Rodriguez v Telstra Corporation Limited [2002] FCA 30
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal - whether Tribunal substituted its own opinion for expert evidence - whether Tribunal asked itself correct question - whether Tribunal’s decision based on its own view - whether Tribunal’s decision supported by probative evidence
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- effect of rules of evidence in Administrative Appeals Tribunal
WORKER’S COMPENSATION - compensation for major depressive disorder - whether compensation available pursuant to Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 - whether disorder arose out of or in the course of employment
GABRIEL RODRIGUEZ v TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED Q164 of 2001
KIEFEL J BRISBANE
25 JANUARY 2002
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 165 OF 2001
ON APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
GABRIEL RODRIGUEZ APPLICANT
AND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
KIEFEL J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JANUARY 2002
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of 29 June 2001 be set aside and the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, differently constituted, for consideration according to law.
3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 165 OF 2001
ON APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
GABRIEL RODRIGUEZ APPLICANT
AND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
KIEFEL J
DATE:
25 JANUARY 2002
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 14 October 1999 Spender J made orders in three appeals brought by the applicant from decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal concerning his entitlement to workers’ compensation. Two of the decisions concerned a condition relating to the applicant’s neck which was said to have arisen out of an incident in which he was involved in the course of his employment. The Tribunal found that the applicant had suffered a naturally occurring degenerative condition and rejected those claims for compensation. The third involved a claim for a major depressive disorder. His Honour ordered that the decision rejecting…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Rodriguez v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2002] FCA 30
Case
[2002] FCA 30
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In Rodriguez v Telstra Corporation Ltd, the appellant, Rodriguez, sought to challenge a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that his major depressive disorder was not an injury within the meaning of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 from 1 September 1998. The primary judge, Spender J, had previously set aside a decision of the AAT and remitted the matter for further consideration. The AAT then found that Rodriguez’s disorder was work-related up until 1 September 1998. The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal was correct to determine that Rodriguez's disorder was no longer work-related from 1 September 1998. The court was required to consider the medical evidence and the circumstances surrounding Rodriguez's employment and the events that allegedly contributed to his condition.
The court examined the medical evidence provided by various psychiatrists and doctors who diagnosed Rodriguez with a major depressive disorder. The doctors attributed the onset of the disorder to Rodriguez's perception of events in the workplace, including delays in compensation claims, conflicts with superiors, and disputes over sick leave. The court noted that the doctors believed Rodriguez’s disorder was entrenched and perpetuated by his belief that he had suffered injustice, lack of money, and unemployment. The court had to determine whether these factors, particularly the workplace incidents, were the primary cause of Rodriguez's disorder or if other factors had become predominant.
The court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in finding that Rodriguez's major depressive disorder was no longer work-related from 1 September 1998. The evidence suggested that while the workplace incidents had contributed to the onset of Rodriguez's disorder, other factors such as his fixation on the past events, lack of financial stability, and belief in having suffered injustice had become the primary perpetuators of his condition. The court found that the Tribunal had appropriately considered the medical evidence and the circumstances surrounding Rodriguez's disorder when making its decision. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the decision of the AAT was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for further consideration in light of the court's findings. Additionally, Telstra was ordered to pay Rodriguez’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of 29 June 2001 be set aside and the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, differently constituted, for consideration according to law.
3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The respondent’s principal submission is that matters of proof and causation, usual in a purely adversarial system, do not apply to the Tribunal: Comcare v O’Dea (1997)150 ALR 318, 322; Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408, 424-425; McDonald v Director-General Department of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354, 356. THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE Dr Green was the first psychiatrist to whom the applicant was referred. He saw him between June 1994 and October 1995. Dr Green explains in his reports how he came to diagnose a major depressive disorder on the second occasion the applicant consulted him. In his view the disorder developed as a consequence of the applicant’s preoccupation with supposed injustices he felt in the treatment of him by Telstra, a reference to the incidents. When asked, in cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel, whether he would expect the applicant’s condition to improve since he had been away from Telstra since May 1994, the doctor said that it was possible but that it was obvious that the applicant has a “considerable amount of unfinished business” with Telstra. He agreed that it was unlikely to be a permanent condition, but the degree of recovery may not be complete. Such a condition often remains as a chronic fluctuating disorder, but improved over its original state. Dr Green said nothing about changes to the causes of the illness or its perpetuation. The witness who had been called prior to Dr Green was Dr Levien, who provided a report dated 16 September 1996. The doctor had been provided with two reports from each of Drs Reddan and Klug, to which reference will shortly be made. Dr Levien also diagnosed a major depressive disorder and gave as a cause the applicant’s dispute with Telstra. In his view the depression was entrenched and perpetuated by lack of money, unemployment and the applicant’s belief that he had suffered injustice. The reasons given by Dr Levien as to why the applicant did not get better are summarised in part in paragraph 110 of the Tribunal’s reasons set out above. In addition to the insufficiency of psychiatric treatment, Dr Levien considered that people such as the applicant become fixated on a period in their life; the applicant felt he had been denied justice and the litigation process required him to go over the events which had caused his anxiety. The doctor expected that the applicant might improve, but not get better. The last of Dr Klug’s four reports is dated 26 September 2000. Telstra first referred the applicant to the doctor in September 1995. In his view the probable cause of the applicant’s condition was a chain of events starting with his neck and back injury and following events. The applicant felt that he was persecuted by Telstra for seeking compensation. The doctor said that the work factors had contributed in a material degree to his condition and went on to say that he did not believe any factor other than those so contributed. Cross-examination of the doctor was focussed largely upon his views about the possibility that the applicant was malingering, as it was with other doctors. The source of this was a second report of Dr Reddan. Dr Klug was asked about the applicant’s prospects of improvement, but not about whether the condition continued because of other, newer causes and the doctor had offered no opinion on that topic. He did say that he did not think that the applicant was quite so preoccupied with Telstra and did not think about it all the time, as he had six months before. Given that first date of the Tribunal hearing was March 2001, I take it the doctor is referring to his last consultation in about September 2000. He believed however that the applicant would remain suspicious of Telstra. He had a constant hate and anger against it.
Decision
Reasons for decision
KIEFEL J
On 14 October 1999 Spender J made orders in three appeals brought by the applicant from decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal concerning his entitlement to workers’ compensation. Two of the decisions concerned a condition relating to the applicant’s neck which was said to have arisen out of an incident in which he was involved in the course of his employment. The Tribunal found that the applicant had suffered a naturally occurring degenerative condition and rejected those claims for compensation. The third involved a claim for a major depressive disorder. His Honour ordered that the decision rejecting this claim be set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for further considerationTHE TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal considered the matter afresh and on 29 June 2001 set aside the decision of the delegate of 17 December 1996, rejecting the claim, and substituted its decision that: “1.sets aside the decision of the respondent dated 17 December, 1996; and 2. substitutes a decision that: (1)the applicant’s major depressive disorder is an injury within the meaning of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 from and including 1 July, 1994 up to and including 1 September, 1998; and (2)the applicant was totally incapacitated for work as a result of that major depressive disorder from and including 1 July, 1994 up to and including 1 September, 1998; and 3. adjourns consideration of costs to a date to be fixed.” It is the Tribunal’s decision that the disorder from which the applicant is suffering was, from 1 September 1998, no longer work-related which is at issue on the appeal. The hearing before the Tribunal involved a number of psychiatrists and other doctors and therapists. The Tribunal found, following the hearing: “The consensus amongst all of the psychiatrists is that Mr Rodriguez is suffering from a major depressive disorder and we so find.” although it noted the differences in the medical opinions and in particular whether he suffered from delusional or paranoid thinking. The medical evidence was to the effect that he was to be taken to suffering from the disorder if he was found to be a truthful person. The Tribunal did not find him to be untruthful. It then posed the question for itself: “Did that condition arise out of, or in the course of, his employment so that it is an injury within the meaning of s. 4(1) of the Act?”and answered it: “On the basis of the psychiatric evidence, we find that his condition arose out of his perception of the events in the workplace.” And the Tribunal adopted the summary of those events earlier made by Spender J. “There were many aspects of the workplace relationship which, it is said on Mr Rodriguez’s behalf, contributed to the onset of his disorder. There was the delay in settling his claims for compensation for medical expenses associated with his neck injury. There was the requirement by his superiors that he resign from the position of floor warden. There was the issue of his signing on in the sign-on book as if he had been at work when he had been at physiotherapy; this was something that he claimed to be entitled to do, but which was disputed by his superiors, and generated much tension. The unhappy relationship which developed between Mr Rodriguez and his superior in the latter half of 1993, included a complaint by Mr Rodriguez that she had singled him out for special attention. There is undisputed evidence that the supervisor approached two other employees of Telstra senior to Mr Rodriguez and told them to keep a special eye on him, and told them that, if the supervisor was on holidays and Mr Rodriguez had a day off, they were to ring her at home so she could drive past his house to check on him. There was the direction by his superiors that the setting up of procedures and systems to do with the handling of enquiries, which work Mr Rodriguez was initially entrusted with, be taken away from him. Mr Rodriguez considered this direction to be a slight on him. There were disputes about the claim by his superiors that he was taking excessive sick leave.” (I shall refer to those events as “the incidents” in the balance of these reasons).