Cabal v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cabal v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth [2001] FCA 583

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- judicial review – Attorney-General’s power under s 27 of Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) – whether intention of Parliament was that power to deliver property seized under warrant to extradition country was contingent upon Attorney-General’s own view of whether property may be material as evidence or has been acquired as a result of extradition offence – whether wholly or partly question of objective fact – whether constitutes “jurisdictional facts” for purposes of administrative law.

EXTRADITION – judicial review – Attorney-General’s power under s 27 of Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) to direct, by notice in writing, that property seized under s 14 be sent to extradition country – whether ss 27(b)(i) and 27(b)(ii) contingent upon “jurisdictional facts” – whether Article 23 of Treaty between Australia and United Mexican States operates to limit or qualify s 27.

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 11(1), 11(6), 14(1)(a), (c), 19(5), 27(a), 27(b)(i), 27(b)(ii),
Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the United Mexican States Art 23

Cabal v United Mexican States (No 3) [2000] FCA 1204 referred to
Cabal v United Mexican States [2001] FCA 427 referred to
Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 at 225ff referred to
George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 110 referred to
Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 297 referred to
Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Limited (1995) 60 FCR 456 at 465-466 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Naumovska (1989) 88 ALR 589 at 601-602 referred to
Buck v Comcare (1996) 137 ALR 335 referred to
Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL (1998-1999) 46 NSWLR 55 at 64 referred to
Karalis v Australian Community Pharmacy (1998) 90 FCR 473 referred to
Pharmacy Guild of Australia v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (1996) 70 FCR 462 at 476 referred to
Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 158 referred to
Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 435-436 referred to
Flanagan v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (1995) 60 FCR 149 at 188 referred to
Aronson & Dyer, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 2nd ed 2000 at 194, 199

MI Aronson, The Resurgence of Jurisdictional Facts (2001) 12 Public Law Review 17

TERESA PASINI CABAL, ANA MARIA CABAL PASINI, TERESA CABAL PASINI, SOFIA CABAL PASINI and CARLOS CABAL PASINI v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
V150 of 2000

WEINBERG J
21 MAY 2001
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V150 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

TERESA PASINI CABAL
FIRST APPLICANT

ANA MARIA CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
SECOND APPLICANT

TERESA CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
THIRD APPLICANT

SOFIA CABAL PASINI
(Through her litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
FOURTH APPLICANT

CARLOS CABAL PASINI
(Through his litigation guardian Teresa Pasini Cabal)
FIFTH APPLICANT

AND:

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 583
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Cabal v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, the applicants challenged the Attorney-General's authority to order the return of property seized under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) to the requesting country, arguing that such authority should only be exercised if the property was acquired through an offence specified in the Act. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue was whether certain factual determinations in the Act are jurisdictional facts, which would require judicial oversight before the Attorney-General can exercise his power to return seized property.

The court engaged in a thorough analysis of the statutory language and the broader structure of the Act to determine whether the factual references in ss 27(b)(i) and 27(b)(ii) are jurisdictional facts. It concluded that these sections do indeed contain statutory requirements that should be regarded as jurisdictional facts, primarily due to the omission of words indicating the mental state of the decision-maker, and the overall structure and purpose of the Act. The court also considered the nature of the task assigned to the Attorney-General, the potential inconvenience of treating these facts as non-jurisdictional, and the importance of the values at stake. The court's reasoning reflected a broader approach to jurisdictional facts, aligning with recent High Court and appellate decisions.

The court ruled that the questions raised were justiciable by the Federal Court, that the Attorney-General's power to direct the return of seized property only arises if a court determines the property was acquired through a specified offence, and that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to order the return of property if it concludes the property was not acquired through such an offence. The court did not answer whether the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and Mexico limits the Attorney-General's power. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicants' costs, and the proceeding was listed for a directions hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The questions to be decided separately from any other question and before any trial in the proceedings be answered as follows:

Question (a) Is the question, whether property or a thing seized under section 14 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Act”) is property or a thing acquired as a result of an offence within section 27(b)(ii) of the Act, justiciable by the Federal Court?”

Answer: Yes.

Question (b) Does the power of the Attorney-General to direct, pursuant to sub-paragraph 27(b)(ii) of the Act, that property or a thing seized under section 14 of the Act be sent to the extradition country (“the power”) only arise where:

(i) a court of competent jurisdiction determines, in appropriate proceedings, that the relevant property or thing has been acquired as a result of an offence referred to in paragraph 14(1)(a) of the Act; or

(ii) the Attorney-General, acting in good faith and otherwise according to law, concludes that the relevant property or thing has been acquired as a result of such an offence?”

Answer: The power only arises where a court of competent jurisdiction determines, in appropriate proceedings, that the relevant property or thing has been acquired as a result of an offence referred to in par 14(1)(a) of the Act.

Question (c) Is it open to the Federal Court to determine, in a proceeding under subsection 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903, that particular property or a thing seized under section 14 of the Act was not acquired as a result of an offence referred to in paragraph 14(1)(a) of the Act?

Answer: Yes.

Question (d) Do the provisions of article 23 of the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the United Mexican States (“the Treaty”) limit or qualify the power of the Attorney‑General pursuant to sub-paragraph 27(b)(ii) of the Act, so that the power will only arise where:

(i) a court of competent jurisdiction determines, in appropriate proceedings, that a third party does not have rights over the relevant property or thing; or

(ii) the Attorney-General, acting in good faith and otherwise according to law, determines that no third party has rights over the relevant property or thing?

Answer: Not answered.

Question (e) Does the Federal Court have jurisdiction to direct the Attorney-General to issue a direction in writing to a police officer, who has retained property or a thing pursuant to subsection 14(5) of the Act, that the police officer deliver the property or thing to a person where the Federal Court concludes that the property or thing has not been acquired as a result of an offence referred to in paragraph 14(1)(a) of the Act?

Answer: Yes.

2. The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of and incidental to the determination of these questions.

3. The proceeding be listed for a directions hearing on a date to be fixed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
It may fairly be said that the authorities which deal with “jurisdictional facts” are difficult to reconcile, and that some reflect a broader and more generous view of that “doctrine” than others. Professor Aronson perceives a “resurgence” in the “doctrine” and expresses reservations about the trend of recent authority. The decisions of the High Court in Corporation of the City of Enfield and of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Timbarra certainly qualify as manifesting that resurgence, albeit under the ambit of ordinary principles of statutory construction.CONCLUSION The issues raised for determination by the preliminary questions are not easy to resolve. I consider that I am bound to follow the approach taken by the High Court in Corporation of the City of Enfield (supra) to the “doctrine” of “jurisdictional fact”. That approach seems to me to be somewhat broader than that which has found favour in earlier decisions, including Australian Heritage Commission (supra). I also consider that there is nothing special about the task of statutory construction with regard to the determination of whether a factual reference in a statutory formulation is a “jurisdictional fact” and that all the normal rules of statutory construction apply: Timbarra (supra). The starting point must be the language in which the statutory formulation is expressed. It is obviously significant that the factual references which appear in ss 27(b)(i) and 27(b)(ii) of the Act do not contain words involving the mental state of the primary decision-maker – “opinion”, “belief”, or “satisfaction”. Those words, or words like them, are present in ss 16 and 22 of the Act. That makes their omission from s 27 a matter of particular significance, and I accept the applicants’ submissions in that regard. At the same time I recognise that the language in which the relevant provision is expressed is not necessarily determinative of whether “jurisdictional facts” are stipulated. Among the matters which are relevant to that issue are:·the nature of the task committed to the respondent under the Act and, in particular, whether that task involves the assessment of complex facts and the formation of opinions on a potentially wide range of matters. Were that to be the case it would be suggestive of an intention that the respondent have the power to make a conclusive determination of the matter.·the inconvenience which would arise if the facts to be determined were regarded as “jurisdictional facts” rather than simply facts to be found by the decision-maker.·whether “transcendent” or “important” values are at stake. Having taken all of these matters into account I have concluded that ss 27(b)(i) and 27(b)(ii) of the Act contain statutory requirements which should be regarded as “jurisdictional facts”. I have arrived at that conclusion principally because of the structure of the Act taken as a whole, and the text of the relevant provisions. I have also had regard to the importance of the interests which are protected at common law and which are affected by the operation of those provisions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J

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