SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 106

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interpreters – allegation of inadequate interpretation – power of the Court to appoint an expert.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – natural justice – procedural fairness – administration of highly specific questions by a tribunal member – whether unfair – whether an indication of predisposition.

MIGRATION LAW – whether independent evidence used to falsify an answer is “information” within s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424A, 425, 430

M175 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1212
Mazhar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 183 ALR 188
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZHXF (2008) 166 FCR 298
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX [2009] HCA 31
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
NADH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264
NAPS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1091 NAPS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 159
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6
Re Refugee Review Tribunal and Another; Ex parte H and Another (2001) 179 ALR 425
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 922
SZKLX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1414
VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471
WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 511

SZJBD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

NSD 1706 of 2008

SPENDER, BUCHANAN AND PERRAM JJ
28 AUGUST 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1706 of 2008

TRANSFERRED FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZJBD
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, BUCHANAN AND PERRAM  JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

28 AUGUST 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for judicial review is dismissed with costs

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1706 of 2008

TRANSFERRED FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZJBD
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, BUCHANAN AND PERRAM  JJ

DATE:

28 AUGUST 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SPENDER J:

  1. I have had the benefit of reading in draft form the reasons for judgment of Buchanan J.

  2. As…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved the appellant, SZJBD, challenging the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship regarding his visa application. The central dispute was whether the administrative process adhered to the principles of procedural fairness and if the tribunal’s handling of evidence was appropriate. The Federal Court of Australia was the judicial body that reviewed the case.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Federal Magistrate erred in not admitting the tape of the tribunal hearing as evidence in support of the appellant's claim of apprehended bias, and whether the tribunal's method of assessing the authenticity of the respondent's religious beliefs was compliant with procedural fairness. The court also examined the scope of information disclosure under section 424A of the relevant legislation.

The court reasoned that the Federal Magistrate had erred by failing to consider the appellant's complaints about the tribunal's questioning and the interpreter's conduct as part of a broader complaint of apprehended bias. The court held that the magistrate should have admitted the tape of the hearing as evidence, as it could have provided insight into the appellant's concerns about bias. Furthermore, the court found that the tribunal's method of assessing the respondent's religious beliefs was a legitimate part of the evaluation process, used to test the credibility of the respondent's claims. The court concluded that the tribunal's actions did not breach the principles of procedural fairness.

The Full Court dismissed the application for judicial review, affirming the tribunal’s decision. The court held that the tribunal's use of information about religious beliefs to evaluate the respondent’s claims was appropriate, and that the process did not violate the statutory requirement for procedural fairness. The court also determined that certain factual statements and intermediate findings were not subject to disclosure under section 424A of the Act.

ORDERS:
1. The application for judicial review is dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for judicial review is dismissed with costs

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Applying these observations his Honour said (at [21]-[25]):“21 In my view, the true nature of the complaint which the appellant was making before the Federal Magistrate, when she referred to the ‘misleading’ nature of the Tribunal’s questions and the alleged bullying by the interpreter, was a complaint of the nature referred to in these observations of the High Court. That is, that the hearing was conducted in a matter that might give rise to the inference in the mind of a fair-minded lay observer that the Tribunal did not have an open mind on the question of whether she was a Falun Gong practitioner.22. In my view, in the overall context of the appellant’s complaint, the Federal Magistrate took too literal a view of the appellant’s complaint by treating the complaints as to the ‘misleading’ questions and the bullying by the interpreter as discrete complaints rather than incidents of a complaint of apprehended bias.23. Some of the questions the Tribunal asked of the appellant appeared to be sufficiently peripheral as to cause some concern to the Federal Magistrate. It was at least arguable that the questions were capable of causing a fair-minded lay observer to query whether questions of this kind would be asked by a person seeking fairly to test whether the appellant was an adherent to Falun Gong. Further, the Federal Magistrate correctly expressed some disquiet about the use of the word ‘infinitesimal’ by the Tribunal in describing the appellant’s knowledge of Falun Gong. In other words, there was enough before the Federal Magistrate to preclude a finding that the appellant’s claim of apprehended bias was so frivolous or otherwise devoid of merit, that she should not be permitted to advance evidence in support of it.24. Although new evidence will not generally be admitted on the hearing of an application for judicial review, evidence of what occurred at a hearing in support of a complaint about the absence of procedural fairness or bias in relation to the hearing, is an exception to the general rule, and may be admitted. (See MZXLD v Minister for Citizenship [2007] FCA 1912 at [10]-[11]).25. In my view, the Federal Magistrate erred, in the circumstances of this case, in failing to admit the tape of the hearing as evidence in support of an allegation of apprehended bias. This occurred because the Federal Magistrate failed to treat the complaint about the so called ‘misleading’ questioning and oppressive behaviour by the interpreter as comprising incidents of a complaint of apprehended basis. It was not a sufficient answer to the appellant’s real concern to point out, as did the Federal Magistrate, that the questions which the appellant could remember as being objectionable, were recorded in the Tribunal’s reasons and that there was, therefore, no need to listen to the tape. This missed the point that the appellant was trying to make, namely, that the unreasonableness of some of the questions indicated a predisposition on the part of the Tribunal to find that the appellant was not a Falun Gong practitioner and the hearing was conducted in a way that reflected that attitude. Further, it was no answer for the Federal Magistrate to say that he would derive no assistance from the tape because he did not understand Mandarin. It may have been possible for the Federal Magistrate at the very least to discern from the tone of the interchanges whether there was substance to the appellant’s complaint. In any event, the Federal Magistrate could have used the services of an interpreter. In other words, the Federal Magistrate erred in determining, as he, in effect, determined, that the tape could not possibly be of any probative value in respect of the allegation of apprehended bias.”(Emphasis added.)

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, BUCHANAN AND PERRAM JJ
The Full Court said (at [15]-[16]):“15 The second matter to be considered relates to the Tribunal’s mode of assessing the genuineness of the first respondent’s case, namely, by testing his familiarity with the Ahmadi faith and how it differs from the Muslim faith. The material gathered from this questioning process, such as information about figures of religious significance to the Ahmadi, is not, of itself, the reason or part of the reason for affirming the Minister’s decision that a protection visa should not be granted. Rather, it is a body of material used by the Tribunal as part of its evaluation exercise to weigh and consider the first respondent’s claim that he is an Ahmadi and is therefore subject to persecution in Bangladesh.16 In this case, the material relating to the Ahmadi faith was used by the Tribunal in a process of reasoning which allowed it to reach a conclusion that the first respondent’s beliefs were not genuine. This conclusion was formed pursuant to reasoning which assumed that knowledge of important aspects of the Ahmadi faith is indicative of the authenticity of a person’s assertions that he or she is a genuine Ahmadi. By way of example, where a question arises as to whether a person is a Christian, it may be relevant for the Tribunal to ask him or her questions about biblical incidents and teachings, and it would not be necessary for the Tribunal to produce to that person, as ‘information’ under s 424A of the Act, a copy of the Bible itself. Material which sets out basic religious beliefs is not information which is directed to a determination of an application. Rather, it is a tool which may be used to test and evaluate the credibility of evidence furnished to the Tribunal by an applicant or any other source.”(Emphasis added.) I can see no adequate basis for distinguishing SZHXF from the present case. I feel obliged, therefore, to exclude from the concept of information under s 424A not only the intermediate findings of fact to which I earlier referred but also any process of comparison between the applicant’s answers and the factual statements with which those answers were compared. That leaves only the factual statements themselves but, shorn of the analytical context in which they played their part, they have, as counsel for the Minister contended, no feature or attribute which makes them disclosable under s 424A. The primary facts about the Falun Gong movement and its founder are neutral. They do not tend for or against affirmation or rejection of the decision of the delegate as pieces of information in their own right. They only have that significance when matched with answers given by the applicant. The matters to which I have referred have persuaded me that my initial inclinations were unsound. In any event, I would have felt compelled not to depart from the analysis in SZHXF, which is a recent Full Court judgment on the same issue of statutory construction. In the circumstances I would dismiss the application for judicial review. There is no reason why costs should not follow the result in the usual way.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER, BUCHANAN AND PERRAM JJ