W A L E S )................................................
D e f e n d a n t , ‘
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW SOUTH WALES.
H C OF A
Negligence— Pedestrian crossing street— Injured by tram-car—Defendant’s negligem
](j3g
proved— Contributory negligence— Burden of proof.
S y d n e y , In an action for damages for negligence, once initial negligence on the part
of the defendant is established, the burden of proof is upon the defendant to
A u j .
10,11.
establish contributory negligence in the plaintiff, and th a t that contributory
Dixon, Evatt
and .Me lie/iiaii
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
S3.
A verdict for the plaintiff cannot be set aside on the ground that contributorj' negligence has been conclusively proved unless on the facts hi evidence there is no explanation of his conduct consistent with proper care on his part.
Commissioner of Railways v. Leahy, (1904) 2 C.L.R. 54, and Fraser v. Vic torian Railways Commissioners, (1909) 8 C.L.R. 54, discussed.
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (FuU Court); Com missioner for Road Transport and Tramways v. Williams, (1933) 33 S.R- (N.S.W.) 250; 50 N.S.W.W.N. 116, reversed.
A p p e a l from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
An action was brought by Edith Rose Williams, under the provisions of the Compensation to Relatives Act1897 (N.S.W.), against the Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways, to
50 C.L.R.] OF AUSTRALIA.
259
recover damages for the loss which she had sustained by reason of C- of A.
the death of her husband, who was struck by a tram and killed in
George Street, Sydney. The plaintiff alleged that the accident was
W illiam s
due to the negligence of the driver of the tram, who was an employee
Commis-
of the defendant Commissioner. The accident occurred at about was about midway between two tramway stopping-places for south bound trams, and that the tram was travelling at a steady pace of about eight to ten miles per hour. He said ;—“ After I left the stopping-place before Martin Place and after crossing Martin Place almost near the Post Office, all of a sudden I saw a person step right on the fine in front of me, standing in front of me on the line within about three feet. I applied my emergency brake immediately and rang my bell. I had not seen that man before. . . . I do not know just exactly where he came from. I stopped my car within.
12-30 p.m. on 10th August, in George Street, opposite to the inter- T ransport
section with Barrack Street. The deceased, who was sixty-five T ramw ays
years of age, was described by the plaintiff as an active man…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott [1933] HCA 33
Case
[1933] HCA 33
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an application for a writ of prohibition against the War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal. The applicant, Bott, sought to challenge the Tribunal's decision regarding his entitlement to a war pension. The dispute centred on whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant legislation in determining Bott's eligibility for the pension.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal had acted in excess of its jurisdiction by misinterpreting or misapplying the provisions of the *War Pensions Act 1920* (Cth) in relation to the applicant's claim. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Tribunal's findings of fact were so unreasonable as to indicate an error of law, thereby vitiating its decision.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had indeed erred in law. The Court reasoned that while the Tribunal had the power to determine facts, its interpretation of the statutory provisions governing entitlement to a war pension was demonstrably flawed. The Tribunal's approach to the evidence presented, particularly concerning the causal connection between military service and the applicant's disability, was found to be inconsistent with the legislative intent. The Court emphasised that a tribunal's jurisdiction is limited by the correct interpretation of the statute it administers, and a fundamental misconstruction of the governing legislation constitutes an excess of jurisdiction.
Consequently, the High Court made absolute the order nisi for a writ of prohibition, quashing the decision of the War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal.