FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CJU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 875
Appeal from: CJU17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3742 File number: VID 70 of 2019 Judge: MIDDLETON J Date of judgment: 7 June 2019 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65(1)(b), 424AA, 424A Cases cited: MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190
SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 179 FCR 109
Date of hearing: 7 June 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 19 Counsel for the Applicants: The First Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
VID 70 of 2019 BETWEEN: CJU17
First Applicant
CJV17
Second Applicant
CJW17
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MIDDLETON J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The time for leave to appeal be extended to allow the appeal to be filed and served.
2.The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MIDDLETON J:
On 7 June 2019, I made orders in this matter to the effect that the time for leave to appeal was extended to allow the appeal to be filed and served, but that the appeal was dismissed with costs. These are the reasons for those orders.
INTRODUCTION
In the matter before me the Applicants seek an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal against a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court dated 17 December 2018 and published as CJU17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3742. The Applicants filed their notice of appeal seven days out of time. In the decision the subject of the proposed appeal, the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Second Respondent (the ‘Tribunal’) to affirm a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent (the ‘Minister’) to refuse to grant the Applicants visas under s 65(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the ‘Act’).
The Applicants’ draft notice of appeal contains one proposed ground of appeal to the effect that the primary judge erred in not holding that the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error by failing to comply with s 424A of the Act.
It is relevant to note that this attack on the Tribunal’s decision was not originally raised by the Applicants before the primary judge. Instead it was the Minister who, in fulfilling…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 875
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had complied with s 424A of the Act in respect of certain evidence given by a witness, AB, who was the First Applicant's older sister's husband. Section 424A of the Act requires the Tribunal to provide the applicant with clear particulars of any information that would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review, ensure that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on, and invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it. The Tribunal had recorded AB's evidence and the First Applicant's belief as to the circumstances of the death of her ex-husband's previous wife but had not put the information from AB to the First Applicant in accordance with s 424A, nor did it send a letter to the First Applicant under s 424A.
The court found that AB's evidence did not, in its terms, contain a rejection, denial or undermining of the applicants' claims to satisfy the criteria for a visa. Rather, it tended to in fact support the view that the First Applicant's ex-husband's family had a history of causing harm to others. The Tribunal's recording of the 'discrepancy' between the accounts of the First Applicant and AB of the ex-husband's previous wife's death merely went to the credibility of their respective evidence. Therefore, AB's evidence was not information that, in its terms, would be the reason (or part of the reason) for affirming the decision under review.
The court granted the extension of time for the appeal to be filed and served, but dismissed the appeal with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The time for leave to appeal be extended to allow the appeal to be filed and served.
2. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The issue for determination before me is whether the Tribunal was required to put the information from AB to the First Applicant under s 424A(1) of the Act.CONSIDERATION The principles applicable to the operation of s 424A may be summarised as follows:(1)the operation of the section is to be determined ‘in advance – and independently – of the Tribunal’s particular reasoning of the facts of the case’ (SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190 (‘SZBYR’) at [17]);(2)in order for the section to be engaged in respect of particular information, the information should contain ‘in [its] terms a rejection, denial or undermining’ of the visa applicant’s claims to satisfy the criteria for a visa (SZBYR at [17]);(3)the relevant ‘information’ in the context of the section must be ‘related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence’ (SZBYR at [18]) – information that ‘merely [goes] to credibility is not within the section’ (MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483 at [29]); and(4)‘information’, within the meaning of the section, does not encompass ‘intermediate findings of fact’ and ‘any process of comparison between the applicant’s answers and the factual statements [of third parties] with which those answers were compared’, and nor do such ‘factual statements’ of third parties themselves, ‘shorn of the analytical context in which they played their part’, necessarily constitute ‘information’ for the purposes of the section (SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 179 FCR 109 at [104] (Buchanan J, with whom Perram J agreed)). Further, in a similar case, Judge Driver of the Federal Circuit Court identified in SZVSP v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1339 that: [a] useful test for distinguishing the claims material and the mere credibility material is to ask whether, if the information were believed and looked at in isolation (i.e. apart from any inconsistencies or comparisons with other material), would it harm the applicant’s case? If the answer is no, it is not “s 424A information”. Applying that test, and considering AB’s evidence ‘in isolation’ and ‘apart from any inconsistencies or comparisons’ with the First Applicant’s own evidence, it becomes apparent that it did not ‘harm’ the Applicants’ case. Indeed, AB’s evidence tended to in fact support the view that the First Applicant’s ex-husband’s family had a history of causing harm to others (and therefore may harm the Applicants). The Tribunal’s recording of the ‘discrepancy’ between the accounts of the First Applicant and AB of the ex-husband’s previous wife’s death merely went to the credibility of their respective evidence. In other words, AB’s evidence was not therefore information that, in its terms, would be the reason (or part of the reason) for affirming the decision under review.