DDG17 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DDG17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1608

Appeal from: DDG17 v Minister For Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 3538
File number: NSD 2164 of 2018
Judge: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 27 September 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION­ – appeal from Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – where leave sought to raise grounds not relied upon in the Court below – where appellant claims that the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to address whether it should consider new information­ – where Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider certain documents­ – where failure to do so could not have affected the outcome of the decision – leave to rely on new grounds granted – appeal dismissed  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473CB, 473DB(1), 473DB(2), 473DC, 473DC(3), 473DD, Pt 7AA
Cases cited:

AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 804

BOZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 418

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 114; (2018) 261 FCR 35

CHZ19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1112
DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 43
EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20

FKO17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 98

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 92 ALJR 780

Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CPA16 [2019] FCAFC 40

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 353 ALR 600

Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney [2012] FCAFC 146; (2012) 207 FCR 277

SZSKR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 2

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing:  24 July 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 48
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D Godwin
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 2164 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DDG17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 SEPTEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to rely on the amended grounds is granted.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 27 August 2012. The appellant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) on 24 February…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1608
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DDG17 v Minister for Home Affairs involved the appellant, DDG17, challenging the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) in the Federal Circuit Court, which dismissed his application for judicial review. The appellant sought to rely on new grounds for appeal in the Federal Court of Australia that had not been raised in the Court below. The central issue was whether the IAA had properly considered new information provided by the appellant. Additionally, the court had to determine if the IAA's failure to consider certain documents could have affected the outcome of the decision, and whether leave to rely on new grounds should be granted.

The court noted that the IAA had not addressed whether it should consider the new information provided by the appellant. However, it found that the failure to consider certain documents could not have affected the outcome of the decision. The court considered the principles for granting leave to rely on new grounds, emphasizing that such leave should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice and if the new ground has merit. In this case, the court found that the proposed ground of appeal had no merit and there was no justification for permitting it to be raised for the first time before the court. Despite these findings, the court granted leave to rely on the amended grounds, but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

In conclusion, the court granted leave to the appellant to rely on the amended grounds but dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to rely on the amended grounds is granted.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons below, leave to rely on the grounds is granted, however the appeal is dismissed. The decision of the Authority The Authority noted the history of this matter which included that on 27 July 2013 the appellant made an invalid application for a protection visa, and on 24 February 2016 he made an application for a SHEV. It is that latter application which the Minister’s delegate refused which gives rise to these proceedings. The Authority also detailed the proceedings before it, and submissions and other material received from the appellant. These matters, which reflect opportunities to provide information, were relevant to the Authority’s consideration of the information provided. The Authority listed the claims made by the appellant, which is later summarised as follows: The applicant is a male Catholic Tamil from the Northern Province aged approximately 29 years, who previously was suspected of being involved with the LTTE and detained at a rehabilitation centre for approximately 10 months. He has attended diaspora memorial events in Australia and intends to publish poetry about the experience of Tamils during the war and will be returning as an asylum seeker who departed the country illegally. Noting the applicant’s history and profile, and having regard to the country information about the situation in Sri Lanka, I am not satisfied that he faces a real chance of serious harm now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. As explained in more detail below, the Authority accepted some of the appellant’s claims, but rejected others. Suffice to say at this stage that the Authority concluded, having regard to the appellant’s history and profile, and to the country information about the situation in Sri Lanka, that it was not satisfied that the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. It also concluded that there were not substantial grounds for believing that, as a consequence of being returned from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk that the appellant would suffer significant harm. On the basis of these findings the Authority also rejected the appellant's claim under the complementary protection criteria.Federal Circuit Court As the grounds now relied on were not raised in the Court below it is unnecessary to consider the reasoning of that Court. Suffice to say that in that Court after the application for review was filed the appellant sought leave to amend to raise a further ground relating to the Authority’s consideration of the new information. The delay in identifying the ground was said to be that the ground only came to light when the matter was reviewed. The appellant was denied leave to rely on the ground. ConsiderationLeave to appeal As noted above, although the appellant was represented in the Court below, neither of the two grounds now relied on were raised. Leave to rely on these grounds in this Court is required. The relevant principles for the grant of leave are well established and are summarised in VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [46]–[48] where the Full Court said:In our view, the application for leave to rely upon the sole ground of appeal now raised should be refused. Leave to argue a ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: O’Brien v Komesaroff [1982] HCA 33; (1982) 150 CLR 310; H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; and Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833; (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [20]-[24] and [38].In Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ observed, in their joint judgment, at 7:It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish.The practice of raising arguments for the first time before the Full Court has been particularly prevalent in appeals relating to migration matters. The Court may grant leave if some point that was not taken below, but which clearly has merit, is advanced, and there is no real prejudice to the respondent in permitting it to be agitated. Where, however, there is no adequate explanation for the failure to take the point, and it seems to be of doubtful merit, leave should generally be refused. In our view, the proposed ground of appeal has no merit. There is no justification, therefore, for permitting it to be raised for the first time before this Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As the grounds now relied on were not raised in the Court below it is unnecessary to consider the reasoning of that Court. Suffice to say that in that Court after the application for review was filed the appellant sought leave to amend to raise a further ground relating to the Authority’s consideration of the new information. The delay in identifying the ground was said to be that the ground only came to light when the matter was reviewed. The appellant was denied leave to rely on the ground. ConsiderationLeave to appeal As noted above, although the appellant was represented in the Court below, neither of the two grounds now relied on were raised. Leave to rely on these grounds in this Court is required. The relevant principles for the grant of leave are well established and are summarised in VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [46]–[48] where the Full Court said:In our view, the application for leave to rely upon the sole ground of appeal now raised should be refused. Leave to argue a ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: O’Brien v Komesaroff [1982] HCA 33; (1982) 150 CLR 310; H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; and Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833; (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [20]-[24] and [38].In Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ observed, in their joint judgment, at 7:It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish.The practice of raising arguments for the first time before the Full Court has been particularly prevalent in appeals relating to migration matters. The Court may grant leave if some point that was not taken below, but which clearly has merit, is advanced, and there is no real prejudice to the respondent in permitting it to be agitated. Where, however, there is no adequate explanation for the failure to take the point, and it seems to be of doubtful merit, leave should generally be refused. In our view, the proposed ground of appeal has no merit. There is no justification, therefore, for permitting it to be raised for the first time before this Court. The respondent opposed leave being granted to rely on the new grounds principally for two reasons. First, that the appellant was represented in the Court below: Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 at [24]. Second, that advancing on an appeal from a trial court’s judgment fresh grounds challenging an administrative decision is contrary to the legislative scheme under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) that explicitly limits the Court’s original jurisdiction: AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 804 at [14]. The respondent argued that this Court is not a trial court.