FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cong Tam Dang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 73
MIGRATION – Deportation of non-citizens who have committed serious crimes – the requirements of the Ministerial Policy – the need to balance all relevant considerations – a two-stage process not required – whether the Tribunal substituted its own opinion for those of experts – whether the Tribunal breached “natural justice” by not alerting the applicant’s representatives to the adverse view it had taken of certain evidence in the applicant’s case – whether language used by the Tribunal created an apprehension of bias
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 200 and 201
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 33Gascor v Ellicott [1997] 1 VR 332 applied
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Gray (1994) 50 FCR 189 considered
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 followed
ReGogebakan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 6 AAR 544 referred to
Gumus v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 30 FCR 145 referred to
Percerep v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 483 referred to
Marelic v Comcare (1993) 121 ALR 114 distinguished
Meadows v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 54 ALD 654 distinguishedCONG TAM DANG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 157 OF 1999DRUMMOND, MATHEWS AND MANSFIELD JJ
15 FEBRUARY 2000
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 157 OF 1999
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
CONG TAM DANG
APPELLANT
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
DRUMMOND, MATHEWS AND MANSFIELD JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
15 FEBRUARY 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 157 OF 1999
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
CONG TAM DANG
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
DRUMMOND, MATHEWS AND MANSFIELD JJ
DATE:
15 FEBRUARY 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DRUMMOND J:
I agree that this appeal should be dismissed, generally for the reasons given by Mathews J.
However, I wish to explain why I would reject as unfounded the ground of appeal suggesting bias on the part of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal member. This ground was raised for the first time, by leave, at the hearing of the appeal.
This attack on the Tribunal’s decision was based on the learned primary judge’s comments set out in Mathews J’s reasons. The appellant here submitted:
“… that the language used by the AAT as summarised by the trial judge, for the reasons given by his Honour, creates the apprehension of bias and would do so in the fair-minded…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 73
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Tribunal engaged in a process of independent merits review as required by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). It found that the Tribunal had indeed undertaken a de novo review, considering new evidence and making its decision based on the merits of the case. The court also assessed whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations, such as the appellant's employment and potential positive contributions to the community. Despite the appellant's argument that the Tribunal only made a "passing reference" to his employment, the court found that this matter was sufficiently considered in the context of the overall merits review.
In conclusion, the court determined that the Tribunal's decision was legally correct and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: DRUMMOND, MATHEWS AND MANSFIELD JJ
According to the appellant, these passages indicate that the Tribunal was considering the factors for and against the delegate’s decision rather than embarking on a process of de novo merits review. However it is perfectly clear both from the transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal and from the reasons for its decision that the Tribunal embarked upon precisely the process which is envisaged by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“the AAT Act”), namely a process of independent merits review. At no stage did it seek to analyse the correctness or otherwise of the delegate’s decision, either during the course of the hearing or in its reasons for decision. The Tribunal received a great deal of evidence, including evidence not available to the delegate, and made its decision on the basis of that evidence. The presiding member was a Deputy President with a great deal of experience in the area. It is unthinkable that he would have been misconceived as to the object or process of merits review. In my view there is no substance in this ground of appeal.Did the Tribunal fail to take into account relevant considerations? The first matter raised under this ground is that the Tribunal failed to consider whether the appellant would make a positive contribution to the Australian community. The Tribunal’s supposed failure to consider the appellant’s contribution as a separate balancing factor was also raised by the fourth particular under this ground. The two issues are virtually identical and will be discussed together. The Tribunal in its reasons for decision first discussed considerations which would favour the making of a deportation order. It then turned to those which might favour the appellant. After discussing his family background, the Tribunal made the following observations:“It may be said in the applicant’s favour that he has spent just on half of his life in this country, and hence he should be our responsibility rather than that of his country of citizenship. Alas, that is not the law, but it does indicate his contribution to this country is minimal, Dang having spent a large part of his adult life to date in prison.Whilst in prison his conduct can hardly be described as exemplary. However, given the ‘culture’ of prison life and the Vietnamese inmates who rule it over their compatriots, I make no adverse findings on that aspect. Currently, Dang is employed and I am satisfied that he has made every effort to find – and hold down – gainful employment. At one stage, he claimed that he could not call his employer as a character witness, asserting that he would lose his job the next day, albeit later in the evidence, it was said the employer was aware of his criminal past.” The appellant urges that it was insufficient for the Tribunal to make a “passing reference” to the appellant’s employment. This was relevant to the contribution he might be expected to make to the Australian community and should have been discussed in that context. On the other hand, Mr Beech-Jones, who appeared for the respondent on the appeal, pointed out that the appellant had been in employment for only a few weeks at the time of the Tribunal’s hearing. This was hardly a weighty matter in his favour, but in any event it was clearly taken into account by the Tribunal.