Oliver and Comcare (Compensation) [2018] AATA 1964 (29 June 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2017/3257
Re:Catrina Oliver
APPLICANT
AndComcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President Gary Humphries
Date:29 June 2018
Place:Canberra
The Applicant's application in matter 2017/3257 is dismissed pursuant to s 42B of the Administrative AppealsTribunal Act 1975.
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Deputy President Gary HumphriesCatchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – s 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 – dismissal of proceedings if there are no reasonable prospects of success – Tribunal entitled to assess the strength of case based on material before it – Tribunal not satisfied that the Applicant has evidence of sufficient quality and weight to succeed at a hearing – Application dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – release from an implied undertaking
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ss 42B
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 31A
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 14, 37
Cases
Comcare v Wuth [2018] FCAFC 13
Chin and Comcare [2017] AATA 634
Filsell and Comcare [2009] AATA 90
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd and Others [2008] FCAFC 60
Kanan v Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union (1992) 43 IR 257
LMFP and Comcare [2017] AATA 1512
Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] HCA 19
MRCC v May (2016) 257 CLR 468
Novosel v Comcare [2017] FCA 722
Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28Warner and Comcare [2017] AATA 2709
Secondary Material
Explanatory Memorandum, Tribunals Amalgamation Bill 2014
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President Gary Humphries
29 June 2018
INTRODUCTION
The Applicant, Ms Catrina Oliver has brought three applications for merits review before the Tribunal, all relating to injuries she says she incurred in the course of her employment. This is an interlocutory application by Comcare for dismissal of one of those applications, pursuant to s 42B(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act), on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success.
Section 42B(1) allows the Tribunal to dismiss an application for review of a decision, at any stage of a proceeding, if it is satisfied that the application:
(a)is frivolous, vexatious misconceived or lacking in substance;
(b)has no reasonable prospect of success; or
(c)is otherwise an abuse of process of the Tribunal.
BACKGROUND
The following factual background was submitted by the parties to the Tribunal.
Ms Oliver is, and was at all relevant times, employed with the Department of Social Services (the DSS). She has an accepted workers compensation claim in respect of an unspecified disorder of synovium, tendon and bursa (left) and wrist sprain (left)[1] (the compensable conditions) with a date of injury of 30 July 2012.
[1] In this decision, italicised text is generally used to indicate direct quotations.
Ms Oliver has two proceedings before the Tribunal which relate to the compensable conditions. Those applications are:
(i)Application 2016/4926 which relates to…
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- Re Oliver and Comcare [2018] AATA 1964
- Case
- [2018] AATA 1964
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The AAT was required to determine whether Ms Oliver's application for review had no reasonable prospect of success, thereby permitting its dismissal under section 42B of the AAT Act. This involved assessing the quality and weight of the evidence presented by Ms Oliver in support of her claim that her right shoulder and wrist pain was a consequence of her accepted left wrist injury. The Tribunal also had to consider an interlocutory issue regarding the use of expert reports, specifically whether the use of Professor Youssef's reports breached an implied undertaking not to use documents produced in other proceedings for purposes other than those for which they were given.
The Tribunal considered the extensive medical evidence, which included reports from various medical professionals and imaging results. This evidence generally indicated normal findings for Ms Oliver's right shoulder and wrist, with some reports noting reduced grip strength in the right wrist at one point, but later normal grip strength and full range of movement. Crucially, Dr Thai's report suggested that Ms Oliver's right-sided shoulder and neck pain were likely referred pain from her cervical spine, unrelated to employment, and that symptoms would have developed regardless of her favouring her right arm. The Tribunal found that the evidence did not demonstrate a sufficient link between Ms Oliver's claimed right-sided conditions and her accepted left wrist injury, nor did it establish that the conditions were employment-related. The Tribunal also noted that Comcare had been released from the implied undertaking concerning Professor Youssef's reports.
The Tribunal concluded that Ms Oliver had not provided evidence of sufficient quality and weight to establish that her claimed right-sided conditions were a consequence of her accepted left wrist injury or arose from her employment. Consequently, the Tribunal was satisfied that the application had no reasonable prospect of success and ordered that the application be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
French CJ and Gummow J stated at [24]–[25]:[24] The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution. That is so whether such disposition is sought on the basis that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action or on the basis that the action is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process. The same applies where such a disposition is sought in a summary judgment application supported by evidence. As to the latter, this Court in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd said:“The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried”.More recently, in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ repeated a statement by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Agar v Hyde which included the following:“Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.”There would seem to be little distinction between those approaches and the requirement of a “real” as distinct from “fanciful” prospect of success contemplated by s 31A. That proposition, however, is not inconsistent with the proposition that the criterion in s 31A may be satisfied upon grounds wider than those contained in pre‑existing Rules of Court authorising summary dispositions.[25] Section 31A(2) requires a practical judgment by the Federal Court as to whether the applicant has more than a “fanciful” prospect of success. That may be a judgment of law or of fact, or of mixed law and fact. Where there are factual issues capable of being disputed and in dispute, summary dismissal should not be awarded to the respondent simply because the Court has formed the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the factual issue. Where the success of a proceeding depends upon propositions of law apparently precluded by existing authority, that may not always be the end of the matter. Existing authority may be overruled, qualified or further explained. Summary processes must not be used to stultify the development of the law. But where the success of proceedings is critically dependent upon a proposition of law which would contradict a binding decision of this Court, the court hearing the application under s 31A could justifiably conclude that the proceedings had no reasonable prospect of success. (Footnotes omitted)CONSIDERATIONThe implied undertaking and Prof Youssef The Tribunal will deal firstly with an interlocutory issue. Ms Oliver took objection to the Tribunal using the reports of Prof Youssef. It was said that Prof Youssef’s opinion was formed using documents produced in other proceedings before the Tribunal, such that their use constituted a breach of the implied undertaking not to use such material for any purpose other than that for which it was given. Comcare told the Tribunal that Prof Youssef’s reports were produced as part of the claims management of her compensable conditions, and that the Tribunal had previously released Comcare from the implied undertaking for such purposes.