HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJMatter Nos B53/2001 and B54/2001
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE APPELLANT
STATE OF QUEENSLANDAND
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESPONDENTS
COMMISSION AND ORSMatter Nos B56/2001, B57/2001 and B58/2001
MINISTER FOR EMPLOYMENT AND APPELLANT
WORKPLACE RELATIONS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIAAND
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESPONDENTS
COMMISSION AND ORSAttorney-General (Q) v Australian Industrial Relations Commission
Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Australian Industrial Relations Commission
[2002] HCA 423 October 2002
B53 & B54/2001; B56, B57 & B58/2001ORDER
ORDERS IN MATTER NO B53/2001:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 November 2000 and in its place order that:
(a)a writ of prohibition issue to the first respondents prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, further proceeding upon or enforcing the decision of the first respondents made on 27 November 1998 in Matters C No 31982 of 1998, C No 32162 of 1998 and C No 32163 of 1998;
(b)a writ of certiorari issue to the first respondents to remove into this Court so far as may be necessary proceedings C No 31982 of 1998, C No 32162 of 1998 and C No 32163 of 1998 in the Commission for the purpose of quashing the decision of the first respondents made on 27 November 1998;
(c)a writ of mandamus issue to the first respondents compelling them to hear and determine according to law the appeals C No 31982 of 1998, C No 32162 of 1998 and C No 32163 of 1998.
ORDERS IN MATTER NO B54/2001:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 November 2000 and in its place order that:
(a)a writ of prohibition issue to the first respondents prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, further proceeding upon or enforcing the decision of the first respondents made on 30 June 1998 in Matters C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997;
(b)a writ of certiorari issue to the first respondents to remove into this Court so far as may be necessary proceedings C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997 in the Commission for the purpose of quashing the decision of the first respondents made on 30 June 1998;
(c)a writ of mandamus issue to the first respondents compelling them to hear and determine according to law the appeals C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997.
ORDERS IN MATTER NO B56/2001:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 November 2000 and in its place order that:
(a)a writ of prohibition issue to the first respondents prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, further proceeding upon or enforcing the decision of the first respondents made…
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- Case
- [2002] HCA 42
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondent unions had acquired or accrued a "right" under the previous legislation, specifically section 104 of the *Industrial Relations Act 1988* (Cth), to have their pending industrial disputes arbitrated by the Commission, notwithstanding the introduction of section 111AAA. This question involved the construction of the *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth), particularly section 8(c), which presumes that a repeal or partial repeal does not affect acquired or accrued rights unless a contrary intention appears. The Court had to determine if the presumption applied and, if so, whether the amending statute displaced it.
The High Court reasoned that the "right" accrued by the respondent unions was not a right to a particular award, but rather a public law right to have their disputes dealt with by the Commission in accordance with the law as it stood at the time. Drawing on the principles established in *R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd*, the Court held that the words "the Commission shall proceed" in section 104(1) of the 1988 Act imposed an imperative requirement. This duty, the Court found, was susceptible to mandamus under section 75(v) of the Constitution, compelling the Commission to hear and determine matters according to law, rather than to decide them in a particular manner. The Court concluded that the accrued right was the susceptibility to such a writ, and that the new section 111AAA did not displace this accrued right.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the orders of the Federal Court. In their place, the High Court ordered that writs of prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus issue to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. These writs were directed at quashing the Commission's previous decisions and compelling it to hear and determine the relevant appeals according to law, effectively preserving the unions' right to have their disputes arbitrated under the pre-amendment regime.
Orders
Orders of the court
ORDERS IN MATTER NO B53/2001:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 November 2000 and in its place order that:
(a) a writ of prohibition issue to the first respondents prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, further proceeding upon or enforcing the decision of the first respondents made on 27 November 1998 in Matters C No 31982 of 1998, C No 32162 of 1998 and C No 32163 of 1998;
(b) a writ of certiorari issue to the first respondents to remove into this Court so far as may be necessary proceedings C No 31982 of 1998, C No 32162 of 1998 and C No 32163 of 1998 in the Commission for the purpose of quashing the decision of the first respondents made on 27 November 1998;
(c) a writ of mandamus issue to the first respondents compelling them to hear and determine according to law the appeals C No 31982 of 1998, C No 32162 of 1998 and C No 32163 of 1998.
ORDERS IN MATTER NO B54/2001:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 November 2000 and in its place order that:
(a) a writ of prohibition issue to the first respondents prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, further proceeding upon or enforcing the decision of the first respondents made on 30 June 1998 in Matters C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997;
(b) a writ of certiorari issue to the first respondents to remove into this Court so far as may be necessary proceedings C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997 in the Commission for the purpose of quashing the decision of the first respondents made on 30 June 1998;
(c) a writ of mandamus issue to the first respondents compelling them to hear and determine according to law the appeals C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997.
ORDERS IN MATTER NO B56/2001:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 November 2000 and in its place order that:
(a) a writ of prohibition issue to the first respondents prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, further proceeding upon or enforcing the decision of the first respondents made on 27 November 1998 in Matters C No 31982 of 1998, C No 32162 of 1998 and C No 32163 of 1998;
(b) a writ of certiorari issue to the first respondents to remove into this Court so far as may be necessary proceedings C No 31982 of 1998, C No 32162 of 1998 and C No 32163 of 1998 in the Commission for the purpose of quashing the decision of the first respondents made on 27 November 1998;
(c) a writ of mandamus issue to the first respondents compelling them to hear and determine according to law the appeals C No 31982 of 1998, C No 32162 of 1998 and C No 32163 of 1998.
ORDERS IN MATTER NO B57/2001:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 November 2000 and in its place order that:
(a) a writ of prohibition issue to the first respondents prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, further proceeding upon or enforcing the decision of the first respondents made on 30 June 1998 in Matters C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997;
(b) a writ of certiorari issue to the first respondents to remove into this Court so far as may be necessary proceedings C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997 in the Commission for the purpose of quashing the decision of the first respondents made on 30 June 1998;
(c) a writ of mandamus issue to the first respondents compelling them to hear and determine according to law the appeals C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997.
ORDERS IN MATTER NO B58/2001:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court dated 20 November 2000 and in its place order that:
(a) a writ of prohibition issue to the first respondents prohibiting them from acting upon, giving effect to, further proceeding upon or enforcing the decision of the first respondents made on 30 June 1998 in Matters C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997;
(b) a writ of certiorari issue to the first respondents to remove into this Court so far as may be necessary proceedings C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997 in the Commission for the purpose of quashing the decision of the first respondents made on 30 June 1998;
(c) a writ of mandamus issue to the first respondents compelling them to hear and determine according to law the appeals C No 40827 of 1997, C No 40829 of 1997 and C No 40830 of 1997.
Background
Background to the litigation
Initially, industrial disputes were governed by the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), which imposed an obligation on the AIRC to arbitrate such disputes unless it found that a state award or an employment agreement governed the wages and conditions in question and that halting the arbitration was not in the public interest. However, the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) introduced significant amendments, including a provision that required the AIRC to cease dealing with industrial disputes if it was satisfied that a state award or employment agreement governed the wages and conditions of employment. This amendment aimed to streamline the industrial relations process and reduce the AIRC's jurisdiction over certain matters.
The unions involved in the case argued that they had acquired or accrued rights under the 1988 Act that entitled them to have their disputes arbitrated by the AIRC, independent of any subsequent statutory changes. They posited that these rights were preserved by the presumption under s 8(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) that a repeal or partial repeal does not affect any right acquired or accrued under the earlier Act unless there is a contrary intention in the repealing statute. They further argued that these rights were akin to the "imperative requirement" identified in R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd, which mandated that the AIRC proceed with the arbitration of disputes.
The unions' appeals were directed towards specific AIRC decisions made after the enactment of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). They sought orders to compel the AIRC to reconsider these decisions, arguing that the AIRC had erred by failing to observe the alleged accrued rights stemming from the 1988 Act. The unions' submissions hinged on the interpretation of the statutory language and the legal nature of the rights they claimed to have accrued, which they believed entitled them to the arbitration of their disputes in accordance with the 1988 Act provisions.
Ultimately, the case before the court involved a complex interplay between statutory interpretation, the effect of legislative amendments on accrued rights, and the continuing duty of the AIRC to arbitrate industrial disputes in compliance with the law as it stood at any given time. The unions' arguments sought to uphold their contention that the AIRC was obliged to consider their disputes in light of their perceived accrued rights under the earlier statute, notwithstanding the legislative changes introduced by the 1996 Act.
This case before the High Court of Australia is an appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The appeals were heard in two separate matters, B53/2001 and B54/2001, which were consolidated for the purposes of the hearing. The appeals were brought in response to the Full Court's decision to quash certain decisions of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) and dismiss the appeals brought by the unions against those decisions. The union appeals before the AIRC were brought under section 111 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and related to the AIRC's jurisdiction to hear and determine the industrial disputes in question. The unions sought to have the AIRC's decisions reviewed on the basis that the AIRC had failed to consider relevant legislation which governed the disputes. The High Court's decision to hear these appeals was predicated on the complexity of the legal questions arising from the interaction between the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), as well as the significant public interest implications of the cases.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the statutory amendment requiring the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to cease dealing with an industrial dispute if satisfied that a State award or employment agreement governs the wages and conditions of employment in issue, unless satisfied that ceasing would not be in the public interest, apply to pending proceedings?
2. Does the presumption that a repeal or partial repeal of a statute does not affect any right acquired or accrued under the earlier Act unless a contrary intention appears in the repealing statute apply to the respondent unions' rights to have their disputes arbitrated by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission?
3. Had the respondent unions acquired or accrued a "right" to have their disputes arbitrated by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission without regard to the statutory amendment?
4. Was the presumption displaced by a contrary intention in the repealing statute?
Held
1. The court concluded that the statutory amendment does not apply to pending proceedings, holding that the amendment's requirement for the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to cease dealing with an industrial dispute if satisfied that a State award or employment agreement governs the wages and conditions of employment in issue, unless satisfied that ceasing would not be in the public interest, does not extend to matters already before the court.
2. The court determined that the presumption that a repeal or partial repeal of a statute does not affect any right acquired or accrued under the earlier Act unless a contrary intention appears in the repealing statute applies to the respondent unions' rights to have their disputes arbitrated by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission.
3. The court found that the respondent unions had not acquired or accrued a "right" to have their disputes arbitrated by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission without regard to the statutory amendment.
4. The court concluded that the presumption was not displaced by a contrary intention in the repealing statute, affirming that the respondent unions' rights to have their disputes arbitrated by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission were preserved.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, HUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ
The respondent unions do not assert that they had acquired or accrued a "right" to an award. Rather, they submit that they had acquired or accrued the "right" to have their disputes arbitrated in accordance with s 104 of the 1988 Act. Describing the putative right in this manner, however, says little about its legal nature or the way in which it may be enforced. The right acquired or accrued by the respondent unions is more accurately described as a public law right to require the Commission to observe its duty to comply with the law as it exists from time to time. A right of that nature, where it exists, is a right to have a claim or application considered in accordance with the statute that governs its determination.R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration;Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd Those seeking to uphold in this Court the decision of the Full Federal Court fix upon the words in s 104(1) "the Commission shall proceed". Similar terms in s 38 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) ("the 1904 Act") were construed in R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd[15] as imposing an "imperative requirement". This Court reached that conclusion independently of the additional consideration that the old Arbitration Court was the recipient of jurisdiction under the 1904 Act and as a court was under a duty to exercise that jurisdiction[16]. Further, it was decided in Ozone Theatres that mandamus under s 75(v) of the Constitution would lie, albeit as a discretionary remedy, to compel performance of that duty. The Court rejected the submission that if[17]:"the Arbitration Court shall interpret the words on which its jurisdiction depends and the court in fact applies itself to that question, then, in the absence of mala fides, it discharges the duty imposed on it".[15](1949) 78 CLR 389 at 398.[16](1949) 78 CLR 389 at 398‑399.[17]By counsel for the respondent, reported (1949) 78 CLR 389 at 395. In the present appeals, the respondent unions submit that it follows from the application of the reasoning in Ozone Theatres to the 1988 Act that, as at 1 January 1997, the applicants who had moved under par (g) of s 111(1) had "accrued rights" to the discharge by the Commission of its continuing duty stemming from s 104(1). It is apparent that the "right" which was "accrued" was reflective of the susceptibility of the Commission to mandamus under s 75(v) of the Constitution. But that invites attention to the nature of the particular duty placed by the 1988 Act upon the Commission. It was pointed out in Ozone Theatres that[18]:"in the case of a court or other body which is under a duty to hear and determine a matter, the tenor of the writ will require the hearing and determination of the matter, and not the decision of the matter in any particular manner".This precept finds expression in the form of order, exemplified in Wade v Burns[19], which requires a determination "according to law"[20].[18](1949) 78 CLR 389 at 399.[19](1966) 115 CLR 537 at 569. See also Sinclair v Mining Warden at Maryborough (1975) 132 CLR 473 at 488; Re Coldham; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation (1985) 159 CLR 522 at 531.[20]In some cases, it may be appropriate to frame the order so as to require the making of a particular decision: R v Mahony; Ex parte Johnson (1931) 46 CLR 131 at 139, 154; R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 177 at 188, 203, 206.