant was born in Vietnam on 18 December 1968. His youth, before coming to this country, was marked with considerable deprivation and hardship. In December 1984 he and his family arrived in Australia on refugee visas. The family unit consisted of himself, his parents and four younger siblings, being three sisters and a brother. The appellant’s criminal record commenced in December 1986 when he was convicted of assault and placed on a 12 months good behaviour bond. In September 1987 he was convicted of assault and stealing and was fined $500 and $300 respectively. At around this time, in 1987, he was twice the victim of shooting incidents in the Cabramatta area, where he and his family were then living. According to his account, he was, on each occasion, the innocent victim of random events. He happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. The first incident occurred, he said, as he was walking down the street in Cabramatta. A fight had broken out on the other side of the street and when shots were exchanged he was hit by a stray bullet. On the second occasion, he was staying with friends when the doorbell rang. He opened the door and was shot several times, apparently being mistaken for someone else. The Tribunal, not surprisingly, was unconvinced by the appellant’s account of these incidents. It considered it likely that neither of these shootings was “accidental” in the sense described by the appellant. In this regard the Tribunal made the following comment:“I am satisfied that he had been involved in the local culture of violence and crime for some time. While he may not have been aware of the exact identity of the people who shot him, he was well aware that it was as a consequence of the lifestyle he adopted and the choice he made to throw in his lot with the local criminal underworld.” The appellant’s parents became concerned about the violence of the appellant’s environment. After the second incident, the whole family moved to Brisbane. However not long afterwards the appellant returned, alone, to Cabramatta. His explanation for this move, namely that he needed to find out who had shot him, was highly implausible and was not accepted by the Tribunal. It was not long after his return, on 20 December 1988, that the deportable offence was committed. This offence was categorised by the Tribunal as a “home invasion”, and there is no doubt that it was a particularly serious offence. A group of five armed and masked young men broke into a home at Cabramatta where they terrorised the occupants, a family of two parents and four children aged from 2 to 14 years. They threatened them with violence and loaded the family’s valuables into the family car which was then driven away by the appellant. The appellant’s role consisted, it seems, of removing the flyscreen at the home so that his co-offenders could gain entry, and later driving them away. There was no evidence that he himself entered the house, although he must have known that his masked companions were up to no good.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

DRUMMOND, MATHEWS AND MANSFIELD JJ
The appellant’s early time in prison could be categorised as turbulent. However on all accounts he underwent a behavioural change during the course of his sentence and during the latter part he undertook some vocational courses and generally kept out trouble. He was released from prison on 20 March 1997. On 9 June 1997 the Minister’s delegate made the deportation order. The appellant sought AAT review of this decision. On 12 June 1998 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.The Tribunal’s Decision After making some preliminary observations, the Tribunal in its decision set out what it viewed as its task in the proceedings:“ A deportation order, sending a person back to another country, more often than not has serious consequences for the family of that person and more particularly for the person deported, particularly where he or she may no longer have any connections with that country, may not speak its language, and no longer has any immediate family there to help in the re-integration of that person that country [sic]. It follows that when considering an appeal against a deportation order, a tribunal seized of the matter must carefully weigh up the issues for and against deportation, looking for any extenuating circumstances which may tip the balance in favour of allowing the appeal and permitting that person to remain in Australia. Thus on the one hand, the tribunal must have regard to the potential hardship to the applicant if deported, the effect of his or her deportation, on his or her immediate family, particularly if there are young children involved as well as the potential benefit the Australian community may derive from his or her continued presence in this country, to name but a few. On the other side of the scales, the Tribunal must have regard to the national interest, including Australia’s criminal deportation policy, the need for the protection of its citizens, assessing the potential or likely cost to the community in permitting the person to remain in this country – and by ‘cost’ I am not simply looking at the issue in dollar terms, but on a broader basis. Thus, if the person, for example, has a bad criminal record, is he or she likely to re-offend if permitted to stay.” The Tribunal went on to describe the appellant’s background, his various criminal offences and the circumstances of the robbery of December 1988. It categorised this offence as a “horrendous crime known as ‘home invasion’”. On a number of occasions the Tribunal described the offence as a “horrendous crime”: this was an appropriate description of an offence which involved, among other aggravating features, one of the appellant’s co-offenders terrorising the adult victims into submission by slashing the feet of their two year old daughter. The Tribunal then proceeded to explore the factors which, as the Tribunal put it, “support upholding the Delegate’s decision to deport the applicant”. In this context the Tribunal rejected the appellant’s account that his participation in the robbery was procured by threats from his co-offenders. The Tribunal referred to a number of different explanations which the appellant had given as to how he came to be involved in this crime. The Tribunal found that the appellant was aware that his co-offenders were intent on engaging in “home invasion”, and was “keenly alive to the possibility that these gangsters would resort to violence”. The Tribunal went on to emphasise the seriousness of this crime and to express concern at the fact that the appellant had refused to identify his co-offenders. The Tribunal’s decision quoted from the sentencing Judge’s observations on sentence, and particularly the Judge’s opinion that “this type of offence falls towards the top of the range of robbery in company, which carries the maximum sentence of 20 years”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DRUMMOND, MATHEWS AND MANSFIELD JJ

According to the appellant, these passages indicate that the Tribunal was considering the factors for and against the delegate’s decision rather than embarking on a process of de novo merits review. However it is perfectly clear both from the transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal and from the reasons for its decision that the Tribunal embarked upon precisely the process which is envisaged by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“the AAT Act”), namely a process of independent merits review. At no stage did it seek to analyse the correctness or otherwise of the delegate’s decision, either during the course of the hearing or in its reasons for decision. The Tribunal received a great deal of evidence, including evidence not available to the delegate, and made its decision on the basis of that evidence. The presiding member was a Deputy President with a great deal of experience in the area. It is unthinkable that he would have been misconceived as to the object or process of merits review. In my view there is no substance in this ground of appeal.Did the Tribunal fail to take into account relevant considerations? The first matter raised under this ground is that the Tribunal failed to consider whether the appellant would make a positive contribution to the Australian community. The Tribunal’s supposed failure to consider the appellant’s contribution as a separate balancing factor was also raised by the fourth particular under this ground. The two issues are virtually identical and will be discussed together. The Tribunal in its reasons for decision first discussed considerations which would favour the making of a deportation order. It then turned to those which might favour the appellant. After discussing his family background, the Tribunal made the following observations:“It may be said in the applicant’s favour that he has spent just on half of his life in this country, and hence he should be our responsibility rather than that of his country of citizenship. Alas, that is not the law, but it does indicate his contribution to this country is minimal, Dang having spent a large part of his adult life to date in prison.Whilst in prison his conduct can hardly be described as exemplary. However, given the ‘culture’ of prison life and the Vietnamese inmates who rule it over their compatriots, I make no adverse findings on that aspect. Currently, Dang is employed and I am satisfied that he has made every effort to find – and hold down – gainful employment. At one stage, he claimed that he could not call his employer as a character witness, asserting that he would lose his job the next day, albeit later in the evidence, it was said the employer was aware of his criminal past.” The appellant urges that it was insufficient for the Tribunal to make a “passing reference” to the appellant’s employment. This was relevant to the contribution he might be expected to make to the Australian community and should have been discussed in that context. On the other hand, Mr Beech-Jones, who appeared for the respondent on the appeal, pointed out that the appellant had been in employment for only a few weeks at the time of the Tribunal’s hearing. This was hardly a weighty matter in his favour, but in any event it was clearly taken into account by the Tribunal.