DHM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DHM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1071

Appeal from: DHM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3428
File number: VID 1586 of 2018
Judge: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 11 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “AAT”) – whether the AAT decision was affected by jurisdictional error – use of interpreter – whether interpretation irregularities deprived appellant of the meaningful hearing that was required by s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 76

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pt 7, ss 411, 414, 425, 427

Cases cited:

BRQ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 319

BZAID v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 242 FCR 310

CPN16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 872

DHM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3428

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553

MZAES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 307

MZAES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1133

Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6

SBLF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 103 ALD 566

SZHEW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 783

SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 219 FCR 212

SZSEI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 465

SZSUT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 190

SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 562

W284 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1788

Date of hearing: 28 May 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 57
Counsel for the Appellant: Dr A. McBeth
Solicitor for the Appellant:

Wimal & Associates

Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C.M. McDermott
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1586 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DHM17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SNADEN J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant is a 27 year-old citizen of Pakistan.  He hails from Bara, in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly within the Khyber Agency of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas).  He is a Sunni Muslim of Afridi Pashtun ethnicity.  He speaks Pashto, Urdu and…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1071
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DHM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal by the appellant, DHM17, against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that dismissed his application for a protection visa. The appellant, who had fled from Pakistan due to fear of being kidnapped, tortured, or killed by extremist groups due to his opposition to the Taliban, sought judicial review of the AAT decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The central issue was whether the AAT's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, particularly whether the use of an interpreter during the hearing deprived the appellant of a fair and meaningful opportunity to present his case as required by section 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court examined the role of the interpreter and whether any translation errors or omissions deprived the appellant of a fair hearing. Transcripts from the hearing and notes from the interpreter, Mr Ahmadzai, were considered, with the court finding that while there were some translation issues, they were not significant enough to affect the outcome of the hearing. The court concluded that the deficiencies in the interpretation process did not contribute to the AAT's conclusion that the appellant was not a reliable witness, as the lack of detail in his testimony was due to his inability to recall specific information rather than any translation errors.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had not demonstrated that the AAT's decision was flawed due to interpretation issues. The court also ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

DHM17, an individual from Pakistan, applied for a protection visa in Australia, claiming fear of persecution due to his opposition to the Taliban and his associations with various political and social groups in Pakistan. He detailed a history of threats, violence, and harassment from extremist groups such as Lashkar-e-Islam and the Taliban, resulting in personal harm, loss of property, and the displacement of his family. His claims included specific incidents of kidnapping, torture, and the destruction of his family home, along with the targeting of his relatives due to their opposition to extremist groups. DHM17's application was supported by a personal statement and post-hearing submissions detailing his experiences and the risks he faced if returned to Pakistan.

The matter began with DHM17's application for a protection visa, which was initially decided upon by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. DHM17 was dissatisfied with this decision and applied for review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT found against DHM17, leading to his appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The FCCA dismissed DHM17's appeal, prompting his further appeal to the Federal Court of Australia. The Federal Court considered the appeal on the basis of whether the AAT's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, particularly concerning the use of an interpreter during the AAT proceedings.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is not in dispute (nor credibly disputed) that the obligation for which s 425 of the Act provides is an obligation imposed upon the Tribunal to afford an applicant a fair and meaningful opportunity to advance his or her visa application: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, 361-362 [58]-[62] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553, 561 [35]-[38] (Gray, Cooper and Selway JJ); BRQ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 319, [28] (Perry J); SBLF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 103 ALD 566, 574-575 [29] (Gray J).The Tribunal Decision In support of both his Visa Application and his Review Application, the appellant claimed that he left Pakistan because he felt that he was at risk of being kidnapped, tortured or killed. That fear, he contended, arose from his opposition to the Taliban, which was known sufficiently widely in his home region. Amongst other things, the appellant said that:(1)when he resided in Bara, he spent some time as a member of a local “peace committee”, a purpose of which was to protect the local community from attacks by extremist organisations;(2)he opposed the politics and religious ideas of the Taliban;(3)he and members of his family are or were active within the Awami National Party, or “ANP” (and that, at college, he was active within its student wing, the Pukhtoon Student Federation, or “PSF”);(4)by reason of that association, he and they were named on what he described as a “main list” (the precise nature of which is less than clear);(5)he was a member of the Khyber Union, an organisation dedicated to the advancement of Afridi students;(6)he had, for a time commencing when he was 16 years of age, been conscripted by members of his village to serve as a bodyguard of “the religious person at the Mosque in Bara known as Moulvi Gul Salam”—he was told that, unless he performed in that role, the locals would burn down his house;(7)after the Moulvi left Bara and his (the appellant’s) service as a bodyguard came to an end, he (the appellant) was kidnapped by agents of the extremist group, Lashkar-e-Islam, who kept him in a private jail and periodically beat him with guns;(8)his kidnapping came to an end when his uncle paid a ransom (presumably to Lashkar-e-Islam, or forces aligned with it);(9)after his release, Lashkar-e-Islam continued to threaten him and his family, including by means of demands for money and/or that he (or they) commit to fighting for it;(10)a relative of his father’s was a radio disk jockey, who regularly played songs and discussed topics that attracted the ire of extremist groups, which, in turn, resulted in pressure being brought to bear upon the appellant and his family by local people apparently concerned to avoid that wrath;(11)his family home was destroyed, either by Lashkar-e-Islam or Ansar Ul-Islam (a rival extremist group) and, apparently, because of his or his family’s opposition to the Taliban;(12)in 2008 (or possibly 2009), he moved to Peshawar to attend college—he stayed in a hostel (although, may, for some of the first year that he was in college, have commuted, or regularly moved, between Peshawar and Bara);(13)he was once fined for having music stored on his mobile telephone;(14)he was once caught dancing at a wedding, for which he was fined and sent for 10 days of religious education in Punjab;(15)a relative of his had been killed along with six (or maybe five) others, at least some of whom were doctors (he initially claimed that they all were but later conceded that they might not all have been)—their deaths were apparently at the hands of extremists in the appellant’s home region;(16)the Taliban had once kidnapped a cousin of his, but he (the cousin) was later released (possibly because other relatives paid a ransom to secure his release, although the evidence about what the appellant’s recollection on that front was is unclear);(17)another relative—a known supplier of arms to groups opposed to extremist organisations such as Lashkar-e-Islam—was kidnapped in May 2012 and his whereabouts since are unknown;(18)yet another cousin was also kidnapped and taken to a training facility operated by Lashkar-e-Islam or forces aligned with it—he (the cousin) escaped but was later killed when (or, possibly, at some point after) unknown men (assumed to be aligned with Lashkar-e-Islam or its leader, Mangal Bagh) tried to recapture him;(19)in 2009, he (the appellant) was required to assist Pakistan’s Frontier Corps or the Pakistani military by identifying Taliban operatives in the local Bara area;(20)he (the appellant) applied to join the Pakistani military but was rejected because (or for reasons that included that) he is Pashtun and/or hails from what was once the Khyber Agency (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa);(21)after he arrived in Australia, his (the appellant’s) family’s business—a “medicine store” in Bara—had to be closed down because of orders (presumably made by extremist groups in the region, although that isn’t clear) that western medicines not be used;(22)his (the appellant’s) brother had been threatened with death on account of his employment with a non-governmental organisation known as “ACE”, which was dedicated to the creation of employment opportunities and the advancement of children, and which, because it was an NGO, extremist groups were known to abhor—his brother’s work involved conducting surveys within the Bara region (although other evidence suggested that he may have been an accountant of some sort);(23)prior to his arrival in Australia, the appellant had worked at his family’s shop in Bara and at a fabrics business in Peshawar (although the appellant later indicated that the latter might not have been a regular engagement);(24)he (the appellant) had “lost many scholarships” because of his or his tribe’s association with (or proximity to) extremists and the difficulties that created with the Pakistani government (which included difficulties in getting certain documents signed or approved); and(25)the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had registered his (the appellant’s) family as internally displaced persons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Where, in a case involving an interpreter, it can be said that a variety of factors has operated in favour of a conclusion that an applicant ought not to be believed, attention should focus upon whether or not any deficiencies in the interpretation process might have contributed to that conclusion. It will be sufficient for an applicant to show that a different conclusion might have been reached had the deficiencies not transpired: W284 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1788, [35] (French J); BZAID v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 242 FCR 310, 329 [113] (Edelman J).Consideration The FCCA admitted into evidence two documents that are properly described as transcripts of the Tribunal Hearing: one the Hearing Transcript (a fulsome transcript of the entire hearing), the other the Ahmadzai Note (below, annexure 1). Those documents do not perfectly correspond: that is to say that, in varying respects, they attribute slightly different statements to the participants of the Tribunal Hearing. In her reasons for the FCCA Judgment, the judge at first instance gave primacy to the Hearing Transcript: DHM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3428, [47] (Judge Hartnett). In other words, to the extent that the two documents offer conflicting evidence about what was said in English during the Tribunal Hearing, the Hearing Transcript prevails. As is recorded above, the accuracy of Mr Ahmadzai’s English translations of what was said in Pashto (by both the interviewer and the appellant) is not in question; likewise each of the observations that he recorded in his note (other than those that didn’t survive evidential objection). It cannot credibly be doubted—and the Ahmadzai Note makes it clear—that there were exchanges during the Tribunal Hearing that were not as well translated to and from Pashto as might ordinarily be preferred. The question for resolution is whether any of them individually, or any two or more of them in combination, compel the view that the appellant was denied a fair opportunity to advance the case that he wished to advance in support of his Review Application. For the following reasons, I do not accept that they do. First, the irregularities identified in the Ahmadzai Note must be considered in their proper context. The Tribunal Hearing extended for five hours and 10 minutes (inclusive of breaks—four-and-a-half hours exclusive). The Hearing Transcript is 93 pages long. In addition to what was said at the Tribunal Hearing, the appellant advanced post-hearing submissions that totalled 72 pages (including attachments). The “personal statement” that he attached to his Visa Application (and that was before the Tribunal for the purposes of the Review Application) was 18 pages long. The 23 irregularities highlighted by the Ahmadzai Note were, in a volume or numerical sense, not significant. Second (and more importantly), none of the irregularities identified in the Ahmadzai Note is of a species that might be thought to have contributed, or potentially contributed, to any of the central findings upon which the Tribunal Decision rested. It is clear from the lengthy recitation of its findings (Tribunal Decision, [31]-[63]—above, [15]) that the Tribunal’s conclusion that the appellant was not a reliable witness was a function of the fact that his evidence, in multiple respects, was critically lacking in detail. None of the irregularities referred to in the Ahmadzai Note explains, or might potentially explain, that particularity deficit. On the contrary, it is abundantly clear that the want of specifics about each of the matters that the Tribunal painstakingly recited arose, in each case, not because the appellant was unable to properly understand or communicate the information that was sought; but, rather and more simply, because he didn’t possess it. That was a problem for him that no standard of interpretation could have overcome. Whether it was a function of his fading memory or something else is a matter for speculation that is beyond the scope of this appeal. What can be said with clarity is that none of the discrete examples of misinterpretation that are the subject of the Ahmadzai Note served, or might have served, as part of the foundation upon which rested the Tribunal’s conclusion that the appellant was “not a witness of truth”.