Hee and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Citizenship)
[2025] ARTA 2022
•10 October 2025
Hee and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Citizenship) [2025] ARTA 2022 (10 October 2025)
Applicant/s: Yen Zhen Hee
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
Tribunal Number: 2024/10235
Tribunal:General Member A. Maryniak KC
Place:Melbourne
Date:10 October 2025
Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the matter for reconsideration in accordance with the direction that the Applicant is of good character for the purposes of section 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth).
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General Member A. Maryniak KCCatchwords
CITIZENSHIP – application for Australian citizenship by conferral – Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) – whether the Applicant is of good character pursuant to section 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) – Tribunal satisfied in its evaluative judgement that the Applicant is of good character pursuant to section 21(2)(h) – reviewable decision set aside and remitted for consideration in accordance with the direction that the Applicant is of good character pursuant to section 21(2)(h)
Legislation
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth)
Cases
BOY19 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCA 574
Dawlatshahi and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] AATA 2437
Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 128
Secondary Materials
Citizenship Policy Instruction 15 – Assessing Good Character under the Citizenship Act (CPI 15)
Statement of Reasons
The Applicant seeks review of a decision made on 19 November 2024 refusing the approval of his Australian citizenship by conferral pursuant to section 24(1) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
BACKGROUND
The Applicant is a citizen of Malaysia aged 37, currently living in Robertson, Queensland, having first arrived in Australia in July 2011, aged 23 as the holder of a Subclass 189 visa as a dependent applicant.[1]
[1] Joint Hearing Book at HB396.
On 11 December 2023, the Applicant sought Australian citizenship by conferral pursuant to the general eligibility provisions of the Act and disclosed that he was the subject of a domestic or family violence order issued on 16 May 2023 and in force until 16 May 2028. On 19 November 2024, the delegate refused the Applicant’s citizenship application on the basis that he did not satisfy the good character requirement of section 21(2)(h) of the Act.
On 6 December 2024, the Applicant sought review of his refusal decision to the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
CONSIDERATION
At issue is whether the Applicant is of ‘good character’ pursuant to section 21(2)(h) of the Act.
The applicable legal principles were considered by the predecessor to this Tribunal, as presently constituted, in Dawlatshahi and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] AATA 2437 at [4] to [13]. Such analysis is relevant to this application for review and for convenience it is set out below:
4. Pursuant to s. 24(1A) of the Act, the Minister (and hence now the Tribunal) must not approve an application for Australian citizenship unless the Applicant satisfies the relevant eligibility requirement under s. 21 of the Act; apropos this review, s. 21(2)(h). The Tribunal must be satisfied that the Applicant is of ‘good character’ at the time of this decision by forming an “opinion requiring an evaluative judgement” and by reaching “an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character” BOY19 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCA 574 at [54]-[55].
5. In determining ‘good character’ the Tribunal is to look holistically at an applicant’s behaviour over time to be satisfied of ‘enduring moral qualities’ within the prospective Australian citizen. Such phrase, as guided by the Citizenship Policy Instruction 15 – Assessing Good Character under the Citizenship Act (CPI), encompasses the following:
(a) Characteristics which have been demonstrated over a long period of time;
(b) Distinguishing right from wrong; and
(c) Behaving in an ethical manner, conforming to the rules and values of Australian society.
6. CPI 15 further sets out examples of characteristics of a person of good character and they do not include those who practice deception or fraud in their dealings with the Australian Government or other organisations. For example, intentionally providing false personal information (such as fraudulent work experience or qualification documents); or other material deception during visa and citizenship applications.
7. Section 50 of the Act provides that it is an offence to deliberately make, or cause to make, a false or misleading statement, or conceal circumstances in relation to an application for Australian citizenship.
8. The Tribunal is to consider a range of events and conduct connected with the Applicant: Grass v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 128 at [60].
9. Justice O’Bryan in BOY19 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCA 574, engaged in a substantial analysis of the meaning of ‘good character’ in this context. Since not defined, the Parliament intended the term to be used in a broad way:
(a) One looks to the enduring moral qualities of a person and not to the good standing, fame or repute of that person in the community, although the latter may provide evidence of the former;
(b) It does not have a fixed and precise content;
(c) It imports a discretionary value judgement to be made by reference to undefined factual matters confined only by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statutory provisions; and
(d) It requires judgement as to whether any proven deficiencies in the moral qualities of a person are sufficient to deny the person citizenship.
10. Justice O’Bryan accepted that “[t]he subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act is informed by its Preamble which states:
The Parliament recognises that Australian citizenship represents full and formal membership of the community of the Commonwealth of Australia, and Australian citizenship is a common bond, involving reciprocal rights and obligations, uniting all Australians, while respecting their diversity.
The Parliament recognises that persons conferred Australian citizenship enjoy these rights and undertake to accept these obligations:
(a) By pledging loyalty to Australia and its people;
(b) By sharing their democratic beliefs;
(c) By respecting their rights and liberties; and
(d) By upholding and obeying the laws of Australia.
These ideals of diversity, democracy and liberty are to be assessed “by moral qualities that are regarded as a necessary concomitant of Australian citizenship”.
11. As to the ‘satisfied’ requirement in s. 21(2)(h) of the Act, the word:
“is not amenable to the application of an evidentiary burden of proof, such as the balance of probabilities... the decision is an administrative decision to which the rules of evidence are inapplicable, and the evidentiary burden of proof inapposite... the applicant’s good character, is not a fact to be proved but an opinion requiring an evaluative judgement. A standard of proof, such as balance of probabilities, is incapable of application to such an opinion”.
“The absence of an evidentiary burden of proof does not mean there is an absence of a legal standard of satisfaction. In the context... satisfaction requires that the decision-maker reach an affirmative belief that the applicant is a person of good character. It is not sufficient for the decision-maker to believe that there is a chance that the applicant is a person of good character; equally, it is not necessary for the decision-maker to have a high degree of confidence that the applicant is a person of good character”.
12. The decision making power is therefore to be exercised reasonably.
13. Part of the task is to assess the relative weight to be given to conduct that reflects positively or negatively on the Applicant’s character.
Section 52(1)(b) of the Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to review decisions made under section 24 of the Act.
The Tribunal has considered the documentary material before it and the testimony of the Applicant, who was cross examined and questioned by the Tribunal, together with the written and oral submissions of the parties.
The Respondent contends that the Applicant is not of good character because of his alleged conduct associated with a Domestic Violence Order,[2] consented to by the Applicant on a without admissions basis on 16 May 2023, which remains in place until 16 May 2028 (‘the DVO’). The alleged conduct occurred on 29 April 2023, details of which are written up in the Grounds for the protection order FT8/78 (‘the April 2023 Incident’).
[2] Ibid at HB174.
The background to the April 2023 Incident provides relevant context. About a year after the Applicant arrived in Australia, he met his now ex-wife (divorced in about June 2025), Ms Z, in July 2012 on campus and in December 2012 they moved in together. They got along well and some years later they were married at the Brisbane Registry Office in June 2018 and apparently, according to his testimony, held the wedding ceremony or party in Malaysia also at about this time. When they returned to Australia after the wedding celebration, Ms Z’s mother came back with them to Australia and moved in with them. The Applicant’s mother-in-law (‘the mother-in-law’) never left and was still living with the Applicant and Ms Z years later as at the time of the April 2023 Incident.
The presence of the mother-in-law had a negative impact, to say the least, upon the Applicant and his marriage essentially from the time they all arrived in Australia in June 2018. The Applicant’s unchallenged evidence regarding the mother-in-law is informative. Inter alia, he declares the following:[3]
14. My wife and I were always in a loving, understanding and supportive relationship until her mother moved into our household on or around June 2018.
15. Upon my mother-in-law moving in this had a detrimental impact upon my wife and I’s relationship.
16. My mother-in-law would always provoke me to with my wife of small and insignificant matters. She would say she will help with the house chores, but I ended up doing all of them. She would also contradict her own words, like agreeing that we should keep the house clean, yet she would wear her outdoor shoes inside, even after I had just cleaned and mopped the floor. Then she would tell [my wife] that the house is still dirty and not properly cleaned, while accusing me of being lazy. Additionally, my mother-in-law would constantly praise how hardworking and diligent her husband was, while comparing me to him, calling me lazy and useless.
17. My mother-in-law for some reason decided that I had to do all the house chores and prepare all of the family’s meals. She would purposely leave messes in the house and taught my wife to demand me to clean all of it up.
18. My mother-in-law had no understanding of privacy and would enter our bedroom whenever she liked. My wife wouldn’t allow me to close or lock our bedroom door as she always said words to the effect that ‘she’s my mother and let her do whatever she likes’. This lack of privacy impacted my happiness in the relationship.
19. My mother-in-law and wife would verbally attack me with negative words and verbal abuse and would say that I am useless, hopeless, cripple, a beggar, that my parents hadn’t taught me well, that I wasn’t a man, that I wasn’t human and that I wasn’t able to support my family with my low income. Whenever there was a disagreement, my wife and her mother would attack me with verbal abuse.
20. My mother-in-law would constantly emphasise that she is always an elder/senior and as such I had to obey her. She would complain and incite my wife to get angry and frustrated at me whenever I would ignore her.
21. After my mother-in-law moved into our house, I was no longer allowed to socialise with my friends and was told to only prioritise our family and my wife’s mother. My wife would say words to the effect that ‘it is my duty to care and tend her mother as a son-in-law’. As for my parents, I haven’t been able to visit or care for them since 2018. The only time I saw them was at my sister’s wedding in December 2019. I feel incredibly ashamed about this, especially considering how supportive they’ve been of our family and relationship. My parents even lent me money for the down payment on our house at [address omitted].
[3] Ibid at HB390.
The Respondent emphasises that the DVO was applied for by the police and not Ms Z, being the alleged victim of the incident.[4] Whilst this is correct, the subject matter of the grounds for the DVO was informed by Ms Z (with no statement or other material from her or the mother in law being before the Tribunal) and remains untested in a Court, thus is far from proven to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. There is some tension in the evidence between the Grounds for a protection order as written up by the police (which itself contains competing versions of such events as between Ms Z and the Applicant) and the Applicant’s imperfect recollection of the events on the day leading up to the April 2023 Incident, as outlined in his statutory declaration and his testimony.
[4] Ibid at HB176.
However, by the Applicant’s testimony, as highlighted by the Respondent, the Applicant admits that on 29 April 2023 he called his ex-wife a ‘bitch’ and did push her (inadvertently) out of the way in order the drive himself to Prince Charles Hospital. The Applicant declares:[5]
[5] Ibid at HB391.
22. On 29 April 2023, I was very unwell with a viral infection, which I believe to have been COVID-19 and was experiencing chest and back pain. I believe it was COVID-19 as my wife, mother-in-law and daughter, had all recently had COVID and had only just recovered when I fell ill.
23. I told my wife that I was feeling extremely unwell and that I needed to rest. I took some medicine and went to bed.
24. Despite me feeling very unwell, my wife and mother came into my room and demanded that I make the family dinner. I tried to communicate that I was not fit to do this and asked them to leave the room so I could rest.
25. They kept yelling, demanding that I make them dinner and would not leave the room. In order to get out, I had to push past her, which resulted in her being moved out of the doorway. At no time did I have any intent to harm or intimidate her as I was preoccupied with anxiety for my health.
27. In hindsight I felt a deep sense of regret and heartache that I pushed past my wife as I realise I was not showing adequate care. It was a moment of high emotion and anxiety for me and I should have been more patient.
28. I then proceeded to drive to the Prince Charles Hospital where I was told I was experiencing a viral infection. I have provided a letter from the Hospital which shows that I was diagnosed with a viral infection. For the reasons outlined in paragraph 22, I believe this viral infection was COVID-19.
29. I understand my wife and her mother called the police and made a complaint that I had pushed her.
30. The police then came to the hospital and issued me the police protection notice.
31. I understand that in the police protection notice it says that I pushed my wife twice. This is not an accurate characterisation and does not accurately reflect what occurred. As stated in paragraph 26, in a moment of medical emergency and heightened anxiety, I pushed past wife (once) who was blocking the doorway, which resulted in her being moved outside the doorway.
Hence the Tribunal is left with admitted facts that the Applicant did call his wife a bitch and did push her once in order to get past her and out of the house, away from her and the mother-in-law, and drive to the hospital. The Applicant is remorseful and regrets these actions which are completely out of character and appear to be a one off ‘wrinkle’ in his otherwise unblemished character.[6] The Tribunal notes the Applicant’s general diagnosis of depression and anxiety by Colin Kong, from at least 4 July 2023 but most importantly Mr Kong’s view that the Applicant “has admitted wrongdoing, has expressed remorse, and has expressed a genuine commitment to not repeat this”.[7]
[6] Ibid at HB357.
[7] Ibid at HB372.
The Applicant was cross examined and questioned by the Tribunal in respect of so called ‘previous incidents’ which, in light of his testimony denying them, are simply untested allegations appearing in the Grounds for a protection order. On balance, the Tribunal is not satisfied that such previous incidents as written up, occurred, particularly in the absence of any corroborating evidence.
The April 2023 incident is serious and involves a form of domestic violence. It should not have occurred, and the Australian community takes a very dim view of this type of conduct. The background and events leading up to it do not excuse it or justify it. However, the task of the Tribunal hear is to exercise its decision-making power reasonably, looking holistically at the Applicant’s behaviour, including making a judgement as to whether any proven deficiencies in the moral qualities of the Applicant (as established and discussed above regarding the April 2023 Incident) are sufficient to deny the Applicant citizenship.
Dr James Freeman, Forensic-Clinical Psychologist, provided a report dated 28 February 2025, having conducted an in-person 90-minute assessment of the Applicant on 26 February 2025. Despite some minor inconsistencies between the information provided by the Applicant as recorded by Dr Freeman and the Applicant’s evidence before the Tribunal, as highlighted by the Respondent, the Tribunal agrees with Dr Freeman’s opinion that the Applicant was a truthful individual, meek, and not a violent person.[8] Importantly, Dr Freeman assessed the Applicant with the lowest score possible of 1 out of 40 for risk of committing any act(s) of violence in the future.[9] All the evidence considered by the Tribunal is consistent with Dr Freeman’s expert opinion in this regard.
[8] Ibid at HB360.
[9] Ibid at HB361.
Further, Dr Freeman was of the view that even in the unlikely event that the Applicant was to get himself into a similar unsuccessful relationship in the future, he is at very low risk of re-offending, as such is totally out of character. Dr Freeman notes that the Applicant has completed two parenting programs (which each took some time to complete) that incorporate the development of dispute resolution skills) and he maintained his opinion that there “is no evidence that he needs to make a further rehabilitative recovery in regard to avoiding future risk”. Dr Freeman concluded:[10]
In summary, it is the writer’s Structure Professional Judgment (STP) that Mr. Hee presents as a high functioning individual who continues to be remorseful for engaging in the uncharacteristic behaviour. There do not appear to be any clear criminogenic treatment needs or outstanding risks (to the community), but rather, his goals are prosocial and achievable.
[10] Ibid at HB364.
The Tribunal accepts and agrees with Dr Freeman’s conclusions regarding the Applicant and whilst noting the Respondent’s submission that nonetheless the Applicant remains subject to a DVO in Australia until 2028, in the circumstances of this Application, aspects of which have been considered above, the Tribunal is satisfied in its evaluative judgement that the Applicant is of good character pursuant to section 21(2)(h) of the Act. The Applicant is a hardworking and highly valued employee, as confirmed by various character references before the Tribunal, a fact which is consistent with the findings the Tribunal has made in respect of the Applicant’s good character.
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the matter for reconsideration in accordance with the direction that the Applicant is of good character for the purposes of section 21(2)(h) of the Act.
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General Member A. Maryniak KC
10 October 2025
Date of hearing: 22 September 2025 Applicant: Yen Zhen Hee Applicant’s solicitor: Isaac Ford of Vocare Law Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship Respondent’s solicitor: Stefan Tucakovic of Sparke Helmore
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