FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZRSU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1919
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read SZRSU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] FCA 1919
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the AAT's failure to disclose the existence of s 438 certificates constituted jurisdictional error. The High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA clarified that non-disclosure of such certificates breaches procedural fairness but does not necessarily amount to jurisdictional error unless it causes practical injustice. The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the non-disclosure resulted in material practical injustice, and thus, this ground of appeal was not established. Similarly, the court found that the AAT's failure to provide particulars of adverse information did not amount to jurisdictional error, as the appellant did not show that such disclosure would have changed the outcome. The court also determined that the AAT's engagement with the appellant's claims was adequate, and no active engagement was necessary to avoid jurisdictional error.
The court concluded that none of the grounds of appeal had been established. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent. The court further ordered that the name of the first respondent be amended to "Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs" to reflect the current title of the relevant government official.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs”.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant made some brief oral submissions which generally related to matters raised by those grounds. Ground 1: the Tribunal failed to properly consider the appellant’s claims under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act This ground was a bald assertion unsupported by particulars or argument. In those circumstances this ground is not established.Ground 2: the s 438 certificates This ground related to two certificates which were before the Tribunal. The documents the subject of the certificates were before the Court below. Since the decision of the Federal Circuit Court in this case, the High Court has delivered its decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 93 ALJR 252 (SZMTA). That case concerned the issuing of certificates by the secretary of the department under s 438 of the Migration Act. The High Court concluded that, in the case of a valid s 438 notification, failure by a tribunal to disclose the fact of the notification to an applicant constituted a breach of the tribunal’s implied obligation of procedural fairness, however that such a breach will only amount to jurisdictional error if there is practical injustice. The Court also found that an invalid certificate constitutes a breach of a limitation within the statutory procedures which condition the performance of the tribunal to conduct a review, but that such a breach must be material to amount to jurisdictional error. As the plurality of the Court (Bell, Gagelar and Keane JJ) explained at [38]: Because procedural fairness requires disclosure of the fact of notification, non-disclosure of the fact of notification constitutes, without more, a breach of the Tribunal’s implied obligation of procedural fairness. For such a breach to constitute jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, however, the breach must give rise to a “practical injustice”: the breach must result in a denial of an opportunity to make submissions and that denial must be material to the Tribunal’s decision.And later, at [44]-[46] (citations omitted): …The Secretary's provision of an incorrect, and therefore invalid, notification that s 438 applies in relation to a document or information amounts, without more, to an unauthorised act in breach of a limitation within the statutory procedures which condition the performance of the overarching duty of the Tribunal to conduct a review. Applying the principle of construction recently explained in Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, however, the Act is not to be interpreted to deny legal force to a decision made on a review in the conduct of which there has been a breach of that limitation unless that breach is material.Materiality, whether of a breach of procedural fairness in the case of an undisclosed notification or of a breach of an inviolable limitation governing the conduct of the review in the case of an incorrect and invalid notification, is thus in each case essential to the existence of jurisdictional error. A breach is material to a decision only if compliance could realistically have resulted in a different decision. Where materiality is in issue in an application for judicial review, and except in a case where the decision made was the only decision legally available to be made, the question of the materiality of the breach is an ordinary question of fact in respect of which the applicant bears the onus of proof. Like any ordinary question of fact, it is to be determined by inferences drawn from evidence adduced on the application.