Kaur v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 2877
•23 November 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KAUR & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 2877 |
| Catchwords: WORDS AND PHRASES – “employment referred to in the relevant employer nomination”. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Pt.5, Div.5, ss.137Q, 137T, 476 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.2.50AA |
| Cases cited: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630 |
| First Applicant: | SIMARPREET KAUR |
| Second Applicant: | HARMEEK SINGH |
| Third Applicant: | BISMANPREET KAUR |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | PEG 246 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Antoni Lucev |
| Hearing date: | 16 November 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 November 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 23 November 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| For the Applicants: | The first applicant appeared in person (with the assistance of an interpreter) |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms E Tattersall |
| For the Second Respondent: | Submitting appearance, save as to costs |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
That the application be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 246 of 2016
| SIMARPREET KAUR |
First Applicant
| HARMEEK SINGH |
Second Applicant
| BISMANPREET KAUR |
Third Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant seeks judicial review (“Judicial Review Application”) under s.476 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal Decision” and “Tribunal” respectively) made on 12 May 2016. The Tribunal Decision affirmed a decision of a delegate (“Delegate’s Decision” and “Delegate” respectively) of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (“Minister”) affirming the Delegate’s Decision to not grant the applicant an Employer Nomination (Residence) (Class BW) Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (subclass 857) visa (“857 Visa”).
The Tribunal Decision is at Court Book (“CB”) 338-347.
Factual and procedural background
The factual and procedural background to this matter is as follows:
a)the applicant was granted the 857 Visa on 27 February 2014, and the applicant's husband (the second applicant) and daughter (the third applicant) were granted the 857 Visas as members of the applicant's family unit: CB 1-12;
b)on 4 August 2014 the applicant was notified by the Department of Immigration & Border Protection (“Department”) of the possible cancellation of her 857 Visa on the basis that she had not commenced employment with SB & SN Group Pty Ltd (“Sponsoring Employer”) as a shop manager in an Indian grocery store, Salaam Namaste: CB 14-15;
c)on 11 August 2014 the applicant replied to the Department's email and provided supporting documents: CB 16-55;
d)on 10 December 2014, the applicant was issued with a notice of intention to consider the cancellation (“NOICC”) of the 857 Visa: CB 67-70;
e)on 5 February 2015 the applicant's agent responded to the NOICC and stated that the applicant had entered into a loan agreement with a Mr Mereddy and the agent acknowledged “that my client made wrong choices by entering into what is deemed unethical behaviour and arrangements ...”: CB 83-87;
f)on 22 June 2015 and 11 August 2015 the applicant provided further material in response to the NOICC: CB 95-112 and 148-157;
g)on 31 August 2015 the NOICC was re-issued because the original notice contained an error: CB 158-161;
h)on 29 September 2015 the applicant provided a further response to the NOICC: CB 175-195;
i)on 15 October 2015 the Delegate cancelled the applicant's 857 Visa under s.137Q of the Migration Act: CB 201-208. The Delegate was satisfied that the grounds for cancellation existed and that the 857 Visa should be cancelled;
j)on 19 October 2015 the applicant lodged an application with the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s Decision: CB 209-211; and
k)on 23 March 2016 the applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal with the assistance of her representative and a Punjabi interpreter: CB 325. Mr Mereddy was a witness before the Tribunal: CB 325.
Tribunal Decision
In the Tribunal Decision the Tribunal:
a)found that the applicant had not commenced working for the Sponsoring Employer within six months of the grant of the 857 Visa. The applicant's evidence to the Tribunal was that she last worked for the Sponsoring Employer on 9 February 2014 prior to the grant of the 857 Visa on 27 February 2014: CB 340 at [10];
b)to the extent that it was necessary, assumed in the applicant's favour, that the applicant had worked for the Sponsoring Employer from November 2013 to February 2014: CB 340 at [11];
c)noted the applicant's evidence that from the date the 857 Visa was granted she was on leave and upon her return the position for which she had been sponsored was not available: CB 340 at [12];
d)noted that the applicant returned to India as her father-in-law was having a knee replacement: CB 341 at [32];
e)recorded that the Department had received information from a director of the Sponsoring Employer that the applicant had not worked for the Sponsoring Employer and that Mr Mereddy received a personal financial benefit to employ her and support the 857 Visa application: CB 340 at [13];
f)considered the role of Mr Mereddy in the allegations made about the applicant's employment: CB 340 at [15]-[21];
g)considered whether the applicant had made a genuine effort to start the employment, finding that:
i)Mr Mereddy attempted to resign as a Director of the business in December 2013 and ceased involvement in the day to day operations of the business, including decisions about the employment of staff at that time: CB 341 at [22];
ii)Mr Mereddy did not have authority to issue the letter in relation to the applicant's leave dated 17 March 2014 (“Leave Letter”): CB 341 at [23]. The Leave Letter indicated the applicant was going on holidays for “about three months” although the applicant only requested four weeks leave. The Tribunal found that the Leave Letter was unusual as it was not addressed to the applicant and did not provide a date on which she would return to work: CB 342 at [24]-[25];
iii)it did not accept that, at the time the Leave Letter was written, either Mr Mereddy or the applicant believed that she continued to be a full time employee of the business given the applicant's evidence that she had not worked since 9 February 2014: CB 342 at [27];
iv)the Leave Letter was not convincing evidence that the applicant had genuinely sought leave from existing employment and accordingly, did not find that the leave arrangements showed that the applicant made a genuine effort to commence employment within six months of the grant of the 857 Visa: CB 342 at [28]-[29];
v)in considering the applicant's claims regarding the financial difficulties of the Sponsoring Employer and the dispute between the Directors: CB 342-345 at [30]-[37], the applicant's explanation in relation to her involvement in the transfer of money was unconvincing: CB 343 at [38];
vi)taking into account the oral evidence of the applicant as well as Mr Mereddy: CB 343-344 at [39]-[42], it did not accept that, if there was a joint venture between Mr Mereddy and his existing business partners, the business partners would accept Mr Mereddy having loans for a new business transferred to his personal account: CB 344 at [43]; and
vii)the second applicant had transferred $23,000 to Mr Mereddy's personal bank account and at least part of that was transferred on the understanding it was required to meet the applicant's wages. The Tribunal did not accept that the funds had been transferred for the purpose of starting another shop: CB 345 at [48];
h)was not satisfied that the applicant had made a genuine effort to commence employment because it was also not satisfied the Leave Letter reflected her employment arrangements or that her subsequent attempt to contact the Sponsoring Employer reflected a genuine expectation that she could commence work or a genuine effort to start work: CB 345 at [49];
i)considered whether the discretion to cancel the 857 Visa should be exercised, and had regard to the relevant PAM 3 guidelines: CB 345 at [51], the matters advanced by the applicant, and specifically:
i)the purpose of the applicant's travel to Australia, namely to work for the Sponsoring Employer, as well as the family's ties to Australia and India: CB 345-346 at [53][55];
ii)the hardship that would be caused by cancelling the 857 Visa: CB 346 at [56]-[58], referring to the claims raised by the applicant in relation to the issue, and found that the applicants would have family support in India: CB 346 at [58];
iii)the circumstances leading to the cancellation of the 857 Visa: CB 346 at [59], accepting that there was an ongoing dispute between the directors of the Sponsoring Employer that affected the applicant, but that this did not outweigh the concern about the second applicant transferring money on the understanding that it was for the payment of the applicant's wages;
iv)the past and present conduct of the applicant: CB 346 at [60], noting that neither the applicant nor the second applicant disclosed the transfer of funds in the first instance, but that there was nothing before the Tribunal to show that the applicant had otherwise breached any conditions of her 857 Visa or failed to cooperate with the Department;
v)the consequential cancellation under s.137T of the Migration Act of the second and third applicants’ 857 Visas: CB 346-347 at [61][65], where it considered the claimed harm to the third applicant as well as the psychological state of the applicant and second applicant, and found that there was nothing before it to show that the third applicant would be at an increased risk of rape or kidnapping or that the applicants could not re-locate within India to avoid any such harm; and
vi)international obligations: CB 347 at [66], and found that there was nothing before it to show any international obligations would be breached if the 857 Visa were cancelled;
j)found that it had no jurisdiction with respect to the second and third applicants as their 857 Visas were automatically cancelled by force of s.137T(l) of the Migration Act: CB 339 at [5]; and
k)considering the circumstances as a whole, found that the 857 Visa should be cancelled and affirmed the Delegate’s Decision to cancel the 857 Visa: CB 347 at [67].
Grounds of Judicial Review Application
The 13 “grounds” as set out in the Judicial Review Application are as follows:
1. On 27 February 2014 I was granted a Subclass 857 (Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme) visa together with my husband Mr Harmeek Singh and daughter Miss Bismanpreet Kaur as secondary applicants.
2. The visa was for a period of 2 years to work for my sponsor SB & SN Group Pty Ltd (SB & SN Group) as a shop manager in an Indian grocery store, Salaam Namaste.
3. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection cancelled my visa under s.137Q of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) because the delegate found that I had not worked in the grocery store from the time the visa was granted.
4. I applied to review the decision to Appellate Appeals Tribunal (AAT) earlier known as Migration Review Tribunal.
5. On 23 March 2016 I with my husband appeared before the Tribunal with evidence.
6. In my statement to Tribunal I gave several evidence that SB & SN Group had several directors and one director had offered the position.
7. After getting the visa I applied for leave to the company director who approved the leave for me to travel back to my country due to medical reasons of my father in law.
8. I came back after 5 weeks to commence my job. The company refused to provide the job. This evidence was also provided to the Tribunal.
9. After several attempts I found a job in same occupation within 6 months after visa approval in Perth, WA (regional area for migration purposes).
10. I worked as a retail manager with Dream India in Perth, this evidence was also provided in my hearing.
11. The Tribunal overlooked all my evidence that I meet the criteria for the 857 visa.
12. The law states that if the visa holder works in the occupation of the visa and lives in the regional area as per the visa conditions then they meet the visa criteria of Subclass 857 (Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme) visa.
13. My appeal to this Honourable Court is to provide me with Natural Justice and set aside the decision of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and set aside the decision made by Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Migration Review Tribunal). There has been a judicial error by AAT as I do meet the SC857 criteria. The law is broken by DIBP & AAT.
Consideration
Jurisdictional error required
The Tribunal Decision is only liable to be set aside upon review if it involves jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1 at [76] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. Further, an error by the Tribunal, will only constitute jurisdictional error if the Tribunal:
a)identifies a wrong issue;
b)asks the wrong question;
c)ignores relevant material; or
d)relies on irrelevant material,
in such a way that the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected resulting in a decision exceeding or failing to exercise the authority or powers given under the relevant statute: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225 at [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. In certain circumstances a denial of procedural fairness may also constitute jurisdictional error: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 81 ALJR 515; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 93 ALD 300 (“SZBEL”).
Legislative framework
Section 137Q of the Migration Act provides as follows:
Employment does not commence
(1) The Minister may cancel a regional sponsored employment visa held by a person if:
(a) the Minister is satisfied that the person has not commenced the employment referred to in the relevant employer nomination within the period prescribed by the regulations; and
(b) the person does not satisfy the Minister that he or she has made a genuine effort to commence that employment within that period.
Employment terminates within 2 years
(2) The Minister may cancel a regional sponsored employment visa held by a person if:
(a) the Minister is satisfied that:
(i) the person commenced the employment referred to in the relevant employer nomination (whether or not within the period prescribed by the regulations); and
(ii) the employment terminated within the period (the required employment period ) of 2 years starting on the day the person commenced that employment; and
(b) the person does not satisfy the Minister that he or she has made a genuine effort to be engaged in that employment for the required employment period.
Regional sponsored employment visa
(3) In this section:
“regional sponsored employment visa” means a visa of a kind that:
(a) is included in a class of visas that has the words “Employer Nomination” in its title; and
(b) is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this definition.
Regulation 2.50AA of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Migration Regulations”) provides as follows:
For section 137Q of the Act, each item in the table sets out:
(a) a kind of visa that is a regional sponsored employment visa; and
(b) the period within which a holder of a visa of that kind must commence the employment referred to in the employer nomination.
Item Visa Period 3 Subclass 857 (Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme) visa 6 months from the date of grant of the visa
The Tribunal also had regard to the PAM 3 guidelines which went to the exercise of its discretion. It is unnecessary to set out those guidelines in detail, as, to the extent relevant, they are set out in the Tribunal Decision: CB 345-347 at [51]-[67], and see [4(i)] above.
Issues
The issues for consideration by the Tribunal were:
a)whether the grounds for cancellation of the 857 Visa existed pursuant to s.137Q(l) of the Migration Act; and
b)whether to exercise its discretion to cancel the 857 Visa.
Grounds 1-10
Grounds 1-10 recount the factual history of the matter. As such those grounds do not identify or establish any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.
Ground 11
Ground 11 asserts that the Tribunal overlooked all of the applicant's evidence that she met the criteria for the 857 Visa.
It was not necessary for the Tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and to every contention made by the applicant in the Tribunal Decision, provided that it considered those contentions related to the relevant criterion and proceeded on a correct understanding of the basis or bases on which the applicant sought to review the Delegate’s Decision: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [45]-[47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ (“WAEE”); Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v MZYTS & Anor [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 230 FCR 431; (2013) 136 ALD 547 at [34] and [62] per Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ.
It is plain from the detailed setting out of the Tribunal Decision at [4] above that:
a)the Tribunal considered the applicant’s claims and the evidence in relation to them, and made findings in relation to those claims relevant to the issues to be considered by the Tribunal, and determined those issues, namely that there were grounds for the cancellation of the 857 Visa, and that the Tribunal was satisfied that it ought to exercise its discretion to cancel the 857 Visa; and
b)the Tribunal’s consideration of the applicant’s claims was comprehensive, and its findings and conclusions were open to it on the evidence.
It is not for this Court, sitting to hear the Judicial Review Application, to engage in merits review. Merits review of a judicial review application of this type is impermissible because it crosses the line between judicial review and merits review: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang& Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1; CLR at 272 and 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ (“Wu Shan Liang”); Zentai v O’Connor & Ors (No 3) [2010] FCA 691; (2010) 187 FCR 495; (2010) 270 ALR 293; (2010) 116 ALD 476 at [367] per McKerracher J.
In Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1; (1990) 64 ALJR 327; (1990) 93 ALR 1; (1990) 33 IR 263 (“Quin”) the High Court observed that:
The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository’s power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.
Quin CLR at 35-36 per Brennan J.
It is trite to observe that mere disagreement by the applicant with the Tribunal’s assessment of the evidence does not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision: SZJEH v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 1706 at [14] per Jacobson J.
In the circumstances, ground 11 is not made out and does not establish any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.
Grounds 12 and 13 – 857 Visa criteria
To the extent that the applicant asserts in grounds 12 and 13 that she met the "visa criteria of Subclass 857 (Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme) visa" the grounds are misconceived. The grant of the applicant’s 857 Visa necessarily meant that the applicant had already met the relevant criteria for the grant of the 857 Visa. What the Tribunal was considering in this instance was whether or not the 857 Visa ought to be cancelled because the applicant had not commenced employment within a period of six months with the Sponsoring Employer, and had not made a genuine effort to commence that employment within that six month period: Migration Act, s.137Q(1). If the Minister is so satisfied then the relevant visa (in this case the 857 Visa) can be cancelled. Meeting the criteria for the original grant of an 857 Visa, and whether the conditions permitting the Minister to cancel the 857 Visa are met, are discrete issues. In this instance, it is the cancellation of the 857 Visa which was the subject of consideration by the Tribunal in the Tribunal Decision.
To the extent that the applicant says that the 857 Visa could not be cancelled because she continued to meet the conditions of the 857 Visa, and that those conditions were that:
a)she worked in the occupation nominated in the 857 Visa; and
b)she lived in the regional area pursuant to the conditions of the 857 Visa,
those assertions involve a question of construction of s.137Q(1) of the Migration Act.
There does not appear to be any authority concerning the construction of s.137Q of the Migration Act. One good reason for that might be that its terms are plain. Its terms provide the Minister with discretion to cancel a regional sponsored employment visa (and the 857 Visa is one of those) if the Minister is satisfied that a person has not commenced “the employment referred to in the relevant employer nomination”. It is only the employment in the relevant employer nomination which must be considered, and not some other employment outside that referred to in the relevant employer nomination. That employment, which is the employment referred to in the relevant employer nomination, must be commenced within the period prescribed by the Regulations, which is six months: Migration Regulations, reg.2.50AA, Item 3. If the person is found not to have commenced that employment the onus falls on to the person concerned to satisfy the Minister that they have made “a genuine effort to commence that employment within that period”: Migration Act, s.137Q(1)(b). The reference to “that employment” in s.137Q(1)(b) of the Migration Act is plainly a reference to “the employment referred to in the relevant employer nomination” in s.137Q(1)(a) of the Migration Act. Thus, it is only the employment referred to in the relevant employer nomination that must be considered by the Minister in determining cancellation. The fact that a person is employed elsewhere, and in employment not referred to in the relevant employer nomination, is irrelevant. In the circumstances, the Tribunal proceeded on a correct interpretation of the provisions of s.137Q(1) of the Migration Act. The construction put forward by the applicant in these proceedings is, for the above reasons, without any basis in the terms of s.137Q(1) of the Migration Act.
For the above reasons, grounds 12 and 13 insofar as they deal with the 857 Visa criteria and the cancellation of the 857 Visa do not establish any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.
Ground 13 – procedural fairness
Insofar as ground 13 is concerned the applicant’s “appeal” is to provide the applicant “with Natural Justice”, more commonly now referred to as procedural fairness. It is not evident that what is asserted is a denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal, but assuming that to be the case the Court makes the following observations.
As the High Court observed in SZBEL at [25] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ:
… The relevant question is about the Tribunal’s processes, not its actual decision.
The High Court went on to observe as follows in SZBEL at [32]-[33] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ (footnotes omitted):
32 In Alphaone the Full Court rightly said:
“It is a fundamental principle that where the rules of procedural fairness apply to a decision-making process, the party liable to be directly affected by the decision is to be given the opportunity of being heard. That would ordinarily require the party affected to be given the opportunity of ascertaining the relevant issues and to be informed of the nature and content of adverse material.”
(emphasis added)
33 The Act defines the nature of the opportunity to be heard that is to be given to an applicant for review by the Tribunal. The applicant is to be invited “to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. … The reference to “the issues arising in relation to the decision under review” is important.
In this case the obligations of procedural fairness are exhaustively set out in Division 5 of Part 5 of the Migration Act.
No breach of the rules of procedural fairness (or natural justice) set out in Division 5 of Part 5 of the Migration Act is apparent in the Tribunal Decision or the materials brought before the Court, and no affidavit evidence was filed by the applicant to support the allegations of a denial of procedural fairness, nor was anything said at hearing before the Court by the applicant which would indicate that there was any denial of procedural fairness at the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing, heard her case, including putting to her various concerns it had with that case, and delivered the Tribunal Decision dealing with, as the Court has found above, all of the relevant issues, facts and circumstances put before it by the applicant. In those circumstances, there was no denial of natural justice or want of procedural fairness in the Tribunal’s processes: SZBEL at [25] and [32]-[33] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61; (2006) 151 FCR 214; (2006) 231 ALR 412 at [60]-[67] per Heerey, Conti and Jacobson JJ.
In the above circumstances ground 13, if it alleges a denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal, is not made out, and does not establish any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.
Further materials
At the hearing of the Judicial Review Application the applicant sought to tender:
a)an email to the Commonwealth Bank dated 17 March 2014 concerning her employment and an application for a home loan, which email was not presented to the Tribunal at its hearing on 23 March 2016; and
b)correspondence concerning the factual background to this matter which was dated 7 and 14 November 2017.
The Minister objected to the Court admitting the above materials.
The Court did not admit the above materials. The Commonwealth Bank email was not before the Tribunal, and there was no explanation as to why it was not before the Tribunal in circumstances where its creation preceded the Tribunal hearing by some two years. In any event, the email plainly invited this Court to engage in impermissible merits review contrary to the principles established in Wu Shan Liang and Quin. The more recent correspondence again went to the merits of the applicants’ case. It is not open to the Court on a judicial review application to consider material which post-dates the Tribunal hearing: WZATI v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 923 at [70] per Barker J, and particularly so where those materials appear to invite impermissible merits review contrary to the principles in Wu Shan Liang and Quin.
Conclusion and orders
The Court has concluded that the applicant has failed to establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision. It follows that the Judicial Review Application must be dismissed.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Antoni Lucev
Date: 23 November 2017
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Immigration
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Procedural Fairness
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Jurisdiction
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Natural Justice
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Statutory Construction
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