Ajmal and Comcare (Compensation) [2022] AATA 3978 (24 November 2022)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2021/4286
Re:Muhammad Ajmal
APPLICANT
AndComcare
RESPONDENT
Decision
Tribunal:Member W Frost
Date:24 November 2022
Place:Canberra
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review pursuant to subsection 43(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
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Member W Frost
Catchwords
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – section 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 – denial of liability for an aggravation of lateral epicondylitis (right) – ‘tennis elbow’ -- where Applicant worked as auditor – keyboard and mouse usage – where symptoms aggravated by employment and outside daily living activities – underlying degenerative condition – employment contribution not established to a significant degree – decision under review affirmed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, ss 37, 43(1)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, ss 4, 5A, 5B, 14Cases
Beezley v Repatriation Commission (2015) 150 ALD 11
Rodriguez v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2002] FCA 30
Comcare v Power [2015] FCA 1502REASONS FOR DECISION
Member W Frost
24 November 2022
INTRODUCTION
The Applicant, Mr Muhammad Ajmal, applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) for review of a decision by the Respondent, Comcare, affirming its determination denying liability to pay him compensation under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act) for ‘right lateral elbow tendinopathy’ (referred to as LET and commonly known as ‘tennis elbow’).
Mr Ajmal claimed to have begun experiencing pain while undertaking audit work in his employment with the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). Comcare declined liability under the SRC Act because it found that Mr Ajmal did not suffer an ‘injury’ for the purposes of the SRC Act; it was not satisfied that the LET was contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment.
The Tribunal has considered all documents filed pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act) and the parties’ ‘Hearing Book’ bundle of documents, together with their submissions at the hearing.[1] For the following reasons, the Tribunal affirms Comcare’s decision because Mr Ajmal’s application fails to meet the requirements of the SRC Act and Comcare is therefore not liable to pay him compensation.
[1] Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.
ISSUE
The issue for the Tribunal to decide in this proceeding is whether Mr Ajmal suffered an ‘injury’ under the SRC Act.
BACKGROUND
Mr Ajmal is 46 years old.[2]
[2] Exhibit 1, page 28.
In 2011, Mr Ajmal commenced employment with the ANAO.[3] He is employed as a Team Member of the Assurance Audit Services Group at the Australian Public Service Level 5.[4]
[3] Ibid., page 34.
[4] Ibid., pages 75-76.
On 20 August 2020, Mr Ajmal completed an ANAO ‘Accident/Incident Report’ and relevantly stated that he ‘started experiencing pain in forearm and elbow region during the DFAT and DVA audit final field work’, ‘kept working’ and considered the pain to be ‘muscular and due to fast paced audit work environment and extra work’.[5] Mr Ajmal…
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- Case
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the Tribunal was whether Mr. Ajmal had suffered an "injury" as defined by the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act). Specifically, the Tribunal was required to determine if Mr. Ajmal's lateral epicondylitis constituted a "disease" under the Act, which necessitates a finding that his employment contributed to the condition to a significant degree. The Tribunal also considered the evidentiary standard required to satisfy the statutory requirements for compensation.
The Tribunal reasoned that while Mr. Ajmal experienced pain symptoms during his work, this alone was insufficient to establish that his ailment was significantly contributed to by his employment. The weight of the expert medical evidence did not support a significant contribution from his employment with the ANAO. Instead, the Tribunal found that Mr. Ajmal's condition was primarily the result of an underlying constitutional and age-related process, not caused by his work. Consequently, the Tribunal was not satisfied that his employment contributed to his ailment to a significant degree, meaning he had not suffered a "disease" or "injury" under the SRC Act.
Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed Comcare's decision, finding that Comcare was not liable to pay compensation to Mr. Ajmal pursuant to section 14 of the SRC Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Comcare contended that the medical evidence does not establish that Mr Ajmal’s condition met the requirements of a ‘disease’ under the SRC Act. While Comcare accepted that Mr Ajmal suffered from an ‘ailment’, being his LET or right-sided ‘tennis elbow’, it submitted that this was a degenerative condition and was not contributed to, to a significant degree, by Mr Ajmal’s employment with the ANAO. Therefore, Comcare sought an affirmation of its reviewable decision that it is not liable to pay compensation to Mr Ajmal under the SRC Act. CONSIDERATIONThe Tribunal’s task The issue before the Tribunal is whether Mr Ajmal suffered an ‘injury’, as defined by the SRC Act, in order to be paid compensation by Comcare. While it is well established that there is no onus of proof in the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the Tribunal must be satisfied, based on relevant and probative material, that the requirements of the relevant legislation are met for a particular statutory power to be exercised in favour of an applicant. The Federal Court of Australia in Beezley v Repatriation Commission (2015) 150 ALD 11 at [68] held that:If an applicant does not provide evidence and information sufficient to meet the statutory requirements, an applicant is unlikely to have the statutory power exercised in her or his favour. And unless and until a decision-maker is satisfied, or persuaded, that the requirements are met, then no occasion to exercise the power in favour of an applicant arises. In that sense, as a practical matter, it is not incorrect to say that a person “must satisfy” the requirements in the statute. To say that is not to impose an onus of proof on an applicant, but rather to recognise the operation of the legislative scheme under which the person seeks a benefit or interest. Additionally, Justice Kiefel (as her Honour then was) said in Rodriguez v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2002] FCA 30 at [25] that, although the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, this ‘does not justify decisions made without a basis in evidence having probative force’.[48] In this regard, it was held at [26] that:[49]It may be said that expert evidence is sometimes over-utilised and is called in situations where an arbiter of fact is in a position to determine the matter for itself. Sometimes all that is necessary is for a method or process to be explained, so that the Court or Tribunal can then apply it to the facts it finds. On the other hand, there are cases where a whole question is, in effect, relegated to experts to give evidence upon it. This was such a case. The Tribunal was not put in a position where it could simply draw its own inferences. In an area which required an understanding of a disorder it could only receive the opinions, have the bases for them explained if they differed and apply logic to determine which were to be accepted.[48] Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs[1979] AATA 64; (1979) 36 FLR 482, 492, referring to Consolidated Edison Co v National Labour Relations Board [1938] USSC 176; (1938) 305 US 197, 229; The King v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott[1933] HCA 30; (1933) 50 CLR 228, 256. [49] These paragraphs were referred to in Comcare v Wuth [2018] FCAFC 13 at [98].