BRQ18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRQ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 319

Appeal from: BRQ18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 2142
File number: NSD 1501 of 2018
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment:

6 March 2019

Date of publication of reasons: 8 March 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa - appeal against decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of Tribunal’s decision – whether Tribunal’s decision tainted by apprehended bias by reason of doubts expressed by the Tribunal about the appellant’s claims in the course of the hearing – observations as to the inquisitorial nature of the Tribunal’s function – where no error in the Tribunal’s treatment of a non-disclosure certificate issued under s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183; (2016) 244 FCR 305

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH [2012] FCAFC 45; (2012) 200 FCR 223

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR [2003] FCAFC 126; (2003) 128 FCR 553

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 75 ALJR 982

Date of hearing: 6 March 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 31
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Ms J Strugnell of Minter Ellison

Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 1501 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BRQ18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MARCH 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)

PERRY J:

1.                 INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision made on 7 March 2018 by the Administrative Appeals…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 319
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant, a citizen of China, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court (FCC) to dismiss his application for judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s (AAT) affirmation of the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant him a protection visa. The appellant had applied for a protection visa in October 2014, claiming that he had worked for a food processing company, discovered that it was producing “gutter oil,” reported the illegal activity to the local government, and subsequently faced detention and threats. The AAT affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the visa, finding that the appellant was not a truthful witness and that the claimed events had not occurred, due to inconsistencies in his evidence.

The appellant argued that the AAT’s decision was tainted by apprehended bias and that the AAT erred in its treatment of a non-disclosure certificate. The primary judge rejected these arguments, explaining that the limited function of a court on judicial review and appeal is confined to determining whether the AAT’s decision was lawfully made under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court held that the AAT’s decision was not invalid by reason of a jurisdictional error, and that neither the FCC nor the court had jurisdiction to grant the appellant a visa, to consider whether he satisfied the criteria for a protection visa, or to correct mistaken findings of fact by the AAT.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the First Respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed. The decision underscores the constrained role of the courts in reviewing AAT decisions, particularly in the context of protection visa applications, where the primary focus is on the legality of the decision-making process rather than the merits of the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The first hearing of the appeal was adjourned at the appellant’s request after he did not appear at the first hearing but was able to be contacted by telephone. He said that he had not received any of the documents relating to the listing of the appeal. The appellant appeared at the rescheduled hearing of his appeal and made submissions with the assistance of an interpreter who was an accredited Level 3 (Professional) interpreter in Mandarin and English. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 The application for the protection visa and delegate’s decision I have summarised the background to the appeal in general terms in order to minimise the risk of disclosing identifying details about the appellant. The appellant is a citizen of China. He applied for a protection visa in October 2014. The appellant claimed that he had worked for a food processing company. In his application for a protection visa, the appellant claimed that he had discovered that his company was secretly producing “gutter oil” which causes serious damage to people’s health. The appellant claimed that he persuaded other workers not to participate in processing the oil and was immediately fired. He also said that the head of the security department warned him not to make trouble. He said he then collected evidence and reported the illegal activity to the local government, providing them with the evidence. He claimed to have been detained on two occasions the following month. On the first occasion, he said that he was detained by the city security bureau where he was interrogated many times, and forced to write a letter of repentance and to promise not to report the factory again. Not long thereafter he claimed to have been sent to the local detention centre where he was held for a couple of weeks, beaten, and only released upon his wife paying a fine. He believed the police were watching his family in order to catch him and had threatened his son. The appellant also claimed that he had found a friend to help him to apply for a visa to leave China and he went to neighbouring Asian countries. However, he claimed that as the tour guide monitored them strictly, he had no chance of escaping. It was only later in mid-2014 that he came to Australia.2.2 The Tribunal’s decision on review The appellant applied for review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal. He appeared before the Tribunal on 9 February 2018 to give evidence and present arguments with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin and English languages. The interpreter’s level of accreditation was not disclosed by the Tribunal’s records in the appeal book. By a decision given on 7 March 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision by the Minister’s delegate to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Tribunal reached that decision on the ground that it did not consider that the appellant was a truthful witness and it was not satisfied that the claimed events had occurred, given inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence with respect to key aspects of his claim and in the absence of what the Tribunal regarded as any convincing explanation for those inconsistencies (Tribunal reasons at [48]). In particular, the Tribunal took into account the following inconsistencies and omissions in his evidence:(1)while in his written statement, the appellant said that he was fired and threatened by the company’s security officer before he went to the authorities, he gave oral evidence before the Tribunal that:(a)it was his choice to stop working at the company and he made that decision because it was better for him to leave voluntarily than be fired (Tribunal reasons at [32]); and (b)it was only after submitting his evidence to the authorities that the company’s security man approached him and threatened him (Tribunal reasons at [33]);(2)the appellant’s explanation for these inconsistencies, namely that he did not memorise his written statement and the events happened a long time ago, which led the Tribunal to consider that this suggested that the events were constructed and it was not persuaded that the passage of time would account for the differing accounts of what occurred (Tribunal reasons at [34]-[35]);(3)at the hearing, the appellant gave evidence that he was detained only on one occasion for 2 weeks and in one location only, being a small house which did not belong to the police; however in his written statement he said that he had been detained for a period totalling a month, first in a bungalow behind the public security bureau and subsequently at a detention centre (Tribunal reasons at [36]-[37] and [39]);(4)the appellant gave differing accounts in his written statement and oral evidence of the manner in which injuries allegedly suffered by him during detention were treated; and(5)the appellant gave evidence for the first time at the Tribunal hearing that, following his return to China from nearby Asian countries, he was approached by some people and told that he should be held responsible for the situation he had caused for his food company (Tribunal reasons at [43]-[44]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant is a citizen of China. He applied for a protection visa in October 2014. The appellant claimed that he had worked for a food processing company. In his application for a protection visa, the appellant claimed that he had discovered that his company was secretly producing “gutter oil” which causes serious damage to people’s health. The appellant claimed that he persuaded other workers not to participate in processing the oil and was immediately fired. He also said that the head of the security department warned him not to make trouble. He said he then collected evidence and reported the illegal activity to the local government, providing them with the evidence. He claimed to have been detained on two occasions the following month. On the first occasion, he said that he was detained by the city security bureau where he was interrogated many times, and forced to write a letter of repentance and to promise not to report the factory again. Not long thereafter he claimed to have been sent to the local detention centre where he was held for a couple of weeks, beaten, and only released upon his wife paying a fine. He believed the police were watching his family in order to catch him and had threatened his son. The appellant also claimed that he had found a friend to help him to apply for a visa to leave China and he went to neighbouring Asian countries. However, he claimed that as the tour guide monitored them strictly, he had no chance of escaping. It was only later in mid-2014 that he came to Australia.2.2 The Tribunal’s decision on review The appellant applied for review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal. He appeared before the Tribunal on 9 February 2018 to give evidence and present arguments with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin and English languages. The interpreter’s level of accreditation was not disclosed by the Tribunal’s records in the appeal book. By a decision given on 7 March 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision by the Minister’s delegate to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Tribunal reached that decision on the ground that it did not consider that the appellant was a truthful witness and it was not satisfied that the claimed events had occurred, given inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence with respect to key aspects of his claim and in the absence of what the Tribunal regarded as any convincing explanation for those inconsistencies (Tribunal reasons at [48]). In particular, the Tribunal took into account the following inconsistencies and omissions in his evidence:(1)while in his written statement, the appellant said that he was fired and threatened by the company’s security officer before he went to the authorities, he gave oral evidence before the Tribunal that:(a)it was his choice to stop working at the company and he made that decision because it was better for him to leave voluntarily than be fired (Tribunal reasons at [32]); and (b)it was only after submitting his evidence to the authorities that the company’s security man approached him and threatened him (Tribunal reasons at [33]);(2)the appellant’s explanation for these inconsistencies, namely that he did not memorise his written statement and the events happened a long time ago, which led the Tribunal to consider that this suggested that the events were constructed and it was not persuaded that the passage of time would account for the differing accounts of what occurred (Tribunal reasons at [34]-[35]);(3)at the hearing, the appellant gave evidence that he was detained only on one occasion for 2 weeks and in one location only, being a small house which did not belong to the police; however in his written statement he said that he had been detained for a period totalling a month, first in a bungalow behind the public security bureau and subsequently at a detention centre (Tribunal reasons at [36]-[37] and [39]);(4)the appellant gave differing accounts in his written statement and oral evidence of the manner in which injuries allegedly suffered by him during detention were treated; and(5)the appellant gave evidence for the first time at the Tribunal hearing that, following his return to China from nearby Asian countries, he was approached by some people and told that he should be held responsible for the situation he had caused for his food company (Tribunal reasons at [43]-[44]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge rejected these grounds for reasons I later explain.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 The limited function of a court on judicial review and on the appeal At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant submitted that his experiences were true and that if he could stay in Australia, he had the potential to build a better future for Australia. However, while the appellant understandably focused upon these matters, those submissions raise matters which neither the FCC could take into account on his application for judicial review, nor this Court on the appeal. The circumstances in which the FCC may find an error on a judicial review application which would justify the Court setting aside or quashing the Tribunal’s decision are very limited. The jurisdiction of the FCC is confined to deciding whether the Tribunal’s decision was made lawfully under the Act, that is, whether the Tribunal’s decision is invalid by reason of a jurisdictional error. This Court in turn must decide whether the FCC wrongly decided that there was no jurisdictional error. The Tribunal would make a jurisdictional error if, for example, it misunderstood the criteria by which the appellant’s visa application must be considered under the Act, the Tribunal’s decision was illogical or irrational, the Tribunal approached the application with a mind closed to persuasion, or the Tribunal did not otherwise give the appellant a meaningful hearing: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 (the Court). However, neither the Federal Court nor the FCC has jurisdiction to grant the appellant a visa, to consider whether he satisfies the criteria for the grant of a protection visa, or to correct mistaken findings of fact by the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220 at [65] (Sackville J), [146] (Kenny J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 at [114] (Kirby J). As for example, the High Court explained in Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173 at 184-185 (French CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ):23 It is necessary to make some preliminary observations in relation to the constraints within which the plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the Delegate’s decision falls to be determined. These constraints are aspects of the scope of judicial review of administrative action, which is confined to the legality of the Delegate’s decision. In particular, judicial review is concerned with whether the Delegate’s decision was one which he was authorised to make; it is not:“an appellate procedure enabling either a general review of the… decision … or a substitution of the … decision which the … court thinks should have been made.” [quoting Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 175.]