Evans and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Veterans' entitlements)
[2019] AATA 2215
•10 July 2019
Evans and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Veterans' entitlements) [2019] AATA 2215 (10 July 2019)
Division:VETERANS' APPEAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2018/7431
Re:Tracey Evans
APPLICANT
AndMilitary Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Member W Frost
Date of decision: 10 July 2019
Date of
Written reasons: 29 July 2019
Place:Canberra
The application for review is dismissed pursuant to section 42B(1)(b) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.
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Member W Frost
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – compensation - application to dismiss on basis of no reasonable prospect of success – past award of common law damages - whether s 48(4) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-related Claims) Act 1988 precluded claim for compensation – tribunal satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of success – application for review dismissed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 42B
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-Related Claims) Act 1988 ss 6A, 16, 19, 24, 27, 48
Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015
Cases
Australian Tertiary Academy Pty Ltd and Australian Skills Quality Authority [2017] AATA 480
Complete Training Institute Pty Ltd and Australian Skills Quality Authority [2018] AATA 4638
Filsell and Comcare [2009] AATA 90
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60
Oliver and Comcare [2018] AATA 1964
Paraponiaris and Secretary, Department of Employment (2015) 68 AAR 143
Secondary Materials
Explanatory Memorandum, Tribunals Amalgamation Bill 2014
The Scheme for Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration (the CDDA Scheme), Department of FinanceREASONS FOR DECISION
Member W Frost
29 July 2019
INTRODUCTION
The Applicant, Ms Tracey Evans, applied to the Tribunal for review of a decision of the Respondent dated 3 December 2018 that compensation for her accepted condition was not payable under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-Related Claims) Act 1988 (Act) in circumstances where she had previously received an award of common law damages in relation to that condition.
A hearing of the application was scheduled for 29 July 2019. The Respondent made an interlocutory application to the Tribunal to dismiss Ms Evans’ application for review pursuant to section 42B(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act), on the basis that the application had no reasonable prospect of success because no better outcome could be achieved by Ms Evans before the Tribunal and it would therefore be futile to continue with her application.
At a pre-hearing directions hearing on 10 July 2019, the Tribunal heard from the parties regarding the Respondent’s dismissal application. The Tribunal at that hearing dismissed Ms Evans’ application for review on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success. The Tribunal provides these written reasons for its dismissal of the application.
ISSUE
The issue before the Tribunal was whether compensation was payable to Ms Evans for her accepted condition given the application of section 48(4) of the Act, which provides that compensation is not payable to an employee in respect of injury, loss or damage, after the date on which damages were recovered by the employee.
BACKGROUND
Ms Evans was born in November 1971 and enlisted with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in April 1991 at 19 years old.
From 1991 to 1999, Ms Evans served with the ADF as a dental nurse (T54).
In or around 2003, Ms Evans transferred to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Police. Since discharge from the RAAF, Ms Evans has worked as an interviewing officer with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) (T54).
Dr Jennifer Dunlop, Cosmetic Physician, in her report dated 31 October 2001, noted that in 1991, prior to joining the ADF, Ms Evans described having ‘a small white “warty” lesion on her right upper lip, which she has had prior to joining the army in 1991’. The report notes that two weeks after her enlistment, this lesion was cauterized under local anaesthetic ‘at the army’s request’. Dr Dunlop reported that Ms Evans ‘thinks the lesion vanished immediately, and only reappeared in 1997 as a small white dot of a scar’ (T10).
In 2000, the ADF arranged for Ms Evans to see Dr Chandra Patel, Plastic Surgeon, who said that he would revise the scar using a ‘vertical incision parallel to the philtrum of my lip’ (T8.3; T10).
On 17 January 2001, at Duntroon, Dr Patel performed the surgery to Ms Evans’ lip region. However, instead of performing a vertical incision, Dr Patel performed a transverse incision (T10). In her words, this surgery left Ms Evans ‘disfigured and embarrassed about my condition’ (Paragraph 6, Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions of the Applicant dated 30 April 2019, (Applicant’s Statement)).
On 7 February 2001, Ms Evans returned to Dr Patel and expressed her dissatisfaction. Ms Evans was advised by Dr Patel to return in three months (T8.3). After that period of time, Dr Patel recommended waiting a further three months before having a re-excision or laser resurfacing of Ms Evans’ lip region. Ms Evans expressed her concern with this suggestion to Dr Dunlop, who sought a second opinion from Dr Robert Drielsma, Cosmetic Surgeon. Dr Drielsma suggested waiting twelve months and performing a vertical excision, leaving a ‘T’ shaped scar (T7, T8.3 and T10).
On 9 May 2001, Ms Evans submitted a formal complaint to the Commanding Officer of the Canberra Area Medical Unit (CAMU) in the Department of Defence (Defence) regarding the treatment she received from Dr Patel (T8.3, T10). Ms Evans also sought a further opinion from Dr Taylor, Plastic Surgeon, who recommended two separate surgical procedures six months apart to effect a vertical re-exercising of the original scar (T10).
On 26 July 2001, the Department of Defence responded to Ms Evans’ formal complaint against Dr Patel (T8). Defence stated that it:
accepts that you have not…experienced the outcome you expected from plastic surgery provided by Dr Patel. Whilst it is believed that you have been afforded the best care possible, an individual’s expectations must be respected and, to this end, you have been provided with further specialist care at Commonwealth expense.
On 19 August 2002, Ms Evans sought damages for negligence, plus costs and interest, against Dr Patel and the Commonwealth in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (T13). Ms Evans’ Statement of Claim particularised her injuries as being, amongst other things: ‘obvious horizontal scarring on the red surface of the upper lip’; ‘loss of sensation in the upper lip’; ‘reduction in sensitivity near the scar’; and ‘a prominent scar in the vermillion’. Ms Evans contends that she commenced legal proceedings against Dr Patel on ‘advice from the Commanding Officer of CAMU’ (Paragraph 8, Applicant’s Statement).
On 18 July 2003, and importantly for Ms Evans’ application before the Tribunal, the Supreme Court ordered Dr Patel to pay damages to Ms Evans in the amount of $17,500 in relation to her claim for negligence for events surrounding the surgery and resulting injury to her lip region (T60).
On 9 October 2011, Dr Alan Ferguson, Plastic and Reconstruction Surgeon, removed Ms Evans’ pitted central indentation with a biopsy punch. Dr Dunlop reported that Ms Evans still experienced sensory loss along the vermillion border of the right upper lip and along the transverse scar line from the original procedure performed by Dr Patel in January 2001 (T9 and T10).
On 18 May 2018, Ms Evans made a claim with the Respondent for compensation under section 14 of the Act for ‘face condition’ (T56). In her statement, Ms Evans characterised her injury as ‘resulting in permanent impairment by way of visible unevenness, a disfigured ugly scar and substantial sensory nerve loss’ in the lip (T56.1).
On 30 July 2018, the Respondent denied liability to compensate Ms Evans for a ‘face condition’ under section 14 of the Act on the basis that no diagnosis was established and that Ms Evans did not ‘suffer an injury as an unintended consequence’ of the surgery in order to satisfy the relevant causal connection of the condition to her service with the ADF under section 6A of the Act (T57).
On 20 August 2018, Ms Evans sought reconsideration of the Respondent’s determination (T58).
On 3 December 2018, the Respondent revoked its July 2018 determination and in its place found that liability be accepted for Ms Evans’ ‘transverse scar with sensory loss along the vermillion border of the right upper lip’ pursuant to section 62(2) of the Act, with the date of injury being 17 January 2001. The Respondent noted that:
the evidence indicates the procedure from Dr Patel on 17 January 2001 failed to reduce the size or appearance of the scar, but instead resulted in the development of a new scar resulting in sensory loss. I find the result was not a desired outcome, nor was it a likely consequence of treatment.
However, the Respondent also determined that, given the operation of section 48 of the Act, compensation was not payable to Ms Evans in respect of the injury because she had previously recovered common law damages for that injury (T1.1).
On 2 January 2019, Ms Evans applied to the Tribunal for review of the Respondent’s decision (T1). In her application, Ms Evans stated that:
In 2003, I sought Supreme Court action to claim damages against Dr Patel for an incorrect surgical procedure whilst I was serving. The surgical procedure has left me disfigured and embarrassed about my appearance. In Mar 2018, I submitted a claim to DVA [Department of Veterans’ Affairs] for my condition but the claim was REJECTED as my condition was considered to be a ‘Common side effect’ of the surgical procedure. In Aug 2018, I appealed this decision by proving that my condition was surgical error, not a common side effect. On 3 Dec 18, DVA reversed the earlier decision and have ACCEPTED liability for my condition but…‘under section 48 of the DRCA [the Act] you are not entitled to compensation (including treatment) for ‘transverse scar with sensory loss along the vermillion border of the right upper lip’ as you have previously received common law damages pertaining to this injury and its resulting impairment’. At the time of seeking Supreme Court action against Dr Patel, I was NOT advised that this action would prevent me from claiming compensation from DVA in the future.
I seek to have compensation (in particular future treatment) awarded by DVA for my condition. I am fully prepared to repay the civil damages awarded in 2003.
LEGISLATION AND COMMON LAW
The Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Defence-Related Claims) Act
Section 6A of the Act relevantly provides that:
2If, at any time, whether before, on, or after, 1 December 1988:
(a) an employee to whom this section applies received or receives medical treatment paid for by the Commonwealth; and
(b)as an unintended consequence of that treatment the person suffered or suffers an injury;
the injury to the employee is taken to have arisen out of, or in the course of, the person’s employment, whether or not the person has remained an employee to whom this section applies.
Section 48 of the Act provides that compensation for an injury suffered by an employee is not payable by the Commonwealth where damages have already been recovered for that injury. The relevant parts of this provision are as follows:
1This section applies where:
(a)an employee recovers damages in respect of an injury to the employee…being an injury, loss or damage in respect of which compensation is payable under this Act; or
…
4Compensation is not payable under this Act to the employee in respect of the injury, loss or damage…after the date on which the damages were recovered by the employee…
The AAT Act
Section 42B(1) of the AAT Act provides the Tribunal with power to dismiss an application as follows:
The Tribunal may dismiss an application for the review of a decision, at any stage of the proceeding, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the application:
(a)is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or
(b)has no reasonable prospect of success; or
(c)is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Tribunal.
The current form of section 42B(1) of the AAT Act commenced following amendments made by the Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth). The power of the Tribunal to dismiss an application was expanded, including to circumstances where an application has no reasonable prospect of success. In this regard, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Tribunals Amalgamation Bill 2014 (at para 552) explained that:
This amendment would modernise the language of existing paragraph 42B(1)(a) and clarify the policy surrounding the grounds for dismissal. The proposed new grounds are similar to dismissal powers available to other bodies. For example Rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 allow for summary judgment on matters which have no reasonable prospect of success, or are an abuse of process. Similarly, section 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 provides for dismissal of applications where the application is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance or otherwise an abuse of process. These powers would provide the Tribunal with greater power to dismiss unmeritorious matters early where appropriate.
Prior to the 2015 amendment to section 42B(1) of the AAT Act, the power to dismiss an application was limited to circumstances where the Tribunal was satisfied that an application was ‘frivolous or vexatious’. As the Tribunal recently observed in Oliver and Comcare [2018] AATA 1964 at [67], the power conferred by section 42B provides the Tribunal with more extensive power to dismiss an application than it had prior to the amendment to that provision.
Application of dismissal power
In Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60, the Federal Court of Australia considered the scope of the equivalent power to dismiss in section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, which provides for summary judgment where ‘the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect’ of either successfully prosecuting or successfully defending the proceeding. The Tribunal sets out their Honours’ views on the effect of the dismissal power provision under the Federal Court of Australia Act in circumstances where the Tribunal’s now expanded dismissal power was cited in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Tribunals Amalgamation Bill 2014 as being ‘similar’ to the Federal Court’s summary judgment provision. In Jefferson Ford, Finkelstein J stated that:
the section requires the judge to conduct what might loosely be described as a preliminary trial and look more closely than he would under an O 14 application to a party’s assertion that there is a real question of law or fact to be decided. Such an assertion is to be examined with a critical eye. The judge is to decide whether the opposing party has evidence of sufficient quality and weight to be able to succeed at trial. There will be cases where the asserted facts appear to be so improbable that there is no point in allowing them to go to trial.[1]
[1] Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60 at [23].
Rares J noted that:
if Jefferson Ford is able to establish that there was a real issue of fact or a real issue of law capable of being decided in its favour then, subject to the Court’s discretion to determine the question of law, the matter ought to be allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way. [2]
[2] ibid at [74].
Finally, Gordon J asserted that:
Section 31A is a provision which permits, and assists, the Court to manage proceedings and therefore assists in controlling the cost of, and delays in, resolving proceedings by summarily dismissing claims which have no reasonable prospect of success. At the same time, it is a provision that ensures that no injustice is done to a party. The mechanism adopted to achieve these objectives is that before judgment is entered, the claim or part of the claim must have “no reasonable prospect of success.” [3]
[3] ibid at [125].
In Filsell and Comcare [2009] AATA 90, the Tribunal noted the following when setting out the principles that should be followed by the Tribunal in relation to applications for dismissal under the previous terms of section 42B of the AAT Act:[4]
if proceedings have no reasonable prospect at all of success, they should be dismissed under s 42B, since it would be futile for the proceedings to continue, and inappropriate to use the time and resources of this tribunal, and to put the respondent to the expense that would be involved in the matter proceeding to a hearing.
[4] Filsell v Comcare (2009) 109 ALD 198, [33], cited in Paraponiaris and Secretary, Department of Employment (2015) 68 AAR 143, [33] (Paraponiaris).
The Tribunal in Paraponiaris and Secretary, Department of Employment (2015) 68 AAR 143, considered the then new ‘no reasonable prospect of success’ ground for dismissal and stated that:
The exercise of the Tribunal’s power to dismiss proceedings under s 42B, being a power to dismiss a proceeding summarily, “must always be attended with caution” and “is not to be exercised lightly” (Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) CLR 118 at [24], [60]; see also Re Williams and Australian Electoral Commission [1995] AATA 160; (1995) 38 ALD 366 at 372), as ordinarily a party ought not be denied the opportunity to put their case and have it heard in the usual way; the expression “no reasonable prospect” prescribes a standard describing “a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to [hearing] in the ordinary way” (Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; (2000) 201 CLR 552 at [57], cited with approval in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256 at [46]).
The requirement that the Tribunal be satisfied that the application “has no reasonable prospect of success” necessarily involves a consideration of the merits in the sense that it requires a finding that the application lacks any prospect of success which can properly be said to meet the standard of being a reasonable one (see Duncan v Fayle [2004] FCA 723; (2004) 138 FCR 510 at [22] per French J). The Tribunal’s discretion to dismiss an application for review under s 42B(1) of the AAT Act is enlivened in circumstances where the Tribunal forms the view that the application, upon a practical judgment as to the expected ultimate outcome of the proceeding, suffers from the requisite deficiency described in s 42B(1)(b), which will depend upon the nature of the issues raised by the application, particularly whether the case involves resolution of issues of fact, law or both (Spencer at [25]-[26]).
In Australian Tertiary Academy Pty Ltd and Australian Skills Quality Authority [2017] AATA 480, the Tribunal said:
The power under s 42B is not exercised lightly. Its exercise denies the applicant the opportunity to put its case at a hearing where all of its evidence and submissions might be considered de novo. Where the application for dismissal relies on s 42B(1)(b), the Tribunal will need to be confident it can make any necessary findings of fact on the basis of the material before it that is not seriously contested. (It may not be necessary to make findings of fact in some circumstances: for example, where the applicant is unable to succeed as a matter of law.) It will also need to be confident that material which has not yet been adduced would not change the outcome. Ultimately, the Tribunal should be satisfied it is not appropriate to wait for a final hearing because there are no reasonable prospects of success.
The Tribunal has also recently stated that the exercise of the dismissal power under section 42B of the AAT Act does not require an application to be ‘hopeless’, ‘bound to fail’, or ‘meritless’.[5]
CONTENTIONS
[5] Complete Training Institute Pty Ltd and Australian Skills Quality Authority [2018] AATA 4638 at [44].
The Applicant’s Contentions
Ms Evans concedes that: ‘in accordance with s 48(4) of the Act, I am barred from receiving compensation under the Act as I have received damages through my Supreme court action’ (Paragraph 14, Applicant’s Statement).
However, Ms Evans contends that ‘had I been made aware by the Department of Defence that my civil action would make me ineligible to compensation in the future from DVA, I would NOT have proceeded with my civil action’ (Paragraph 15, Applicant’s Statement). In this regard, Ms Evans asserts that she is ‘the victim of Defective Administration by the Department of Defence’ (Paragraph 16, Applicant’s Statement). To this end, in a Statutory Declaration made on 10 January 2019, Ms Evans states that:
I initially addressed the surgical error by Dr Patel with the Senior Medical Officer at the Defence Canberra Medical Centre (CAMU) in 2004 and was advised that this was out of their hands and it was best that I pursue this matter civilly. At no stage during the redress process with CAMU did the Senior Medical Officer or medical staff advise me to lodge a claim with DVA regarding the surgical error, nor did they advise me that, by pursuing this matter through the civilian courts, it would prevent me from receiving any future compensation (treatment) from DVA for the surgical error.
In the Applicant’s Statement, Ms Evans listed the following issues for determination by the Tribunal:
(a)whether I suffered an injury whilst serving in the Army,
(b)whether, under normal circumstances, I would have been eligible for compensation under SRCA [the Act] for an ACCEPTED condition, and
(c)whether, during the process of my Supreme court action in 2003, I was subject to defective administration because I was NOT advised that my action would prevent me from seeking compensation from DVA in the future.
The Respondent’s Contentions
The Respondent concedes that Ms Evans suffered an injury on 17 January 2001, being ‘transverse scar with sensory loss along the vermillion border of the right upper lip’, as a result of the surgery performed on that date by Dr Patel (Paragraph 23 of the Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions of the Respondent, (Respondent’s Statement)).
The Respondent also concedes that, pursuant to section 6A of the Act, the ailment can be characterised as an unintended consequence of the surgery because the outcome, being the accepted injury, was not desired or aimed for when Ms Evans underwent the surgery (Paragraph 24 of the Respondent’s Statement).
The Respondent further concedes that, pursuant to section 6A of the Act, Ms Evans satisfies the requisite causal connection between her accepted injury and her employment. The Respondent accepts liability under section 14 of Act in respect of that injury (Paragraph 25 of the Respondent’s Statement).
However, the Respondent contends that section 48(4) of the Act applies, with the effect that Ms Evans is barred from receiving any compensation under the Act, specifically sections 16, 19, 24 and 27[6], because she received common law damages in 2003. The Respondent asserts that section 48(4) of the Act applies because Ms Evans’ injury for which she is seeking compensation, pursuant to her application before the Tribunal, is the same injury for which she previously recovered damages such that she cannot now receive compensation for that injury (Paragraph 26 of the Respondent’s Statement).
CONSIDERATION
[6] For completeness, the Tribunal notes that these provisions of the Act relate to compensation in respect of: medical expenses (section 16); injuries resulting in incapacity (section 19); injuries resulting in permanent impairment (section 24); and non-economic loss (section 27).
Did Ms Evans suffer the claimed injury?
The Respondent accepted in its determination on 3 December 2018 that Ms Evans suffered the claimed injury, being ‘transverse scar with sensory loss along the vermillion border of the right upper lip’, on 17 January 2001 as a result of the surgery performed on that date by Dr Patel. The Tribunal agrees with the Respondent’s decision in relation to the acceptance of Ms Evans’ injury.
Payment of Compensation
Also in its determination dated 3 December 2018, the Respondent accepted liability under section 14 of Act in respect of Ms Evans’ injury. The Tribunal also agrees with the Respondent’s decision in relation to its acceptance of liability. Without the intervening effect of section 48(4) of the Act, the Commonwealth would be liable to pay compensation in relation to that injury pursuant to section 14 of the Act.
Effect of section 48(4) of the Act
The effect of section 48(4) of the Act is that Ms Evans is not entitled to compensation under the Act for her accepted injury because she has previously received a payment of common law damages for that injury.
Relevantly for the Tribunal’s determination of the application for dismissal brought by the Respondent, Ms Evans concedes that she is barred from any further compensation under the Act as a result of section 48(4) of the Act (Paragraph 14 of the Applicant’s Statement).
Claim of Defective Administration
Because of the effect of section 48(4) of the Act on Ms Evans’ application, and based on her contentions regarding the events surrounding her common law damages claim, Ms Evans’ remaining complaint is the alleged defective administration by Defence.
The fundamental problem with bringing before the Tribunal a claim of defective administration is that the Tribunal does not have the requisite legislative authority to hear and determine any such claim. In this regard, the Tribunal neither considers nor makes any findings in relation to that claim in these reasons for decision.
At the directions hearing on 10 July 2019, the Tribunal informed Ms Evans’ representative of the appropriate avenue to pursue her claim against Defence, being through the Scheme for Compensation for Defective Administration (CDDA Scheme), which:
provides a mechanism for non-corporate Commonwealth entities (NCEs) to compensate persons who have experienced detriment as a result of a NCE’s defective actions or inaction.
The CDDA Scheme is discretionary as well as permissive. It does not oblige the decision-maker to approve a payment in any particular case.
Claims under the CDDA Scheme are managed and investigated by the NCE which is alleged to have been defective.
…
Portfolio Ministers have responsibility for decisions made under the CDDA Scheme. Ministers may also authorise departmental officers to make decisions.[7]
[7] Department of Finance, The Scheme for Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration (the CDDA Scheme) (Web page, 27 November 2018), accessed 23 July 2019.
Application for dismissal
The substantive hearing of Ms Evans’ application for review was scheduled to be held on 29 July 2019. At the pre-hearing directions hearing on 10 July 2019, the Respondent sought dismissal of Ms Evans’ application under section 42B(1) of the AAT Act on the basis that the application is misconceived because no better outcome can be achieved by her before the Tribunal and it would therefore be futile to continue to a hearing of that application.
Having regard to the parties’ position in relation to Ms Evans’ accepted injury, the effect of section 48(4) of the Act and the claim of defective administration, the only relevant consideration for the Tribunal was whether to dismiss the application before holding the substantive hearing because it had no reasonable prospect of success.
The Tribunal’s power to dismiss an application is not to be exercised lightly. In relation to Ms Evans’ application, there is no real question or issue of either fact or law to consider and determine having regard to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The application sought compensation for Ms Evans’ accepted injury. However, any compensation for that injury is not payable by the Commonwealth because of the operation of section 48(4) of the Act.
The application of section 48(4) of the Act is such that Ms Evans cannot now receive compensation for her accepted injury because it is the same injury for which she has previously recovered an award of damages. The effect of this provision is understood and accepted by Ms Evans. As a matter of law, Ms Evans’ application cannot succeed. The Tribunal therefore determined that it would be futile for Ms Evans’ application to be allowed to continue to a substantive hearing in circumstances where it had no reasonable prospect of success.
DECISION
The Tribunal, being satisfied that the application for review has no reasonable prospect of success, dismisses the application pursuant to section 42B(1)(b) of the AAT Act.
I certify that the preceding 53 (fifty-three) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Member W Frost.
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Associate
Dated: 29 July 2019
Date(s) of hearing: 10 July 2019 Representative for the Applicant: Mr Arnie Vereschildt, Veterans Support Centre Woden RSL Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr Tony Giugni, Australian Government Solicitor
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