Reibey and Reibey (Child support) - [2025] ARTA 1105

Reibey and Reibey (Child support) [2025] ARTA 1105 (15 May 2025)

Applicant/s: Ms Reibey

Respondent: Child Support Registrar

Other Parties: Mr Reibey

Tribunal Number: 2024/MC029005
Tribunal: Senior Member A Suthers
Place:Perth
Date:15 May 2025
Decision:The decision under review is set aside and, in substitution, the parties’ respective existing percentages of care for [Child A] will not be revoked as a result of the notification of a change in care by Mr Reibey on 26 June 2023.
This decision has effect on 12 December 2024.

CATCHWORDS
CHILD SUPPORT – percentage of care – change to the pattern of care – Federal Circuit and Family Court – court orders – care calendar of nights in care not allowed in evidence – submitted too late – requested adjournment to seek legal representation – discretion not exercised – school refusal disorder – refusal to stay with father – mother contemporaneously kept her diary – father recreated his record from previous messages – no change to the cost percentage – existing percentages of care will not be revoked – no special circumstances prevented the application being made in time – decision under review set aside and substituted 

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision and replaced with generic information pursuant to subsection 16(2AB) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

Statement of Reasons

SUMMARY

Ms Reibey and Mr Reibey (‘the parties’) are the parents of, relevantly, [Child A], who is [Age] years old. A child support case was registered with Services Australia – Child Support (‘Child Support’) on 13 October 2022. Ms Reibey has been recorded as providing 79% care for the child with Mr Reibey providing the balance (21%) of care.
On 26 June 2023, Mr Reibey notified Child Support that a change to the care arrangements for the child had occurred from 2 February 2023.
Child Support recorded that it also contacted Ms Reibey on 26 June 2023, and that she agreed to the ‘facts of the change in care, as notified by [Mr Reibey]’.
On 26 June 2023, an original decision maker accepted that change and recorded updated percentages of care of 63% to Ms Reibey and 37% to Mr Reibey from 2 February 2023 (‘the original decision’).
An objections officer considered an objection lodged by Ms Reibey on 22 March 2024 (which was not within the prescribed time to do so), and on 30 June 2024 disallowed the objection, thereby affirming the original decision (‘the objection decision’). The objection decision noted, relevantly, that:
[Ms Reibey] has objected to this decision because there are court orders, but the court orders have never really been followed. [Child A] is encouraged to go to his dads but has had some difficulties at his father house so often care has been missed. [She has] recorded the actual nights of care that [Child A] has spent with [Mr Reibey] since February 2023 in a diary [she] will provide. The following nights:
February 7 nights care
March 13 nights
April 10 nights
May 7 nights
June 9 nights
July 13 nights
August 10 nights
September 6 nights
October 5 nights
November 1 night
December 4 nights
January 4 nights
…
We spoke to [Mr Reibey] to confirm the objection details and he advised that there have not been many nights missed care.
As these verbal statements are conflicting, we will refer to any evidence that has been provided throughout the objection process.
Both parents were afforded the opportunity to provide evidence to show us what care is being provided for [Child A]; however, no documentary evidence was received from either party.
In the absence of evidence, we cannot be satisfied that there has been a change to the ongoing pattern of care.
Therefore, we have made the decision to reflect the care of [Child A] as 63% to [Ms Reibey] and 37% to [Mr Reibey] from 2 February 2023.
Final parenting orders were made in respect of [Child A] on 28 September 2023 in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (‘the court orders’). They are in evidence and provide for [Child A] to live predominantly with Ms Reibey and to spend time with Mr Reibey during school terms on an alternate weekly basis, as follows:
· Week 1 – from the conclusion of school on Thursday to commencement of school on Monday (or 9.30 am if a non-school day); and
· Week 2 – from the conclusion of school on Thursday to the commencement of school on Friday (or 9.30 am if a non-school day).
Mr Reibey is also to spend one-half of each school holiday period with [Child A] in his care.
On 12 December 2024, Ms Reibey lodged an application for review of the objection decision (which was not within the prescribed time to do so). That is the application before me.

The hearing and the evidence

I heard the matter on 14 April 2025 and took evidence and submissions from Ms Reibey and evidence from Mr Reibey with submissions from Dr Alexander of counsel, who represented Mr Reibey. Child Support elected not to participate in the hearing. I also had regard to the 142 numbered pages lodged by Child Support in the application.
Ms Reibey had lodged 91 pages of documents on the weekend prior to the hearing, which was conducted on a Monday. She did not serve a copy on Mr Reibey. Much of the material was not relevant to the issues in question but she did lodge copies of the care calendar referred to in the objection decision. I had to consider whether to admit that into evidence.
Dr Alexander objected to the admission of the documents. She pointed to the late lodgement, against the backdrop of Ms Reibey’s significant delay in progressing both the objection and this application for review. Dr Alexander was not in the same location as her client, which she submitted would make it difficult for her to obtain instructions even if I stood the matter down to provide her with a copy of the calendar. She had only set aside one hour for the hearing, in accordance with the listing advice sent to the parties.
The Tribunal’s Child Support Practice Direction, to which all parties are referred in the Notice of Hearing they receive, advises that, in the absence of specific directions to the contrary and where both parties reside in Australia, the parties must lodge all documentary evidence that they wish to rely on at least 14 days prior to the hearing, and that documents not given to the Tribunal in accordance with the Practice Direction will only be considered with the permission of the Tribunal.
Given the extensive delay in lodging the calendar, which Ms Reibey knew was probative since at least the objections process, and the identified prejudice to Mr Reibey if I allowed it into evidence, I refused to allow Ms Reibey to rely on it.
Ms Reibey then sought an adjournment of the hearing, not on the basis that the calendar was excluded from evidence but because Mr Reibey was legally represented, and she was not. She had been told, correctly, that most parties in the Tribunal are not represented and only found out that Mr Reibey would be legally represented on 10 April 2025. If granted an adjournment, Ms Reibey said she would seek legal representation. Dr Alexander opposed an adjournment, noting that Ms Reibey knew she could have had representation had she wanted it, and the prejudice to her client in the waste of her fees if the matter did not proceed, which could not be remediated with a costs order in this Tribunal.
Again by reference to the Child Support Practice Direction, parties and their representatives are subject to a prohibition on asking direct questions of the other party during a hearing of this nature. On that basis, the manner in which oral evidence is given and tested is controlled by the presiding member. Furthermore, the member has a duty to ensure that they understand and correctly apply the relevant legislation and policy, and do not simply accede to submissions as to the law made by a legal representative. This matter has no particular legal complexity in any event. I was not satisfied that it was appropriate to exercise my discretion to adjourn.
In brief, the parties’ respective positions are that:
(a) Ms Reibey says that her calendar records that [Child A] has spent 89 nights in Mr Reibey’s care in the 12 months from 4 February 2023; however
(b) Mr Reibey maintains that his records show that [Child A] spent 107 nights in his care in that period, in that he acknowledges that [Child A] did not come into his care, or remain in his care, on 30 of the 137 nights that [Child A] was to spend with him in accordance with the court orders.
For the following reasons, I am persuaded that there was a change to the pattern of care, but the existing percentages of care should not have been revoked.

OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

It is necessary to set out, to an extent, the law and relevant policy to be considered.
The Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act) provides for Child Support to make an administrative assessment of child support. Child Support does so by reference to the relevant legislation and to the ‘Child Support Guide’ (the Guide) published by the Department of Social Services, where relevant. The Guide contains governmental guidelines and statements of policy as to how the relevant legislation is to be applied.
Under section 25 of the Act, a parent of a relevant child may apply for an administrative assessment. If the necessary conditions are met, Child Support must make the assessment using a formula containing variables such as the parties’ adjusted taxable incomes and the respective percentages of care the parties have provided, or are likely to provide for each relevant child, in the ‘care period’ that Child Support decides it is appropriate to consider.
Child Support usually considers a care period of 12 months from when the actual care of a child began or changed: subparagraph 50(1)(b)(ii) of the Act and section 2.2.1 of the Guide. If the assessment is made before the end of the care period, Child Support must make a partially forward-looking judgment as to the care of each relevant child a party to the assessment is likely to provide over the period.
In doing so, Child Support considers whether the parties have had, or are likely to have, a ‘pattern of care’ for the child during the care period. The pattern of care informs the assessment of the ‘percentage of care’ used in the formula. The pattern and percentage of care will commonly be determined by reference to the number of nights each child spends in the care of each party to the assessment: section 54A of the Act and section 2.2.1 of the Guide.
Once an assessment of the percentage of care is made and applied in the formula, Child Support continues using that percentage of care until it is informed or becomes aware that an anticipated pattern of care did not eventuate, or that it did eventuate but subsequently changed.
If notified of an alleged change in the actual or anticipated pattern of care of a child, Child Support must consider whether such a change occurred. If Child Support is satisfied that it did, then the percentages of care used in the assessment may, or in some cases must, be revoked (sections 54F, 54G and 54H of the Act) and another assessment made using newly determined percentages of the actual care the parties provided or are likely to provide to the child in a newly determined care period: subsection 49(2) and paragraph 50(1)(b) of the Act.
Sections 80A and 89 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) (‘the R&C Act’) provide that the parties to the assessment may lodge an objection to a care percentage determination made by Child Support and can then seek review of the objection decision in the Tribunal.
I have jurisdiction and power to conduct this review due to the combined effect of sections 80A, 87 and item 2 of the table in section 89 of the R&C Act, read with sections 12 and 105 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (the ART Act).
In conducting the review, I should also have regard to the Guide and apply the policy contained in it where relevant, so long as what it contains is lawful, does not purport to control my decision and there are no cogent reasons not to do so: Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634; G v MIBP [2018] FCA 1229; Minister for Home Affairs v G and Another [2019] FCAFC 79 at [57]–[62]. I am not bound to follow the Guide, though, and will record any instance where I disagree with what it contains.
I ‘stand in the shoes’ of the original decision maker, in that I am to determine for myself on the material before me the decision which can, and which I consider should, be made in the exercise of the power or powers conferred on the original decision maker for the purpose of making the original decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 31 ALR 666 at 671 per Smithers J. However, as section 9 of the ART Act makes clear, the Tribunal makes its decision on review independently of the parties, and the original decision maker. The Tribunal is also subject to the same constraints as the original decision maker: Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] HCA 16 at [51] discussing relevantly indistinguishable provisions of the, now repealed, Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. There is no presumption that the objection decision is correct: McDonald v Director General of Social Security [1984] FCA 57 (McDonald).
‘Care’ is not defined in the legislation. The level of care provided by a responsible person for a child is a question of fact to be determined in each case by reference to the particular facts and circumstances: P v Child Support Registrar [2013] FCA 1312; (2013) 62 AAR 17 at [107].
Whilst the parties’ respective percentages of care may, and commonly will, be assessed based on the respective nights the child spends in their care, that is not mandatory. If a more appropriate basis for assessment of that issue is identified and is based on permissible considerations, it may be used: P v Child Support Registrar [2014] FCAFC 98.
If I revoke the existing care percentages on review and redetermine them, the relevant care period is such period as I consider to be appropriate having regard to all the circumstances: subsection 49(1) and subparagraph 50(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. Whilst section 2.2.1 of the Guide provides that a care period is generally assumed to apply for the subsequent 12-month period from when the actual care of a child began or changed, a shorter or longer care period may be appropriate depending upon the circumstances of the case.
If the percentage of care assessed is not a whole percentage, the percentage assessed is rounded down to the nearest whole number if it is lower than 50%, and up to the nearest whole number if it is higher than 50%: section 54D of the Act.
I may then need to consider whether a ‘care arrangement’ is in place in respect of the child, but not being followed. The meaning of ‘care arrangement’ is imported into the Act via the definitions contained in section 3 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 and can be broadly described as a written agreement between the parties or a relevant court order (from a defined list) that influences how a child of the assessment is cared for.
Not all changes to a care percentage determination will effect a corresponding change in the child support assessment. That is because the care percentages are then broken down into seven ‘cost percentage’ brackets and, for example, a party with anything less than a 14% care percentage is still assessed at a 0% cost percentage. A simplified table that amalgamates the content of section 55C and subsection 5(2) of the Act, and that links defined and otherwise commonly described levels of care, makes this clearer:

Care percentage	Equal to number of nights a year	Care level	Cost percentage
0% to less than 14%	0–51	Less than regular care	0%
14% to less than 35%	52–127	Regular care	24%
35% to less than 48%	128–175	Shared care	25% plus 2% for every percentage point over 35% of care
48% to 52%	176–179	Shared care	50%
More than 52% to 65%	190–237	Shared care	51% plus 2% for every percentage point over 53% of care
More than 66% to 86%	238–313	Primary care	76%
More than 86% to 100%	314–365	More than primary care	100%

The date of effect of any changes in the assessment may be affected by:
(1) when Child Support was notified of the change of care: subsections 54F(3) and 54H(3) of the Act;
(2) if the objection is ultimately successful, whether the objection was lodged within 28 days from service of the original decision: section 87AA of the R&C Act; and
(3) if my decision has the effect of changing the objection decision, whether the application to the Tribunal was made within 28 days from service of the objection decision on the applicant: section 95N of the R&C Act.
unless special circumstances prevented the lodgment of the objection or the application for review in time: sections 87AA and 95N of the R&C Act.
I am to review all the evidence before me (from whatever source), determine the relevant facts (including by resolving any disputed assertions of the parties that need to be determined), and independently decide afresh whether I can be satisfied that a material change of care has occurred and, if so, what that change was.
If I revoke the existing percentages of care and re-determine them by assessing the pattern of care in the relevant care period, I need to consider the evidence as to the actual care that the child was receiving in the care period to date and, to the extent it may be relevant, the pattern of care likely to occur in the balance of the care period.

ISSUES

The issues which arise, or potentially arise, in this case are as follows:
(1) Was there a change in the pattern of care for the child, and, if so, when did it occur?
(2) If there was a change in the pattern of care, should the existing percentages of care be revoked?
(3) If so, what new determination of percentages of care should be attributed to the parties in respect of the child?
(4) If there is a change in the percentages of care attributed to the parties, from what date should the administrative assessment be amended to reflect the changes?
(5) When will my decision have effect?

CONSIDERATION

Ms Reibey’s evidence

Ms Reibey’s oral evidence was to the effect that there was a change to the pattern of care in February 2023. She maintains that she recorded the actual nights that [Child A] spent in Mr Reibey’s care contemporaneously in her calendar. She had been told that was important. She maintained that the nights in each relevant month that she advised Child Support of in the objections process are correct. She said the non-compliance with the orders was due to [Child A’s] refusal to spend time with Mr Reibey.

Mr Reibey’s evidence

Mr Reibey’s oral evidence was that there was an interim parenting arrangement for him to spend time with [Child A] each weekend ‘during COVID’.
Then, on a date he seems to think was 4 February 2023, interim parenting orders were put in place for him to have [Child A] in his care in the same manner as the final court order.
He says that he has reconstructed a tally of the individual nights that [Child A] did not come into his care when it was to occur under the orders, from text messages he sent contemporaneously, but he did not lodge that evidence in the proceedings. Nor did he lodge the interim orders. He would always attend in accordance with the court orders to collect [Child A] and when that occurred at [Child A’s] school it usually proceeded uneventfully. However, [Child A] has had school refusal disorder and when he has tried to collect [Child A] from Ms Reibey’s home it has been more problematic.
Specifically, he says that the nights he was unable to provide court ordered care for [Child A] in the period February 2023 to January 2024 were:
February 2023 – nil
March – nil
April – nil
May – 5, 6, 7, 18, 19, 30
June – nil
July – 20, 21, 22, 23
August – 18, 19, 20
September – 28, 29, 30
October – 19, 21, 21, 22
November – 2, 3, 4, 5
December – 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18

Mr Reibey says that on every one of those dates there were messages to correlate with the dates he recorded. He would try to collect [Child A] every time he was to do so under the court orders, even if [Child A] was unwell as he is willing to care for [Child A] in those circumstances. On some of those dates [Child A] would spend the day with him but return to Ms Reibey’s house to sleep.

Assessing the evidence as to a change of care

The Tribunal acts in an inquisitorial fashion and is not bound by the rules of evidence: section 52 of the ART Act. There is no legal onus of proof on a party where no such onus is imported by the referring legislation. However, the Tribunal’s inquisitorial role does not mean that a party can simply present what are said to be facts and leave it to the Tribunal to search out the truth of any and all allegations, in effect shifting the burden of providing the evidence in support of their position to the Tribunal. Rather, the Tribunal’s role is to respond to the case that the party advances: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389; at [78].
The position, outlined by the Full Bench of the Federal Court in McDonald v
Director-General of Social Security [1984] FCA 57; (1984) 1 FCR 354 at 357, is that even where there is no onus of proof in administrative decision making of this nature a party asserting a claim and addressing a relevant statutory provision needs to ensure that sufficient probative evidence is before the decision maker to support the claim.
Whilst this may be Ms Reibey’s application for review, it has come about through Mr Reibey’s notification of a change in care to Child Support. If, as is the case here, a party such as Mr Reibey needs to rely on a legislative provision to effect a change to an established position, then the absence of sufficient probative evidence to demonstrate a change of care has occurred will lead to the original notification of change of care not being accepted. That is simply a ‘common sense approach’: McDonald.
In considering the evidence before it, the Tribunal needs to reach its conclusions based on ‘rationally probative evidence’ rather than mere ‘suspicion or speculation’: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi [1980] FCA 85; (1980) 31 ALR 666 at 685.
The evidence produced by the parties ‘is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted’: Coshott v Prentice [2014] FCAFC 88; (2014) 221 FCR 450 at [80], quoting Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65; 98 ER 969 at 970.
As a preliminary observation, Ms Reibey’s evidence was often generalised and was occasionally difficult to follow. She did not impress as someone who is careful to consider her evidence and provide thorough responses. She regularly responded to specific questions with responses such as ‘there were many different things’ that prevented Mr Reibey spending time with [Child A] in accordance with the orders. In fairness, she was not asked to nominate the specific dates [Child A] did go into Mr Reibey’s care in her oral evidence because at that time it was not known that Mr Reibey asserted that he held a specific record against which that evidence could be tested. She said she had nominated specific dates in the objections process but that is not recorded.
Mr Reibey, on the other hand, was careful and methodical in his evidence, giving the general impression that he was doing his best to give accurate evidence.
However, there are well understood dangers in attempting to assess a party or witness’s credibility based on their demeanour. Those dangers are only enhanced where, as here, the parties appeared by audio link. In those circumstances and given the disparity between the evidence of the parties, their evidence is generally more persuasive where there is consistency between the parties; they have made concessions against their interests; it is otherwise consistent with contemporaneous, independent or non-party evidence; it appears to be inherently probable, or where they have taken appropriate steps to try to substantiate it.
Weighing the evidence using those principles, Ms Reibey, as an unrepresented litigant, at least attempted to lodge contemporaneous documents in the form of her care calendar, such that it could be tested. That she did so too late does not entirely rob that act of significance.
Mr Reibey, on the other hand, as the party originally notifying a change of care, lodged nothing to substantiate his method of recreating the dates he was supposed to spend with [Child A], but did not. I also note that whilst Mr Reibey may not have known the actual dates Ms Reibey said he had [Child A] in his care in any given month, he at least knew well in advance of the hearing the number of nights Ms Reibey alleged that occurred. He took no steps to substantiate, with probative supporting evidence, that his care in a specific month exceeded that alleged by Ms Reibey. As but one example, supportive evidence that he had [Child A] in his care on more than one night in November 2023 would have been sufficient to cast doubt on Ms Reibey’s evidence. That Mr Reibey failed to take those steps, despite being represented by both a solicitor and counsel, where such evidence was clearly probative, diminishes the weight I give to his evidence.
Further, Ms Reibey says she contemporaneously kept her diary, whereas Mr Reibey recreated his record from previous messages which, in my view and in the absence of being able to examine the source documents, is a process inherently more likely to lead to error or oversight.
For those reasons, I accept Ms Reibey’s evidence as to the number of nights [Child A] spent in Mr Reibey’s care.

Was there a change in the pattern of care for the child, and if so when did it occur?

This is a matter where the pattern of care should be considered on a nights-in-care basis. That is how the parties approached it, and there is insufficient evidence to assess it in another way.
The parties accept that there was a change to the pattern of care on 2 February 2023. I am satisfied that was the case.

Should the existing percentages of care be revoked?

Subdivision C of Division 4 of Part 5 of the Act outlines circumstances where an existing care determination must or may be revoked.
Mandatory revocation of care percentages only applies under section 54F of the Act where the new care percentage determination would change the party’s cost percentage. Mandatory revocation of care percentages only applies under section 54G of the Act where one of the parties who was to have at least regular care of the child under the existing determination now has no care or less than regular care despite the child being made available by the other parent. In this case, for reasons I will come to, section 54F and section 54G of the Act do not apply.
Section 54H of the Act allows for discretionary revocation of care percentages where the new care percentage determination affects the care percentage but not the cost percentage, and certain other conditions, uncontroversial in this review, are met. This section is engaged.
In relation to discretionary revocation, section 2.2.2 of the Guide is relevant. It states as follows:
Whether the Registrar revokes an existing care percentage determination under section 54H will depend on the circumstances of the case. If there is clear evidence of a change in care and the Registrar is able to determine new care percentages for the parties to an assessment, the Registrar should revoke the existing care percentage determination, even though the cost percentage is not affected. This helps to ensure there is an accurate record of the care history on a case. However, if the evidence indicates that a change in care has occurred that would not affect the cost percentage, but the evidence is not conclusive as to the precise care percentages, the Registrar may decide not to revoke the existing determination. This discretion enables the Registrar to decide not to proceed with unnecessary investigations to determine precise care percentages that would not make a material difference to the assessment.
As I have, on balance, accepted Ms Reibey’s evidence as to the number of nights [Child A] spent in Mr Reibey’s care, if called upon to do so I would assess the percentages of care in the appropriate care period as 76% to Ms Reibey, and 24% to Mr Reibey. However, I note that even if I had accepted Mr Reibey’s evidence it would lead to a reassessed percentage of his care as 29%. Consequently, redetermining the percentages of care recorded for the child in the assessment would have no impact on the rate of child support payable in either case, as the cost percentage would remain at 24% in any event. That was the cost percentage used in the assessment before the notified change of care.
Given the difficulties I have identified with the paucity of contemporaneous evidence available to me, and the remaining doubt I have about what occurred, I do not consider this an appropriate case to exercise the discretion to revoke the existing percentages of care.

When will my decision have effect?

There is no time limit within which a person must lodge an objection against a care percentage decision. If a person lodges their objection more than 28 days after the date the notice of the decision is served upon them, and the objection has the effect of varying the determination to which the care percentage decision relates, or substituting a new determination, the date of effect of the review decision is the day on which that person lodged the objection: subsection 87AA(1) of the R&C Act.
However, subsection 87AA(2) of the R&C Act states that if there are special circumstances that prevented the objection being lodged within 28 days, the reference to 28 days may be such longer period as determined appropriate, effectively allowing an extension of time.
Section 95N of the R&C Act then needs to be considered. It provides that if I vary or substitute a care percentage decision on review, and the application for review in the Tribunal was made more than 28 days after the objection decision was served on the applicant, then my decision is taken to have had effect on and from the day the application for ART review was made.
Again, though, subsection 95N(2) of the R&C Act provides that I can decide to allow such longer period as I determine to be appropriate for lodgment of the application, if there are special circumstances that prevented the application being made in time. In that event, there is no delayed operation of my decision.
Ms Reibey accepts that she received both the original decision and the objection decision more than 28 days prior to lodging the objection and application for review, respectively. As to special circumstances that prevented lodgment of either subsequent process in time, she says that ‘it was all so new’ and ‘maybe it was her ignorance’. She was overwhelmed because she had to move home within [a number of] months from February 2023, whilst caring for [a number of] children. She relied on the same issues in respect of late lodgement of the objection.
Dr Alexander, on the other hand, submitted that Ms Reibey was obliged, by a court order not in evidence before me, to move from the house within [a number of] months of November 2023.
I do not need to resolve that factual dispute. In either event, I am not satisfied that Ms Reibey has demonstrated that special circumstances prevented her lodging the application for review in the Tribunal in time.

Conclusion

As a result, I will set aside the decision under review to revoke and redetermine the care percentages used in the assessment arising from the notification to Child Support on 26 June 2023, but this decision will only have effect on 12 December 2024.

DECISION

The decision under review is set aside and, in substitution, the parties’ respective existing percentages of care for [Child A] will not be revoked as a result of the notification of a change in care by Mr Reibey on 26 June 2023.

This decision has effect on 12 December 2024.

Date(s) of hearing:	Monday, 14 April 2025
Representative for the Applicant:	Self-represented
Representative for the Other party:	Dr Alexander of counsel, instructed by Ms Helen Suke