CCB15 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CCB15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 1001
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – applicant claiming a fear of harm in Sri Lanka – applicant disbelieved in critical respects and other fears found not to be well-founded – whether the Tribunal came under a duty to enquire in relation to a partially translated document or whether the Tribunal mischaracterised the document considered – whether the Tribunal was unlawfully reconstituted or whether the Tribunal otherwise fell into error considered.

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s.19D

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.36
Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 75 ALD 630

Azzi v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 24

Minister for Immigration v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

Minister for Immigration v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123

Minister for Immigration v SZNSP [2010] FCAFC 50; (2010) 184 FCR 485

NABE v Minister for Immigration (No.2) [2004] FCAFC 263
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2731
Perera v Minister for Immigration [1999] FCA 507; (1999) 92 FCR 6;
Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 198 ALR 59
SZHKA v Minister for Immigration [2008] FCAFC 138
SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCAFC 142; (2013) 219 FCR 212
SZSEI v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCA 465
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCAFC 69

Applicant: CCB15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2774 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Driver
Hearing date: 16 May 2017
Date of Last Submission: 4 July 2017
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 28 August 2017

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr S Tambimuttu of Stephen Hodges, Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson
Solicitors for the Respondents: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

  1. The application as amended on 3 June 2017 is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2774 of 2015

CCB15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and background

  1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 23 September 2015.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister (delegate) not to grant the applicant a protection visa. 

  2. The following statement of background facts concerning the applicant’s claims for protection and the decision of the Tribunal on them is derived from the submissions of the parties.

  3. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, and an ethnic Tamil. He arrived in Australia on 7 July 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 15 November 2012 he applied for a protection visa[1]. The applicant claimed to fear harm in Sri Lanka from the authorities and Tamil paramilitary groups.…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 1001
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal before Judge Driver concerning a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The applicant, CCB15, challenged the lawfulness of the decision-making process.

The central legal issue before the court was whether a decision-maker under administrative law has a duty to seek additional material, particularly when relevant facts are known to be readily available, and whether a failure to do so could render the exercise of the decision-making power improper or unreasonable.

Judge Driver, referencing previous authorities including *Azzi v Minister for Immigration*, *Rahman*, *Turner v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs*, *Kioa v West*, *Enichem Anic Srl v Anti-Dumping Authority*, *Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs*, *Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs*, *Luu v Renevier*, and *Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs*, explained that while a decision-maker is generally entitled to rely on the material provided by an applicant and is not obliged to make the applicant's case, there are circumstances where an unreasonable failure to ascertain readily available relevant facts can lead to the decision being considered an improper exercise of power. The court noted that on judicial review, facts known to the decision-maker, or those that would have been learned but for unreasonable conduct, are considered. The failure to make inquiries, when aware of readily available factual material likely to be of critical importance to a central issue, may vitiate the decision as unreasonable and potentially breach a duty to act fairly.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

It may be that a decision maker has no general duty to seek additional material. However there are certain situations in general administrative law in which a decision-maker who unreasonably fails to ascertain relevant facts that may be known to be readily available will be taken to have exercised the decision-making power improperly[58]. The relevant paragraphs from the judgment by Justice Allsop, as his Honour was then known, are reproduced below: [58] See Azzi v Minister for Immigration [2002] FCA 24 (25 January 2002) at [102]-[104]In Rahman, supra, French J noted at [25] that generally a decision-maker is entitled to rely upon materials supplied by the applicant and has no duty to seek additional material. He referred to Turner v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1981] FCA 65; (1981) 35 ALR 388, 392-93 (Toohey J), Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550, 587 (Mason J) and Enichem Anic Srl v Anti-Dumping Authority [1992] FCA 579; (1992) 111 ALR 178, 190 (Hill J, with whom Gummow J agreed). However, he noted that while it is no part of the duty of the decision-maker to make the applicant's case for it, there may be cases in general administrative law in which a decision-maker who unreasonably fails to ascertain relevant facts known to be readily available will be taken to have exercised the decision-making power improperly. His Honour referred to what was said in Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 47; (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 170. Further, French J noted (at [30]) that upon judicial review at common law or under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (the ADJR Act):The Court is entitled to consider those facts which were known to the decision-maker, actually or constructively, together only with such additional facts as the decision-maker would have learned but for any unreasonable conduct by him - Prasad at 169 (Wilcox J) and Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 449; (1985) 8 FCR 167 at 178 (Toohey J).French J noted that the Full Court in Luu v Renevier [1989] FCA 518; (1989) 91 ALR 39 had confirmed (at 50) the possibility that, in certain circumstances, the failure of a decision-maker to make inquires would vitiate, as being unreasonable, the purported exercise of a power. The Full Court there said:One may say that the making of a particular decision was unreasonable - and, therefore, an improper exercise of the power - because it lacked a legally defensible foundation in the factual material or in logic. But, equally, one may be able to say that a decision is unreasonably made where, to the knowledge of the decision-maker, there is readily available to him or her other factual material, likely to be of critical importance in relation to a central issue for determination, and which has not been obtained.His Honour also noted the suggestion in Detsongjarus v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62; (1990) 21 ALD 139 at 143 that a failure to enquire, by considering only the material produced by the applicant, may in some circumstances breach a duty to act fairly towards the applicant, so that while the decision-maker is not obliged to make the applicant's case and may ordinarily decide an application on what the applicant puts forward, the decision-maker may sometimes be obliged to make further inquiries where the decision-maker knows that there is available other factual material likely to be of critical importance in relation to a central issue for determination.(applicant’s emphasis retained)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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