DMH20 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DMH20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCAFC 31  

Appeal from: DMH20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCA 1054
File number(s): VID 616 of 2022
Judgment of: CHARLESWORTH, THAWLEY AND KENNETT JJ
Date of judgment: 9 March 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders dismissing an application for a declaration that it was not reasonably practicable to remove the appellant, an unlawful non-citizen, from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future – whether primary judge erred by failing to distinguish between the concepts of voluntariness and cooperation –whether primary judge erred in failing to find that it was unlikely that the appellant would become voluntary towards his removal – no error established – appeal dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – s 21

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – ss 189, 196, 198, 199, 200

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – r 30.01

Cases cited:

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; 175 CLR 564

Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562

Arrowcrest Group Pty Ltd v Gill (1993) 46 FCR 90

Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1992] HCA 64; 176 CLR 1

Commonwealth v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; 273 CLR 43

DMH20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCA 1054

Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2010] NSWCA 222; 243 FLR 177

Plaintiff M47/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] HCA17; 265 CLR 285

Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2003] HCA 75; 216 CLR 53

Samiv Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCA 1513

Sankey v Whitlam [1978] HCA 43; 142 CLR

SHDB v Goodwin [2003] FCA 300

Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations [1993] FCA 105; 41 FCR 89

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 84
Date of hearing: 22 February 2023
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A M Hochroth with Ms H D Ryan
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ryan & Payten Criminal Law Specialists
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P D Herzfeld SC with Ms J D Watson
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 616 of 2022
BETWEEN:

DMH20

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

CHARLESWORTH, THAWLEY AND KENNETT JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

9 MARCH 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. Ahmed Ali Al-Kateb was a stateless Palestinian born in Kuwait, who arrived in Australia without a passport or visa in December 2000 and was taken into immigration detention. His application for a protection visa was refused and that refusal was upheld by the Refugee Review Tribunal. His application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 31
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by DMH20, an unlawful non-citizen, against the Minister for Home Affairs, seeking a declaration that it was not reasonably practicable to remove him from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future. The case revolved around the appellant's argument that there was no realistic prospect of his removal due to Malta's refusal to issue him a travel document, which would be necessary for his return to his country of nationality. The appellant contended that Malta would not accept his return at all or would only do so if he voluntarily consented to it. The primary judge dismissed the application, and DMH20 appealed to the court, which ultimately dismissed the appeal with costs.

The court was required to decide whether the primary judge erred in not distinguishing between the concepts of voluntariness and cooperation, and whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that it was unlikely that the appellant would become voluntary towards his removal. The court also had to consider whether there was any error in the primary judge's approach to the evidence and the assessment of the likelihood of the appellant's removal.

The court concluded that there was no error in the primary judge's decision. The court found that the primary judge had correctly considered the evidence and had not erred in her assessment of the likelihood of the appellant's removal. The court held that the primary judge had correctly distinguished between the concepts of voluntariness and cooperation, and that there was no basis to conclude that it was unlikely that the appellant would become voluntary towards his removal. The court also found that the primary judge had not erred in her approach to the evidence, and that there was no reason to interfere with her conclusions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As mentioned, although we have concluded that the appeal must be dismissed for reasons unrelated to the factual merits of the case sought to be advanced, we consider it appropriate to express our conclusions as to the merits of that case and to address the grounds of appeal briefly.THE JUDGMENT UNDER APPEAL The appellant argued that there was no realistic prospect of his removal from Australia becoming practicable because his country of nationality – Malta – would not issue him a travel document that would allow him to enter. It was common ground that there was no possibility of his removal to another country. The argument was put on two bases: first, that Malta would not accept his return at all; and secondly, that Malta would not accept his return if he did not voluntarily consent to that return.First basis: Malta would not accept the appellant As to the first basis, the primary judge summarised the relevant evidence at J[27]–[58] and [64]. There was documentary evidence before her Honour of Malta’s High Commissioner to Australia in 2012 and 2013 (Mr Tabone) expressing a significant degree of unwillingness to see the appellant return to his country. Malta’s Foreign Minister, who was also Deputy Prime Minister, was also referred to as having queried whether it “made sense” to return the appellant. These reservations appear to have been a response to the crimes that the appellant had committed. Mr Tabone finished his term on 30 June 2013. In early 2014 the new Maltese High Commissioner expressed the view that Australia should “look after” people in the appellant’s position and sought a meeting with the Minister. However, in mid-2014 there was an “in principle” agreement to accept removal of the appellant and two other detainees to Malta. There were further communications in 2014 in which the High Commissioner agreed to consider taking steps to allow the appellant’s return, but he needed to confer with authorities in Malta. Maltese officials seemed to understand that the appellant wished to return at that stage. In July 2015, the High Commission reported that it had received advice from Malta to issue a travel document to the appellant. However, by that time, the appellant had applied for a protection visa and his removal was no longer being pursued. Between November 2014 and October 2018 the appellant was pursuing either his protection visa application or related legal proceedings, and officers were therefore not seeking to remove him. There was documentary evidence of communications with Malta during that period, relating to another detainee, in which Malta’s position was that it would only grant a travel document if the detainee consented to and “willingly” signed the application for the document. After 2018, when the appellant again became the subject of discussions between Australian and Maltese officials, the barrier was Malta’s insistence on consent by the person to be removed. There was no suggestion that the appellant’s character or conduct was a reason why his return to Malta would not be accepted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Al-Kateb was not removed, because Australian officials were unable to obtain the necessary international co-operation, and remained in detention. On 3 April 2003, this Court dismissed an application for a declaration that he was unlawfully detained. The primary judge (von Doussa J) found that all reasonable efforts had been made to remove Mr Al-Kateb but that his “removal from Australia is not reasonably practicable at the present time as there is no real likelihood or prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future”: SHDB v Goodwin [2003] FCA 300 at [9]. The expression “reasonably practicable” reflected the language of s 198 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which requires an “officer” to remove a non-citizen in detention from Australia in certain defined circumstances, including when a request for removal is made by the non-citizen: s 198(1). Mr Al-Kateb’s appeal from that judgment was removed into the High Court, where a majority held that his continued detention was authorised by ss 189 and 196 of the Migration Act and that these provisions were valid: Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562 (McHugh, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ dissenting). At the level of statutory construction, the reasoning of the majority depended principally on the language of s 196(1), which provided that a non-citizen who had been detained under s 189 was required to be detained “until he or she is” either removed from Australia under ss 198 or 199, deported under s 200, or granted a visa. That language was seen as leaving no room for release from detention in other circumstances, in particular where removal was not, and not likely to become, “reasonably practicable” in the foreseeable future. At the level of constitutional validity, the majority held that detention of a non-citizen for the purpose of removing him or her from Australia did not infringe the principles laid down in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1992] HCA 64; 176 CLR 1 even if that purpose was not able to be carried into effect or likely to become so in the reasonably foreseeable future. The minority held, in short, that the command in s 196 was to be read as subject to an exception where s 198 was unable to be carried out such that, in those circumstances, the Migration Act provided no authority for continued detention. The provisions that were considered in Al-Kateb have since been amended, but not in a way that affects the reasoning. The decision of the High Court in Al-Kateb has been the subject of commentary, much of it adverse. It is sometimes suggested that the High Court might come to a different decision if the issue were to be considered again. However, an appropriate vehicle for reconsideration of Al-Kateb has yet to come before the High Court. Plaintiff M47/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] HCA17; 265 CLR 285 came before the High Court by way of a special case setting out agreed facts and questions of law. The plaintiff invited the Court to infer from the agreed facts that there was no real prospect or likelihood that he would be able to be removed from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future and to hold that his detention was therefore unlawful. The Court declined to draw the inference. The plaintiff had deliberately failed to assist the officers of the Department in their attempts to establish his true identity and nationality. The Court held that there was no basis to assume that it was beyond the plaintiff’s power to provide further information on these issues, and there was thus no way of knowing whether his identity could be established and his removal from Australia achieved. Accordingly, no factual basis was established for the application of the view of the minority in Al-Kateb: Plaintiff M47 at [42] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ).