Davis v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Davis v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2024] FCA 322   

File number(s): QUD 480 of 2022
Judgment of: MEAGHER J
Date of judgment: 3 April 2024
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for default judgment pursuant to r 5.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where applicant sought orders that documents not be accepted for filing pursuant to r 2.27 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – late filing of summary dismissal application and supporting evidence - where delay was short and no prejudice suffered by the applicant - where orders made extending the time for the filing of the application and supporting evidence - application for default judgment dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for summary judgment under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) - whether the applicant has a reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding - where applicant seeks judicial review of respondents' conduct and decision not to reimburse tolls pursuant to the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (Cth) - where toll claims have been subsequently reconsidered and paid - where the respondents have made various concessions - summary judgment granted in favour of the respondents

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s25D

Administrative Decision (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss5(1), 6, 7, 16(2)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss59, 75, 81, 182(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s31A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr2.27, 5.22, 16.21, 26.01

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s39B

Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (Cth) ss5, 269, 290, 293, 295, 333(b), 346(1), 347, 352, 354, 361, 362

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 (Cth) s14

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s16(6)

Veterans’ Affairs Legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous Measures) Act 2023 (Cth) s293

Cases cited:

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564

Alders v Tax Agents’ Board of Queensland [2006] FCA 1442

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Chung v University of Sydney [2001] FMCA 94

DMH20 v Minister for Home Affairs (2023) 296 FCR 256

Dowling v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2008] FCA 59

Dudzinski v Rossington [2000] FCA 1659

Haque v Jabella Group Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 962

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Lamb v Moss (1983) 5 ALD 446

Macksville & District Hospital v Mayze (1987) 10 NSWLR 708

Mbuzi v Baldwin [2016] FCA 1314

Meredith v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (2001) 64 ALD 120

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ozmanian (1996) 71 FCR 1

Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438

R v War Pension Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228

Randall and The Council of the Town of Northcote (1910) 11 CLR 100

Schlaepfer v Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2017] FCA 1122

Smethurst v Commissioner of Police (2020) 376 ALR 575

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 322
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Davis v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission was heard by the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, Davis, sought judicial review of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission's (the Commission) conduct and decision not to reimburse tolls pursuant to the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (Cth). The Commission sought summary judgment, arguing that the proceeding was futile as any errors made had been acknowledged and rectified, and that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. The applicant also sought default judgment and to have certain documents filed by the Commission not accepted for filing.

The court was required to decide whether the proceeding was futile and whether the applicant had a reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. The court also needed to consider whether the application for default judgment should be granted and whether certain documents filed by the Commission should be accepted for filing.

The court dismissed the applicant's application for default judgment, finding that the delay in filing the application and supporting evidence was short and no prejudice had been suffered by the applicant. The court also dismissed the applicant's application for summary judgment, finding that the proceeding was not futile and that the applicant had a reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the Commission's conduct or decision was inconsistent, unlawful, or arbitrary. The court also found that the applicant's claims had been subsequently reconsidered and paid, and that the Commission had made various concessions.

The court exercised caution when exercising its power to grant summary judgment, particularly in circumstances where there was a complex question of fact or law. The court also exercised caution when the proceedings had been instituted by a self-represented litigant. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the Commission's conduct or decision was inconsistent, unlawful, or arbitrary, and that the applicant's claims had been subsequently reconsidered and paid.

The final orders of the court were that the interlocutory application filed by the applicant on 29 May 2023 be dismissed, judgment be entered in favour of the respondents in relation to the whole of the proceeding, and that the parties were to bear their own costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed by the applicant on 29 May 2023 be dismissed.

2. Pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), judgment be entered in favour of the respondents in relation to the whole of the proceeding.

3. The parties are to bear their own costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Caution ought be exercised when exercising power pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act, particularly in circumstances where there is a complex question of fact or law: Upaid Systems Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2016] FCAFC 158 at [48]. Similarly, caution should be exercised when the proceedings have been instituted by a self-represented litigant: Dowling v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2008] FCA 59 at [57] (Reeves J); Sullivan v North West Crewing Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1130 (McKerracher J); Haque v Jabella Group Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 962 at [36]- [38] (Bromwich J).Evidence The evidence of Ms Taylor, from her affidavits, evidence in chief and cross examination relevantly included that: ·The Department administers the functions of the Commission;·The applicant’s First Claim and Second Claim had been paid as a result of a reconsideration. The reconsideration of the First Claim was undertaken at the behest of the Commission on its own initiative. The reconsideration of the Second Claim was undertaken as part of a general practice of review and oversight;·A process to improve the ability of veterans to make claims is underway but will take time as it involves changes to the online portal which may only be made by request to Services Australia which has a shared services agreement with the Department;·In the meantime, the Department’s website includes a section for road tolls which states ‘If you have a receipt or statement confirming the cost incurred, you can include the details in the ‘comments’ section of the MyService portal for consideration’; ·Between 18 December 2018 and 30 March 2023, the applicant has been paid in excess of 30 toll claims – some at first instance and some on reconsideration; and·Processing claims involves the following: (a)the claims are submitted either by way of the MyService portal, email or hard copy claims form; (b)when received, they are allocated based on the relevant legislation; (c)departmental staff access a separate portal which contains information relevant to the particular applicant, such as the accepted conditions and the applicable legislation, to assess the eligibility of the applicant;(d)once eligibility is assessed, departmental staff access an Excel spreadsheet into which information from the MyService portal is entered to determine the eligible monetary figure payable; (e)departmental staff access a separate portal named “Dollars” and input information such as the monetary amount payable, what the payment relates to, the claim number and the identifying details of the applicant. Once this is submitted, a “number” is provided which is entered into the Excel spreadsheet; (f)the departmental staff access a pro forma letter and insert the relevant information from the submitted claim form; and (g)the letter is signed and sent to the applicant. ·At the various stages of the claims processing, there exists the possibility of human error as each process is undertaken manually; ·Even when changes are made to the portal, the process will not be completely free of the possibility of human error;·In order to determine whether there are claimants who have not received road toll claims payable to them, the Department would need to consider every claim manually as they are not recorded electronically.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Commission sought summary judgment by an interlocutory application filed on 25 May 2023 (Summary Judgment Application) in the following terms:1.Pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 and r 26.01(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, there be summary judgment in relation to part or all of the proceeding.2.In the alternative to order 1, an order pursuant to r 16.21(1) (b) and/or (d) of the Rules that parts of the Applicant’s Amended Originating Application for Judicial Review filed on 20 April 2023 be struck out in the manner as identified in the marked up pleadings Annexed to this Interlocutory Application.3.The parties are to bear their own costs.(emphasis in original) On 29 May 2023, the applicant also filed an interlocutory application (Default Application) which sought the following interlocutory relief: 1.Pursuant to Federal Court rule 5.22 the First Respondent is in default.2.Pursuant to Federal Court rule 2.27 the following documents submitted by the First Respondent are not accepted;(a)lnterlocutory Application dated 24 May 2023.(b)Affidavit of Amanda Louise Taylor sworn 24 May 2023.(c)Respondents Submissions dated 26 May 2023.3. Costs awarded to the Applicant. While the summary dismissal application was brought by the Commission, the written submissions in reply were filed on behalf of both the Commission and the Department. Additionally, the Commission and the Department were represented by the same solicitors and counsel. Accordingly, for consistency, they will be collectively referred to as the respondents where appropriate. The applications were heard together on 14 September 2023. The applicant relied on his affidavits, one sworn on 14 March 2023 and two further affidavits both sworn on 16 June 2023. The Commission relied on the following material: •Affidavits of Fiona Ellen Dempsey sworn on 8 May 2023 and 10 July 2023; •Affidavits of Amanda Louise Taylor affirmed on 24 May 2023 (First Taylor Affidavit), 14 August 2023 (Second Taylor Affidavit) and 13 September 2023 (Third Taylor Affidavit);•Affidavit of Lindsay Jeanne Cooper affirmed on 11 July 2023; and•Document entitled ‘MyService Enhancement Proposal – Indicative Process and Timelines’ tendered through Ms Taylor. One witness was called by the applicant, Ms Amanda Taylor (Ms Taylor), who is the Assistant Secretary, Litigation and Advice Breach, General Counsel Division at the Department of Veterans' Affairs. For the reasons that follow, summary judgment is ordered against the applicant. The applicant's amended originating application and interlocutory application are dismissed. LEGISLATIVE SCHEME The Commission is established by s 361 of the Act. Pursuant to s 362 of the Act, it has a range of functions including making determinations relating to the payment or provision of compensation. Section 5 defines "compensation" as compensation under the Act, including pursuant to treatment provided under Chapter 6. Section 269, which provides an outline to Chapter 6, states that "Compensation for costs incurred in travelling to obtain treatment is also provided for".

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondents submitted that summary judgment should be granted as the proceeding is futile. Any errors made have been acknowledged by the respondents and rectified. The respondents submitted that given the lack of controversy surrounding the key issues, there is no reason to infer that, contrary to the applicant's submissions, he will only be able to be paid road tolls if he seeks judicial review before the Federal Court, or that review avenues cannot address any future errors that may occur. The respondents also submitted that much of the conduct about which the applicant complains is insufficiently proximate to any relevant decision. With respect to the relief sought by the applicant, the respondents submitted it was “inapposite” for a variety of reasons. In the circumstances, the respondents submitted, the applicant has no reasonable prospects of making out that an error of law has occurred.CONSIDERATIONADJR Act Claims The AOA contains the following conduct as providing the basis upon which the relief referred to in relation to the ADJR Act is sought: 27. The Respondent’s Liability Handbook states “It is RCG policy to give clients who are to receive an adverse decision, advance warning of that likely outcome. The purpose of that policy is to give that client the opportunity to submit new evidence in the light of your interpretation of the evidence (or lack of it)”. “The suggested means of giving this advance warning is for the Delegate to phone the client and discuss the case, the proposed decision and the reasons for that decision”. The Respondent did not afford the Applicant this opportunity. …37. It appears that the only way the Applicant can get a road toll paid is by initiating Federal Court processes i.e. The Respondent/s website and online claims portal instruct Veterans they cannot claim road tolls, the Applicant makes a claim for road tolls, the Respondent/s ignore the claim (do not make a decision), the Applicant commences Federal Court processes, the Respondent/s state to the Court they believe “road tolls are a reasonable travel expense under MRCA”, the Respondent/s review the original determination, then the Applicant gets the claim paid. 38. Breaches of natural justice have occurred, are occurring, and are likely to occur. 39. Errors of law have been, are being, and likely to be made. 40. Justice delayed is justice denied. 41. There is no evidence or other materials to justify the making of the proposed decision. …44. It is an accepted tenant of Administrative Law that consistency and certainty in administrative decision making are desirable goals, especially in relation to discretionary powers, and that the adoption of guiding policies is something to be encouraged. This is especially so in areas of high volume decision making. However, such policies must be lawful and cannot be blindly applied. The applicant submits the conduct of the Respondent/s is inconsistent and unlawful without fact or basis.…47. The Respondent/s repeatedly failed to make a decision (s7 ADJR). 48. Through failure to make a decision the Respondent/s have attempted to reject the Claim by stealth. (emphasis in original)