Toms v Harbour City Ferries Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Toms v Harbour City Ferries Pty Limited [2015] FCAFC 35

Citation: Toms v Harbour City Ferries Pty Limited [2015] FCAFC 35
Parties: CHRISTOPHER TOMS v HARBOUR CITY FERRIES PTY LIMITED and FAIR WORK COMMISSION
File number: NSD 1003 of 2014
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, SIOPIS J AND BUCHANAN J
Date of judgment: 16 March 2015
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – application under s 39B of Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – where applicant was dismissed from his employment by the first respondent as a ferry master – where applicant breached first respondent’s drug policy – unfair dismissal proceedings brought before the Fair Work Commission (“FWC”) – where question for the FWC was whether dismissal was “harsh, unjust or unreasonable” – where Full Bench of the FWC reversed an order of a Deputy President ordering reinstatement of the applicant – whether Full Bench decision affected by jurisdictional error – consideration of the history of the term “harsh, unjust or unreasonable” – consideration of “fair go all around” – consideration of the nature of jurisdictional error by the FWC and a Full Bench of the FWC
Legislation:

Constitution, ss 51(xx), 51(xxxv)
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 341, 381(1)(c), 381(2), 382, 385(b), 387, 387(h), 390, 400(1), 539, 545, 577, 578, 591, 604(1), 607(3)
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s 170CA(2)

Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW), s 28
Passenger Transport (Drug and Alcohol Testing) Regulation 2010 (NSW), reg 17

Cases cited:

Harbour City Ferries Pty Ltd v Toms[2014] FWCFB 6249
Toms v Harbour City Ferries Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 2327
Toms v Harbour City Ferries Pty Ltd PR549780 Order (16 April 2014)

Bostik (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gorgevski (No 1) (1992) 36 FCR 20
Bostik (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gorgevski (No 2) (1992) 36 FCR 439
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1994) 47 FCR 300
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1992) 45 IR 178
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (1998) 89 FCR 200
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Ex parte Hebburn Ltd; Re Kearsley Shire Council (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 416
Gorgevski v Bostik (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 39 IR 229
Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 455
Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 79
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
In re Loty and Holloway v Australian Workers’ Union [1971] AR (NSW) 95
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Monsanto Chemicals (Australia) Ltd v Amalgamated Engineering Union (1958) 90 CAR 27
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513
Parmalat Food Products Pty Ltd v Wililo [2011] FWAFB 1166
Public Service Association of…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a ferry master employed by the respondent, was dismissed after being found to have breached the respondent's drug policy by smoking marijuana before reporting for duty. The applicant brought unfair dismissal proceedings before the Fair Work Commission (FWC). The Deputy President of the FWC found the dismissal to be harsh, unjust or unreasonable and ordered reinstatement, but this decision was reversed by a Full Bench of the FWC. The applicant sought judicial review of the Full Bench’s decision. The central legal issue was whether the Full Bench's decision was affected by jurisdictional error.

The Full Bench had considered the breach of the drug policy to be a valid reason for dismissal. However, the Full Bench disagreed with the Deputy President’s view that the absence of proven impairment from the drug use was relevant to the fairness of the dismissal. The Full Bench considered the breach of the drug policy, which was central to public safety, to be the most determinative factor. The Full Bench concluded that the Deputy President had erred in considering other factors that did not address the core issue of the breach of the drug policy. The Full Bench’s analysis focused on whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, and it found that the Deputy President had made an error in his reasoning. The Full Bench’s decision was based on a proper examination of the relevant factors and a correct understanding of its jurisdiction.

The Full Bench's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. It correctly identified and addressed the core issue of whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The Full Bench’s reasoning was consistent with its jurisdiction under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), and it properly exercised its appellate function by reviewing the Deputy President’s decision.

The Full Bench dismissed the application for reinstatement. The Full Bench's decision was that the dismissal was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable, and therefore, the order for reinstatement was quashed. The Full Bench’s decision was based on a thorough examination of the relevant factors and a correct application of the law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

With respect, that is an important statement and it brings together a number of matters where the High Court was critical of the analysis of the Full Court. The task on judicial review is not simply to assess whether an administrative tribunal was right or wrong in its conclusions, or whether it made errors in its analysis. The task is not to correct perceived errors made within jurisdiction. The task is to examine whether the tribunal misconceived its role or otherwise failed to exercise its jurisdiction so that its decision should not be seen as a true exercise of the power committed to it at all. The background facts The applicant was employed by the respondent as a ferry master. He had been employed since 1996, initially as a general hand, later as an engineer and in 2010 he obtained a Master IV Certificate of Competency. He became a permanent ferry master in March 2011. On 25 July 2013, a day on which he was rostered off duty, the applicant agreed to come in to work to replace another employee on afternoon shift. The evening before he had, he later admitted, smoked marijuana. He said he did so because of shoulder pain. While on duty, the applicant misjudged an approach to a wharf and the ferry struck a pylon. Although no one appeared then to be injured, the incident was a reportable one. The applicant reported the incident about 30 minutes later, although he should have done so at once. He was required, as a matter of routine, to cease his duties and attend the office of the respondent where he was required to take a drug test at about 6 pm. The applicant did not disclose that he had smoked marijuana the previous evening until the drug test returned a positive reading that evening. When the drug test returned a positive reading for cannabis the applicant was immediately suspended. The respondent has a “zero tolerance” policy for drugs and alcohol. It has statutory obligations towards the public and it is an offence for some employees (including ferry masters) to operate ferries whilst under the influence of alcohol or some drugs (Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW), s 28; Passenger Transport (Drug and Alcohol Testing) Regulation 2010 (NSW), reg 17). After further investigation, the applicant was dismissed with five weeks pay in lieu of notice, on 28 August 2013. The applicant, with the assistance of the Australian Maritime Officers’ Union, applied to the Fair Work Commission for a remedy for unfair dismissal on 16 September 2013. The reinstatement decision The application was decided in favour of the applicant by Deputy President Lawrence on 16 April 2014 ([2014] FWC 2327). The Deputy President was satisfied that there was a valid reason for the dismissal of the applicant and that the other specifically mentioned factors in s 387 of the FW Act were either neutral or did not suggest unfairness. Nevertheless, under the general rubric of “any other matters that the FWC considers relevant” (s 387(h)) and having regard to the object in s 381(2) to ensure “a fair go all round”, Deputy President Lawrence found that the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 385(b) fulfils no such function. The FWC is entitled to approach its task by focusing on considerations it considers to be relevant (while also complying with s 387). Here, its view (after identifying what it perceived to be the error in the Deputy President’s approach) was that the core question – the deliberate disobedience of a significant policy (one central to the safety of the public and the public’s confidence in the safety of ferry travel) was not touched by a lack of evidence of impairment, or by a lack of evidence of causal relationship between the event and the cannabis, or by the other considerations that were said to weigh in the balance in favour of the applicant. (d) No evidence or irrational? Each of those is a serious charge. They amount to an accusation of a failure to carry out the assigned task, or attempting to do so in a way which is manifestly inadequate or capricious. As the respondent’s submissions pointed out, the statements about which specific complaint was made (at [27]) reflected matters debated in the proceedings and reflected in the policies and evidence in contest in the proceedings. The tests which must be applied in considering whether a decision is legally unreasonable are those stated by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, as further discussed in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1 especially at [44]. Applying those tests, this argument must be rejected. (e) No Full Bench finding supporting its order? The way in which the first argument of jurisdictional error discussed earlier was formulated makes it apparent at the outset that this criticism has no substance. There, the criticism was that the reasoning of the Full Bench was directed to the substitution of its own view of the merits, rather than an examination of specific error. That assertion is destructive of any proposition that the Full Bench failed to address the question of whether the dismissal of the applicant was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. In any event, there is no substance in the contention that the reasons of the Full Bench were not satisfactorily addressed to the question of whether the termination of the applicant’s employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. A finding to that effect by the Deputy President was a fundamental pre-condition to any order for reinstatement. Whether that finding was correct was the very subject of the appeal, and the arguments of both parties. Once the Full Bench found error in the finding that the termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable (as it undoubtedly did) it was open to it to quash the order for reinstatement. Once that was done, it was necessary for the Full Bench to take some further step. Unless the application for reinstatement was remitted for further hearing, after the order for reinstatement was quashed it was inevitable that the Full Bench would deal with the question itself. It was open to the Full Bench to decide the original application itself, which is what it did. It is in no way surprising that it did so as an extension of its reasons for quashing the order for reinstatement and by applying the findings it had already made. Its decision to dismiss the application must be taken to have reflected the matters discussed by it in concluding that Deputy President Lawrence had erred in his own decision. Conclusion

Decision

Reasons for decision

ALLSOP CJ, SIOPIS J
Section 607(3) states the powers of the FWC on appeal as follows: 607 Process for appealing or reviewing decisions… (3)The FWC may do any of the following in relation to the appeal or review: (a)confirm, quash or vary the decision; (b)make a further decision in relation to the matter that is the subject of the appeal or review; (c)refer the matter that is the subject of the appeal or review to an FWC Member (other than an Expert Panel Member) and: (i)require the FWC Member to deal with the subject matter of the decision; or (ii)require the FWC Member to act in accordance with the directions of the FWC. On the appeal the Full Bench quashed the decision of Deputy President Lawrence and substituted its own decision that the application to the FWC for relief should be dismissed. The Full Bench, in its short decision, turned very quickly to matters at the heart of Deputy President Lawrence’s reasoning, accepting the Deputy President’s finding that there was a valid reason for dismissal and that the specific matters stated in s 387 (except s 387(h)) did not assist the applicant. That left for consideration by the Full Bench (as it had by Deputy President Lawrence) only whether there were “any other matters” (s 387(h)) which the Full Bench considered were relevant and whether they had been taken into account or, conversely, whether the matters considered relevant by Deputy President Lawrence were correctly taken into account. The Full Bench thought the policy about drug and alcohol use was highly relevant. It thought that the absence of proven impairment of the applicant was not relevant. Those conclusions identified error in the approach taken by the Deputy President and in the decision-making process. It is plain that the Full Bench was not speaking of relevance in a strict legal sense (c.f. Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24). Rather, the Full Bench was indicating what matters were important enough to be potentially determinative in the overall evaluation to be made. After a short discussion of some matters of general principle stated by an earlier Full Bench, the Full Bench said (at [17]): [17] We have had regard to the facts of this application. The application is concerned with serious misconduct which was a valid reason for the termination of Mr Toms’ employment. The serious misconduct was the breach of an important policy by an employee at the most senior level of employment at Harbour City in a situation where there was compliance with procedural fairness. As is apparent from this passage, the Full Bench decided that the applicant’s conduct involved serious misconduct, even though the Full Bench appeared to accept that the utility of urine testing for the use of drugs was contestable. The Full Bench had earlier said: [8] This Full Bench has some experience of applications involving the application and efficacy of such workplace policies. We are not persuaded that urine testing, the agreed method of drug testing at Harbour City, is a guide as to the actual presence of marijuana in an employee’s system or any impairment arising as a consequence. It is a testing system which in this case indicated past use and no present impairment. [9] Despite our reservations concerning the usefulness of Harbour City’s policy as an effective method of drug detection, when considering leave to appeal and the merits of the appeal, we have identified and considered the misconduct of Mr Toms as his attending work in breach of the policy.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ALLSOP CJ, SIOPIS J

Full text does not contain this section.