Van Phuc Diep v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Van Phuc Diep v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

[2000] FCA 272

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm a decision of a delegate of the Minister to order the deportation of the applicant under s 200 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal erred, inter alia, in its interpretation and application of paragraphs 22(b), 22(e) and 24(c) of the General Directions – Criminal Deportation No 9

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 200, 201
General Directions – Criminal Deportation No 9, pars 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 21, 22, 24

Butescu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1713, referred to
Cong Tam Dang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 73, referred to
Rokobatini v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1238, referred to
Percerep v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 483, referred to

VAN PHUC DIEP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 1047 OF 1999

LEHANE J
14 MARCH 2000
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1047 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

VAN PHUC DIEP
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

LEHANE J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 MARCH 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed;

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1047 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

VAN PHUC DIEP
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

LEHANE J

DATE:

14 MARCH 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal, under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal constituted by a Deputy President, Dr P Gerber. By its decision, given on 20 August 1999, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister, under s 200 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), to order the deportation of the applicant. Section 200 applied to the applicant because he was a non‑citizen who had been convicted in Australia of an offence for which he had been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of not less than one year; and when he committed the offence he had been in Australia as a permanent resident for a period of less than ten years (Migration Act s 201).

  2. Thus, the question is whether in exercising, in relation to the applicant, the powers and discretions of the decision‑maker under s 200 of the Migration Act (as s 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act required it to do in reviewing the delegate’s decision), the Tribunal made an error of law.  The applicant claims that the Tribunal failed to take relevant matters into account; based its decision,…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 272
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Van Phuc Diep v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Vietnamese-born Australian permanent resident, challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to order his deportation under the Migration Act. The Tribunal had found that the serious nature of the applicant's drug-related offences outweighed the factors that could be considered in determining whether deportation was appropriate. The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment and weighing of the factors relevant to the decision to deport the applicant. The applicant argued that the Tribunal failed to appropriately consider evidence of his rehabilitation, his employment, and the hardship deportation would cause his family.

The court found that the Tribunal's decision did not demonstrate an error of law. The Tribunal correctly identified and assessed the relevant factors, including the seriousness of the applicant's offences, his lack of remorse, and the risk of recidivism. The court emphasised that the Tribunal's role was to balance these factors, not to weigh the merits of the case. The Tribunal's decision to discount the applicant's evidence due to his admitted dishonesty was within its discretion, as was its assessment of the weight to be given to evidence of rehabilitation and change of lifestyle. The court held that the Tribunal's conclusion that the factors against deportation were not strong enough to outweigh the seriousness of the offences was a reasonable one, given the nature of the crimes involved.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion and that the decision did not involve any error of law. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed;

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Thus, the question is whether in exercising, in relation to the applicant, the powers and discretions of the decision‑maker under s 200 of the Migration Act (as s 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act required it to do in reviewing the delegate’s decision), the Tribunal made an error of law. The applicant claims that the Tribunal failed to take relevant matters into account; based its decision, in part, on a finding not open on the evidence; and erred in interpreting or applying (or by failing to reveal its reasoning as to the way in which it interpreted or applied) certain paragraphs of General Directions – Criminal Deportation No. 9 (to which I shall refer as the Criminal Deportation Direction), a direction given by the Minister under s 499 of the Migration Act.Facts What follows is taken substantially from a summary (in written submissions prepared by counsel for the applicant) of the facts found by the Tribunal. Counsel for the Minister accepted it as an accurate and appropriate summary. The applicant was born in Vietnam on 16 March 1969. In about 1980, he escaped from Vietnam to Thailand with an elder brother, Nhan Than Diep, and the brother’s wife. They were accepted for resettlement in Australia as refugees and arrived here on 6 November 1981. They lived in Newcastle for about two years and then moved to Melbourne. The applicant had difficulties with English and left school halfway through Year 10. He then worked as a labourer for about four months. He was injured when a piece of steel fell across his neck and, following hospitalisation for three days, received compensation for some two years. In May 1987, the applicant moved to Sydney where he lived with a friend he had met in Melbourne. On 18 January 1988, the applicant was arrested and charged with knowingly taking part in the supply of heroin. He pleaded guilty and, on 3 March 1989, was sentenced to eight years imprisonment, with a five year non‑parole period. The sentence was redetermined as a minimum term of three years, two months and six days, with an additional term of one year, ten months and two weeks. The offence for which he received that sentence was the offence on which the decision to order the applicant’s deportation was based. On 19 March 1991, the applicant was released on parole. Following his release, he lived with Nhan Than Diep and his family. He met his fiancee, who is an Australian citizen. In early 1992, the applicant’s parents migrated to Australia; they also lived with Nhan Than Diep. On 30 November 1992, the applicant was convicted of two offences of possessing a prohibited drug and one of administering a prohibited drug to himself. He was sentenced to a fixed term of five months imprisonment from 19 September 1992; he was released on 18 February 1993. In mid 1993, and again in early 1994, the applicant spent about a month in Vietnam. That is the only time he has spent in Vietnam since he came to Australia in November 1981. On 13 August 1996, the applicant was convicted of conspiring, between 1 May 1994 and 23 September 1994, to supply heroin. He was sentenced to a minimum term of three years and six months imprisonment and an additional term of two years and three months. He started work release in December 1997 and was paroled on 20 April 1998.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant accepted that he was liable to deportation under s 200 and that his offences – particularly, the first of them, on which the deportation order was based – were serious. He claimed, however, that the Tribunal made several errors in dealing with the evidence before it and in balancing the factors for and against deportation. I shall deal with them in turn.(a) Risk of recidivism; evidence of change of lifestyle The applicant’s case before the Tribunal, as conveniently summarised in his written submissions on the appeal, was that there were factors which weighed heavily against deportation, despite the serious nature of the applicant’s offences. They included:“(a)the low risk of recidivism because of the Applicant’s efforts at rehabilitation and significant changes in his lifestyle;(b)he is in full‑time employment and is making a contribution (albeit late) to the Australian community;(c)he migrated at the age of 12 as a refugee and so spent a considerable portion of his formative years in Australia;(d)he has little remaining contact with Vietnam and does not wish to return there; and(e)The evidence of the applicant, his fiancee and their family is that they would all suffer significant hardship if the applicant was deported.” Evidence of a change of lifestyle and attitude by the applicant was given, before the Tribunal, by the applicant himself, a consultant psychologist, Dr Hayes, the applicant’s mother and brother and his fiancee’s father. The Tribunal discounted evidence given by the applicant largely because of the applicant’s own admission that he had told a number of lies in his evidence to the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that, in many respects, Dr Hayes’ evidence was of little weight because the opinions expressed were based largely on information given to Dr Hayes by the applicant, who the Tribunal found was not to be believed. The applicant does not base any submission on the Tribunal’s treatment of his own evidence or that of Dr Hayes to the extent that it depended on what she was told by the applicant. The applicant’s mother made a statutory declaration in which, among other things, she said this about the applicant:“He is different to how he was before he went to prison. At that time, even though he lived with my husband and I, we saw less of him than we do now and we never spoke properly. He was thin and unhealthy. He did not listen to me and I thought he was a bad son. We had many arguments about his behaviour and the people he was with. Although at that time I did not [know] that he was using drugs, as I had no contact with them, I knew that something was not right. He was unhealthy and slept in. He was lazy and not interested in finding work.Since he has been released from prison I have noticed a great change in Phuc. He is bigger and healthier. He watches what he eats and even eats fruit, which he never did. He is respectful towards his family and listens when I speak. He does not go out with his friends and he is happier. He has found a job and tells me that he is doing well. He was proud when the boss told him he was happy with his work and made him full‑time and gave him a rise in his wages. I have never seen him happy at work before now. I know that he gets up very early to go to work and that he never takes a day off. These are all things that he would not have done before prison and I see him as a different person.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

LEHANE J
Having listed those matters, the Tribunal proceeded to its conclusion as follows (pars 37 and 38):“The deportation policy requires the balancing of a number of factors. Two of these factors are classed as primary considerations, which are to be given greater weight. However, this is not intended [to] stop other considerations being assessed as outweighing the primary considerations. In this matter, what must be assessed is community expectation of protection from criminals, the serious nature of the offences, the applicant’s lack of remorse and appreciation of the impact of his offences, risk of recidivism, and that deportation of people who commit such offences may prevent others from taking their place.Although there are a number of factors in the applicant’s favour which I have set out above, I am satisfied that they are not sufficient to outweigh the seriousness of the offences he has committed. The deportable offence was one of knowingly taking part in the supply of heroin. The applicant was subsequently convicted of conspiring to supply heroin, having been arrested just over three and a half years following his release from gaol for the first conviction, and only 20 months after serving five months for possession and self administration of heroin. Supply of heroin is an offence that is regarded by the community as very serious, and it would require extremely strong factors against deportation to outweigh this. I have therefore come to the conclusion that in the weighing up process, the factors against deportation are not strong enough to outweigh the factors favouring deportation.”In my view, the Tribunal weighed the various factors as it was required to do, and in a way which discloses no error of law. In my view, counsel for the Secretary rightly submitted that, upon analysis, to give effect to the applicant’s submissions would be to undertake an impermissible review of the merits of the Tribunal’s decision.Conclusion It follows that the application will be dismissed. The applicant should pay the respondent’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LEHANE J

Paragraph 24 includes, among the factors to be considered in relation to the question of hardship to Australian citizens or permanent residents:“(b)the effect deportation would have on other family members, social ties and business associates and whether deportation would impose hardship on them;(c)social ties developed after the liability for deportation arose, especially after the liability had been brought to the notice of the offender, may be given less weight; …” Grounds of application; submissions; considerations The applicant accepted that he was liable to deportation under s 200 and that his offences – particularly, the first of them, on which the deportation order was based – were serious. He claimed, however, that the Tribunal made several errors in dealing with the evidence before it and in balancing the factors for and against deportation. I shall deal with them in turn.(a) Risk of recidivism; evidence of change of lifestyle The applicant’s case before the Tribunal, as conveniently summarised in his written submissions on the appeal, was that there were factors which weighed heavily against deportation, despite the serious nature of the applicant’s offences. They included:“(a)the low risk of recidivism because of the Applicant’s efforts at rehabilitation and significant changes in his lifestyle;(b)he is in full‑time employment and is making a contribution (albeit late) to the Australian community;(c)he migrated at the age of 12 as a refugee and so spent a considerable portion of his formative years in Australia;(d)he has little remaining contact with Vietnam and does not wish to return there; and(e)The evidence of the applicant, his fiancee and their family is that they would all suffer significant hardship if the applicant was deported.” Evidence of a change of lifestyle and attitude by the applicant was given, before the Tribunal, by the applicant himself, a consultant psychologist, Dr Hayes, the applicant’s mother and brother and his fiancee’s father. The Tribunal discounted evidence given by the applicant largely because of the applicant’s own admission that he had told a number of lies in his evidence to the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that, in many respects, Dr Hayes’ evidence was of little weight because the opinions expressed were based largely on information given to Dr Hayes by the applicant, who the Tribunal found was not to be believed. The applicant does not base any submission on the Tribunal’s treatment of his own evidence or that of Dr Hayes to the extent that it depended on what she was told by the applicant. The applicant’s mother made a statutory declaration in which, among other things, she said this about the applicant:“He is different to how he was before he went to prison. At that time, even though he lived with my husband and I, we saw less of him than we do now and we never spoke properly. He was thin and unhealthy. He did not listen to me and I thought he was a bad son. We had many arguments about his behaviour and the people he was with. Although at that time I did not [know] that he was using drugs, as I had no contact with them, I knew that something was not right. He was unhealthy and slept in. He was lazy and not interested in finding work.Since he has been released from prison I have noticed a great change in Phuc. He is bigger and healthier. He watches what he eats and even eats fruit, which he never did. He is respectful towards his family and listens when I speak. He does not go out with his friends and he is happier. He has found a job and tells me that he is doing well. He was proud when the boss told him he was happy with his work and made him full‑time and gave him a rise in his wages. I have never seen him happy at work before now. I know that he gets up very early to go to work and that he never takes a day off. These are all things that he would not have done before prison and I see him as a different person.”