Mines and Minerals (N.S.W.)—Mining on private lands for minerals privately owned—Authority to enter—Powers of warden—Previous agreement giving rights to work land—Refusal of application by warden—Whether mandamus lies—Errors in construction of statute—Mining Act, 1906-1963 (N.S.W.), ss. 46 (3), 50 (2) (a), 70A (2). Prerogative Writs—Mandamus—To compel performance of duties by administrative authority—Error by administrative authority in construction of statute conferring authority—Power of mining warden to refuse authority to enter on private lands to search for minerals privately owned—Mining Act, 1906-1963 (N.S.W.), ss. 46 (3), 50 (2) (a).
Decisions
May 20. The following written judgments were delivered: - BARWICK C.J. The respondent Burns (the warden) is a mining warden appointed under and for the purposes of the administration of the Mining Act, 1906-1963, of the State of New South Wales (the Act): s. 6. The appellant is an applicant for an authority to enter private lands to search for zircon, rutile and ilmenite, substances which have been declared to be minerals for the purposes of the Act. The respondents Frederick Charles Hughes, Peter James Prichard, Jessie Hughes, Hector James Robertson and Ena Frances Robertson (the owners) were at all relevant times the owners and occupiers of the lands the subject of the appellant's application for authority to enter (the said land). The title to the said land did not reserve to the Crown rutile, zircon or ilmenite. Though minerals within the meaning of the Act, they are therefore privately owned minerals for its purposes. The respondent New South Wales Rutile Mining Co. Ltd. (the company) is a company which, after the lodging of the appellant's application, entered into an agreement with the owners under which they granted to the company, "subject to the provisions of the Act", the exclusive right and authority to enter upon the said land and to carry on mining operations thereon for a term of years for the purpose of winning rutile, zircon and other privately owned minerals. At the date of the hearing by the warden of the appellant's application, the company was in fact carrying on mining operations for such minerals upon the land. Some four years before the appellant lodged his application for authority to enter, an agreement had been made between the owners and the appellant and another by which the appellant and that other had been granted an exclusive right of entry and of mining the said lands for a period of five years for the said minerals. The appellant and his co-contractor had carried on such operations for about one year until the price of rutile made the operations uneconomic. Such operations were not thereafter resumed but, although the agreement was thus in default, the owners did not actually terminate it. It was common ground between the parties before this Court that at the date of the lodgment of the appellant's application for authority to…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Wade v Burns [1966] HCA 35
Case
[1966] HCA 35
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Wade v Burns*. The dispute concerned the appellant's claim for damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The appellant alleged that the respondent's negligent driving caused the accident and his subsequent injuries.
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the appellant had established a breach of duty of care on the part of the respondent. This involved determining whether the respondent's driving fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver in the circumstances, and if so, whether that breach caused the appellant's injuries.
The Court considered the evidence presented regarding the manner in which both vehicles were being driven immediately prior to the collision. It applied the principles of negligence, focusing on the foreseeability of harm and the reasonableness of the respondent's actions. The Court ultimately found that the evidence did not establish that the respondent had breached his duty of care to the appellant.